The Constitutional History of England by Maitland, Frederic William
THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 
A  COURSE OF LECTURES 
DELIVERED BY 
F.  W.  MAITLAND First Edition 1908 
PREFACE 
dcI  have  written  a  course  of  lectures  in  six  months  on 
Constitutional History.  Do I publish it? No."  The lectures 
written  in  six  months,  which  Professor  Maitland  told  the 
Cambridge Law Club would not be published, were delivered 
during  the Michaelmas  term  of  1887 and the Lent term  of 
1888, and were  specially  designed  for  the  needs  of  under- 
graduates of  the University  of  Cambridge  reading  for  the 
Law Tripos.  The last word of the last lecture was written on 
April 7, 1888. 
Let us observe the date.  Maitland had been  recalled  to 
Cambridge as Reader in  English Law in  1883 and this is one 
of  his early courses of  academic  lectures delivered  before  his 
election to the Downing Chair in the summer of 1888.  It was 
written  seven years  before the appearance of  the History of 
English Law, nine years before Domesday Book and Beyond, 
ten years before Township and Borough, twelve years before 
the Introduction to Gierke's Political Theovies of  the Middle 
Ages.  From  internal evidence  it  would  seem  that some of 
the  earlier  lectures  were composed  before the completion of 
Bracton's Note Book in 1887.  Much  of  the ground which  is 
here  covered was  afterwards  traversed with  greater delibera- 
tion  and more  elaborate scrutiny; some part  of  the journey 
Maitland had never the leisure to retrace.  Yet the student of 
his  work  will  find  in  these  early  discourses  many  of  the Preface  vi i 
seminal  ideas  which  were  subsequently  developed  in  the 
History of  English Law, and here, as elsewhere, will  admire 
the union  of  high speculative power with  exact and compre- 
hensive  knowledge  of  detail.  This  volume  then  is  not  a 
specimen of  Maitland's  polished  and  mature work;  it  does 
not claim to be based upon original research; for much of  his 
information the Reader of  English Law was confessedly con- 
tent to draw upon  the classical  text-books, Hallam, Stubbs, 
Dicey, Anson, the study of  which he frequently commends to 
the attention  of his  audience.  Yet although the manuscript 
was laid aside, and the larger theme was  abandoned for more 
special researches into medieval  law, the author would  some- 
times admit that, did time allow, the course of  lectures upon 
Constitutional  History  might  be  worked  up  into  a  shape 
worthy  of  publication. 
There is much to be said against printing work which was 
not intended for the press, and I should not have ventured to 
recommend  the  publication  of  these  lectures but  for  three 
compelling  reasons.  The first  is  that  the lectures  cannot 
detract from Maitland's reputation; but must, on the contrary, 
if  possible, enhance it, showing, as they do, that the profound 
student was  also  a brilliant  populariser  of  knowledge.  The 
second  is  that the lectures  contain  several new and original 
ideas, which Maitland had no opportunity of expressing in  his 
later work and which we cannot afford to lose.  The third is 
that  there  is  no book,  to my knowledge, which  provides  so 
good an introduction  to the study of  English Constitutional 
History or which is likely to be more highly valued by practical 
teachers of the subject at our Universities.  I can vouch good 
and lawful men to warranty.  Professor Dicey, Sir Courtenay 
Ilbert and  Mr  C. R. L.  Fletcher were  kind  enough  to look 
over the manuscript and concurred in urging its publication. 
The editor's part has been  insignificant.  The lectures are 
printed as they were delivered, and there has been no attempt 
to rewrite, expand or compress wherever  the manuscript was 
fairly written  out.  In a few  places  however the manuscript 
took the form of  brief  notes which have been expanded with 
as strict an economy of  words as is  consistent with grammar. 
In  one  place  the substance of  a  missing  page was  happily 
recovered  from  notebooks  kindly  lent  to  the  editor  by  Dr 
Pierce Higgins of Downing College and Mr A. H. Chaytor of 
Clare College.  For the references and remarks in  the foot- 
notes the editor is  responsible, save where they  are followed 
by the initials of the author.  The references to the Statutes 
have been verified. 
Help  has  been  generously  given  by  many  friends,  in 
particular by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, who has contributed many 
valuable suggestions with reference to the last  section  of  the 
volume.  The editor  will  be  grateful  to his  readers  for  any 
further suggestions by ineans of which a second edition of the 
book,  should  one  be  called  for,  may  be  made  more  fully 
worthy  of  the author and the subject. 
H.  A.  L.  FISHER. 
NEW COLLEGE,  OXFORD. 
May  198. Outline of the  course.  Sketch of public law at five periods, 
(I) 1307, (11)  I 509, (111)  1625, (IV) 1702, (V) the  present day. 
Reasons for this choice of periods.  The  first and last sketches 
will be the most thorough. 
PERIOD  I. 
ENGLISH  PUBLIC  LAW  AT  THE  DEATH  OF EDWARD  I. 
A.  General  Characteristics of  English  Law and  Reviezo  of 
Legislation. 
(i)  Before  1066.  Dooms of  the kings and witan ;  substratum of 
traditional law (folk right) ;  local customs ;  theory of  the three laws, 
West Saxon, Mercian, Danish ;  formalism of traditional law ;  Roman 
law unknown ;  influence of  the church ;  characteristics of the dooms 
Pages 1-6 
(ii)  1066-1  154.  What  law  had  the  Normans?  Survival  of 
English law ;  confirmations by William I and Henry I.  Law books : 
Leges  Edwardi,  H/iIlelmi,  Henrici  Primi;  fusion  of  English  and 
Norman  (Frankish)  law.  Genuine  laws  of  William  I; charters  of 
Henry I and Stephen ; Domesday  Book  .  6-10 
(iii)  1154-1215.  Henry 11  as a  legislator;  Constitutions of 
Clarendon  (I  164) ; growth  of  Canon  law;  study  of  Roman  law; 
'  assizes ' ;  possessory assizes and grand assize ; assizes of  Clarendon 
(I  166) and Northampton (I  I 76).  Law books : Glanvill (circ. I 188) ; 
Dialogus de  Scaccario ;  the first Plea Roll (I  194)  .  .  10-14 
' Printed  copies  of  this  analysis  or  syllabus  were  supplied  to  those  who 
attended the course of  lectures.  A few sllght changes have been made, where the 
order  of  topics  in the lectures  does not  correspond  w~th  that  laid down  in  the 
analysis. (iv)  1215-1272.  The Charter : various editions,  1215,  1216, 
12 I 7,  1225 ; its  chardcter ; beginning  of  statute book ;  Statute  of 
Merton (1236), of  Marlborough (1267) ;  the Barons' war.  Study of 
jurisprudence : Bracton  (ob  I 268) ;  Roman law and  English '  case 
law ' ;  evolution of con~mon  law  .  .  14-18 
(v)  I 272-1307.  '  The English Justinian.'  The great statutes, 
I 275  Westminster  I,  1278  Gloucester,  I 284  Wales,  1285  West- 
minster I1 and Winchester,  1290 Westminster 111, 1297 Conjrnzatio 
Cartaruwz ;  their character and permanent  importance.  Edward as 
an administrator.  Law books : Britton, Fleta.  The first Year Book, 
1292.  Check on growth  of  unenacted  law.  Roman  law  ceases  to 
be studied.  Growth of class of  lawyers.  'Common law,' contrasted 
with statute, local custom, ecclesiastical law ;  not yet with  'equity ' 
18-23 
B.  The  Land Law. 
Reasons for starting with land law  .  .  23-24 
Theory  of  tenure.  Subinfeudation :  stopped  by  Statute  of 
\Irestminster I1 ;  the feudal formula A  tenet  terranz de B.  Tenure 
and  service.  Classification  of  tenures :  (I)  frank  almoign ; (2) 
knight's  service ; the  knight's  fee ; homage,  fealty ; aids,  reliefs, 
prilner  seisin,  wardship,  marriage,  fines  on  alienation,  escheat ; 
(3) grand serjeanty; (4) petty  serjeanty ; (5) free socage;  incidents 
of socage tenure ;  (Note, classification of  tenures not  a  classification 
of  lands; the  same land  may  be  held  by  several  tenures.  Note 
military service done only in the king's army ;)  (6) villeinage ;  villein 
status and villein tenure ;  tenencenturn no12  vtutat statunz .  24-35 
Definition  of freehold ;  li6er.um tener~zentum  opposed  to villanunt 
tenemzntul~c  ; afterwards  also  to  chattel  interests.  Treatment  of 
chattels;  testamentary  causes  go  to  court  christian;  no  wills  of 
freehold ; primogeniture,  its gradual  spread. 
[The  manor  and its courts; court  baron and customary  court; 
who  were  the judges?  I-Tad  every  manor  freeholders?  No  more 
manors  to be  created  (rzgo).] 
Feudal ideal;-no  connection between  lord  and vassal's  vassal; 
this ideal to be had in mind that we  may see how far it is realized 
35-39 
C.  Divisions  of  the  Realm  and Local Goz~er~lntent. 
(i)  The shire ;  its history ;  shire moot ; ealdorman ;  sheriff;  the 
Norman  earl  (comes)  and  Norman  sheriff  (z~iceconres).  The county 
court  (shire  moot)  not  feudalized;  its  constitution;  its  political 
importance ; quasi-corporate character  of county ; acts as a  whole 
for many purposes ;  election of coroners (I  194) ;  struggle for elective 
sheriffs ; the county (court) represented in parliament  .  39 -44 
(ii)  The hundred ;  its history,  hundred moot : quasi-corporate 
character  of  the  hundred;  its  duties;  represented  in  the  eyres  by 
jurors.  Hundreds in private hands ;  the court leet and the sheriffs 
turn ;  the serjeant of  the hundred .  .  .  44-46 
(iii)  The vill  or township;  its duties;  represented  in  the eyre 
by  reeve  and four  men;  election  of  the  reeve.  Relation  of the 
township  to the manor  .  .  47-52 
(iv)  The boroughs; each borough has its own history, generali~a- 
tion difficult.  Privileges of boroughs may be brought  under  several 
heads : (a) immunities ;  (6) courts of their own, like hundred-courts ; 
(c)  elective officers, baillivi, prmpositi;  (d)  collection  of  royal  dues, 
thejma  burgi;  (e) guilds.  The city of London.  The notion of  a 
corporation (juristic person)  not  yet  formed; but the greater  towns 
have what are afterwards regarded as the powers of  corporatiolls 
52-54 
D.  Central  Goz)ernme~ct. 
Retrospect :- 
(1)  Before  1066.  King  and  witan;  actual  composition  of 
witenagemot;  theory  that  it  had  been  a  folk  moot;  the  bishop; 
the  ealdorman ; the  thane  (minuter  regis).  Tendency  to\\  ards 
feudalism.  I'owers  of  this  assembly ; election  and  deposition  of 
kings, appointment of  officers, legislation, judicature, etc. ;  but  really 
there is little central government.  Kingship increases in  splendour : 
but rather in splendour than in power  .  .  54-60 
(ii)  1066-1154.  Title to the kingship ; practical  despotism of 
Norman kings; tradition of  counsel  and consent maintained.  The 
Cz~ria  Regis, how far formed on feudal lines ;  number of  tenants in 
chief; suit of  court a burden.  The ct~ria  Regis in a narrower sense ; 
the administrati~e  body; the officers of  state, justiciar,  chancellor; 
the exchequer and its routine  .  .  60-64 
(iii)  I 154-1  2 16.  Definition  in  Charter  (I  2 15)  of  commz~ne 
cotlsiliunz  regni.  Who  were  the 6lzrones  nzajores  and  what  was  a 
baronia?  Line  of  demarcation gradually  drawn  among tenants  in 
chief.  Assemblies  under  Henry  11;  consent  to  legislation  and 
taxation.  The administrative and judicial  body ;  professiona! judges 
under Henry I1 ;  itinerant judges ;  the barons of the exchequer .  .  . 
Xlll 
(iv)  1216-1295.  Changes in the Charter.  Growth of  repre- 
sentation;  parliament  of  1254; later parliaments;  events of  1261, 
I 264, I 265 ;  doubts as to constitution of later parliaments ;  parliament 
of  I 295 becomes a model  .  69-75 
Constitution of  parliament of three estates. 
(I)  Clergy:  the  bishops,  their  two-fold  title;  abbots;  the 
inferior  clergy ; praemunientes  clause ; parliament  and  the  con- 
vocations  .  75-78 
(2)  Ba~onage  :  difficulties created by demand for a strict theory ; 
tenure by  barony and barony by  tenure;  barony  by  writ;  a  distinct 
theory  of  hereditary right  supersedes a  vaguer  theory  of  right  by 
tenure.  Judges and other councillors summoned ;  their position 
78-84 
(3)  Commons:  communes  and comtnunae ; the  electors  in  the 
shire; representation  of  the county court; the boroughs;  demesne 
and other boroughs ;  the electors in the boroughs ;  non-representation 
of the palatinates  .  .  .  85-90 
Magna  Concilia as contrasted with Parliaments : specification  of 
terms  .  90 
The  Co~zcilium  Regis;  growth  during  minority  of  Henry  I11 ; 
relation  of  council  to  parliament,  as yet  undefined. 
I.  Legislation ;  in  parliament, in  a  Mapzsm  ConciZium, in  the 
permanent  council.  Line  between  statute  and  ordinance  slowly 
drawn. 
2.  Taxation ;  sources of royal revenue, profits of demesne lands, 
feudal dues,  profits  of justice,  sale of  privileges  and offices,  eccle- 
siastical  dues,  tallage  of  demesne  lands,  customs;  extraordinary 
revenue,  Danegeld, carucage, taxes on movables.  Consent necessary 
to  taxation;  charter  of  1215 ; practice  under  Henry  I11  and 
Edward  I ; crisis  of  I 297 ; the  Con.rmatio  Cartarum  and  De 
Tallagio  ?ton co?~cedendo  .  .  91-96 
The kingship ; becoming  hereditary ; coronation  oaths.  'The 
king can  do no wrong ':-meaning  of  this.  Theory of  kingship  in 
Bracton;  the right  to revolt.  Modern  notion  of  'sovereignty'  in- 
applicable;  denied  by  current doctrine  of  church  and state.  The 
king as a legislator ;  Glanvill and Bracton  on  Quod prifzc$i  placuit, 
etc.  Legislation  by  means  of  new  writs;  can  the king  make new 
writs ?-a  limit set to this power  .  97-105 
E.  Administration  of  Justice. 
The courts are (I)  communal,  (2) feudal,  (3) royal, central and 
permanent,  (4) royal,  local  and temporary  (visitatorial),  (5)  eccle- 
siastical.  General principles as to their competence. 
The king's  court  to start  with,  (a) a  court of  last  resort  when 
justice  denied, (6)  a  court  for  the  tenants in chief,  (c) a  court  for 
pleas of the crown  .  .  105-107 
Growth of  royal jurisdiction :- 
(i)  Criminal.  Pleas of the crown; in  Canute's  laws;  in Leges 
Henrici Phi;  gradual extension by means of the ideas of (a) king's 
peace,  (6) felony.  The appeal and indictment  .  .  107-111 
(ii)  Civil.  Lines of  progress,  (I) evocation of  causes pod  nisi 
feceris,  etc. ; (2)  no  one  need  answer  for  freehold  without  writ; 
(3) royal  procedure  of  grand  assize;  (4)  royal  possessory  assizes ; 
(5)  writs  of  praeczpe ; contempt  of  king's  writ ; (6) king's  peace ; 
action  of  trespass.  The king's  court  offers advantages  to suitors, 
e.g. trial by jury  .  .  .  .  111-11s 
History  of  procedure.  Archaic  procedure ; proof  comes  after 
judgment and is an appeal to the supernatural :  oaths ;  compurgation ; 
formal witness  procedure ;  ordeals ;  (after  Conquest) battle.  Germ 
of jury-trial not to be found in England ;  but in prerogative procedure 
of  Frankish  kings;  the  Frankish  inpuisitio ; trial  by  the  oath  of 
presumably  impartial neighbour-witnesses ;  introduced into  England 
as  a  royal  privilege;  Domesday  book.  Generalization  of  inquest 
procedure  under  Henry  I1 ; regale  henejcium ; (I) grand  assize, 
(2) possessory assizes, (3) the jurata in civil cases, (4) the accusing 
jury  (connexion  with  Ethelred's  law  disputed),  (5)  the jurata  in 
appeals and indictments; peine forte  el dure.  Jurors still  witnesses 
at end of  thirteenth  century.  Local courts never  attain to trial  by 
jury  .  .  115-132 
The courts  in  the time  of  Edward  I.  Work  of  (a) communal, 
(6)  feudal  courts,  rapidly  diminishing : Statute  of  Gloucester.  (c) 
The king's central court has divided itself; extinction of  the justiciar- 
ship; (i) king's bench, (ii) common pleas, (iii) exchequer, (iv) king in 
parliament, (v) king in council.  History of the (a')  visitatorial courts; 
justices in eyre ;  the more  modern commissions,  (I) assize,  (2) gaol 
delivery, (3) oyer et termirrer  .  .  132-141 xiv 
F.  Retrospect  of  Feudalism.  PERIOD  11. 
Notion  of  a 'feudal  system,'  as a  system  of  European  common 
law introduced by Spelman, popularized by Wright and Blackstone ; 
an  early  effort  of  comparative  jurisprudence;  it  is  valuable,  but 
differences  between  various  countries  are great  and should  not  be 
overlooked  .  .  141-143 
Attempts  to define  feudalism.  How  far  was  the  feudal  idea 
realised  in  England ? 
Tendency towards feudalism in Anglo-Saxon law; the territorializa- 
tion of legal relationships ;  its economic causes.  (I) The thegnage ; 
the thegn as a landowner;  military  duty and land-owning; folkland 
becoming  terra Regis.  (2)  The duty of  having  a lord imposed by 
the state.  (3) Grants of  jurisdiction.  (4)  Dependent landowners ; 
villeinage  .  .  143-151 
Feudalism  in  the Frank  Empire;  benejcium and feoakm;  the 
breaking up of  the dominiunz.  Jurisdiction  in private  hands.  The 
kingprimus interpares.  Relation of  the Duke of  Normandy to the 
king of the French. 
In what  sense  William  introduced  feudalism.  The theory  of 
tenure : all land brought within it ;  a quiet assumption  feudal tenure 
not  the mark  of  a  noble  or  military  class.  So far as feudalism  is 
mere private law England is the most feudalised of all countries 
152-158 
Gradual development of  doctrine of  military service by means of 
particular  bargains;  not  completed  until  scutage  is  imposed  and 
feudalism  is  on the wane.  Elaboration  of  'incidents of  tenure' is 
also gradual ;  burdens of  wardship and marriage  unusually  heavy  in 
England. 
But  political  influence  of  feudalism  is  from  the  first  limited. 
(I) Oath of  allegiance exacted.  (2) Man  never  bound  by  law  to 
fight for any but the king;  private war never  legal.  (3)  Duty of  all 
to serve in army irrespective of  tenure is maintained.  (4) Taxation 
not  limited  by  feudalism.  (5)  Feudal  justice  has  but  a  narrow 
sphere; communal courts  retained and not feudalised.  (6) King's 
court and council not definitely feudalised  .  .  158-164 
SKETCH OF  PUBLIC  LAW  AT  THE  DEATH  OF HENRY  VII. 
I.  Its  Constitution. 
History  of  the three  estates. 
(i)  Clergy :-bishops,  abbots;  non-attendance  of  clerical 
proctors. 
(ii)  Lords :-the  dukes,  marquises,  viscounts.  Peerage  by 
patent and peerage  by writ.  Barony by tenure.  Number  of  peers. 
Idea of  'peerage';  right to trial by peers admitted, but within narrow 
limits.  Court  of  the  High  Steward.  The  peerage  not  a  caste. 
Preponderance in the House of Lords of lords spiritual. 
(iii)  Commons :-Number  of members.  The county franchise ; 
the forty shilling freehold.  Number of  boroughs represented.  The 
borough franchises.  Wages of members. 
Arrangement  of  Parliament  in  two  houses;  when  effected. 
Functions  of the two  houses.  Wording  of  the writs  .  165-177 
2.  Frequency  and  Duration  of  Parliaments. 
Annual Parliaments.  Statutes of 1330 and 1362.  Intermissions 
of  Parliaments become commoner under Edward IV  .  177-178 
3.  Business  of  Parliament. 
We  must  not  start with  a  theory  of  parliamentary  sovereignty; 
such a theory the outcome of struggles .  .  I79 
(i)  Taxation :-here  the  need  of  Parliaments  is  established. 
Direct  taxation without  consent of  Parliament becomes impossible. 
History of indirect taxation.  Benevolences.  Parliamentary taxation; 
taxation  of  clerical  estate.  Money  grants  to  be  initiated  by  the 
Commons:  form  of  grants.  Tonnage and poundage.  Wealth  of 
Henry VII.  Change in  the king's  financial position.  Purveyance 
and preemption.  Audit of accounts and appropriation of supplies 
179-184 
(ii)  Legislation.  Changes in  the legislative  formula.  Original 
equality  of  commons and clergy.  Declaration  of  1322.  Gradual 
coordination  of  lords and commons.  Mapa conn7ia.  Legislation 
by  the king's  Council ;  ordaining and dispensing  powers.  Forms of 
bill  and  statute.  Royal  dissent.  Growing  bulk  of  statute  law: 
character of  the statutes  .  .  184-190 xvi  Analysis 
D.  General  Characteristics  of  English  Law. 
B.  The  King and his  Council. 
The king's title : events of  1327 and 1399.  Title of  Henry IV, 
Edward VI and Henry VII.  Legitimism of the Yorkists  190-195 
His powers  or  'prerogatives':  their wide  and indefinite  extent. 
The character of  the kingship varies with the character of  the king ; 
but law varies little.  Thus the (so-called) 'New  Monarchy'  is  intro- 
duced without  change in  the law.  Fortescue's  theory of  the king- 
ship  .  -  195-199 
The Council : its constitution ;  its constantly changing character. 
Royal  minorities  and  regencies.  The  Council  as  a  council  of 
regency.  Under Edward  IV and Henry VII it  becomes  strong as 
against  the  people,  weak  as against  the  king.  The king's  seals; 
'  ministerial responsibility.'  Functions of the Council  .  199-203 
C.  Administration  of lustice. 
Decay  of  feudal  and  comnlunal  courts.  The justices  of  the 
peace ; their  history ; their  ever-growing  powers ; summary  penal 
jurisdiction ; their  connexion  with  the council.  The  three  courts 
of common  law.  The commissions  of  assize, etc.  The nisi  prius 
system.  Trial by jury;  changes in its character ;  in  civil cases ;  in 
criminal cases ;  grand and petty juries ;  peine forte  et dare.  Appeals 
and indictments.  Fortescue on the jury  .  .  204-213 
Jurisdiction  of  the Parliament  (i.e.  for this  purpose,  House of 
Lords) :-(i)  trial  of  peers,  (ii)  writs  of  error,  (iii)  impeachments. 
Contrast  between  impeachments  and  acts  of  attainder;  early 
instances  .  .  213-216 
Jurisdiction  of  the Cauncil,  (I)  as  courts  of  error,-this  sup- 
pressed;  (2)  as a  criminal  tribunal  of  first  instance;  statutes and 
petitions against it; gradual acquiescence of Parliament;  jurisdiction 
of Council acknowledged  by statute ;  question as to the legality of 
the jurisdiction;  the Act  of  1487.  (3)  Jurisdiction  of  Council in 
civil cases;  growth of the Court of Chancery  .  .  216--221 
The chancellor  and his powers.  Petitions to the king  for  civil 
relief  referred  to  the  chancellor.  He is  warned  off  the  field  of 
common  law;  but  acquires an  'equitable' jurisdiction.  Nature  of 
Equity;  becomes a supplemental system of law  .  .  221-226 
Common Law; its conservatism ;  its development under Edward IV 
and Henry VII ;  new forms of action.  Text books and reports. 
Statute  law;  characteristics  of  medieval  statutes;  growth  of 
economic legislation. 
Remarks on criminal procedure.  History of the law of treason 
226-236 
PERIOD  111. 
SKETCH  OF PUBLIC  LAW  AT  THE  DEATH  OF  JAMES  I. 
A.  Parliament. 
I.  Constitution  of  Parliament. 
(i)  House of Lords.  Disappearance of the abbots ;  legislation 
as to the appointment of,bishops.  Number of temporal lords. 
(ii)  House of  Commons.  Number  of  members.  Creation of 
new boroughs. 
The clergy have practically ceased to,be an estate of  the realm; 
taxes still voted in convocation, though confirmed by  statute 
237-240 
2.  Przvileges of Parliammt. 
'  Privilege ' now an important topic. 
(a)  Freedom of debate ;  Haxey's  case ;  Thorpe's  case ;  Strode's 
case;  Strickland's  case;  Wentworth's  case;  Elizabeth's  views  and 
James's ;  events of 162  I. 
(6)  Freedom from arrest; statute of 1433; Ferrer's case; Shirley's 
case ;  statute of  1604. 
(c)  Punishment  for  contempt;  cases  of  Storie,  Parry,  Bland, 
Floyd  .  .  240--245 
3.  Jurisdiction  of Parliament. 
i.e. of House of Lords, (a)  as a court of ferror, (6) in trial of peers, 
(c)  in  impeachments : revival  of  impeachments ;  their  importance. 
Jurisdiction as a '  privilege ' of House of Lords.  Acts of attainder 
245-246 
4.  3unctions of  the  Commons in granting money  .  247 
5.  Right to determine disputed Elections. 
Claim  of Commons to decide disputes as to elections ;  Nowell's 
case; events of  1586  .  .  247-248 
6.  Parliamentary procedure. 
The outlines  now drawn ;  proxies and protests of  the lords ;  the 
king in the House of  Lords .  .  .  248 xvi  i i  A  naGysis  A  naGysis  xix 
7.  Freq~ncy  and Duration of  Parliaments. 
Long Parliaments  of  Henry VIII and Elizabeth;  long intervals 
without  a  session;  old  statutes  as  to  annual  Parliaments  not 
repealed.  Important results  of  long  Parliaments  .  248-251 
B.  Relation  of  the  King to  Parliament. 
Pliability of  Tudor Parliaments ;  forced loans ;  forgiveness of the 
king's  debts ;  growing independence of  Parliaments under Elizabeth 
and James. 
Supremacy of  king  in  Parliament  made apparent  by  (I) acts of 
attainder;  (2) forgiveness  of  the king's  debts ; (3) repeated  settle- 
ments of  royal  succession ;  will of  Henry VIII ;  (4) '  the Lex Regia 
of  England'  (1539)  and its  repeal;  (5) acts enabling the  king  to 
revoke  statutes ;  their  repeal ;  (6)  interferences  with  religion.  Sir 
Thomas Smith  on supremacy  of  king-in-Parliament  .  251-255 
But in  many directions  the king's  power is ill defined; constitu- 
tion of the Council.  Want of definition illustrated : 
(I)  In  legislation.  The  ordaining  power;  instances  of  pro- 
clamations ;  resolution  of  the judges in Mary's reign ;  parliamentary 
protests.  Council in Star Chamber enforces proclamations  255-258 
(2)  In fiscal matters.  The '  impositions ';  Bates'  case ;  Coke's 
opinion;  difficulty caused by wide extent of  undoubted prerogatives, 
e.g. as to debasing the coinage.  Benevolences.  Monopolies ;  statute 
against them ;  sale of privileges in the Middle Ages  .  258-261 
(3)  In  judicial  matters.  (i)  The  Court  of  Star  Chamber; 
theories as to its origin  and legality ;  Plowden's  opinion ;  statute of 
1562 ;  Coke's  opinion.  Connexion  with  the  now  well-established 
Court of  Chancery.  Its procedure ;  arbitrary  punishments ; use  of 
torture.  (ii)  The  Council  of  the  North.  (iii)  The  Council  of 
Wales;  doubts as to its  jurisdiction.  Usefulness  of  these  courts, 
owing  to decay of  old  local  courts.  (iv)  The High  Commission; 
Coke's  opinion  as to king's ecclesiastical supremacy;  his opinion as 
to the Commission.  (v)  Commissions of  martial law ;  the Court of 
the  Marshal  and  courts  martial;  precedents  under  Edward  IV ; 
proclamations  of  1588 and  1595  .  .  261-267 
Prerogative and law ;  illustrations from Coke's career ;  the quarrel 
with  the ecclesiastical  courts;  the king  no judge;  quarrel with  the 
High  Commission;  opinion  as to impositions ; as  to taking extra- 
judicial opinions from the judges severally; quarrel with the Chancery; 
case of the tommendams; his disgrace ;  the four p's which ruined him. 
Why  controversy collects  round  the writ  of  habeas  corpus;  its 
history;  statutes as to bailing  prisoners.  Is the king's  command a 
cause  for  imprisonment?  'The  resolution  in  Anderson.'  Coke's 
change of  mind. 
The gathering storm.  Where is sovereignty ?  .  .  267-275 
C.  History  of  the  Army. 
The feudal levy ;  its clumsiness ;  scutage.  The Assize of  Arms ; 
the Statute of  Winchester;  the village  constables.  Commissions of 
array; statutes of  Edward I11  and Henry IV.  No standing army. 
Act  of  Philip and Mary as to musters;  its repeal.  Act  of  Philip 
and  Mary  as  to  keeping  armour.  Situation  in  James'  reign. 
Difficulty as to (I) martial law,  (2) obtaining money for payment of 
troops.  Pressing for the navy legal  .  .  275-280 
Dl.  Local  Government. 
El.  General  Charactmitics of  Laref,  especialb  Criminal fiw. 
F1.  hgal History  of  the  Reformation. 
PERIOD  IV. 
A.  Constituhbn  of  the  Kings@. 
Legal theory  of  Restoration  and Revolution.  The Convention 
Parliament and the Convention;  were they Parliaments?  Attempts 
to legalize  their  acts.  James'  'abdication ';  its date ;  existence  of 
an  interregnum.  Was  there  a  Revolution? 
Settlement of  the succession ;  the forfeiture clause.  New coro- 
nation  oath;  history  of  the  old  oath ; charges  against  Laud  of 
tampering  with  it;  quarrel  as  to its  meaning  .  .  281-288 
B.  Constitution of  Parliament. 
(i)  House of  Lords.  Expulsion and restoration of  the bishops. 
Number of the lords.  Abolition of the House in 1649. 
Maitland appended a note to the effect that these  subjects would  be  treated 
6.  ~f time serves.'  Time did not serve, but the Legal IIistory of the Reformation is 
briefly summarised later-pp.  506-13. xxi 
(ii)  House of  Commons.  Number of members ; new boroughs ; 
prerogative  of  giving  members  to towns falls into disuse.  Constitu- 
tion  of  Cromwell's  Parliaments.  Electoral qualifications ;  forfeiture 
of  borough  charters.  Qualification  of  members;  the  projected 
exclusion  of  place-men  by  the Act  of  Settlement.  Disputes  as  to 
elections decided  by  the  House .  ,  .  288-292 
C.  Frequency  and  Dlrration  of  Parliornents. 
Laws of  1641, 1664, 1696.  Chronological summary of sessions 
292-297 
D.  The  Question of  Sovere&-nty. 
The theory of Hobbes.  In 1625 three claimants for sovereignty : 
(I)  king,  (2)  king-in-Parliament,  (3)  the  Law.  Opinion  of  the 
judges  in  the Ship-Money  case;  the king  above  statute.  Logical 
flaw  in the royalist  argument :-it  does  not  go  far  enough.  The 
claim  of  'the Law ';  Coke's  theory as to void statutes ;  past legisla- 
tion renders it difficult  to maintain  this claim; what cannot statute 
do?  The issue  lies  between  (I) and (2),  and is decided in favour 
of  (2).  The progress of the dispute may be seen in several different 
departments  .  .  297-301 
E.  Legislation. 
Dispute as to (I) ordaining  power;  proclamation  of  Charles I ; 
abolition  of  Star Chamber;  (2) dispensing  power;  doubts as to its 
limits;  treatment  of  it at the Revolution;  (3) suspending  power; 
treatment  of  it  at the Revolution;  case  of  the  Seven  Bishops 
302-306 
F.  Taxation and  Control over  Riannce. 
Under Charles I ;  the impositions ;  the forced loan ;  the Petition 
of  Right;  the  ship  money ; legislation  of  1641.  Taxation  by 
James  11.  The Bill  of  Rights. 
Appropriation  of  supplies;  events of  1624 and  1665 ; impeach- 
ment  of  Danby;  beginnings  of  the  civil  list.  The Commons and 
money  bills;  the  'tacking'  in  1700.  Taxation  of  the  clergy. 
Abolition  of  military tenures, purveyance, preemption ;  grant of  the 
hereditary excise  .  .  306-311 
G.  Administration  of Iusfice. 
Abolition  of  Star Chamber,  High Commission, Councils of  the 
North  and of  Wales.  Restoration  of  High Commission by James; 
denounced  in  Bill  of  Rights.  Escape  of  the Chancery. 
Change in  the commission  of the judges;  enforced  by  Act  of 
Settlement.  Independence  of  jurors ; Bushell's  case. 
The habeas corpus; Darnel's case; Eliot's case; the Act of  1679; 
excessive bail forbidden. 
The era  of  impeachments;  various  points  settled  by  decision. 
Changes in the law of treason.  Acts of attainder.  Disputes between 
the Houses as to the jurisdiction  of  the House of  Lords.  (a) as a 
court appeal from Chancery, (b)  as a court of first instance. 
Jurisdiction of the Council in admiralty and colonial cases 
31  1-320 
H.  Privilege of  Parliament. 
(I)  Freedom of  speech;  Eliot's case.  (2)  Freedom from arrest; 
arrest  of  the five  members;  extent  of  the privilege.  (3)  Power  to 
punish  for  'contempt '; what  is contempt?  Assertions  of  privilege 
abovelaw  .  .  320-324 
I.  Military  Afairs. 
The commissions  of  martial  law;  billeting  of  troops;  impress- 
ment,  '  the power  of  the militia.'  Settlement  at  the  Restoration ; 
growth  of  the  standing  arniy;  commissions  of  martial  law  under 
Charles I1 and James  11.  Settlement at the Revolution;  the first 
Mutiny  Act;  control  of  Parliament  over  the  standing  army. 
Necessity  for  annual  sessions.  The remodelled  militia  324-329 
PERIOD V. 
Preliminary. 
I.  Though concerned  chiefly with  England we must remember 
that  England  is  no  longer  a  state  but  is  a  part  of  the  United 
Kingdom. 
Incorporation  of  Wales  in  England.  Union  with  Scotland; 
'personal  union' in 1603; legislative union in 1707 ;  scheme of  the xxii  A  ivadysis  AnaGysis  xxiii 
union ;  the  'fundamental  conditions.'  Relation  of  Ireland  to 
England in  Middle Ages;  Poynings'  law;  questions as to authority 
of  English  statutes and judicial  power of  English  House of Lords; 
Act of  I 7 19 ;  Act of  I 783 freeing Irish  Parliament from subjection; 
union  of  1801 ; articles  of  the  union.  No  federation  of  three 
kingdoms, but a complete merger  in  the United Kingdom of  Great 
Britain and Ireland. 
Colonies  and  Dependencies;  general  principles  as to  laws  in 
force in them;  subjection to legislature of  Great Britain and Ireland; 
taxation  of  the American colonies.  Abolition  of  slavery and other 
instances of legislation  for colonies.  Colonial constitutions;  crown 
colonies and self-governing colonies; wide powers of legislation given 
to colonial assemblies. 
Distinguish  institutions  which  are  merely  English,  from  those 
common  to Great Britain  or to the United Kingdom  or to all the 
king's  dominions;  e.g.  there is  no English  Parliament,  no English 
nationality,  but English courts of law,  English domicile. 
Now  it  becomes important to distinguish carefully rules of  law 
from  rules which  however punctually observed are rules of  'positive 
morality,' 'customs or conventions of the constitution,' 'constitutional 
understandings';  these  are much  interwoven;  reason  of  this,  our 
conservatism of form  .  -  330-343 
A.  The Sovereign  Body. 
I.  Tk  kingsh$ ; statutory  settlement of  succession ; queens ; 
'  queens' husbands.  'The king never dies.'  Coronation oath; declara- 
tion against Popery;  king  must 'join  in communion  with'  English 
church.  Royal Marriage Act.  No legal mode of deposing king. 
Infant and incapable kings ;  common law  makes no provision ; 
king  never  legally incapable;  minorities  provided  for  by  occasional 
statutes;  events  of  1788 and  1810 when  George  I11  was  insane; 
great  seal  used  without  king's  assent  .  -  343  -346 
11.  The House  of  Lords.  Lords Spiritual; legislation as to the 
new  bishoprics.  Irish  bishops  have  come  and  gone.  Mode  of 
appointing  bishops. 
Lords Temporal; increase of numbers; representatives of Scottish 
and Irish peers ; mode of making peers  .  .  347-351 
111.  The House of  Commons.  (I) Fluctuation in number;  the 
Acts of  Union  .  351-352 
(2)  Qualification  of  electors  in  counties  and  boroughs.  The 
reforms of  1832-67-84.  Present state of law. 
Distribution  of  seats.  Parliamentary  and  municipal  organiza- 
tions  become  distinct.  Tendency  towards  equal electoral districts, 
but  still  distinctions  between  borough  and  county  qualifications. 
causes of  disqualification  .  352-364 
(3)  Qualification of  members.  History of  parliamentary oaths. 
History of '  office ' as qualification  .  364-370 
Mode of election ;  introduction of the ballot  .  370 
Determination of disputed elections  .  370 
Modes of  ceasing to be a member;  expulsion;  Wilkes' case 
371-372 
IV.  Ei-equency and Duration of Parliament.  Frequency depends 
on Triennial  Act  of  1694 ; (N.B.  Act  of  1664 repealed  in  1887) ; 
duration on Septennial Act of  I 7  I 5.  Why annual sessions necessary. 
Legislation as to dissolution by demise of  Crown  .  373-374 
V.  Priztileges of  Parliament.  (I) Freedom of speech;  exception 
out of  ordinary law as to defamation ;  Stockdale v. Hansard,  Wason 
v.  Walter.  Reporting.  (2)  Freedom  from  arrest ; now  of  little 
importance.  (3)  Power  of  punishing  for  contempt;  treatment  of 
this power by  courts of law ;  actual use of  it  -  374-380 
VI.  The  Work of Parliament.  Other functions besides passing 
statutes; inquiry and criticism; examination of  witnesses.  Essentials 
of  a  statute;  each  House  has  large  powers  of  regulating  its  own 
procedure; questions as to whether both Houses have really consented 
to what on its face professes to be a statute. 
The omniconlpetence  of  statute;  it  may  not  be  a  'law'  in  the 
jurists'  sense;  instances  of  particular  commands  given  by  statute. 
111  the eighteenth century Houses attempt to govern as well  as legis- 
late  by  statute.  In the nineteenth  century  vast  new  powers  have 
been given to ministers and law courts, and Parliament interferes less 
with  particulars;  but  the power  exists and is exercised, e.g. disfran- 
chisement  by  statute of  A,  B,  and C,  corrupt  voters,  also  Acts  of 
Indemnity, also appropriation of  supplies  .  .  380-387 
B.  The '  Crown ' and the '  Government.' 
Difficulty of  dealing with  this subject  owing  to  the growth  of 
'constitutional  understandings,'  maintenance  of  ancient  forms, and 
unwillingness to expressly take power from the king  .  387-388 xxiv  AnaGysis  A  naZysis  xxv 
HiJtoricat  Review.  Revolution  settlement ; large  prerogatives 
left to William  I11 which  he was expected  to exercise.  Position  of 
Privy Council and growth of  Cabinet.  How the Cabinet was legally 
possible.  Attempt  (1700)  to stop by  statute the growth of  an inner 
council ;  repealed  I 705  .  387-390 
History  of  the  great  officers;  chancellor,  treasurer,  keeper  of 
privy  seal,  president  of  council,  secretaries  of  state,  chancellor  of 
exchequer, admiral; treasury and admiralty in commission.  These or 
some of these form an irregular inner council, with whose concurrence 
a king can exercise prerogatives ;  they have the seals ;  importance of 
the seals of  office ;  no need to summon other councillors  390-394 
Cabinet government of  modern type slowly evolved ;  king ceases 
to  be  present  at  cabinet  meeting;  solidarity  of  cabinet  slowly 
established  (1)  political  unanimity,  (2)  common  responsibility  to 
Parliament  (though  not  to  the  law),  (3) submission  to a  'Prime 
Minister.'  Gradual retirement of king behind his Ministers, who are 
now expected to be in Parliament; he ought to take their advice, and 
choose them in accordance with wishes of  Parliament (later, of  House 
of  Commons).  All  this 'extra-legal.'  King's  legal  powers have not 
been  diminished;  on  the  contrary  since  the  establishnlent  of 
ministerial  system  have  vastly  grown  owing  to  modern  statutes. 
King's own  sign manual or consent given at a  (formal) meeting of 
Privy  Council  necessary  for  countless  purposes.  Other  powers 
given  to this  or  that  high  officer  (cabinet  minister).  Distinguish 
prerogatives (i.e. common law powers) from statutory powers of king 
394-400 
Present State.  (I) Necessary existence of  Privy Council.  (2) Its 
legal  constitution.  (3)  And  actual  composition.  (4)  King  may 
consult  such privy  councillors as he  pleases  and  this  is  legally a 
meeting of  the Privy Council.  (5) Large powers of king in Council. 
(6) Necessary  that king should  have certain  high  officers  (e.g. two 
Lords of  the treasury,  otherwise  he cannot lawfully get  the  money 
that  Parliament  has  voted).  (7)  Customary  composition  of  the 
'Cabinet'  out of these high officers; as a body it has no legal powers. 
(8) But almost every member has large legal powers.  (9) Customary 
composition  of  '  Ministry.'  (10) Solidarity of  Ministry,  maintained 
by  customary rules  as to resignation  and acceptance  of  office,  but 
not  recognized  by  law;  ultimate  sanction  a  refusal  of  supplies. 
(I  I) Legal tenure of  high  offices during king's  pleasure.  Choice of 
Prime  Minister.  (12)  Relation  of  Cabinet  to  the  Privy  Council ; 
formal meetings of  Privy  Council  (i.e.  of  king with a  few  ministers 
and  sometimes  a  royal  duke,  or  officer  of  household),  at  which 
king's  powers  are exercised  in  accordance  with  policy  of  Cabinet. 
(13) Many, but  not  all, royal  powers must  be exercised by Order in 
Council; but every (or almost every) exercise of royal power requires 
authentication  by  some high officer.  Form of  an Order in Council. 
Classification of  delegated powers  .  .  400-407 
Of  some of  the high  officers and their legal  powers.  (I) 'The 
Lords  of  the  Treasury,  (2) the  Secretaries  of  State;  large  legal 
powers in governing  England  of  (Home) Secretary.  (5)  Board  of 
Trade.  (6) Local Government Board.  (7)  Education Department, 
etc.  Illustration of actual working of government system  407-414 
Object of  illustrating these statutory powers :-Blackstone's  state- 
ment that  the high  officers  (e.g. secretaries)  have few  (if  any) legal 
powers of their own, has become utterly untrue, though still repeated 
by  text  writers.  The old  theory  (never  very  true)  that  'legislative 
power  is  in  king  and  Parliament,  executive  power  in  king'  now 
requires  serious  modifications.  Many  powers  of  great  importance 
are given  by statute not  to the king  but  to some high  officer-e.g. 
power of  making rules for the government of police given to Secretary 
of  State.  The requisite  harmony  between  those  who  have  these 
powers  is  obtained  by the (extra-legal)  organization  of  the Cabinet. 
Our  law  now  knows  not  so much  'the executive power'  as  many 
executive (better, governmental)  powers.  This is obscured by  talk 
about 'the Crown ' ; '  the Crown ' is often a cover for ignorance ;  the 
king  has powers  and the high  officers have  powers,  but  the crown 
lies  in  the  Tower. 
Difficulties  as  to  limits  of  king's  prerogative  powers;  because 
instead  of  them  new  statutory powers  are used;  but  a  prerogative 
does not become obsolete by disuse and the clear words of  a statute 
are necessary to take it away  .  .  415-421 
C.  Classz$cafion  of  the  Powers  of  the  Crown. 
Shall deal with  many in subsequent sections ;  but here (I) recall 
powers relating to constitution, assembling  and dissolving  of  Parlia- 
ment  and turning  bills  into statute;  (not  correct  to  speak of  king 
as having a 'veto '; he must  actively assent;  assent  last refused  by 
Anne);  (2)  note power  of  making  war  or  peace;  question  as  to 
power  of  ceding  territory;  power  to  make  treaties, but  treaty does 
not alter English law;  illustration, extradition treaties ;  ambassadors ; 
aliens;  (3) appointment of offices .  .  .  422-430 xxvi  AnaGysis  A  naGysis  xxvii 
D.  The fiscal System. 
Retrospect:  the  Crown  lands  and  king's  private  estates,  the 
national  revenue  and king's  private revenue, gradual  establishment 
of  these  distinctions.  The '  ordinary ' and '  extraordinary ' revenue ; 
decline in  importance of  former.  History of  hereditary excise and 
civil  list;  a  king  with  a  salary  .  430-438 
History of Consolidated  Fund and of  National  Debt.  Charges 
on Consolidated  Fund.  Present  sources  of  revenue.  Most  taxes 
imposed  by  permanent  Acts : but  supply granted only from  year  to 
year.  Function of House of  Commons in granting and appropriating 
supplies.  How supplies expended ;  necessity of  royal  sign manual ; 
method of  voting supplies  .  438-447 
E.  The  Military  System. 
Army.  Annual  Mutiny  Acts;  Army  Act  1881 ; nature  of  its 
contents ; '  Military  law';  prerogative  of  making  articles  of  war ; 
billeting and impressment  of  carts ;  terms  of  soldiers'  service how 
far  fixed by  statute ; conscription  in  the  eighteenth  century ; the 
command  of the army.  .  447-454 
MiMia.  The  'constitutional  force';  models  of  1662,  1757, 
1786, 1802, 1853; suspension of the ballot;  present plan  455-459 
Navj~.  Contrast between treatment of Army and Navy;  Acts of 
1661, 1749, 1866.  Pressing sailors  .  .  460-462 
F.  Administration  of  Justice. 
Put on  one side Judicial Committee of  Privy Council; its great 
importance  .  ..  .  462-464 
a.  System of  Civil Courts.  The great changes of  the nineteenth 
century.  The (new) County  Courts;  the  Court  of  Chancery the 
domain  of  modern  equity;  Chancery procedure ;  fusion  of  Equity 
and Common Law;  the High Court of Justice;  the  High  Court  of 
Appeal ;  the House of Lords. 
Court  of  Appeal,  House  of  Lords.  General  rules  as  to  their 
competence.  Present relation of  Equity to Law  .  464-473 
6.  System  of Criminal'  Courts.  (I) Courts  of  Summary Juris- 
diction formed by justices of  peace.  (2) Quarter Sessions.  (3) High 
Court.  Writs  of  error  to  (4) Court  of  Appeal  and (5) House of 
Lords.  (6) Court for  Crown  Cases Reserved.  Trial of  peers  and 
impeachments before the House of  Lords.  Some notes on Criminal 
Law  .  .  .  .  473-478 
c.  Government  anrZJustice:-(I)  Independence of judges secured; 
(2) king has no powers over Civil Justice ;  but  (3) has legally large 
powers  over  Criminal  Justice;  power  of  pardon;  power  to  stop 
criminal  proceedings ; (4) '  the  king  can  do no  wrong ' ; meaning 
of  this ; petitions of  right ;  (5)  king's officers can be sued and prose- 
cuted in ordinary way  even for official acts  .  478-484 
G.  The  Police  System. 
Continued decline and fall of  sheriff;  his present position.  The 
parish constables;  Act of  1842 ;  special constables.  The new con- 
stabulary;  its  government.  Position  of  police  constable;  law  of 
arrest ; constant  increase  of  police  constable's  statutory  powers. 
Suppression of  tumults ;  Riot Act ;  use of  military force  485-492 
H.  Social Afairs  and Local  Governnaent. 
Only possible to hint at the existence of  this  great field  of  law 
which  constantly grows wider;  but at least  its existence should  be 
known. 
Organs of local government :- 
(I)  Justices of Peace  .  493-495 
(2)  Municipal corporations ;  the reform of  1835  .  495-497 
(3)  Poor Law Guardians;  the reform  of  1834  .  497-498 
(4)  Sanitary authorities ;  acts of  1848 and 1875  .  498 
(5)  School Boards, 1870.  Progress of  democratic representative 
government ;  bill (Act?) of  1888 for County Councils  .  499-501  - 
The new duties thus cast on the Englishman : some of  which are 
active  duties,  e.g. to  register  child's  birth,  have  it  vaccinated, and 
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PERIOD  I. 
ENGLISH  PUBLIC  LAW  AT  THE  DEATH  OF  EDWARD 
THE FIRST. 
A.  General characteristics of  English law  and  review 
of  legislation. 
i.  Before  1066. 
The oldest English laws that have come down to us are 
those of Ethelbert, king of Kent, and we have good reason for 
believing that they were the first English laws that were ever 
put into writing.  Ethelbert became king in 560 and died in 
616.  The laws that we  have must have been published after 
he had received the Christian faith ;  we may attribute them to 
the year 600  or thereabouts.  Thus the history  of  English 
law may be said to begin just about the time when the  history 
of  Kolnan  law-we  will  not  say comes to an  end,  for  in 
a  certain  sense it has never come to an end-but  comes to 
a  well  marlted  period :-the  reign  of  Ethelbert overlaps the 
reign of Justinian.  Not only are Etheibert's the  earliest English 
laws, but they seem to be the earliest laws ever written in any 
Teutonic tongue.  It is true that on the continent the German 
nations which  overwhelmed  the Roman Empire had already 
felt  the impulse to put their laws in writing ; the Lex  Salica, 
for  example, the  law of  the Salian  Franks, is  considerably 
older than anything that we Englishmen have to show, but it 
is written  in  Latin, and for centuries  Latin continued  to be 
the legal  language of  the new  kingdoms.  But  our  earliest 
laws  are written in  English, or Anglo-Saxon,  and until  the 
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Latin was  commonly  used  for  many legal  documents, con- 
veyances of land and the like.  Seemingly it was  the contact 
with  Roman  civilization  in  the  form  of  Christianity  which 
raised  the desire  for  written  laws.  Beda,  who  died  in  735, 
says that Ethelbert put his  laws  in  writing '  juxta  exempla 
Romanorum.'  It is possible  that some collection of  ecclesi- 
astical canons served  as a model.  We do well  to remember 
that  the oldest  laws  that  we  have,  however  barbarous  they 
may seem, are none the less Christian laws.  ' God's property 
and the church's  12-fold.  A bishop's  property  I I-fold.  A 
priest's property 9-fold.  A deacon's property 6-fold.  A clerk's 
property  3-fold':-this  is the first utterance of  English  law. 
This it is well to remember, for it should prevent any glib blk 
about primitive institutions : Teutonic law (for what is true of 
England  is true also of the continent) when  it is  first set in 
writing  has  already  ceased  to  be  primitive ; it  is  already 
Christian, and so  close is  the connection  between  law  and 
religion, that we  may well  believe that it  has already under- 
gone a great change. 
We have two more sets of  Kentish laws, a set from Hlothar 
and  Eadric,  who  seem  to  have  been  joint  kings  of  the 
Kentings, which we may date in 680 or thereabouts, and a set 
from Wihtrzd, which comes from 700 or thereabouts.  Wessex 
takes up the tale ; in  690 or thereabouts king  Ine, with  the 
counsel  and  consent  of  the  wise,  published  a  set  of  laws. 
Then we  have a gap of two centuries, the greatest gap in  our 
legal history.  The laws of  Alfred, which come next in order, 
may be attributed to 890 or thereabouts.  They show us  that 
during the two  last centuries there had been no great change 
in  the  character  of  law  or  the  legal  structure  of  society. 
Alfred disclaims all pretension of  being  an innovator, he will 
but  set down  the best principles that he has been able to find 
in  the laws  of  Ethelbert, of  Ine and  of  the  Mercian  king, 
Offa.  The laws of  Offa of  Mercia, who died  in 796, have not 
come down to us. 
Beginning with  Alfred's  we  now have a continuous series 
of laws covering the whole of  the tenth century and extend- 
ing into the eleventh, laws from Edward the Elder, Ethelstan, 
Edmund, Edgar, and Ethelred ;  the series is brought to an end 
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by  a  long  and comprehensive set of  laws  coming from  our 
great Danish king, Canute.  We have no one law that can be 
ascribed to Edward the Confessor, who, however, in after days 
acquired the fame of having been a great legislator. 
These Anglo-Saxon laws  or  dooms-as  they  call  them- 
selves-after  having lain hid in  MS. for several centuries, were 
dug up  in  the sixteenth  century  as  antiquarian curiosities. 
Lambard  published  some of  them  in  1568  under  the title 
Archaionomia.  In 1840 they were  published  for the Record 
Commissioners with  a modern  English  translation  under the 
title A~iciezzt  Lows ad  I~istitutes  of E?zgla~zd;  they were again 
published  in  1865 with a German translation  by Dr Reinhold 
Schmidl.  These editions  contain, besides the dooms, a few 
brief statements of customary law, forms of oaths and the like. 
The whole material can be printed in about 160 octavo pages. 
We have nothing from this period that can be called a treatise 
on law, and we have but very few accounts of litigation.  011 the 
other hand we have a large number of private legal documents, 
conveyances  of  lands,  or  land  books  as  they  were  called, 
leases, wills and so forth ; these were collected and printed by 
J. M. Kemble in his Codex Dtplo~noticr~s  &vi  Sttxonici. 
I  have spoken  of  '  sets of  laws' and have refrained  from 
using the word  code.  Once or twice it would  seem as if  an 
attempt  had  been  made  to  state the  existing  law ; but  in 
general  these  laws seem to be  new laws, additions to the law 
that  is  already  in  force ; we  may  compare  them  to  our 
modern statutes and like our statutes they pre-suppose a body 
of  existing  law.  I  will  not  say  that  they  pre-suppose 
'common  law,' because  I  think  that the phrase implies law 
common to the whole kingdom, and how much  law there was 
common to the whole kingdom in the days before the Norman 
Conquest is a very difficult question.  In the twelfth century, 
some time after the Conquest, it  was  the established  theory 
that  England  was  or  had  been  divided  between  three  laws, 
the  West-Saxon,  the  Mercian  and  the  Danish.  The old 
laws themselves  notice this distinction  in  a casual  way; but 
we  have little means of telling how deep it went.  It is highly 
1 The  best edltion is now that of F. Liebermann, Die Cesetze de?-  A~zgelsachsm, 
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probable, however, that a great variety of  local customs was 
growing up in England, when  the Norman Conquest checked 
the growth.  Originally  there may  have  been  considerable 
differences between  the laws of  the various tribes of Angles, 
Saxons and Jutes that invaded  Britain, and the Danes must 
have brought with  them  a new supply of  new customs.  But 
this  would  not  be  all ; the  courts  of  justice,  as  we  shall 
presently  see,  were  local  courts,  courts  of  shires  and  of 
hundreds ; resort  to any central tribunal, to the king and his 
wise  men  seems to have  been  rare, and  this localization  of 
justice  must  have engendered a variety of  local  laws.  Law 
was  transmitted  by oral tradition and the men  of  one shire 
would  know  nothing  and  care  nothing  for  the tradition  of 
another shire. 
The written  laws  issued  by the  king and the wise  cover 
but a small part of the whole field of law.  They deal chiefly 
with  matters  of national  importance,  in  particular  with  the 
preservation  of  the peace.  To keep  the peace is the legis- 
lator's first object, and is not easy.  The family bond is strong; 
an act of violence will too often lead to a blood feud, a private 
war.  To force the injured man or the slain  man's kinsfolk to 
accept a money composition  instead of resorting  to reprisals 
is  a  main  aim  for the law giver.  Hence these dooms often 
take the form of tariffs-so  much is to be paid for slaying an 
eorl, so much for a ceorl, so much for a broken finger, so much 
for  a  broken  leg.  Another aim  is to make men  mindful  of 
their police duties, to organize them for the pursuit of robbers 
and murderers, to fine them if they neglect such duties.  Rut 
of what we may call private law we hear little or nothing-of 
property, contract  or the like.  It is easy to ask very simple 
questions about inheritance  and so forth  to which no  certain 
answer  can  be  given,  and  like  enough  there  were  many 
different  local  customs.  There was  as yet no  body  of  pro- 
fessional  lawyers, law was  not yet a subject  for  speculation ; 
it was the right and duty of the free man to attend the court 
of  his hundred  and his shire, and to give his judgment  there. 
This must  not, however, lead  us  to believe  that  law  was  a 
simple affair, that it consisted  of just the great primary rules 
of  what  we  think  natural justice.  In all probability  it was 
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very  complicated  and  very  formal; exactly the right  words 
must  be  used,  the due solemnities must  be  punctually  per- 
formed.  An ancient popular court with a traditional law was 
no court of  equity ;  forms and ceremonies and solemn poetical 
phrases are the things which stick in  the popular memory and 
can be handed down from father to son. 
A great deal  has been  done  by  modern  scholars and a 
great deal  more may yet be done towards reconstructing  the 
Anglo-Saxon legal system.  Besides the primary sources of  in- 
formation that I have mentioned, the evidence of  Caesar and 
Tacitus, the kindred  laws of  other German tribes and books 
written  in  England  after  the  Conquest  may be  cautiously 
employed  for  the purpose:  but  for  reasons  already given  I 
do not think  that  this  matter  can  be  profitably  studied  by 
beginners ; we  must work  backwards  from the known to the 
unknown, from the certain to the uncertain, and when we see 
very confident  assertions  about  the details of  Anglo-Saxon 
law  we  shall  do  well  to  be  sceptical.  One  point  how- 
ever  of  considerable importance  seems pretty clear, namely, 
that the  influence of  Roman  jurisprudence  was  hardly  felt. 
There  is  no  one  passage  in  the  dooms  which  betrays  any 
knowledge  of  the  Roman  law books.  German  scholars  are 
in  the  habit  of  appealing to these Anglo-Saxon  dooms as 
to the purest  monuments  of  pure  Germanic  law; they can 
find  nothing  so  pure  upon  the  continent.  But  we  must 
not  exaggerate  this  truth.  Roman  jurisprudence  did  not 
survive  in  Britain, but  the  traditions  of  Roman civilization 
were of  great importance.  The main  force which  made for 
the  improvement  of  law  was  the  church,  and  the  church 
if  it  was  Catholic was  also  Roman.  Thus, for  example, at 
a  quite early time we  find  the Anglo-Saxons  making wills. 
This  practicc  we  may  safely  say  is  due  to  the church:- 
the church  is  the great recipient  of  testamentary gifts.  We 
may  further  say that  the will  is  a  Roman  institution;  that 
these  Anglo-Saxons  would  not  be  making  wills,  if  there 
had  been  no  Rome, no  world-wide  Roman  Empire;  but  of 
any knowledge  of  the Roman  law of  wills, even of  so much 
of  it  as is  contained  in  the Institutes we  may  safely acquit 
them.  Suppose  a  party  of  English  missionaries  to  go Constitutionn  Z  History 
preaching to the heathen, they would inevitably carry with them 
a great deal  of  English  law although they might  be  utterly 
unable to answer  the simplest examination  paper  about  it ; 
for instance they would know that written wills can  be made, 
and  they would  think  that written  wills  should  take effect, 
though  they  might well  not  know  how  many  witnesses  our 
law requires, or whether  a will  is revoked  by marriage.  In 
some such way the church, Catholic and  Roman, carried with 
it  wherever  it  went  the  tradition  of  the  older  civilization, 
carried  with  it  Roman  institutions, such  as the will,  but  in 
a popularized  and  vulgarized  form. 
I have spoken of the Anglo-Saxon dooms as the dooms of 
this king and of that, but we ought to observe, even in passing, 
and though this  matter  must  come before us  again, that no 
English king takes on himself to legislate without the counsel 
and  consent  of  his  wise  men.  Legislative  formulae are of 
great importance to us, for we have to trace the growth of that 
form  of words in  which  our Queen and Parliament  legislate 
for us  to-day.  Here is the preface of  the laws of  Wihtrzd: 
'In the reign  of  the most clement king of  the Kentish  men, 
Wihtrzd, there  was  assembled  a  deliberative convention  of 
the great men: there was  Birhtwald,  Archbishop  of  Britain, 
and  the  fore-named  king,  and  the  Bishop  of  Rochester, 
Gybmund  by name ; and  every degree of the church  of  that 
province spoke in  unison with the obedient people.  There the 
great men decreed these doonls with the suffrages of  all, and 
added them to the customary laws of the Kentish men';-and 
so on  until  the end  of  the period, until  the laws of  Canute: 
"This  is  the  ordinance  that  king  Canute,  king  of  all 
England, and  king  of  the Danes and  Norwegians,  decreed, 
with  the counsel of  his '  witan ' to the honour and behoof of 
himself." 
ii.  1066-1 I  54. 
The Norman  Conquest is an event of the utmost import- 
ance in the history of English law ; still we must not  suppose 
that English  law was  swept away or superseded by Norman 
law.  We must  not  suppose that the Normans had any com- 
pact body of laws to bring with them.  They can have had but 
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very little if any written law of their own ;  in this respect they 
,yere far behind the English. 
Since 912 these Norsemen  had held a corner of what had 
once  formed  a  part of  the great  Frank kingdom; but  their 
dukes had  been  practically  independent, owing  little  more 
than a nominal allegiance to the kings of  the French.  They 
had  adopted the religion and language of the conquered, and 
we must believe that what settled law there was in Normandy 
was  rather  Frankish than Norse.  They were an  aristocracy 
of Scandinavian conquerors ruling  over a body of  Romance- 
speaking  Kelts.  No  one  of  their  dukes  had  been  a great 
legislator.  Such written  law as there was  must have already 
been of great antiquity, the Lex Salica and the capitularies of 
the Frankish kings, and how far these were really in force, we 
cannot  say.  The hold  of  the dukes upon  their  vassals had 
been  precarious;  but  probably some traditions of strong and 
settled government survived from the times of the Carlovings. 
For instance, that practice of summoning a body of neighbours 
to swear  to royal  and other rights which is the germ of trial 
by jury,  appears in  England  so soon  as the Normans  have 
conquered the country,  and it  can  be  clearly  traced  to  the 
courts of  the  Frankish  kings. 
There is no Norman  law book  that can be traced beyond 
the very last years of the twelfth century ; there is none so old 
as our own Glanvill.  Really we know very little of Norman law 
as it was in  the middle of the tenth century.  It cannot have 
been very unlike the contemporary English law-the  Frankish 
capitularies are very like our English dooms, and the East of 
England  was  full  of  men  of  Norse  descent.  We must  not 
therefore  think  of  William  as  bringing  with  him  a  novel 
system  of  jurisprudence. 
The proofs  of  the survival of  English law can  be  briefly 
summarised.  In the first place one of  the very few legislative 
acts of William  the Conqueror of which we  can be certain, is 
that he confirmed  the English  laws.  ' This I will  and order 
that all shall  have  and  hold  the law of  king  Edward  as to 
lands and all other things with  these additions which  I have 
established for the good of the English people.'  Then again, 
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confirmed  the English law: 'I  give you back king Edward's 
law with  those improvements whereby my father improved it 
by the counsel of  his barons.'  Secondly, these confirmations 
of Edward's law seem to have set several different  persons on 
an attempt to restate what Edward's law had been.  We  have 
three  collections  of  laws  known  respectively  as the  Leges 
Edwardi Confessoris,  Leges  WiZZeZmi  Primi, Leges  lenrici 
Primi.  These are apparently the work of private persons ;  we 
cannot fix the date of  any of  them with any great certainty. 
The most valuable is the Leges Henrici Primi,  which has been 
ascribed to as late a date as the reign of  Henry 11, but which 
the most recent  investigations assign to that of  Henry I.  It 
is  a  book  of  some size,  very  obscure and disorderly.  The 
author has borrowed freely from foreign sources, from the Lex 
Salica,  the  capitularies  of  the  Frankish  kings,  and  from 
collections of ecclesiastical canons-one  little passage has been 
traced to  the Theodosian Code ; but the main part of  the book 
consists of passages from the Anglo-Saxon dooms translated 
into Latin, and the author evidently thinks that these are, or 
ought to be, still regarded as the law of the land.  The picture 
given us by this book  is that of an ancient system which  has 
undergone a very severe shock.  So the compiler of the Leges 
Edwardi Confessoris  has borrowed largely from the old dooms. 
His book did much to popularize the notion that the Confessor 
was a great legislator.  In after times he became the hero of 
many legal  myths; but as already said  there is  no one law 
that can be attributed to him.  The demand for Edward's law 
which  was  conceded  by William  and  by  Henry I  was  not 
a demand for laws made by Edward ; it was merely a demand 
for  the good  old  law,  the law  which  prevailed  here  before 
England fell under the domination of the Conqueror1. Thirdly, 
Domesday book, the record  of  the great survey made in  the 
years 1085-6-the  greatest legal monument of the Conqueror's 
reign-shows  us that the Norman landowners were conceived 
as stepping into the exact place of the English owners whose 
forfeited  lands had come to their hands; the Norman repre- 
For a fuller account of  the law-books of  the Norman period see Pollock and 
Maitland,  History  of  English  Law,  2nd  edn.  vol.  I,  pp.  97-110.  Stubbs, 
Lectures on  Ear&  English History,  37-1  33. 
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ynts an  English  antecessor  whose  rights  and  duties have 
fallen upon him.  The same conclusion is put before us by the 
charters  of  the Norman kings, the documents whereby they 
grant lands  to their  followers.  It is  in  English words  that 
they convey jurisdictions  and privileges : the Norman  lord  is 
to have sac and soc, tkoZ and theam, infangthief  and outfang- 
thief,-rights  which have been enjoyed by Englishmen, rights 
which can only be described in the English language. 
At the same time it must be admitted that there has been 
a  large infusion of Norman  ideas.  Occasionally, though but 
rarely, we can place our finger on a rule or an institution and 
say ' This is  not  English.'  Such is  the case with  trial  by 
battle, such  is  the case with  the sworn inquest of neighbours 
which comes to be trial by jury.  More often we can say that 
a  new  idea, a new theory, has been  introduced  from  abroad, 
this  as we  shall  hereafter see  is  the case with  what we  call 
feudalism.  But still more often we can only say that a  new 
meaning, a new importance, has been given to an old institu- 
tion.  The  valuable thing that the Norman Conquest gives us 
is a strong kingship which makes for national unity. 
No one of the Norman kings, among whom we will include 
Stephen, was a great legislator.  The genuine laws of William 
the Conqueror are few ;  of most of them we shall speak by and 
by.  The two most important are that by which he severs the 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction  from the temporal, and that by which 
he  insists that every  man, no matter of  whom  he holds his 
land, is the king's man and owes allegiance to the king.  From 
the lawless Rufus we have no law.  Henry the  First on his 
accession  (I  100) purchases the support of  the people  by an 
important charter-important  in  itself, for it is a landmark in 
constitutional history, important also as the model for Magna 
Carta.  Stephen also has to issue a  charter, but it is  of less 
value,  for it is  more general in  its terms.  It is as adminis- 
trators rather than as legislators that William the First  and 
Henry the First are active.  The making of  Domesday, the 
great rate book  of  the kingdom, is  a magnificent  exploit, an 
exploit which has no parallel in the history of Europe, an ex- 
ploit only possible in a conquered country.  Under Henry the 
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which an orderly written record is kept.  The sheriffs accounts 
for  1132 are still extant on  what  is  called  the Pipe  Roll  of 
3 I  Hen. I ; this is one of  our  most valuable sources of  infor- 
mation.  It has  been  casually preserved;  it  is  not  until  the 
beginning of  Henry 11's reign  that we  get a regular series of 
such records.  To illustrate the Norman  reigns we  have also 
a few unofficial records of litigation.  These have been printed 
by  Mr  Bigelow  in  his  Placita  Anglo-Normannica.  The 
genuine  laws of  William  I  and the Charter of  Henry  I  will 
be  found  in  Stubbs'  Select  Charters.  The  so-called  Leges 
Edwardi Co?zfes.soris, WilleZnzi Conqzbestoris, and Henrici Prinzi 
are  among  the  Ancient  Laws  published  by  the  Record 
Commissioners1. 
iii.  Henry 11 (I  I 54-89),  Richard  (I  189-gg), John  (I  199- 
1216). 
The reign  of  Henry  I1 is  of  great  importance  in  legal 
history; he was a great legislator and a great administrator. 
Some of  his  laws  and  ordinances we  have,  they  have  been 
casually preserved by chroniclers ; others we  have lost.  The 
time had not yet con~e  when all  laws would  be carefully  and 
officially recorded.  At his  coronation  or soon afterwards he 
issued  a  charter,  confirming  in  general  terms  the  liberties 
granted  by his grandfather, Henry  I.  The next  monument 
that we have of his legislation consists of  the Constitutions of 
Clarendon issued in  I 164.  Henry's quarrel with Becket  was 
the occasion of them.  They deal with the border land between 
the temporal and the ecclesiastical jurisdictions,  defining the 
province  of  the  spiritual  courts.  During  the  anarchy  of 
Stephen's reign the civil, as contrasted with  the ecclesiastical, 
organization  of  society  had  been  well-nigh  dissolved-the 
church  had  gained  in  power  as  the  state  became  feeble. 
Henry endeavoured to restore what he held to be  the ancient 
boundary, to maintain the old barriers against the pretensions 
of  the clergy.  These Constitutions are the result.  To some 
The Leps Edwnrdi Confessoris and the Legees  Henrici Prinri may now be 
read  in- Liehermann's  Gesetze  der Angelsachsen.  For a  full  and valuable  com- 
mentary on the latter  document  see Stubbs, Lectures on Early English History, 
1~3-65.  For the Leges  Willelmi see Stubbs, Select Charters, p.  84. 
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extent Henry failed : the murder  of  the Archbishop shocked 
the world, and shocked him, and he was obliged  to surrender 
several of  the points  for  which  he  had  contended.  Never- 
theless  in  the main  he  was  successful ; by  the action  of the 
royal court which now becomes steady and vigorous a line was 
drawn between the temporal and the spiritual spheres, though 
it was not exactly the line which Henry tried  to define, and 
though for a century and more after his death there was still 
a debateable border  land.  The Canon  law  was  just  taking 
shape, a law for ecclesiastical matters common to all Europe. 
One great stage in its development is marked by the Decretr~vz 
Gratiani, the  work  of  a  Bolognese  monk,  composed,  it  is 
believed, between  I 139 and  I 142, i.e. in  our  King  Stephen's 
reign.  The  decrees  of  ecclesiastical  councils,  ancient  and 
modern, genuine  and spurious, were being elaborated  into a 
great system of jurisprudence.  The classical Roman law, which 
for some time past had  become  the subject of  serious study, 
was  a  model  for  this new  system.  We have to remember 
that throughout the subsequent ages Canon law  administered 
by ecclesiastical courts regulated  for  all Englishmen  some of 
the most  important  affairs of  life.  It did  not  merely  define 
the discipline of the clergy-all  matters relating to marriages 
and  to  testaments  fell  to  its  share.  A  great  deal  of  the 
ordinary private law even of  our own day can only be under- 
stood if we remember this.  The fundamental distinction that 
we  draw  between  real  and  personal  property, to take one 
example, is the abiding outcome of the division of  the field of 
law into two departments, the secular and the spiritual.  Why 
do we  still couple '  probate ' with '  divorce '  ?  Merely because 
both  matrimonial  and  testamentary  causes  belonged  to the 
church courts. 
We have just mentioned the revived study of Roman law. 
In  Southern  Europe  Roman  law  had  never  perished:  it 
had  survived  the dark  ages  in  a  barbarized  and  vulgarized 
form.  Then  in  the  eleventh  century  men  began  to  turn 
once  more  to the classical  texts.  The  new  study  spread 
rapidly.  In  1143 Archbishop  Theobald  brought  hither  in 
his train  one Vacarius, a  Lombard  lawyer.  He lectured  in 
England on  Roman  law;  it seems  that  Stephen  silenced Constitutions  Z History  Henry  11 
him;  Stephen had quarrelled  with  the clergy.  But  he  did 
not  labour  in vain; the influence of  Roman law is apparent 
in  some  of  Henry's  reforms,  and  it  has  even  been  con- 
jectured  that  Henry  as  a  youth  had  sat  at the  feet  of 
Vacariusl.  To the  early part  of  his  reign  we  owe  certain 
measures of the utmost importance.  The text of the ordinances 
or assizes whereby they were accomplished we have lost.  An 
assize (assisa) seems to mean in  the first instance a sitting, a 
session for example of  the king and his barons ; then the name 
is transferred to an ordinance made at such a session-we  have 
the Assize of  Clarendon, the Assize of  Northampton, and, to 
look abroad,theAssizesof Jerusalem; then again it is transferred 
to  any  institution  which  is  created  by  such  an  ordinance. 
Henry by some ordinance that we  have lost  took  under  his 
royal  protection  the possession, or seisin as it was  called, of 
all  freeholders.  The vast  importance  of  this  step we  shall 
better understand  hereafter.  He provided  in  his  own  court 
remedies for all who were disturbed in their possession.  These 
remedies  were  the possessory  assizes  of  novel  disseisin  and 
mort  d'ancestor ; there was a  third  assize of  darein  present- 
ment  which  dealt  with  the right  of  presenting  to churches. 
Doubtless these possessory actions were suggested by, though 
they were not  copied from, the Roman  interdicla.  The dis- 
tinction  between  a  possessory and a proprietary action  was 
firmly  grasped; proprietary  actions  still  went  to the feudal 
courts  while  the  king  himself  now  undertook  to  protect 
possession.  All this  will  become more  intelligible hereafter. 
But  if  the  thotlght  of  protecting  possession  or  something 
different from property was  of  Roman origin, the machinery 
employed  for  this  purpose  was  of  a  kind  unknown  to  the 
Romans,  it  was,  we  may  say, a  trial  by  jury.  This  new 
procedure gradually spreads from these possessory  actions to 
all other actions.  Henry himself  extended  it  to proprietary 
actions for land-in  the form of the grand assize.  The person 
sued might refuse trial by battle and have the question '  Who 
has the best right to this  land?' submitted to a body of  his 
neighbours sworn to tell the truth.  More of  this by  and by 
For a fuller account see Pollock and Maitland, Hzsfory of  Erzglzsh Law, vol. I, 
pp. 118-9. 
when  we  come to the history of  trial by jury;  our present 
point  is  that  by  providing  new  remedies  in  his  own  court 
Henry centralized  English justice.  From  his time  onwards 
the  importance  of  the local  tribunals  began  to wane; the 
king's  own court became ever more and more a court of  first 
instance for all men and all causes.  The consequence of  this 
was a rapid development of law common  to the whole  land ; 
local variations are gradually suppressed ; we come to have a 
common law.  This common  law is enforced  throughout  the 
land  by  itinerant justices,  professional  administrators of  the 
law, all  trained  in  one school.  During  the  latter  part  of 
I-Ienry's  reign  the  counties  are  habitually  visited  by  such 
justices. 
By the Assize of  Clarendon in  I 166 reissued with  amend- 
ments at Northampton  in  I 176 Henry began  a great reform 
of  criminal procedure.  Practically, we may say,  he introduced 
the germs of trial by jury : the old modes of  trial, the ordeals 
and the judicial  combat, begin  to yield  before the oath of a 
body of  witnesses.  From  I 181 we  have the Assize  of Arms 
which reorganizes  the ancient  military  force and  thus estab- 
lishes a counterpoise to feudalism.  From  I 184 we  have the 
Assize  of  Woodstock,  which  for  the  first  time  defines  the 
king's rights in  his  forests.  The establishment of  an orderly 
method of taxation and the decline of feudalism as a political 
force are marked by the first collection of a scutage in  I I jg- 
personal service in the army may be  commuted  for a money 
payment-and  by the first taxation of  personal property, the 
Saladin tithe of  I I 88. 
Two great books illustrate the legal activity  of  the reign. 
The Dialogus de  Scaccario describes minutely the proceedings 
of the  Royal  Exchequer.  It was  written  by  Richard  Fitz 
Neal, Bishop of  London and Treasurer of  the Exchequer.  The 
other book is a Treatise on the Laws of  England, commonly 
attributed  to  Ranulf  Glanvill,  who  became  chief  justiciar 
(prime minister and chief justice we may say) in  I I 80.  This 
book, known to lawyers as '  Glanvill,' was written in  the very 
last years of the reign, I 187-9.  It is the first of  our classical 
text books.  It gives  us  an  accurate picture  of  the working 
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law: as yet  it  is  with  land  that  the royal  court  is  chiefly 
concerned.  We can see that Roman law has been exercising a 
subtle influence ; the writer knows something of the Institutes 
and  occasionally  copies  their  words;  but  in  the  main  the 
king's court has been working out a law for itself.  It is only 
with  the king's  court  that  the writer  deals.  The customs 
which  prevail  in  the  local  courts  are, he  says, so many, so 
various,  so confused, that  to put  them  in  writing  would  be 
impossible.  However by the action of  the royal court a certain 
province has been  reclaimed  from local custom  for  common 
law; that  province  is  'land-holding' about  which  there  are 
already many  uniform  rules.  The book  thus marks an im- 
portant stage in the development of  common law1. 
Henry's reign finished, we  look  onwards to Magna Carta. 
Under  Richard  the  tradition  of  orderly  administration, of 
the  concentration  of  justice  in  the king's  court  was  main- 
tained.  Richard  himself  was  an  absentee king;  he  never 
was in  this country save on two occasions and then  but  for a 
few months ; the country was governed by justiciars, by men 
trained  in  the school of  Henry 11.  Our materials  for  legal 
history now begin  to accumulate rapidly.  Not  that there is 
much that can be called legislation ; but  it now  becomes  the 
practice to keep an official record of  the business done in  the 
king's  court.  Our  earliest  judicial  records  come  from  the 
year  I 194; thenceforward  we  have  the  means of  knowing 
accurately  what  cases  come  before  the  king's  justices  and 
how they are decided.  During the first half of  John's  reign 
the country was decently governed, though the legislative and 
reforming activity of  his  father's  day has ceased.  But then 
John  casts  off  all  restraints,  becomes  involved  in  a  great 
quarrel with the church, in  another  with  the baronage, unites 
the whole nation against him, and at length in  I 2 I 5  is forced 
to grant the great charter. 
iv.  Henry  III (I  2 16-72). 
The great charter, from whatever point of  view we regard 
it, is of  course a document of  the utmost importancea.  The 
I  Pollock and Maitland, History of  EnglzsA Law, vol. I, pp.  161-7, 
An  admirable  commentary  on  Magna  Carta  was  published  by  W.  S. 
McKechnie in 1905. 
Magnn  Carta 
first thing that strikes one on looking at it is that it is a very 
long document-and  a good deal of its importance consists in 
this, that it is minute and detailed.  It is intensely practical ; 
it  is  no  declaration  in  mere  general  terms  of  the rights  of 
Englishmen, still less of  the rights of  men ; it goes through 
the grievances of  the time one by one and promises redress. 
It is  a  definite  statement  of  law  upon  a great  number  of 
miscellaneous points.  In many cases, so far as we  can  now 
judge, the law that it states is not new law; it represents the 
practice of Henry 11's reign.  The cry has been  not  that the 
law  should  be  altered,  but  that  it  should  be  observed,  in 
particular,  that it  should  be observed  by the king.  Hence- 
forward  matters  are not  to be left  to vague  promises;  the 
king's  rights  and their limits are to be set down in  black and 
white.  Apart from the actual contents of  the charter, which 
we  must  notice  from  time  to time  hereafter,  we  ought  to 
notice  that  the  issue of  so long, so detailed, so practical  a 
document,  means  that  there  is  to be  a  reign  of  law. 
Now Magna Carta came to be reckoned  as the beginning 
of  English  statute law;  it  was  printed  as  the first  of  the 
statutes  of  the  realm.  But  to  explain  this  we  have  first 
to remark  that of  Magna  Carta  there  are several  editions. 
We have  four  versions  of  the charter, that  of  1215,  that 
of  1216, that of  1217 and that of  1225, and between  them 
there are important differences.  Several clauses which  were 
contained in  the charter of  I 2 I 5 were omitted in that of  I 2 r 6 
and were never again inserted.  It seems to have been thought 
unadvisable  to bind  the young  king  to  some  of  the  more 
stringent conditions to which John had been  subjected.  The 
charter of  1217 again differs from that of  1216.  Substantially 
it is in  1217 that the charter takes its final form; still it is the 
charter of  I225 which is the Magna Carta of  all future times. 
That there were four versions is a fact to be carefully remem- 
bered; it  is  never  enough  to refer to Magna  Carta without 
saying which edition of  it you  mean.  As we shall hereafter 
see, the whole  history  of  parliament  might  have  been  very 
different, had  not  a  certain  clause  been  omitted  from  the 
charter of  1216  and all subsequent versions-a  clause defining 
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Now  the  charter  of  I225  came  to  be  reckoned  as  the 
beginning of our statute law.  This in part is due  to accidents. 
The lawyers of  the later middle ages had no occasion to go 
behind that instrument ; the earlier ordinances so far as they 
had  not  become  obsolete  had  worked  themselves  into  the 
common law ; but every word of the charter was still of great 
importance.  So when  the  time  for  printing  came  Magna 
Carta, i.e. the charter of  1225, took its place at the beginning 
of  the statute book.  It was  constantly confirmed;  Henry 
confirmed it in  1237 ; Edward confirmed  it  in  1297-thence- 
forward  down  to the  days of  Henry  IV it  was  repeatedly 
confirmed ;  Coke reckons  thirty-two confirmations.  It was 
one thing to obtain  the charter, another to get it  observed. 
It was a fetter on the king, a fetter from which  a  king would 
free himself  whenever  he could ; and  the nation  has to pay 
money over and over again to procure  a confirmation  of  the 
charter :-that  the king is bound by his ancestors' concessions 
is a principle that is but slowly established. 
Magna  Carta then, however  ill  it  may be  observed, con- 
stitutes what for the time is a considerable body of  definitely 
enacted law.  From the long reign of Henry I11 we have not 
much other legislation ; legislation  is  as yet by no means a 
common event.  The interest of the reign  is to be found not 
so much  in  the laws  that are made but in  the struggle  for 
a  parliament.  Gradually, as we  shall  see hereafter, the idea 
of  what  the  national  assembly  should  be  is  undergoing  a 
change ; it is ceasing to be that of a feudal assembly of barons, 
it is becoming that of  an assembly of the three estates of  the 
realm-clergy,  lords and commons ; the summoning of knights 
of the shire in  1254, and of representative  burgesses  in  1264 
are the great landmarks.  Still there are two important legis- 
lative  acts.  The first  of  these  is  known  as the  Statute of 
Merton  made in  1236.  It contains  provisions which  are in 
force  at the  present  moment.  Among  its  other  noticeable 
clauses, we  come across the famous declaration of the barons 
that they will  not change the laws of England.  They have 
been asked by the clergy to consent that children born before 
the marriage of their parents should be deemed legitimate :- 
their reply is  'Nolumus leges Angliae mutare.'  Between this 
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and the next great act, there occurs the great crisis which we 
know as the Barons' War.  The discontent of the nation with 
Henry's  faithlessness and extravagance comes to a head  in 
1258.  After stormy years of  quarrelling, a leader is found in 
De Montfort ; the insurgents are victorious at Lewes (14 May, 
1264), and then defeated  at Evesham (4 Aug. 1265).  But a 
great deal of  what they wanted is gained.  The statute made 
at Marlborough in I 267, commonly called the Statute of Marl- 
bridge, chiefly consists of a re-enactment of certain concessions 
which  had  been  obtained  from the king during the revolu- 
tionary period, concessions which we  know as the Provisions 
of  Westminster of  125g1.  The grievances  redressed  in  this 
instance are for the most part the grievances of  the smaller 
landowners. 
But it is not only or even chiefly by means of  legislation 
that English law has been growing.  The reign of Henry I11 
is the time when a great part of the common law takes definite 
shape-in  particular the land law.  The king's court has been 
steadily at work  evolving common  law;  that law  is  carried 
through the length and breadth of the kingdom by the itinerant 
justices.  As yet the judges have a free hand-they  can invent 
new  remedies  to meet  new  cases.  Towards the end  of  the 
reign  indeed  complaints  of  this  grow loud.  It is more and 
more  seen that to invent new  remedies  is  in  effect  to make 
new laws ; that the judges while professing to declare the law 
are in reality making law ;-and  it is more and more felt that 
for  new  laws the consent of  the estates  of  the realm, at all 
events of  the baronage, is  necessary.  But law, judge-made 
law  if  we  like to call  it  so, has  been  growing apace.  The 
justices  have  been  learned  men,  mostly  ecclesiastics,  men 
not  ignorant of  Canon Law and  Roman  Law.  A great law 
book is the outcome2.  Henry of Bratton, or Bracton as he is 
commonly called, died in  1268 ; for twenty years he had been 
a  judge.  Sometime  between  1250  and  1260 he  wrote  his 
treatise on the Laws of  England.  He owed  a great deal to 
the work  of  an Italian lawyer, Azo of  Bologna, and we  can 
plainly see that the study of  Roman law has had  a  powerful 
Printed in Stubbs' Select  Charters, pp.  400-5. 
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influence  on the growth of  English law:-it  has set men  to 
think  seriously  and  rationally  of  English  law  as a  whole, 
to try to set it in  order and represent it as an organized body 
of connected principles1.  But the substance of Bracton's work 
is English.  He cites no less than 500 decisions of  the king's 
judges.  English  law, we  see, is already  becoming  what we 
now  call '  case law '-a  decided  case is an '  authority ' which 
ought to be followed when a similar case arises.  We see also 
that the growth of English law, especially land law, has been 
very  rapid.  Glanvill's  book  looks  very  small  and  meagre 
when placed beside Bracton's full and comprehensive treatise. 
We may indeed  regard the reign of  Henry I11 as a golden 
age of judge-made law : the king's  court is rapidly becoming 
the regular court for all causes of any great importance, except 
those which belong to the ecclesiastical courts, and as yet the 
judges are not hampered by many statutes or by the jealousy 
of  a  parliament which will  neither amend  the law nor  suffer 
others to amend  it.  Also we  now  hear very  little  of  local 
customs deviating from  the common  law;  as the old  local 
courts give way  before  the rising power  of  the king's court, 
so local customs give way to common law.  The king's court 
gains in power  and influence  because  its procedure  is more 
summary, more rational, more modern than the procedure  of 
the local courts.  Their procedure is never improved, it remains 
archaic;  meanwhile  the royal  court  is  introducing  trial  by 
jury ; all the older inodes of  trial are giving way before this 
new  mode.  In 1215 the Lateran  Council  forbad  the clergy 
any longer to take part in the ordeal.  In England the ordeal 
was at once abolished, and the whole province of criminal law 
was thus thrown open to trial by jury. 
v.  Edward the First (I  272- I 307). 
Edward  I  has been  called  'the English Justinian.'  The 
suggested comparison is not very happy; it is something like 
a comparison between childhood and second childhood.  Jus- 
tinian, we may say, did his best to give final immutable form 
to a system which had  already seen  its best days, which had 
Select  Passages fronr  the Works of  Bracbn and Azo,  ed.  F.  W.  Maitland 
(Selden Society),  1895-with  a  brilliant  introduction. 
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already  become  too  elaborate for  those  who  lived  under  it. 
Edward, taking the whole  nation into his  counsels, legislated 
for  a  nation which was  only just  beginning  to have  a  great 
legal  system  of  its  own.  Still  it  is  very  natural  that  we 
should  seek  some form  of  words  which  will  mark  the fact 
that Edward's reign is  an unique period in the history of  our 
law.  Sir M. Hale, writing late in the seventeenth century, says 
that more was done in the first thirteen years of  that reign to 
settle and establish the distributive justice of the kingdom, than 
in  all the ages since that time put together.  We can hardly 
say so  much  as this;  still  we  rnay  say that  the legislative 
activity of those thirteen years remains unique until the reign 
of  William  IV; for  anything with  which  we  may  compare 
Edward's  statutes  we  must  look  forward  from  his  day  to 
the days of  the Reform  Bill.  Now  Hale,  I  think, hits  the 
mark when he says that more was done to  settle  and establish 
the distributivejzrstice of  the ki?zga'uv~  in Edward's reign than 
in  subsequent  ages1.  The main  characteristic  of  Edward's 
statutes  is  that they  interfere  at countless  points  with  the 
ordinary  course  of law between  subject and subject.  They 
do more than this-many  clauses of  the greatest importance 
deal with what we  should  call public law-but  the character- 
istic which makes them unique is that they enter the domain 
of  private  law and make vast changes in  it.  For ages after 
Edward's  day king and parliament left private  law and civil 
procedure, criminal  law and criminal  procedure, pretty much 
to themselves.  Piles of  statutes are heaped  up-parliament 
attempts to regulate  all trades and all professions, to settle 
what dresses men rnay wear, what food they may eat-ordains 
that they must be buried  in wool-but  we may turn page after 
page of  the statute book  of  any century from  the fourteenth 
to the eighteenth, both inclusive, without  finding any change 
of note made in the law of  property, or the law of  contract, 
or  the law  about thefts and murders, or the law as to how 
property may be  recovered  or contracts may be  enforced, or 
the law as to how persons accused of  theft or murder may be 
punished.  Consequently in  Hale's  day and in  Blackstone's 
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day, a lawyer whose business  lay with the common affairs of 
daily life had to keep the statutes of  Edward I constantly in 
his  mind ; a  few  statutes of  Henry  VIII, of  Elizabeth, of 
Charles I1 he  had  to remember, but there were  large tracts 
of  past history which had  not supplied one single law which 
was of  any importance to him  in  the ordinary course of  his 
business.  To a certain extent this is true even now, even after 
the vigorous  legislation of  the last sixty years.  There are at 
least two statutes of  Edward  I which you will have to know 
well-t  he  De  donis  conditisnalibus  and  the  Quia  emptores 
terrarz~m-these  still are pillars of  our land law;  to pull them 
away  without  providing  some substitute would  be  to bring 
the whole  fabric  to confusion.  It is  well  to remember  the 
dates of the great statutes. 
1275.  Stat. Westminster, I. 
I 278.  Stat. Gloucester. 
1284.  Stat. of Wales. 
1285.  Stat. Westminster, 11. 
Stat. Winchester. 
1290.  Stat. Westminster, 111. 
1297.  Confirmatio Cartarum, with new articles. 
But  Edward  was  not  merely  a  great  legislator, he  was 
a  great  administrator  also,  a  great  organizer.  Take  any 
institution  that exists at the  end  of  the Middle  Ages,  any 
that exists in  1800-be  it parliament, or privy council, or any 
of  the courts of  law-we  can trace it back  through  a series 
of  definite changes  as far as  Edward's  reign, but  if  we  go 
back  further the object that we  have  had  in view  begins to 
disappear, its outlines begin to be blurred, we pass as ~t  were 
from sunlight to moonlight, we cannot be certain whether that 
which we  see is really that for which  we  have  been  looking. 
Shall we  call this court  that is  sitting, the King's  Bench, or 
the Council, or the Parliament? it seems to be  all and yet to 
be  none  of  these.  In  Edward's day all  becomes  definite- 
there is the Parliament of the three estates, there is the King's 
Council, there  are  the  well  known  courts  of  law.  Words 
have become appropriated-the  king in parliament can make 
statutes;  the king in council can make ordinances ; a statute 
I  Growing Insularity  21 
is  one thing, an ordinance  is  another.  It is  for this reason 
that any one who would study the constitution of older times, 
should first make certain that he knows the constitution as it 
is under Edward I. 
The vigorous  legislation  of  the time  has  an  important 
consequence in checking the growth of unenacted law.  Hence- 
forward the common law grows much more slowly than under 
Henry 111.  Its growth is hampered at every turn by statute- 
the judges  are checked  by the now  admitted  principle  that 
changes in  the law are not to be  made without the consent 
of  parliament.  Law continues to grow, but  it  can  grow but 
slowly ; the judges are forced to have recourse to fictions and 
evasions  because  the highroad  of judge-made  law has  been 
barred.  Two  law  books  come to us  from  Edward's  reign, 
Britton and Fleta, both written in 1290 or thereabouts ; Brit- 
ton in French, Fleta in Latin ; both are little better than poor 
epitomes  of  Bracton's  work,  epitomes  which  take notice  of 
the changes introduced by the great statutes.  We learn from 
them an important fact :-it  is  plain that English lawyers are 
no longer studying Roman law.  There can be no doubt that 
under  Henry I11 Roman law was  slowly gaining ground  in 
England.  To any further  Romanization of  English  larv, a 
stop was put by Edward's legislation.  The whole field of law 
was now so much covered by statute, that the study of  Roman 
law had become useless.  About the same time, we  no longer 
find ecclesiastics sitting in the royal  courts;  Bracton was an 
ecclesiastic, an  archdeacon, and the great judges  whose  de- 
cisions he  cites were  ecclesiastics-Martin  Pateshull  became 
Dean  of  St Paul's, William  Raleigh  became Bishop  of  Win- 
chester.  But the opinion steadily grew among the clergy that 
ecclesiastics should not sit in lay tribunals.  The consequence 
is  that from  the  beginning  of  Edward's  reign,  English law 
becomes  always  more  insular, and  English  lawyers  become 
more  and  more  utterly  ignorant of  any law  but  their own. 
Thus English  law  was  saved  from  Romanism;  by  this  we 
lost much-but  we gained much also.  The loss, we may say, 
was juristic ; if  our lawyers had  known more of  Roman law, 
our law-in  particular our land law-would  never have become 
the  unprincipled  labyrinth  that  it became;-the  gain,  we 22  Constitutional History  PERIOD 
may say, was constitutional, was  political :-Roman  law here 
as elsewhere would  sooner  or later have brought absolutism 
in its train.  It should  be added that the rapid  growth of  the 
common  law  under Henry I11 was  connected  both  as cause 
and  as  effect  with  the growth  of  a  large  class  of  English 
lawyers.  From the beginning  of  Edward's reign, it is a large 
and a powerful  class-and  it is  from  among the members  of 
this class that the king chooses his judges.  And now a new 
form of  legal literature appears.  From  1292 we get our first 
law  report-the  first  of  the Year  Books.  The Year  Books 
are reports of  discussions which  took  place  in  court-of  the 
arguments of  counsel  and  the opinions  of the judges.  The 
series extends from Edward I to Henry VIII.  Together with 
the text-books of Glanvill, Bracton, Britton and Fleta, they are 
the great  source  of  all  our  information  as to  the  common 
law and not only are they a source of  information, but the cases 
reported  in  them  were regarded  as authorities-indeed  they 
are so regarded even at the present day-if  an occasion arises 
upon  which  they could  be appropriately cited :-but  this  of 
course seldom happens, for the whole field of  common law is 
pretty well  covered by much more modern  authorities.  Still 
we  note that  from  the middle of  the thirteenth  century our 
common  law has been  case law, that from  1292 onwards we 
have law reports, that from  I 194  onwards we have plea-rolls'. 
This term common  law, which we  have been  using, needs 
some explanation.  I think that it comes into use in or shortly 
after the reign  of  Edward  the  First.  The word  'common' 
of  course  is  not  opposed  to 'uncommon':  rather  it  means 
'general,'  and  the contrast  to  common  law  is  special  law. 
Common  law is  in  the first place  unenacted  law; thus  it  is 
distinguished from  statutes  and ordinances.  In  the  second 
place, it is common to the whole land ; thus it is distinguished 
from local customs.  In the third place, it is the law  of the 
temporal  courts ; thus  it  is  distinguished  from  ecclesiastical 
1 Five volumes of  the Year  Books of  Edward  I, and thirteen volumes of  the 
Year Books of Edward 111, are publ~shed  in the Rolls Series.  The  Selden Society 
has undertaken the publ~cation  of  the Year Books of Edward 11.  The first three 
volumes,  edited  by  Maitland, have  already appeared,  with  introductions of  the 
greatest interest and  importance. 
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law, the law of the Courts Christian, courts which throughout 
the Middle Ages take cognisance of  many matters which we 
should consider temporal matters-in  particular marriages and 
testaments.  Common  law  is in theory traditional  law-that 
which has always been law and still is law, in so far as it has 
not been  overridden  by statute or ordinance.  In older ages, 
while the local courts were still powerful, law was really pre- 
served by oral tradition among the free men who sat as judges 
in  these courts.  In  the twelfth and thirteenth century as the 
king's  court  throws  open its doors wider and wider  for more 
and more business, the knowledge of  the law becomes  more 
and  more  the possession  of  a  learned  class  of  professional 
lawyers,  in  particular  of  the  king's  justices.  Already  in 
John's  reign  they claim  to be juris periti.  More  and  more 
common  law  is  gradually  evolved  as ever  new  cases  arise; 
but  the judges  are not  conceived  as making new  law-they 
have  no  right  or  power  to  do that-rather  they are  but 
declaring  what  has  always  been  law. 
B.  The Land-System. 
It may seem strange that we  begin  our survey of  public 
law  by  examining the system  of  landed  property,  for  pro- 
prietary rights we may say are clearly a topic of  private  law. 
That is true in our own day, though even now  it is impossible 
for  us  fully  to understand our modern  public  law unless  we 
know something of  our law of property:-for  instance the right 
to vote  in  elections  for  members  of  Parliament is  clearly  a 
right given by public law, but directly we ask, Who have this 
right ?-we  have  to speak  of  freeholders, copyholders, lease- 
holders and so forth, to use terms which have no meaning  to 
those  who  do  not  know  some  little  of  our  law  of  landed 
property.  But if  this be true of  our own  day, it is  far truer 
of  the Middle Ages.  What is meant by the word '  feudalism ' 
we  shall understand  more  fully hereafter-but  here  we  may 
describe '  feudalism' as a  state of  society  in  which  all or a 
great part of  public  rights and duties are inextricably inter- 
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system-financial,  military,  judicial-is  part of  the  law  of 
private property.  I do  not mean that feudalism so complete as 
this is ever found-much  less that we find it in England,-we 
shall see that in this country the feudal movement was checked 
at an early date :-but  still it is utterly impossible to speak of 
our medieval constitution except in terms of our medieval land 
law.  Let us then briefly  survey the land  law of  Edward 1's 
time-briefly,  and  having  regard  to its  public  importance ; 
when you come to study real  property law you  will  have to 
examine  the  same system  more  closely  and  from  another 
point of  view'. 
We must start with  this :-All  land  is  held  of  the king. 
The person  who  has  the right  to live  on  the  land  and to 
cultivate it, is a tenant.  He holds that land of some one who 
is his lord.  If that some one be the king, then the tenant is 
one of  the king's  tenants in  chief, or tenants in capite.  But 
between  the  tenant  and  the  king  there  may  stand  many 
persons; A  may hold  the land  of  B,  who  holds of  C, who 
holds  of  D,  and  so forth  until  we  come  to  Z  who  holds 
immediately of the king, who  is one of  the king's  tenants in 
capite.  Each of  the persons who  stands between A and the 
king is a mesne, i.e. intermediate, lord ; as regards those who 
stand below him he is lord, as regards those who stand above 
him  he is  tenant.  Thus take a  short series; A  holds of  B 
and I3  holds of  the king; here B is  lord of  A, but tenant of 
the king. 
Such is the actual arrangement.  With it is connected the 
theory that at some past time all lands were the king's  to do 
what  he  liked  with.  He gave land  to Z  (one of  his  great 
barons)  and  his  heirs  in  return  for  certain  services,  Z  then 
gave part of  it to Y, Y to X, and so on until we  come to the 
lowest tenant, to A who now has the right to enjoy the land 
and  take  the fruits thereof.  This process  of  creating new 
tenancies is called subinfeudation.  At the moment  at which 
we have placed ourselves, that of Edward's death in 1307, a new 
measure has very lately been taken to put a stop to this pro- 
cess,-the  statute  Quia  elnptores  terrarurlz  passed  in  1290: 
'  The subject of this section is  treated with greater fullness in  the History of 
English Law,  vol.  I,  pp.  229-406. 
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more of  this hereafter.  In passing let us warn  ourselves not 
to accept  this legal  theory  that there was  a  time when  all 
land was the king's to do what he liked  with  as describing a 
historical  truth;  at present we  note that it has become  the 
theory.  No one therefore,  save the king,  has land  that he 
does  not  hold  of  some  one  else-every  other  person  has 
some superior, some lord: the formula is  tenet  terrain  iZZane 
de B. 
Now in every case the tenant in  respect of  the land owes 
some service to the lord-this  in theory is the return he makes 
to his lord for the land-he  holds by some tenure (te~zura)  by 
some mode of  holding.  Gradually these tenures have  been 
classified :-we  may  reckon  six  tenures,  (I) frankalmoign, 
(2)  knight  service, (3) grand  serjeanty, (4)  petty  serjeanty, 
(5)  free  socage, (6) villeinage. 
(I)  I mention  frankalmoign  first; it can  be very  briefly 
dismissed, but is instructive as showing how far the theory of 
tenure  has  been  pressed.  Sometimes religious  bodies  and 
religious persons, monasteries, bishops, parsons, hold land  for 
which they do no earthly service to the lord.  They are said to 
hold by way of free alms, free charity, per Ziberam eZemosynam, 
in frankalmoign.  The theory of  tenure however is  saved by 
the  doctrine that they  owe  spiritual  service,  that they  are 
bound to pray for the soul of  the donor who has given them 
this land, and this duty can be enforced by spiritual censures 
in  the ecclesiastical courts.  Do not think that a  monastery 
or a bishop can  hold  by no other than this easy tenure; on 
the  contrary, though  a  large  part  of  England  is  held  by 
ecclesiastics, tenure in frankalmoign is  somewhat exceptional 
-the  ecclesiastics often hold by military service. 
(2)  By far the greater part of England is held of the king 
by military service, by knight service ; in some way or another 
it has come to be mapped out in  knight's  fees.  We cannot 
say that a particular  acreage of  land  or land  of  a  particular 
value constitutes a knight's fee (feodam  militis); but it seems 
as if there had been a vague theory that a knight's  fee should 
normally be worth £20 a year or thereabouts.  But in Edward's 
day we can say, that whether owing to some general rule or to 
bargains made in each particular  case, it has become  settled Aids and Reliefs 
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that this  particular territory  owes the service  of  one knight, 
that it is feodum  militis, while another has not been  split into 
single knight's fees but owes altogether the service of  five or 
of ten knights. 
The service due from  a  single knight's  fee is that of  one 
fully armed horseman to serve in the king's army for 40 days 
in the year in time of war.  We notice however that there has 
been constant quarrelling between king and barons as to the 
definition of  this service.  Can the tenant be forced  to serve 
in foreign parts ?  As a matter of fact they have done so: but 
in  1213 they refused  to follow John to France and so forced 
on the grant of the Charter, and very lately, in 1297, they have 
refused  to  follow  Edward  to  France  and  so forced  on  the 
confirmation of  the Charter.  That they are obliged to serve 
against the Scots and the Welsh is not doubted. 
The tenant  by knight's  service, whether  he holds  of  the 
king or of  some mesne lord must do homage to his lord and 
must swear fealty.  The act of  homage is  this-the  tenant 
kneels before his lord and holds his hands between  the hands 
of his lord, and says, ' I become your man from this day forward 
of life and limb and of earthly worship, and unto you shall be 
true and faithful and bear to you faith for the tenements that 
I hold of you '-then,  if  the lord be not the king, he adds these 
noteworthy words, 'saving the faith  that I  owe to the king.' 
Then  the lord  kisses  his  man.  Fealty is  sworn  thus, with 
hand on book, ' Hear this my lord that I shall be faithful and 
true unto you and faith to you  shall bear fcr the lands that 
I hold of you, and that I shall lawfully do to you the customs 
and  services which  I  ought to do, so help  me God  and  his 
saints.'  The act of  homage constitutes an extremely sacred 
bond  between  lord  and  man-the  bond  of  fealty is  not  so 
close-and  an oath of  fealty must be sworn in  many cases in 
which homage need not be done.  The nature of  these bonds 
we shall consider at  large by and by-happily  for England they 
became rather moral than legal bonds. 
As a consequence of holding by knight's service the tenant 
is subject to many burdens which we know as the incidents of 
military tenure : it is usual to reckon seven ; each of them has 
its own history. 
(a)  Aids.  There has been  a  doctrine of  vague  extent 
that the lord can legitimately demand aid (nz~xiliz~~z)  from his 
tenant when he is in need of  money.  The aid has been  con- 
sidered as a free-will offering, but one which  ought not to be 
refused when the demand is reasonable.  Gradually the demand 
has been  limited  by law.  In the charter of  I215 John  was 
compelled to promise that he would exact no aid without the 
common counsel of  the realm  save in  three cases, namely  in 
order to make his eldest son  a  knight, in  order to marry  his 
eldest daughter, and in order to redeem his body from captivity 
and  then  only a  reasonable aid.  The same restriction  was 
placed  upon  the mesne  lords.  These clauses  however  were 
omitted from a charter of  I 2 I 6.  In  I 297 however Edward I 
was obliged  to promise  that he would  take no aids save by 
the common  consent of  the  realm, saving the  ancient  aids. 
In  I275 (St. West. I. c. 36) the amount of  aid  for  knighting 
the  lord's  son  or  marrying  his  daughter  was  fixed  at 
20 shillings for the knight's fee, and the same sum for every 
estate in socage of £20  annual value. 
(b)  If  the tenant in knight service having an inheritable 
estate died leaving an heir of  full age, that heir  owed  a  relief 
for his land-releviz~m-a  sum due on his taking up the fallen 
inheritance-relevat  hereditatem.  This has been  a sore point 
of contention between the king and his barons, between them 
and their vassals ;-the  lord has been  in  the habit of  getting 
what he can on such an occasion, even  of  forcing the heir  to 
buy the land at nearly its full  price.  Gradually the law  has 
become  more  definite  The relief  for  the  knight's  fee  is 
loo shillings, but  the  holder  of  a  barony  (a  term  to  be 
explained hereafter) pays £100;  the socager pays one year's 
rent.  This  was  already the  law  of  Glanvill's  time;  it  was 
confirmed  by  the charter  (1 21  5,  C.  2). 
But (c) the lords have contended for a certain or uncertain 
right  of  holding  the land  of  the dead  tenant until the heir 
shall offer homage and pay relief :-this  right is that of taking 
the  first  seisin  after the tenant's  death, the right  of  primer 
seisin.  In  this  case  law  has gone against  the  lords,  it \is 
established by the Statute of  Marlborough (1267, c  16) that 
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entry upon  it in  order to preserve  evidence of  his  lordship. 
Law, however, has not had  the same measure for the king as 
for other lords-the  king has a right of primer seisin-he  may 
keep the heir of  his tenant out for a year-or  what  comes to 
the same thing, he  can  in  addition  to the relief  extort  one 
year's profit of the land. 
(d)  On the other hand there are rights of  the lord which 
have steadily grown  and which the law has now  sanctioned. 
If the heir of  the military tenant is under the age of  twenty- 
one, being male, or fourteen, being female, the lord is  entitled 
to wardship-to  wardship of  the body of  his tenant, to ward- 
ship  of  the land  also.  This means  that  he  can  enjoy  the 
lands for his  own  profit  until  the boy  attains twenty-one or 
the girl fourteen.  He is bound to maintain  the child and he 
must  not  commit  waste, but  within  these limits he may do 
what he likes  with  the land  and take the profits to his  own 
use-and  this  profitable  right  is  a  vendible  commodity: 
wardships  are freely  bought  and sold.  Here again  we  find 
that the king  has peculiar rights-prerogative  rights they are 
called.  Generally, if  the child  holds of  two  lords, each lord 
gets the wardship of  those lands that are holden of  him ; but 
if  one  lord  be  the king, then  he gets a wardship of  all  the 
lands, of whomsoever they  be  holden. 
(e)  Connected with the right of  wardship is  the right of 
marriage.  This we can see has steadily grown as we  trace it 
from  the  charter  of  Henry  I  to  the  charters  of  John  and 
Henry I11 and the Statute of  Merton  (1236).  It comes  to 
this, that the lord can dispose of  the ward's marriage, can sell 
his  ward  in  marriage.  The only  limit  to this  is  that  the 
match must be an equal one; the ward is not to be disparaged, 
married to one who is not his or her peer.  At first apparently 
all  that  the lord  claims  is  that his  female  tenant  shall  not 
marry  without  his  consent-a  demand  which  is  reasonable 
enough  while the military  tenures  are great  realities :-my 
female tenant must not carry the land which she holds of  me 
to a husband who is my enemy.  But the right has grown far 
beyond  this  reason :-it  is  now  extended  to  males  as  well 
as females,  and the  marriage  of  every  ward  is  a  vendible 
commodity. 
(f)  Fines on alienation.  Here the law has on the whole 
taken  the  side of the tenant.  We can  produce  no  text  of 
English law which says that the leave of  the lord is necessary 
to an alienation  by  the tenant.  The tenant cannot  indeed 
compel his lord to accept a new  tenant in  his place; but  he 
can create a new tenancy ; B holds of A, B can give the land 
to C to hold of  him, B.  We do not find it laid down that the 
consent of A was necessary for this ; the royal judges, like all 
lawyers, seem  to have  favoured  free alienation :-but  we  do 
find that the consent of  the lords is commonly asked, and we 
do find that the view taken by the lords is that their consent is 
necessary.  This is a battle-field during the thirteenth century ; 
the greater  lords  are opposed  to free alienation, the tenants 
wish  for it; the  royal judges  take  the side of  the  tenants, 
except  against  the  king.  In  1290 a  definite  settlement  is 
arrived  at  by  the famous  Qzdia  emptores  terrarzrm.  That 
statute you must some day study as part of  our existing law 
of  real  property.  What it  does  is  roughly  speaking this, it 
concedes  free  alienation  to all except  the king's  tenants  in 
chief; on the other hand it puts a final stop to the process  of 
subinfeudation ; R holds of  A, B wants to sell his land to C- 
he wants to convey it to C and his heirs; he can do so without 
A's  consent, but  C  is  not to hold  of B, he  is to hold  of  A. 
A tenant may substitute another person in his place-but  the 
creation of  a new  tenure is  impossible-or  rather, I  must  be 
exact  though  the words  may  be  unintelligible  to you-the 
creation  of  a  new  tenure  in  fee  simple  is  impossible.  The 
liberty of alienation however is not yet conceded to the king's 
tenants in chief; the law has one measure for the king another 
for other lords.  If one of the tenants in capite alienates with- 
out  the king's  consent, this is a forfeiture  of  the land ; it  is 
Edward the Third's day before this severity was  relaxed  and 
a fine of one-third of  the yearly value of  the land took  the 
place of the forfeiture. 
(g) Escheat.  If the tenant died without an heir the land 
escheated, that is, fell back to the lord-it  became  his to do 
what  he  pleased  with.  As  you  have been  hitherto reading 
more  Roman  than  English  law,  I  had  better  say  that the 
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from the Roman Raeres.  Before the Conquest the church had 
introduced the testament or last will, and lands or at all events 
some lands as well  as goods could be given by will.  But at 
the Conquest  the will  of lands disappears.  The maxim  is 
laid down in Glanvill-Only  God can make an heir, not man. 
The English heir therefore never succeeds under a will.  This 
is so even at the present day, though since the Restoration, 
1660, lands have been  freely alienable by will.  To this day 
the heir is a person  who  succeeds on an intestacy-he  who 
takes land under a will is a devisee: but at the time of  which 
we are speaking, Edward 1's  day, the will of lands was still in 
the distant future.  But a failure of heirs is not the only cause 
for an escheat, if the tenant commits any of those gravecrimes 
that are known as felonies-there  is an escheat; he loses the 
land, no heir of  his can succeed him, the lord  takes the land 
for good and all. 
Such in brief were the incidents of tenure by knight's service. 
(3)  Grand serjeanty (magna serjanfia)  differed but little 
from this.  The  tenant instead of being bound to serve as a knight 
for forty days in the wars, was bound to do some peculiar ser- 
vice for the king-to  carry his banner, or his sword, to lead the 
vanguard or the rear guard, to be his champion, the constable 
or marshal1 of his army, or the like.  In almost all respects this 
tenure had all those incidents which we  have just  described. 
(4)  Tenure in petty serjeanty came in after-time  to be re- 
garded as but a variation of tenure in socage.  Its characteristic 
was the obligation to provide the king with warlike implements, 
a  sword, a lance, or the like.  It maintains  its place in  the 
catalogue of  tenures merely because it was but slowly that the 
line was drawn between petty serjeanty and grand serjeanty.  It 
was established by Magna Carta that where the service though 
of a warlike nature consisted merely in providing weapons, and 
not in fighting-then  wardship and marriage were not due- 
hence a line was drawn between  the grand  serjeanties which 
in  all  important respects  were like  knight  service-and  the 
petty serjeanties which were almost the same as socage'. 
For Maitland's later views on serjeanties see Hzstory of  English Law, vol.  I, 
pp.  282-go.  ' The central notlon seems what we may call servantship.. the tenant 
by  serjeanty  is  steward, marshal,  constable,  chamberlain,  usher,  cook,  forester, 
falconer, dog-keeper, messenger, esquire ; he is more or  less of a menial servant.' 
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(5)  Postponing to a more convenient season the etymology 
of  the term  socage, we  find that tenure in  free socage is  a 
tenure by  some fixed  service which  is  not  military:  that is 
not the fill1 explanation, but will  serve for the present  The 
service of  the socager generally  consists  of  a  rent  payable 
either in  money or  in  agricultural  produce; very often  he  is 
also bound to do a certain amouht of ploughing for his lord- 
to plough three days a year or the like :-this  is so common 
that lawyers already believe, what is not historically true, that 
the term socage is connected with the word sock, which means 
a  ploughshare.  Now  socage  tenure involved some, but  not 
all, of  those  burdens  of  which  we  have  lately  spoken-the 
socager swore the oath of fealty, though he did not usually do 
homage ; he had to pay the three aids-the  aid for knighting 
the lord's  son, rnarrying  the lord's  daughter, redeeming  the 
lord  from  captivity-in  the first two of  these  cases he  paid 
20 shillings  for  land  of  the  annual value  of  L2o; by  way 
of  relief  he paid  one year's rent ; if  he held  of  the king in 
chief, the king was entitled  to a primer seisin ; if  he held  of 
the king in  chief he  could  not  alienate without  license; his 
land  escheated  to  the  lord  if  he  died  without  an  heir  or 
committed felony.  On the other hand socage tenure did  not 
involve the two worst burdens of feudalism ;  the wardship and 
marriage  of  the socager's heir did not belong to the lord.  If 
he left an heir  under fourteen the next relative  to whom  the 
land  could  not  descend  was  guardian, but  when  the  heir 
attained  fourteen  (that was  full  age  as regards  socage) the 
guardian had to account to him for the profits of the land. 
We must  not  be  led  into speaking as though the distinc- 
tions between these various kinds of  tenures were distinctions 
between various kinds of  lands.  The self-same piece of  land 
might at one and the same time be held by knight service or 
by socage.  For instance A has held  of  the king by military 
service, but he has enfeoffed 13 to hold  of  him  in socage ; the 
military  service due from A  to the king is a  burden  on  the 
land ; if  A will not perform it, then a distress can be made on 
the land and B's  goods may be taken ;  but as between A and 
R, it is A not B who is bound to do the service, or to pay the 
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the scutage; as between A and B, B is only bound to pay the 
fixed rent, to do the ploughing or the like.  By far the greater 
part of the lands of England are, I take it, held of the king by 
military service ; to find  land held  immediately of  the king 
by socage tenure is comparatively rare, but  there seem  to be 
considerable  tracts  which  are  held  of  the  king  by  frank- 
almoign.  The greater part of  England therefore is held  by 
military  service,  but  then  a  great  part  of  this  is  held  by 
socage-the  tenants  in  chief  hold  by  knight's  service,  but 
many of  their sub-tenants hold by socage.  Such is the state 
of  things in  Edward's  day; but  as we  have lately seen, in 
1290 a stop was put to the process  of  subinfeudation-a  new 
tenure of an estate in fee simple can no longer be created-no 
new  rungs can be put into the feudal  ladder.  How far the 
process  had  really gone, it is difficult to say, but I think that 
pretty often the lords and tenants stood three or four deep-we 
may pretty often find that D holds of C who holds  of  B who 
holds of A who holds of the king.  By means of subinfeudation 
free socage has become a far commoner tenure than it was  in 
the  twelfth  century;  the lords  have  found  it  profitable to 
grant out their lands in return for fixed rents. 
One other remark  of  great importance  must  be  made- 
military service is due to none but  the king; this it  is which 
makes English feudalism  a very different thing from French 
feudalism.  Suppose that A, a great lord, held 10 knight's fees 
of  the king, he might grant one of  these to B and stipulate 
that B  should do the military  service due from  that fee: B 
then will  hold  of  A  by military service; if  B  neglects  to do 
the service, then A has legal means of redress : B is bound to 
A to do the service ; still the service is due not to A, but to 
the king ; it  is service to be done for the king in the national 
army; it  is  not  service  to  be  done  for  A  in  A's  quarrels. 
This  makes  English  feudalism  a  very  different  thing  from 
continental  feudalism : elsewhere  we  may  find  the  tenant 
bound to fight  for his  lord  in his lord's quarrels, bound even 
to fight for his immediate lord  against that lord's  lord ; here 
in England, however strong may be the feeling that this ought 
to be so, that the man is bound to espouse his lord's quarrels, 
still  that  feeling  is  not  represented  by  law-rather  it  is 
repressed by law :-the  only quarrel in which any one is bound 
to fight is the king's  quarrel, the only force in which  any one 
is  bound  to serve is the king's  force;  our kings have  been 
powerful  enough  to bring about  this very  desirable  result. 
(6)  Villeinage.  A very large part of  England, by what- 
ever tenure it may be holden of the king, is ultimately held in 
villeinage.  The word ville~zagiz~m  is used in what seems to us 
a confusing way to cover two different things, first a personal 
status and  secondly  a  tenure.  There is  a  very  large class 
of  persons  who  are personally  unfree.  The technical  term 
whereby they are described is nativi, which  means born  serfs 
or  bondsmen-thus  A  is  the nativus of  B; but not unfre- 
quently  they  are spoken  of  as servi  and  as vilani.  They 
are unfree,  but we  must  not  call them  slaves; they are not 
rightless;  the  law  does  not  treat  them  as things, it  treats 
them  as persons; still they are unfree; they must not leave 
their lord's land ;  if they do he may recapture them and bring 
them  back ; the law  will  aid  him  in  this ; it  gives  him  an 
action  for  recovering  the body  of  his  nativz~s,  an action  de 
nativo  hobendo.  Generally, if  not  always, the  nativus  has 
land  which  he  holds  in  villeinage, which  he holds  by villein 
services.  He has land, but how far he can be said to have a 
right in this land is a difficult  question.  One thing is clear- 
the king's  courts do not protect that right  against his lord. 
If the lord capriciously chooses to eject him, he has no remedy 
against his lord  in  the king's  courts.  We find however that 
he  is conceived to hold his land by perfectly definite services 
and that this is not  merely the theory of  the villeins, but the 
theory of the lords also.  This we learn from the surveys which 
religious houses made of their manors.  In such surveys we 
find thousands of entries of  this kind-A.B.  holds a virgate 
of  land ; for this he is bound  to do certain services, e.g. he is 
bound  to work  three days a week on the lord's land, and five 
days a week  in  autumn ; what is  to be deemed a day's work 
is often minutely defined-thus,  if he be set to thrash, he must 
thrash  such  and  such  a  quantity; if  he be  set to ditch, he 
must ditch so many yards in a day-in  general everything is 
very  definitely  expressed.  How  far  he can  be  said  to  be 
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services  is  a  question  which  we  cannot  raise  without  first 
speaking  of  the  manorial  courts;  but  as  already said, the 
king's  courts give him  no  protection  against his lord.  Then 
very  generally  we  find  it  said  that  he  is  prohibited  from 
selling his ox or his horse without the lord's leave, also that 
he  may not give his daughter in  marriage without the lord's 
leave, or at all  events may not give her in  marriage outside 
the manor;  in  many cases  however  the sum  that he  must 
pay for the lord's  license is a fixed sum.  The king's  courts 
however do not  protect his  movable  goods against his  lord, 
any more than they protect his land against his lord : the lord 
may at any time seize the chattels of  his  nativz.  Again  the 
lord may imprison the body of  his nativus ; the king's courts 
give no redress ; but against maiming and death at the lord's 
hand they give protection ; the life and limb of every man, be 
he free or unfree, are in  the king's protection; to slay or to 
maim him  is a felony.  Also it is becoming more and more 
the theory and the fact that the king's courts will protect the 
nativus, his body, his  goods, and  his  lands against every one 
except his lord.  The status of the nativus is coming to be 
more and more regarded as a mere relationship between him 
and his  lord, a relationship which in  no wise  concerns third 
persons,  less  and  less  as  a  status thrust  upon  the  nativus 
by  public  law  which  stamps him  as a  person  who  has but 
imperfect rights. 
But  again,  we  find  that  a  man  may  well  hold  land  in 
villeinage  and yet be  no  nativus.  He is a free man, he  may 
leave  the  land  if  he  pleases,  he  cannot  be  captured  and 
brought back, his chattels are fully his own, the lord may not 
seize  them.  Bracton  often  puts  it  thus : '  tenementum  non 
mzbtat  staturn'-the  tenure of  villeinage  is different from the 
status of  villeinage-this  man  holds  land  in  villeinage,  but 
personally  he  is  no  villein.  However  such  a  tenant  in 
villeinage  has  as yet  no  right  in  the land  which  the royal 
courts will  protect  against the lord.  Their  doctrine  is that 
the land  is  the lord's land, that the tenant is merely a tenant 
at the lord's will, whom  the lord can  at any time eject.  On 
the other hand, as already said, we find it conceived, even by 
the  lords  themselves, that their  tenentes  in villenagzo,  even 
their nativi, held by perfectly definite services-so  many day's 
work  per week, ploughings, harrowings, reapings and so forth 
to be  done on  the lord's  own  demesne  lands.  We find  too 
that these tenentes in vifleuagio do in fact alienate their lands ; 
they cannot do this without the lord's  license ; they yield  up, 
surrender the land into the lord's hand, who then  grants it to 
the new tenant.  We find also that at least in some cases the 
tenant's  rights are considered  as inheritable; thus we  find  it 
said  in  the manorial  surveys  that the heir  of  the tenant in 
villeinage  must pay this or that sum to the lord for leave to 
enter on  his ancestor's  land.  How far such a tenant can be 
said  to have any legal right in his land as against his lord we 
cannot decide at present ; he certainly seems to be conceived 
as having what we should call a moral right ; but the first thing 
to understand is that he has no right in the land as against his 
lord  that is protected  by the royal courts.  This is so in  the 
days of Edward the First and for a long century afterwards1. 
It now becomes possible to fix the meaning of a term that 
we shall have often to use, viz. a freeholder.  Ever since the 
days of Henry the Second the king's own courts have afforded 
protection  to both the possession and the property which any 
one has in  a liberztm tenernenturn.  Gradually a great mass of 
law has been developed as to the meaning of  this term.  In 
the first place it excludes the tenants in  villeinage-Ziberzlrn 
tenementum  is  contrasted  with  villanum  tenementurn.  If  a 
person holds in  frankalmoign, by knight's service, by grand or 
petty serjeanty, or in  free socage, he  has a freehold, and is a 
freeholder; not so he who holds in villeinage.  What exactly 
was  the test which originally distinguished  free socage from 
villeinage, it  is  now very difficult to see.  Any uncertainty in 
the agricultural service seems to have been enough to stamp 
the tenure  as villein2.  The tenant  in  free socage was  often 
bound to do a certain amount of  ploughing on the lord's land ; 
but  generally he owed no week work, was not bound  to work 
for  the lord  so  many  days in  every  week  as the tenant  in 
villeinage commonly was.  When  once the line  was  drawn, 
1 For an elaborate discussion  on the status of  the villein, Hzstofy of  Enghsh 
Law, vol.  I, pp.  412-32. 
The test of  villeinage is discussed by Vinogradoff,  Econonzzc  Jouutzal,  vol. X 
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however, it was of  the utmost importance ; once decided that 
the  tenure  was  freehold,  it was  perfectly  protected  in  the 
king's  own  court ; once  decided  that  it  was  villein  tenure, 
then  the king's courts treated  it as though it were merely a 
tenancy at the lord's will.  Villanum tenementum is thus the 
first contrast to libemm tenementurn. 
But the evolution of  new forms of  landholding provided a 
new  contrast.  Since the  Norman  Conquest  a  practice  had 
grown up of letting land for terms of  years, in  general short 
terms.  The lessee, 'the termor,'  who had  such  a  lease was 
at first  considered  as having  no right  in  the  land, no  real 
right, as we  should  say no right  ia  rem.  He had  merely  a 
personal  right  good  against his  lessor-his  lessor  had  con- 
tracted  that he, paying  his rent, should  enjoy the land  for a 
term of  years ; on that contract he had an action  against his 
lessor.  If  a stranger  ejected him, he had  no  action  against 
that stranger; the lessor  might  sue the stranger for entering 
his (the lessor's) land; but  the lessee had  only an  action on 
the contract against his  lord.  While such was  the case the 
lessee was not conceived to have Ziberum  tenementum, he had 
no tenementum at all ;  he had  but  a right  in persona~n.  ; he 
was  no  freeholder.  The word  freeholder  therefore excluded 
not only the tenant in villeinage, but also the termor, the person 
who had a right to enjoy land limited to some fixed term of 
years.  Before the reign  of  Edward  the First, the situation 
had  been  greatly changed ; the king's  court had  by  degrees 
given a large, though not as yet a complete, measure of protec- 
tion to the termor against the world  at large: it  had  in  fact 
turned  the jz4s  in personarn  into a jus  in rem.  Nevertheless 
the old nomenclature with its important political consequences 
was still maintained-the  termor was no freeholder, he had no 
place in the county court, and therefore no vote in the election 
of  knights  of  the shire-no,  not  until  1832.  A  freeholder 
must hold land at least for the life of himself or of  some other 
person.  He may have,  as the phrase  goes, a greater  estate 
than  this, he  may have an inheritable  estate, one which will 
descend to his heirs, or to a limited class of  heirs, the heirs of 
his body-but  this at least he must  have.  He who  holds  for 
a fixed term of years however long, a thousand years or more, 
is no freeholder. 
The distinction  gets emphasized in another way.  What- 
ever  may  have  been  the  law  or  various  local  customs  of 
inheritance which prevailed here before the Conquest, we may 
be  fairly certain  that primogeniture  was unknown; that if  a 
man  left  several sons, his whole property, land  and chattels, 
were as a genefeal rule divided  among them  all-though  it is 
very  probable  that  land,  especially  land  held  on  servile 
conditions,  often  went  to the youngest  son.  Primogeniture 
creeps in with  the Conquest : very gradually a set of  rules of 
inheritance giving the whole land to the eldest male whenever 
there  are  males  of  equal  degree was  elaborated,  and  very 
slowly it was extended from the lands of  military tenants to 
other lands: that the land  of  the military tenant  should not 
be  divisible  is  very  intelligible.  Before  the end  of  Edward 
the First's  reign  the primogenitary rules had  been  extended 
to socage tenure-this  had been a slow process, but gradually 
it had  become  established  that he who  contended  that  the 
inheritance should be divided among all males of equal degree 
had  to  prove  his  case.  Other  systems endured  merely  as 
local  customs : in  Kent  the  inheritance  was  still  heritable 
among sons, and very commonly a tenement held in villeinage 
descended to the youngest son'.  But the gradual introduction 
of  primogeniture, together with the principle that lands could 
not be left by will and the activity of  the ecclesiastical courts 
combined to set a deep gulf  between what came to be called 
real  and  what  came  to  be  called  personal  property.  An 
explanation of  these two terms would take us  too far afield- 
but seize this principle, that for freehold and for chattels there 
came to be two distinct systems of  succession.  The freehold 
(with which  no  ecclesiastical  court  may meddle) descends to 
the heir, and only by force of  some local custom can it be the 
subject of  a last will.  The chattels can be left by will ; of all 
testamentary matters the ecclesiastical courts have cognizance ; 
if there is an intestacy the heir does not get the chattels ;  they 
are distributed  by the ecclesiastical  courts.  But  further the 
term of  years, the right of a lessee to whom land has been let 
for a term of  years, is for this purpose a chattel ; it is assimi- 
For the custom of  Borough English,  as it was called, see History of  English 
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lated  to  movable  goods;  it  is  a  new  creation,  and  the 
ecclesiastical  courts  have  successfully  asserted  that  it  can 
be  disposed  of  by  will-the  term  of  years  is  a  chattel  and 
personal property.  All this you will  of  course have to study 
much  more  thoroughly  hereafter.  The distinction  between 
real  and personal  property  is still an elementary distinction 
of  profound  importance  at the  present  day.  But  it  was 
necessary to say some  little about it, for the word freeholder 
must be constantly in  our mouths. 
In the Middle Ages land law is the basis of all public law. 
You  will  already have observed  how  the system  of  tenure 
provides  the king with  an  army  and  with  a  revenue-men 
owe military service by reason of tenure, they pay aids, reliefs, 
scutages by reason of tenure, by reason of tenure the king gets 
profitable wardships,  and marriages,  and escheats-he  is the 
supreme and ultimate  landlord.  But the influence of  tenure 
does  not  stop  here;  the  judicial  system  is  influenced  by 
tenure,  the  parliamentary  system  is  influenced  by  tenure. 
Every  lord  claims  a  right  to hold  a  court  of  and  for  his 
tenants.  This is  an important principle,  but we  can  hardly 
speak of its working until we have spoken of the courts older 
than feudalism-the  courts of the shire and the hundred which 
continue to exist during the feudal period. 
Now if we suppose a quite perfect feudal arrangement, then 
all courts, all judicial and governmental organization, should be 
determined by tenure.  The king as highest landlord should 
have a court of his tenants in chief; they would  sit as judges 
therein, and they again would be the king's advisers; it would 
be with their counsel and consent that the king would impose 
taxes and  make laws.  Then again each  of  these tenants in 
chief  would  have his  court of  sub-vassals, who  again  would 
have their courts.  Further the sole connection  between  the 
king and these sub-vassals would be a mediate connection, only 
through their lord would  he control them.  C who held  of B 
who  held of A who held of the king would  not be the king's 
man or have  any place in  a court or assembly over which the 
king presided;  he  would  not  even  be  A's  man;  he  would 
never  meet  or sit  along with  A's  tenants  on  a  footing  of 
legal equality ; he would owe no fealty or homage to any one 
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but his immediate lord, namely, B.  This ideal of  a perfectly 
feudalized  society  was  pretty  fully realized  in  France;  no 
immediate bond bound the vassals of the Duke of Normandy 
to the king of  the French;  they were  bound  to the Duke, 
and the Duke to the king.  Happily this  ideal  is  but very 
imperfectly  realized .  in  England, this  we  must  constantly 
notice ;  but  we  ought  carefully to keep  this  ideal  in  mind, 
for there have been  powerful forces making for its realization 
and they have had  to be  met not only by laws, but also by 
the sword. 
C.  Divisions of  the Realm  and Local  Government. 
(i)  England is divided  into counties or shires.  For the 
most part these units are already of very ancient date ; though 
some of  the Northern counties, in particular Lancashire, have 
been formed since the Norman Conquest.  Already in Edward's 
day the arrangement is in most respects that which at present 
exists.  Many, perhaps  most, of  these divisions  are in  their 
origin  not  divisions  into which  a  kingdom  of  England  has 
been carved, but are units which once were independent states 
but have coalesced to form the kingdom  of  England ; Kent, 
Sussex, Essex,  Middlesex,  Surrey have  had  kings  of  their 
own ; Norfolk and Suffolk are the settlements of  North Folk 
and South Folk.  As these old states by conquest fall together 
into one great state, some part of  their primitive organization 
is left to them; to use a modern phrase, they are mediatized ; 
in  some  cases the old  dynasty of  kings  became  for a while 
a dynasty of under-kings, sub-repli.  In other cases the shire 
may have  been  a division  carved out of  a larger whole, and 
organized on the model of  one of these mediatized  kingdoms. 
At any rate before the Norman  Conquest each shire had  its 
shire moot, which was  a court of  justice  and to some extent 
also a governmental assembly for the shire.  In it the ealdor- 
man had presided.  The ealdorman had been a national officer 
appointed  by the king and the national assembly.  The title 
ealdorman had, however, been giving way to that of eorl, and 
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Every shire had by no means necessarily an ealdorrnan or eorl 
to itself;  Canute had  divided  the kingdom  into four  great 
earldoms ; but down to the time of  the Conquest, this officer 
had  been  the chief  man  of  every  shire that lay within  its 
territory, the president  of  its  court, the leader  of  its forces. 
He received a third  part of  the profits  arising from the shire 
moot, the  third  penny  of  the  county,  as  it  was  afterwards 
called.  Along  with  the  ealdorman  in  the  shire  moot,  the 
*bishop  had  sat; it was  not until  after the Norman  Conquest 
that a firm line was drawn between temporal and ecclesiastical 
causes, the two had been heard together in the ancient courts. 
But  from  a very  remote  period,  the shire had  had  another 
officer, namely the shire reeve, or as we say, sheriff.  He seems 
from the first to have been  a royal  officer, appointed by the 
king, and  representing  the royal  authority.  The ealdorman 
seems to have been considered as a national leader, the sheriff 
as a royal  steward  or bailiff, chiefly concerned with  the pro- 
tection of the king's interests.  The shire moot had seemingly 
been  held  but  twice  in  the year.  There seems  little doubt 
that originally every freeman  of  the shire had  been  entitled 
and bound to attend it, but long before the Norman Conquest 
this right and  duty seems to have been  confined  to the free 
land-owners.  The process  whereby  land-owning  had  taken 
the place  of  personal freedom as a political qualification will 
come  before  us  hereafter,  but  we  had  better  at once  make 
a remark which is necessary if  we  are to understand medieval 
history.  The right  of  attending courts and  assemblies  was 
not a coveted right ; we must think of it rather as a burden- 
some  duty, a  duty  which  men  will  evade  if  they possibly 
can.  We see the class of landless freemen  getting gradually 
excluded from all participation  in  public business ; but where 
we  are apt to see a  disfranchising process, a  deprivation of 
political  rights, they saw  only a  relief  from  public  burdens, 
the  burden  of  attending  court  or  being  fined  for  non- 
attendance. 
Now the Norman Conquest had not destroyed the shire or 
the shire moot.  There was a change of names.  The French 
district  which  seemed  most  analogous  to the English  shire 
was  the cornitatus, the county, the district  which  had  been 
subject to the comes  or count, and  so the English shire  be- 
came a county.  And the earl  became  in  Latin documents, 
the comes.  But this title or dignity was but seldom conferred 
by William or by his sons, and the earl of  Norman times has 
about him but little of  the character of  a public  officer or the 
ruler of  a province.  The dignity was hereditary, though the 
heir did not acquire full possession of  it until he was invested 
by the king, until  he  was  girt with the sword  of  the county. 
He  like  his  English  predecessor  was  entitled  to the third 
penny  of  the  county;  but  for  the rest  he seems  from  the 
Conquest onwards to be rather a great nobleman, who usually 
holds large lands in the shire, than a public officer.  To this 
the palatine  earldoms are exceptions.  The earl  of  Chester 
becomes  almost  a  sovereign  prince,  so  does  the  bishop  of 
Durham ; but on the whole the Norman  kings seem to have 
seen the danger of  allowing official  power and jurisdiction to 
become hereditary in  the houses of  the great feudatories :- 
it was  not  by means  of  earls, but  by means  of  sheriffs, that 
they will govern the counties.  After the Conquest, that ancient 
officer, the sheriff, becomes in Latin documents the vicecomes, 
the vice-count; that was  the continental  title which  seemed 
best  suited  to describe him; but this must not induce us to 
think  of  him  as one  who  derives  his  power  from  the earl, 
or who  in  any way represents the earl : from first to last the 
sheriff is distinctively a royal official, a representative of kingly 
power-and  as the Norman  Conquest greatly  increased  the 
kingly power, so it greatly increased the power of  the sheriff. 
Even here  the tendency, so m~rked  in  the Middle  Ages, of 
every  office  to become  hereditary, to become  property, was 
felt, and just  in  a very few cases  the shrievalty  did  become 
hereditary;  but  on  the whole  the kings  succeeded  well  in 
maintaining  their  hold  over  the  sheriffs,  in  treating  them 
simply as their officers and representatives.  The sheriffs held 
their  offices at the king's  will.  In I 170 Henry I1 dismissed 
all the sheriffs of  England and put others in their stead.  The 
sheriff had in truth become a provincial viceroy; all the affairs 
of  the  shire-fiscal,  military,  governmental, its  justice  and 
police-were  under  his  control, and he  was the president of 
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For the Conquest had  not destroyed the shire moot.  It 
became the county court.  The Norman  kings seem to have 
seen  its value as a counterpoise to feudalism.  To a certain 
extent the feudal principle that all public  rights and duties 
are connected with  land  holding  had, even  before  the Con- 
quest, modified  the constitution  of  the ancient  assembly, it 
had  become  an  assembly  of  free  land-owners.  After  the 
Conquest  the  qualification  became  more  definite;  the free- 
holder  was  entitled  and  was  bound  to be  present.  But  a 
court formed  by all the freeholders  of  a shire is not, you will 
see, a court formed  upon  feudal lines.  In such an  assembly 
the tenants  in  chief  of the crown  have  to  meet  their  own 
vassals  on  a  footing  of  legal  equality ; a  tenant  may  find 
himself  sitting as the peer of  his  own  lord.  This retention 
of  the  old  courts  is  of  vast  importance  in  the  history  of 
parliament.  In  Henry  1's  day the  county court  was  held, 
as in the days of  the Confessor, twice a year.  More frequent 
assemblies  seem to have become  necessary.  By the charter 
of  1217, it  is  ordered  that the county  court  shall  not  meet 
more  often  than  once  a  month;  monthly sessions  seem  to 
have been common. 
For a long time after the Conquest the county court re- 
mained  what it was  before the conquest, the great ordinary 
court of  litigation  for all the men  of  the shire.  The growth 
of  the feudal courts (of which hereafter)  had  to some extent 
diverted  business  from it; on  the other hand, the king used 
it as a check on the feudal courts.  At the petition  of  a suitor 
suggesting that he  could not get justice from the lord's court, 
the king would direct the sheriff to intervene  and remove the 
case into the county court.  Gradually, however, the county 
court began to lose its importance as a judicial tribunal.  This 
was due, however, not to the rivalry of  the feual courts, but 
to the ever  growing  vigour  of  the king's  own  court, which 
began  to throw  open  its doors to all suitors.  Of  this  con- 
centration  of  justice  something  has  been  said  already and 
more must be  said  hereafter.  But by the end of  Edward I's 
reign, the king's  own  courts had  already practically  become 
courts of  first  instance  for all  matters  of  much  importance. 
The county  court  had  jurisdiction  in  personal  actions  (i.e. 
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actions in which land  or rights connected with land were not 
claimed) up to 40 shillings, and jurisdiction in actions for land 
when  default  of justice  was  made in  a  feudal court, but  in 
one way or another litigants could  generally take their  cases 
to the king's courts. 
Rut while the county court was thus losing  its high place 
as a judicial tribunal, it had been becoming the very foundation 
of  the  political  constitution.  When  in  the  middle  of  the 
thirteenth  century  we  find  elected  representatives  called  to 
form  part  of  the national  assembly,  of  a  common  council 
of  the  realm,  or  parliament,  they  are  the  representatives 
of  the county  courts.  They are  not  the representatives  of 
unorganized  collections  of  men, they are the representatives, 
we  might  almost  say, of  corporations.  The whole  county 
is  in  theory  represented  by  its court.  So much  is  this  the 
case  that  the  language  of  the  time  draws  no  distinction 
between the two-the  same word comitatus serves to describe 
both  the county, the geographical district, and the assembly. 
The king  in  his  financial  necessities  has  treated  with  the 
counties,  long  before  the  counties  were  ordered  to  send 
representative  knights  to  parliament.  But  the  corporate 
nature  of  the county,  the identity  of  the  county  and  the 
county court  is  best  brought  out by  entries on  the judicial 
rolls, entries which  enable us  to see the county in  the days 
of  Richard and of John.  The king's  itinerant justices  from 
time  to  time  visit  the  counties;  the  whole  county  (totus 
comitatus), i.e. the body  of  freeholders,  stands before  them ; 
it  declares  what  the county  has been  doing  since  the  last 
visitation;  the county  can  give judgment;  the county can 
give  testimony;  the  county  can  be  punished  by  fines  and 
amercements when the county has done wrong ; if the county 
has  given  false judgment, the county  can  be  summoned  to 
Westminster; four knights must  be sent to represent it; he 
who  has  suffered  by  its  false judgment  may  challenge  the 
county to fight;  and  the county fights  by the body  of the 
county champion.  Even  the principle  of  election  has  been 
long growing before the day when the county is called  on to 
elect members of parliament.  In I 194, for example, coroners 
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elected to keep the pleas of  the crown1.  These custodes pla- 
citorzmz  coronae, or coroners, are intended  to  act as checks 
on the sheriff; they are elected  by the county court.  There 
has  even been a long struggle to make the sheriff an elected 
officer, and at Edward's  death  this  has  for a moment  been 
a successful struggle ; in  1300 he  conceded  the demand  for 
elective  sheriffs.  This  concession, however, was  withdrawn 
very soon after his death.  Of the representation of  the county 
court in  parliament, we  must speak hereafter;  so also of its 
jurisdiction  as a court of justice;  but we  must learn to think 
of  the county as an organized  unity  which  has long had  a 
common life, common rights  and common  duties.  The idea 
of  a corporation  had not yet made its way into English law ; 
we  must wait  for the fifteenth  century for that; had  it  been 
otherwise,  in  all  probability  the  county  of  the  thirteenth 
century  would  have  been  recognized  as constituting a  cor- 
poration, a  corporation governed  by the body of  freeholders 
in the county court. 
(ii)  The county or shire is divided  into hundreds.  The 
number  of  hundreds  in  a  shire varies very greatly, and  the 
size  of  the  hundreds  also  is  very  different  in  different 
parts of  England.  Thus there  are  5  in  Leicestershire, 9 in 
Bedfordshire, 17 in  Cambridgeshire and 63  in  Kent.  This 
division  of  the  land  into  districts  known  as  hundreds  is 
of  very  ancient  date-in  all  probability  it  has  existed  ever 
since the settlement of England by the German tribes.  Similar 
divisions known as hundreds are found in various parts of the 
continent.  It  seems very probable that the German tribe was 
for military and judicial purposes subdivided into groups, each 
of  IOO warriors, and that our English hundreds  represent the 
settlements of  such  groups.  In some  parts  of  England,  in 
the  north-east,  Yorkshire  and  Lincolnshire, the  district  is 
called,  not  a  hundred, but  a  wapentake-this  is  the  name 
both  of the district and of  its court or assembly, and seems 
The Forma procedendi  in  placitis  coronne  regis  (Select Charters, p.  260) is 
generally regarded as the origin of  the coroner's  office.  Dr Gross (Hisfory  of  the 
O8ce  of  Coroner, 1892, and Srlect Cme~from  Coroners' RoZ/s, 1896) claims to have 
found earlier references.  Maitland was unconvinced. ,  See Eng. Hist. Rev.  VIII, 
758, and History of  English Law, I, 519. 
to  point to the time when the assembly was  still  a body of 
armed warriors, who marked their approval  by clashing their 
weapons.  The hundred court or hundred moot of the Anglo- 
Saxon time seems to have been  the court of  ordinary juris- 
diction for the men  of  the hundred ; it, like the shire court, 
had  both civil and criminal jurisdiction ; the relation  of the 
one to the other we  do not exactly know, but perhaps a suitor 
was  not  entitled  to go to the shire-moot, until  the hundred 
moot had  made default in  justice.  It was held twelve times 
a year. 
The Conquest  did  not destroy  the  hundred  court;  the 
freeholders  of  the hundred  were  bound  to attend  it and to 
sit in it as judges.  But in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
it gradually lost business owing to that concentration of justice 
in  the king's courts, of which mention has already been made. 
Before the end of  Edward's reign, its competence in personal 
actions  like  that of the county court had  been  restricted  to 
cases in which less than 40 shillings was at stake.  But further, 
even before the Conquest, many of these courts had fallen into 
private  hands;  the notion  that all  jurisdiction  is  the king's 
had been formed, and the kings had freely given and sold the 
right of  holding courts.  To a great landowner this right was 
very  profitable,  it enabled him  to keep his tenants  in  hand, 
and we  must  further remember  that throughout the Middle 
Ages jurisdiction  is  a source of  income-the  lord  of  a court 
has  a right to the numerous fines and forfeitures which  arise 
out  of  the  doing  of  justice.  It is  probable  that  in  the 
thirteenth century most of  the hundred courts had come into 
private hands.  In 1278 Edward  made a vigorous attempt to 
recover the jurisdictions  which  had  become  proprietary; he 
instituted a searching inquiry qzbo  warranto, by what warrant, 
under what title, the lords were preSuming to exercise a juris- 
diction  which  prima  facie  belonged  to  the  king;  and  his 
justices succeeded in  recovering  a great deal of  the jurisdic- 
tion  by  insisting  that  only  under  written  documents  or by 
long prescription could a subject claim any larger jurisdiction 
than  that  of  the ordinary  manorial  courts.  The  ordinary 
manorial  courts, you  will  understand,  had  grown  up  under 
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the more  ancient courts of  the shire and the hundred.  Also 
we must note that even when a hundred court had fallen into 
private  hands,  the  king's  officer,  the  sheriff,  had  at  least 
generally the right to hold  it twice a year for criminal cases. 
Twice  a year it was  the sheriff's  turn to hold  these courts, 
and  a  court  so holden  by him  came  to  be  known  as the 
sheriff's tourn.  When such  courts as these were  in  private 
hands, they were generally called courts leet.  The court baron 
and the customary  court  of  the manor  are the  outcome  of 
tenure ; a court leet on the other hand  has a certain criminal 
jurisdiction, jurisdiction  in  cases  of  petty  offences, and it  is 
not the outcome of tenure-it  must have its origin in  a royal 
grant, real or supposed ; this doctrine Edward has succeeded 
in enforcing by means of his quo warranto inquiry1. 
In the general  administration of  the law, the hundred  is 
an important unit.  In particular it is important in the system 
of  trial  by jury  introduced  by  Henry  11.  Each hundred  is 
bound to present its malefactors ; this is done by means of  a 
jury of  twelve.  It is a responsible unit in the police system ; 
from an early time, the hundred is bound to pursue criminals. 
Under the law of  the Conqueror, if  a man be found slain and 
the slayer be not produced, the hundred is fined, unless it can 
prove that the slain man was an Englishman ; in other words, 
it pays a murdrum or murder fine unless  there is a present- 
ment of Englishry.  So again in Edward's day, the hundreds 
have lately been  put  under constables  bound to see that the 
men  of  the hundred  have  proper  armour for the pursuit  of 
malefactors and the repelling of  enemies.  In very early times 
we hear a little of  a hundred's  ealdor, and it is possible that 
he  was  an  elected  president  of  the  county;  but  after  the 
Conquest, and  probably before  the Conquest, he has disap- 
peared ; the  sheriff  appoints  a  serjeant  or  bailiff  (serviens, 
ballivus) for each hundred, who presides over the court, unless 
that court be in private  hands, and is  bound to look  after all 
the king's business within the hundred, the collection of taxes, 
fines, forfeitures and the like. 
1 For the whole subject of seigniorial jurisdiction,  see History of  English Law, 
vol. I, pp.  571-94. 
The  Tow~ship 
(iii)  The lowest unit  in the governmental  system is the 
township or vill ; the Latin word  used  to describe the geo- 
graphical  district is viZZa,  while  viZZata  describes the people 
of  the villa regarded  as a collective whole.  The township as 
such has no court of its own, but  it has many police duties 
to perform.  It has duties in  the apprehension  of  criminals, 
and can  be  fined  for the neglect of  them.  When the king's 
justices  visit  the county, every township has to come before 
them.  For  this  purpose,  the  township  is  represented  by 
its  reeve  (praepositus)  and  four  best  men  (quatuor  meliores 
homines),  and  its  opinion  is  constantly  taken  as  to  the 
guilt or innocence of  accused  persons.  We constantly read 
that  the township  of  (let  us  say) Trumpington  (villata  de 
Trumpington) says that A is guilty of  the death of  B, or the 
like ;-if  it says what  is  untrue,  it is  liable to be  amerced. 
The representation  of  the townships in  the local  courts we 
can trace back to the time of Henry I ; but in all probability 
it is of much higher antiquityl. 
Here it becomes necessary to take account of  a principle 
that we largely noticed  when speaking of feudal tenure.  The 
jurisdictional  constitution  of  England  would  have  been  a 
much  simpler  matter  to  describe  had  there  not  grown  up 
by the side of the ancient courts of the shire and the hundred 
a newer set of  courts expressive of  a newer principle-feudal 
courts expressive of the principle that every lord has a right 
to hold  a  court  of  and  for  his  tenants.  The obligation  of 
attending the lord's court, the obligation of doing suit of court, 
is one of  the incidents of  feudal tenure.  This principle has 
been slowly growing up : but seems an admitted truth in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
We find that very generally these feudal courts are courts 
of  manors;  indeed  the  legal  theory  of  later times  asserts, 
though  as I  think  without  warrant,  that only as part  of  a 
manor could  such a court exist.  Of the manor then we  are 
compelled  to say a few words.  We find (I am speaking of 
l It would appear from a note in the MS  that Maitland went on to speak of the 
Township as a fiscal unit.  What he may have said on this point may be gathered 
from Domesday  Book  and  Beyond, p.  147;  and the Hislory  of  Ejzglish  Law,  I, 
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Edward 1's day) that England is full of  manors.  We cannot 
indeed say that the whole  land  is parcelled out into manors ; 
our  law has no such theory as that all land is  part  of  some 
manor.  Still manors there are in plenty.  The name manor, 
manerium, has seemingly meant in the first instance merely an 
abiding place (manerium a  manendo) ; it is closely connected 
with mansio ; it has been used more or less vaguely to signify 
a landed  estate ; gradually it has gained  a legal significance, 
it has  come  to imply the existence  of  a  court.  Now  if  we 
take a typical maneriz~m  of  the time, we  commonly find that 
there  is in  the first place  a quantity of  demesne land-land, 
that  is,  which  the lord  of  the manor  has  in  his  own  hand, 
which  is in  every sense his very own.  Then there are lands 
which  are held  of  him  by  freehold  tenants,  who  owe  him 
services : some of  them perhaps are bound to do the military 
service  due to the  king, others  pay  him  rent  in  money  or 
in kind, and perhaps are bound to aid him in  his ploughing: 
these are free socagers.  Then there are the tenants in villein- 
age, who owe week work and so forth, and by whose services 
his  demesne  lands  are cultivated.  All  these  lands  usually 
lie  together, and very  often  the manor  is  coterminous with 
the township. 
For the free tenants of  his manor, the lord keeps a court; 
generally by  the terms  of  their  tenure  they  are  bound  to 
attend this court at stated intervals, e.g. in every third week ; 
they owe suit to his court, debent sectam ad  cgriam maneni: 
This idea seems indeed to lie at the root of  the term socage, 
it  is  that  of seeking or following;  the socagers,  sohemami, 
are bound to seek, follow, attend the court of  the lord.  The 
general  principle  seems for some time past to have been ad- 
mitted into English law-that  if  a man has freehold tenants, 
he may hold  a court for them ; he  may bind  them  by their 
tenures to do suit to his court.  Such a court then  becomes 
the proper court in which to demand any of the freehold land 
that is holden of  the manor-if  I claim against you land which, 
as we  both  admit,  is  holden  of  A, then  I  must  begin  my 
action  in  A's  court, if  A  has  one.  But  great  inroads  have 
been made upon this system  of  feudal justice.  The hand of 
Henry I1 has been felt.  The principle just expressed has not 
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been abrogated, but its importance has been greatly curtailed. 
In one way and another it has become very possible for  liti- 
gants to evade  the manorial  jurisdictions,  to go straight  to 
the king's court, or having just begun the action in the manor 
court to get it removed  into the king's  court by a royal writ. 
Still these  courts exist, and  in  Edward's  day have not  yet 
ceased to do justice.  Now such a court is constituted by the 
lord  and his  freeholders-they  are the judges;  he who  owes 
suit  of  court  is  bound  to  go  and  sit  there  as  a  judge-a 
question  relating to freehold  land is decided by the peers of 
the  tenure-the  freeholder  there  gets  the  judgment  of  his 
peers,jzrdicizmz pariz~m  suowm.  In  later times such a court 
is known  as 'the court  baron  of  the manor,'  a phrase which 
seems  at first  merely  to have meant  the lord's  court, curia 
baronis. 
But then  again the lord  had what, at least  in  later times, 
was regarded  as a distinct court for the tenants  in villeinage. 
This was  called  the customary court, and the principle  was 
established that in this court, unlike the court baron, the lord's 
steward was the only judge.  I very much doubt whether this 
principle  was  established  in  the thirteenth  century.  Many 
important questions depend on  this point;  in  particular the 
question  how  far the tenants  in villeinage  were protected  in 
their holdings.  If really the lord's steward was the only judge, 
then they were protected  only by the lord's  sense of  justice : 
it  was  otherwise  if  they got the  judgment  of  their pares. 
However you  must know the orthodox theory that the lord's 
steward was the sole judge.  It was  in  this so-called  custom- 
ary court that all transfers of  the lands held in villeinage were 
effected:-A  wishing to put  B in  his  place, surrendered  the 
land into the lord's hand, who admitted B as tenant; A being 
dead, the lord  admitted B his  heir.  It became  the practice 
to enrol  all these  proceedings;  we  have  a  few  manor  rolls 
from  Henry  111,  a  considerable  number  from  Edward  I. 
Copies of  the entries relating to their lands were given to the 
tenants.  Gradually, but this is not until a later day, the term 
tenant in villeinage gives way to tenant by copy of court roll, 
or copyholder ; the copies of  the court roll are the evidences 
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in  order to finish this matter:-about  the middle  of  the fif- 
teenth  century the king's  courts begin  to protect  the copy- 
holder  even  against  his  lord ; the  services  again  become 
commuted  for  money  payments;  after  the  discovery  of 
Mexico the value of  money falls very rapidly, these payments 
become trifling; at last the copyholder is almost as complete 
an owner of  land as is the freeholder :-but  it is long indeed 
before  the distinction ceases to be  of  political importance- 
not  until  1832 does the copyholder vote for  knights  of  the 
shire.  The tenure still exists, a horrible nuisance as you will 
learn at large some day. 
It should  be noted  that according to the orthodox legal 
theory of the sixteenth century and of  to-day, there can be no 
manor without two freehold tenants, sufficient tenants, that is, 
to constitute a court baron.  Whether this theory be of ancient 
date, I very much doubt ;  as a matter of fact, in the thirteenth 
century there are many maneria, so-called in legal documents, 
in which there are no tenants but tenants in  villeinage. 
Our kings have succeeded in asserting and maintaining the 
principle that the feudal jurisdiction is a purely civil jurisdic- 
tion,  that the fact of  tenure  does  not  give to the lord  any 
criminal or correctional jurisdiction over his tenants, or at least 
over such of them  as are free men.  But as a matter of  fact, 
either by means of royal grants purchased from kings in want of 
money, or by means of  usurpations so ancient that they can no 
longer be called in  question, very many of  the lords exercise 
some of  that criminal and police jurisdiction  which as a rule 
belongs to the hundred and county courts.  In the language 
of later law books, and to use  a term  the origin of  which  is 
singularly obscure, they have established  courts leet-courts 
which take cognizance of petty misdemeanours.  Such courts, 
however, according to the legal theory of  Edward's time, are no 
natural outcome of  tenure, like courts baron  and customary 
courts, but must be claimed by grant or prescription1. 
As a matter  of fact, there  is  usually  a  close connection 
between the manor and the township.  Very usually the same 
geographical district which  from one point of  view is a town- 
' 'The lord  might  also  hold  a court  for  his  honour,  for  all  his  immediate 
tenants  ....  The Abbot of  Ramsey may bring to his court at Broughton his frerhold 
tenants  from  seven counties.'  Pollock  and  Maltland,  Hirlory  of  English Law, 
vol. I,  pp. 585-6. 
ship, is from another point of view a manor.  Recent historians 
see in  the township a community which  is  far more  ancient 
than the manor ;  a community which, so far as English history 
is  concerned, we  may  call  primitive; a  group of  men  or of 
families  bound  together,  very  possibly  by  kinship,  which 
cultivates land by a system  of collective agriculture, which is 
or  has  been  the owner of  the land, which  to a  large  extent 
regulates its own  affairs, decides how the land shall be tilled, 
decides whether new members shall be admitted, has a town- 
ship-moot in which  such affairs are settled, though it has  not 
what we should call a court of justice.  In course of time, we 
are told, this primitive community has in general fallen under 
the dominion  of  a lord, has become a community of  tenants, 
and  usually  of  tenants  who hold  in  villeinage,  has  become 
a manor.  But still for the purposes of public law, in  particilar 
for what  we  may  call  police  purposes,  it  is as a  township, 
and not  as a  manor, that the state takes account of  it, and 
when, as sometimes  happens, the vill  is  not  coincident  with 
the manor,  it  is  the township and not  the manor  that must 
answer  to the state for the apprehension of criminals and so 
forth.  The two organisms exist side by side ;  the older is not 
thoroughly absorbed in the newer. 
All  theories, however,  as to the early  history  of  manors 
and townships are beset by very great difficulties which at the 
present  moment cannot be explained.  What at present con- 
cerns us  is that the state has  fixed on the township, not the 
manor, as the unit responsible  for good order.  It is, I think, 
the theory of the thirteenth century and of later times that all 
England  is divided  into townships, that every bit of land lies 
in  some vill, while it is not the theory that every acre of land 
must  belong  to some manor.  Again, and this  may help to 
explain the co-existence  of township and manor, until lately, 
until  1290 it has been quite possible for landowners to create 
new  manors ; they could  not  be  allowed  to alter the police 
system of the country by the creation of new townships.  On 
the other hand, as a matter of fact, it is difficdlt to find a town- 
ship which  is  outside the manorial  system ;  the township is 
represented, we have said, by its reeve and four best men, but 
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elected by his fellow villeins, who is answerable to the lord for 
looking after the manor, and seeing that his fellow villeins do 
their due services; to have served as reeve is indeed regarded 
as a presumptive proof of personal villeinage1. 
(iv)  Under  the name  of  boroughs  a  certain  number  of 
communities have attained to a higher  stage of organization 
than that of the generality of  townships.  But this is a matter 
of  degree; at no time before the year  1835 can we  say that 
the constitution  of  the various boroughs is the same through- 
out England, or even that it conforms to any one type.  There 
hardly  can  be  a  history  of  the  English  borough,  for  each 
borough  has its own  history.  That history  largely depends 
on the charters that it has been able to obtain from the king 
or  from  other  lords,  and  the  liberality  of  the  charter  has 
depended on  the price  that the burghers were ready  to pay 
for  it ; municipal  privileges  were  only  to  be  obtained  for 
valuable consideration.  At the end of the thirteenth century, 
however, the time of which we  are speaking, the privileges  of 
the  boroughs,  the  institutions  which  make  it  something 
different from a mere township, may be summed up under the 
followirig heads. 
(a)  Immunity from the jurisdiction  of  the ordinary local 
courts.  The borough  has  aspired  to  be  a  hundred  all by 
itself-to  be  exempt therefore out of  the jurisdiction  of  any 
hundred court.  When the king's justices visit the county, the 
borough  is  represented  before  it  not by  the reeve  and  four 
men,  but  by  a jury  of  twelve, just  as every hundred  in  the 
county is represented by a jury of twelve.  Occasionally more 
extensive  immunities  have  been  conferred,  the  borough  is 
exempted out of  the jurisdiction  of the county court.  Some 
of the richer and larger boroughs have gone even further than 
this-it  has been  granted to them  that their burgesses  may 
sue and be sued only in their own courts, and thus one cannot 
sue a burgess even in the king's court. 
(b)  Coupled with this immunity is the privilege of having 
courts of its own, usually  with the jurisdiction  of  a hundred 
court ;  but the constitution of these courts varies greatly.  In 
These views are substantially unchanged  in the History  of  Enzlish  Law, 
vol.  1,  pp.  594-634. 
some  cases  the borough  has  already got  itself  free  of  the 
manorial  system, and its courts are presided  over by elected 
officers;  in  other cases the borough  is still a manor and its 
court  is  the  lord's  court  held  under  the  presidency  of  his 
steward. 
(c)  Very frequently indeed  the borough has by this time 
purchased the right of having its own elective officers-ballivi, 
praepositi, bailiffs or reeves, who stand on somewhat the same 
level as the bailiffs of the hundreds whom the sheriff appoints. 
Often again the burgesses have their own coroners, and in this 
respect are free from the organization of the county.  In some 
cases the burgesses have already an elected mayor with ampler 
rights and powers than those of a bailiff or reeve. 
(d) Very generally the burgesses have acquired the right 
to collect the taxes within  the borough, and for this purpose 
to exclude the sheriff.  For the ancient taxes they compound 
with  a  lump sum  at the Exchequer-they  are thus said  to 
hold the borough in farm. 
(e)  Very generally also the borough constitution  is inter- 
woven  with  that  of  a  merchant  guild,  an  association  of 
merchants which has by charter obtained the power  of  regu- 
lating trade.  In  some of the greater  boroughs  besides  the 
merchant-guild,  there  are  trade-guilds,  or  craft-guilds,  the 
weavers' guild, the tailors' guild and so forth.  A constitution 
in which the merchant-guild is the ruling body of the town, is 
gradually,  and  in  very  various  stages,  supplanting  a  more 
ancient  constitution  which  was  simply  that  of  a  privileged 
township or privileged  manor. 
The city of London resembles rather a shire than a town- 
ship-already  in  Henry  1's  day it has got so far as to have 
sheriffs of its own, nay more, it holds the county of Middlesex 
in  farm; its elective sheriffs act as sheriff of  Middlesex1.  To 
be utterly and totally exempt out of the shire organization, to 
be counties of themselves, to have sheriffs of their own, is one 
of  the  ends  for  which  the  more  ambitious  boroughs  are 
striving, though  in  Edward  1's  day none  save  London  has 
attained  it. 
The Charter of  Henry I to  London  is  printed  by  Stubbs, Select  Charters, 
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Boroughs which are also bishop's sees are distinguished 2s 
cities (civitates), and their burgesses  are citizens.  The term 
city tells us no more than this, it does not point to any higher 
degree of  municipal  organization  or independence than  does 
the term borough (burgzis). 
In later  times, in  the fifteenth  century and onwards, we 
can arrive at a legal  definition  of  a borough; the notion of a 
corporation has then been formed, a fictitious person, a juristic 
person, which  has rights and duties which  are quite distinct 
from the rights and duties of  its members.  But this notion, 
though developed  in  the Canon Law, only made its way into 
English law by slow degrees1.  The greater boroughs, however, 
of  Edward's reign have already in substance attained to all or 
almost  all  of  those distinctive characteristics which the later 
lawyers  regarded  as  essential  to  corporate  unity.  These 
characteristics are five-the  right of perpetual succession, the 
power  to sue and be  sued  as a whole and by the corporate 
name, the power  to hold  lands, the right  to use a common 
seal, and the power of  making by-laws.  Substantially these 
characteristics exist, but  as yet  they have not been  worked 
into a theory by the conception  of  a fictitious person, who  is 
immortal,  who  sues  and  is  sued,  who  holds  lands,  has 
a  seal of  his  own, who  makes  regulations  for  those  natural 
persons  of  whom  he  is  composed.  The question  what  is 
the constitution  of this fictitious person, how  he is  made up 
out of  natural  persons, has not  yet  arisen.  The borough  is 
as yet  no  more a corporation, no  less, than is the township, 
the hundred, or the county; and if  the borough may be spoken 
of  as having rights and duties, as breaking the law and being 
punished, this is true also of the county, the hundred, and the 
township. 
D.  Central Government. 
We  turn  to  the  central  government,  the  king  and  his 
councils.  This we  are wont  to  regard  as  the  main  theme 
of  constitutional  law.  We have here, however, postponed  it, 
The idea is worked  out  in Maitland's  Tou~?zsh$  and Boroz~gk,  Cambridge, 
1897. 
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for  it  can  hardly be  understood  without  some  preliminary 
knowledge of the land law and of the local institutions.  Now 
at the end of Edward's reign we find several different central 
institutions.  In the first place there is the kingship; this is 
the centre of the centre.  Then there is that assembly of  the 
three estates of the realm, clergy, lords and commons, to which 
the name parliamenturn  is  coming to be  specifically  appro- 
priated.  Then again the king has a council (concilium) which 
is distinct from  parliament, and he has high officers of  state, 
a chancellor, treasurer, constable, marshal and so forth.  Then 
again he has courts, courts which in  a peculiar sense are his 
courts:  there  is  the King's  Bench, the  Common  Bench, the 
Exchequer.  All these now are distinct and have their different 
functions; but  looking  back  a  little way  we  see  that  they 
have not always been  distinct, that a difference, for instance, 
between  the king's  council  (concilium Regis) and the king's 
court (curia Regis) has  but slowly been  established.  We will 
take therefore a brief retrospect  of the history of our central 
institutions as a whole. 
(i)  Before  1066. 
Among the German tribes described by Tacitus a kingship 
was by no means universal.  In some cases the highest officers 
areprincipes elected  by the tribe in its popular  assembly ; in 
other  cases  the tribe  has already  a  ?,ex; he  also  is  elected, 
chosen  it  would  seem  because  of  his  noble  descent, but  his 
power  seems  to be very limited.  Our own  forefathers when 
they first attacked the province of  Britain seem to have had no 
kings ; their leaders were ealdormen, in whom we  may recog- 
nize the principes of  Tacitus.  But the kingship appears very 
soon ; the process of conquering a new country would be very 
favourable to its development.  The small states which were 
afterwards to coalesce into the kingdom  of England, seem  in 
other  respects  to  have  resembled  the states  described  by 
Tacitus.  Each had  its popular assembly, the assembly of  all 
free men, its principes or ealdormen elected in that assembly, 
and its king.  The ealdorman presides over apagus or district; 
the ealdormen, under the king's presidency, meet to determine 
the minor  affairs of  the state, but the weightier  matters  are Constitz6tionaZ History  Growth of Fegdadism 
discussed  in  the  folk-moot :-de  minoribus  rebas  princ@es 
consultant, de  majoribz~s  omnes. 
Gradually by  conquest  greater kingdoms  are formed,  at 
last  the English kingdom.  The way for  this  was  prepared 
by the acceptance of  the Christian faith and the organization 
of  an  English  church.  The old  state which  has thus been 
absorbed in  a larger state does not lose its unity, it now exists 
as a shire of the new kingdom; sometimes the members of its 
once royal  house continue to be its ealdormen ; its folk-moot 
still exists, but now as a shire-moot, the county court of later 
days.  The  n,atianal  asse~bly  is  not  a  folk-moot,  not  an 
a~emblypf  the whole people, but a witenagemot, an assembly 
&the  wise, the sapientes.  This assembly when we look back 
at it seems a very unstable and indefinite body.  5t: comprises 
the bishops, and towards  the end of the period we often  find 
a number of abbots present.  It comprisesalso the ealdormen 
of the shires ; their number varies according as the shires are 
administered  singly  or  in  groups.  Besides  these  there  are 
a  number  af  peFsons  who  generally describe  themselves as 
ministri Regis, or king's thanes, and this number increases as 
time goes on.  It can never have been a very large assembly. 
' In a witenagemot held at Luton in  November, 931, were the 
2  archbishops,  2  Welsh  princes,  17 bishops,  I5 ealdormen, 
5 abbots and 59 ministri.  In another, that of Winchester, in 
934, were present the 2 archbishops, 4 Welsh kings, 17 bishops, 
4 abbots, 12 ealdormen and  52 mitzistri.  These are perhaps 
the fullest extant lists1.'  The question arises, who were these 
mieistri or king's thanes ? 
Theprincefs of  Tacitus has around him a train of  warlike 
companions (comites).  Jt is the duty of  all men to fight ; the 
host, as is often said, is the nation  in arms ; but these comites 
are more especially bound to fight and to fight for their leader; 
this is their glory; it gives  them  a high place in the estima- 
tion of the community.  We can recognize them in the gesith, 
the companion,  of  our own  kings, a  name which  gradually 
gives  place  to  that  of  thane, or  servant, in  Latin  fninister. 
A nobility by service is thus formed, and the thegnhood begins 
Stubbs, Constttuttoaal History, vol.  I, 5 52. 
to be connected with the holding of land and to be hereditary. 
The unappropriated land, the land of the nation, the folk-land, 
forms a great fund whereout the king, with the consent of  the 
wise, can  reward his faithful followers1.  The thane begins to 
look somewhat like the tenant by knight service of later times, 
and the king's thane (for an ealdorman may have thanes) begins 
to look like a tenant in  chief.  The  definite idea of a military 
tenure,  A  tenet  de Rege per  servicizmt unius  militis, is not 
formed  before  the  Conquest;  but  to an  extent,  and  in  a 
manner that is now very dark to us, the military service due 
comes to be  connected with  and measured  by landholding2. 
It is well  to see that there were powerful economic causes in 
which  this incipient  feudalism  had its roots.  As agriculture 
becomes  higher, as the distribution  of  property grows  more 
unequal, as the art of war is developed, it becomes more and 
more convenient that some should fight while others till the 
soil : there is a  division of labour, a specialization of employ- 
ments.  The work of feudalism goes on in the lowest strata of 
society as well as in the highest.  While the king is gathering 
round him a body of  armed vassals who are great landowners 
because they are vassals, the smaller men  are putting them- 
selves  under  the  protection  of  lords,  are content that their 
lords should do the necessary fighting while they till the lord's 
land.  Dark as is  the early history of  the manor, we can see 
that before the Conquest England is  covered by what in all 
substantial  points  are  manors,  though  the  term  manor .is 
brought hither by the Normans.  Furthermore, in the interests 
of peace and justice, the state insists  that every landless man 
shall have a lord, who will produce him  in  court in case he be 
accused.  Slowly the relation of  man and lord extends itself, 
and everywhere it is connected with land.  The king's thanes 
then are coming to be the king's military tenants in chief. 
The term folk-la~d  is  now regarded  not  as denotlng  public  land,  but  as 
'land held without written title under customary law.'  Histor~~  of  Elzgltsh Law, 
vol.  I, p.  62.  The point was  proved  by  Mr Paul  Vinogradoff in  1893.  Eng. 
Hisf. Rev.  VIII,  1-17.  This does not imply that  there was  no unappropriated 
land, only that it was not called folk-Zatzd. 
Maitland throws some light upon  th~s  dark question  in Domesday Book  and 
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We cannot then  arrive at any strict theory as to the con- 
stitution of  the witenagemat.  It is an assembly af the great 
folk ; when  there is a strong king on the throne it is pretty 
much  in  his  power  to  say  how  it  shall  be  constituted,  ta 
summon whom  he  will; whe-n  th-e  king is weak, it is  apt to 
become  anarchicd.  It has  even  been  contended  by  Mr 
Freeman that every free man had  in theory a right to attend 
itl; but  it is difficult to believe that a theory was maintained 
which was so flagrantly inconsistent with the actual facts.  At 
all  events  it  is  clear  that really  this assembly  was  a  small 
aristocratic body, tending always to become more aristocratic. 
The bishDps constitute its-most  permanent  and at times its 
most  powerful  element. 
Such then is the national assembly, and at least  on  paper 
its powers seem vast ; it-can elect kings and depose them ; the 
king and witan  legislate;  it is with the counsel and sonsent. 
of the witan that the king publishes laws ; the-king and witan 
nominate  the ealdormen  and the bishops, make grants of the 
public  lands,  impose taxes, decide  on  peace  and  war, and 
form a tribunal of last resort for causes criminal and civil.  It 
is a supreme legislative, governmental, and judicial assemhly. 
Such  terms as  these,  however, may  easily  raise  a  false 
notion  in  modern  minds.  The whole  business  of  a  central 
government is  as yet but small.  Legislation is no common 
event; as already  said,  all  the extant  dooms of  kings  and 
witan would  make but  a small book.  Taxation is still more 
uncommon, of anything that can  be called  by that name we 
hear  nothing until  late in  the day.  The rents and profits of 
the public  lands, the profits of  the courts, afford  a sufficient 
revenue  for such central government as there is.  T_hft  Bane- 
geld  ef Eth&dls  reign is pxhaps the first tax ; in gg I,  994, 
1002, 1007, 1011,  a tribute was raised  to buy off  the Danish 
invaders.  Lastly, though we  have clear proof that the witen- 
agemot acted  as a court of justice,  it was  no  ordinary court 
for  ordinary  men ; recourse  to it  was  not  encouraged ; the 
normal courts were the local courts, and suitors were forbidden 
to seek the royal audience until justice had failed them in the 
hundred and the shire. 
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Meanwhile the king's  splendour grew as the extent of  his 
territory  grew.  From  being  merely  the  nation's  leader, he 
became  the lord  of  all men, and we  may almost say the lord 
of all  land  and  lord  of  all justice.  While  as yet almost all 
offences  can  be  atoned  for  by  money  payments,  treason 
becomes  an  utterly  inexpiable offence.  The national  land 
becomes always more and more the king's land, and the king's 
favour is  thus the source of  honour and of wealth.  What is 
more, justice  is  regarded  as being  the  king's,  he  can  grant 
jurisdiction  to whom  he pleases, indeed  a grant of  land  now 
usually  involves a grant of  jurisdiction ; the  hundred  courts 
come into private hands and manorial courts arise.  This, the 
most  dangerous element  of  feudalism,  is  rapidly  developed 
towards  the  end  of  our  period;  in  particular  Edward  the 
Confessor  seems  to have  been  lavish  in  his  grants of  juris- 
diction1. 
We have  said, however, that the king's  splendour  grows, 
rather  than  that  his  power  grows.  Whether  he  will  be 
powerful or  no  depends now very much on  his own personal 
character.  That lordship of  land and of justice  of  which we 
have just spaken, may be as easily a cause  of  weakness  as of 
strength.  Every grant that he makes of  land or of jririsdiction 
raises up a new vassal, and unless the king's  hand  be  heavy 
upon his vassals they may become too strong for him ; he may 
end by being  like the king of the French, primzrs  i?zterpnyes, 
the nominal  head  of  a  turbulent  baronage.  The growth  of 
large  estates  and  private  jurisdictions  surrounds  the great 
thanes with  tenants and retainers  bound  to them  by  a close 
bond of  fealty.  Every man, it  is true, can  be called upon  to 
swear allegiance to the king ; but the king is distant and the 
lord is near. 
Even the fact  that to the very end of the period the king- 
ship is not strictly hereditary, but elective-that  on the Con- 
fessor's death the witan  can  elect Harold-that  a power also 
of deposing a king has been  exercised  as late as the days of 
Ethelred the unready, is really rather a mark of constitutional 
weakness, of a dangerous feudalism, than of popular liberty:- 
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the crown itself may become the prize of the rebellious vassal. 
The really healthy element in  the constitution as_jt stood  on 
th_e eve of the Conquest lies here-that  as yetno~nglish  king 
has taken on himself to legislate or to tax without the counsel 
and consent of  a national assembly, an assembly of the wise, 
thit-is of the great.  This is a valuable barrier against mere 
despotism,  though  what  the  national  assembly  shall  be  a 
strong king can  decide for  himself. 
(ii)  I 066- I 1  5 4. 
William  of  Normandy  claimed  the  throne  as  the  heir 
nominated by the Confessor.  That title the English did  not 
admit; it  had  not been  law  among them  that a king might 
appoint his successor.  Harold was chosen  king.  The battle 
of  Hastings  was  fought.  William  proceeded  to  seek  the 
recognition  of  the  divided  and  dismayed  witan.  He  was 
chosen  and was  crowned, swearing  that he would  hold  fast 
right law, and utterly forbid rapine and unrighteous judgment. 
It is needful to remember that neither of his sons came to the 
throne by what we  should  think or even by what would  then 
have been  thought a good  hereditary title, needful, for to this 
we  probably  owe  the  preservation  of  a  certain  form  and 
semblance of free government.  Rufus  excluded  Robert and 
was  willing to make, though  also  to break, the most  lavish 
promises.  Henry again excluded Robert ;  he was hastily elected 
by a small knot of barons, took the oaths which Ethelred had 
taken, and purchased support by a charter of great importance, 
for it was the model on which the charter of  1215  was framed. 
'Know  ye,'  it  begins,  'that by  the  mercy  of  God  and the 
common counsel of  the barons of the whole realm of England 
I have been crowned  king of  the same realm.'  Henry dead, 
the crown was seized by Stephen of Blois, to the exclusion, as 
we  should  say, of  the Empress Matilda.  He was  obliged to 
make large promises at his coronation, and in I 136 to issue an 
important  charter, important  rather  as a  precedent  than  as 
anything else, for a strong party  favoured the Empress and 
the feudal anarchy broke loose.  In fact we  may regard  our 
Norman kings as despotic ;  when there is not despotism there 
is anarchy; still a certain semblance of another form of govern- 
ment is maintained, government by a king who rules with the 
counsel and consent of his barons. 
Now  the  typical  feudal  king,  if  we  may  make  such  an 
abstraction, should have a court  consisting of  his immediate 
vassals, his tenants in chief.  How much or how  little he will 
be influenced by them, whether they will be utterly powerless 
or whether he will be but the first among equals is a different 
question-but  such  control  over him  as there  is will  be  the 
control of a court thus formed.  It would seem then according 
to this idea that the  court  of  the English king should have 
consisted  of  his  tenants  in  chief.  But  the tenants  in  chief 
were in  England very  numerous : this was  the result  of  the 
Conquest and the subsequent grants of lands deemed forfeited 
-they  were not just a few rulers and owners of  vast provinces ; 
there were a large number  who held  single knight's  fees and 
single  manors  holden  directly  of  the  king.  This  should 
be  remembered,  for  it  affects  the constitution  both  of  the 
House  of  Lords  and  of  the  House  of  Commons  in  later 
days.  The body  of  military  tenants in  chief  was  from  the 
beginning a very  heterogeneous body.  If  it  included  great 
feudatories  with  vast  possessions and numerous vassals, who 
might aspire to play the part of  sovereign princes, it included 
also a large number of  men who were by no means very rich 
or  very  powerful.  This  must  have  rendered  it  practically 
impossible that the king's court should have become a powerful 
definite body formed strictly on feudal lines.  The Conqueror 
we find holds an ordinary court three times a year at the three 
great  festivals.  'Thrice  a  year,'  says the Saxon Chronicle, 
'  King William wore his crown every year he was in England ; 
at Easter he wore it at  Winchester, at  Pentecost at Westminster, 
and at Christmas  at Gloucester; and at these times all the 
men  of  England  were  with  him-archbishops,  bishops  and 
abbots, earls, thegns and knights.'  A similar usage was main- 
tained  by  his  sons though  the  rotation  thus described  was 
not  strictly observed.  When however we  ask  who  actually 
attended ?  still  more  if  we  ask  who  had  a right to attend? 
we get a very uncertain answer.  The passage in the Chronicle 
to which I have just  referred is a specimen of the vague state- 
ments which are all that we get-all  the men of  England were Constitutional History 
with  him-archbishops,  bishops  and abbots,  earls, thanes  or 
knights ; often we are put off with some such word asproceyes, 
which has a very uncertain sound.  The archbishops, bishops 
and abbots attend by  virtue of  their official wisdom, but  the 
theory seems always to gain ground that they are there because 
they  hold  baronies  of  the  king-at  any rate  they  become 
tenants  in  chief  and so for  them  there is certainly  a  place. 
As to the other persons who come, so far as there is any legal 
theory, it must be that they are the tenants in chief.  Probably 
it is fully acknowledged that the king may  lawfully  insist  on 
the presence of every tenant in chief-probably  it is the general 
opinion that every military  tenant in chief has a right  to be 
there.  But we  ought to remember that attendance at court 
is no coveted privilege.  We must be careful not to introduce 
the notions of  modern times in  which a seat in  parliament  is 
eagerly desired.  This would  render  a good  deal of  history 
unintelligible.  For the smaller men attendance at court  is  a 
burden of  which they are very ready to relieve themselves or 
be  relieved,  and  this  is  true,  be  the  court  in  question  the 
hundred court, or the county court, or the king's court. 
What seems to us from the modern point of view a valuable 
political right, seemed to those who had it an onerous obliga- 
tion.  The great baron  again had  no particular desire to be 
about his  lord's court; if, as was too often the case, he  was 
not very faithful to Iiis lord, his lord's court was the very last 
place  in  which  he would  wish  to be.  In  point  of  fact  we 
do not  hear  from  the Norman  reigns  any assertion  of  an 
individual's  right to attend the court.  The king insists on 
bringing  around  him  the  most  powerful  of  his  tenants  in 
chief, and such meetings are to him a source of  strength.  As 
Mr Dicey has pointed  out in  his  Essay on the Privy Council 
it  is  the  strong king  who  habitually  brings  his  magnates 
round  him.  He thus  keeps  his  eye  upon  them,  and  it 
strengthens his hands in  dealing with  the refractory that his 
measures  are  taken  with  the  counsel  and  consent  of  their 
peers. 
Under the Norman  kings counsel and consent  may have 
been  little  more  than  formality,  and  the king  may  have 
exercised the power of  summoning only such of  his tenants 
The  Curia Regis 
in  chief  as he pleased-still  such  few  legislative  acts as we 
have from this period are done with  the counsel and consent 
of the great.  Thus the ordinance which removed the bishops 
from  the secular courts and  recognized  their spiritual juris- 
diction was made with the counsel of the archbishops, bishops, 
abbots, and all the princes  of  the kingdom.  But  anything 
that could be called legislation was seemingly very rare.  The 
right of  the council to join  in taxation was perhaps admitted 
in  theory.  Henry the First speaks of an aid which  had  been 
granted to him  by  his  barons : but there is nothing to show 
that any such  consent  was  asked  when  the Danegeld  was 
levied as repeatedly it was, and the king exercised the power 
of  tallaging his demesne lands of  his own free will.  A court 
of  this  nature was  again  the highest  court  of  judicature, for 
the great cases and the great men.  It was in such courts that 
the king nominated bishops until the right of canonical election 
was conceded by Henry I, and even then the election took place 
in the royal court.  The ceremony of  conferring earldoms and 
knighthood  and  receiving  homage  were  performed  there; 
questions of general policy, of peace and war,of royal marriages 
and so forth seem to have been debated. 
But  a smaller  body  collects  round  the  king,  a  body  of 
administrators selected  from  the ranks of  the baronage and 
of the clergy.  At its head stands the chief-justiciar, the king's 
right-hand  man, his viceroy when  the king is, as often he is, 
in his foreign dominions.  There is also the king's chancellor, 
the head of  a body of  clerks who do all the secretagal work ; 
there are the great officers of  the royal household  and others 
whom the king has chosen.  Under Henry I this body becomes 
organic ; the orderly routine of  administration begins even to 
be a check on the king's power ; Stephen discovers this when 
he quarrels with the ministerial body.  This body when it sits 
for financial purposes constitutes the Exchequer (Scaccaritlm), 
so called  from  the chequered  cloth  which  lies on the table, 
convenient  for  the counting  of  money.  Also  it  forms  a 
council  and court  of  law  for the king, it is curia Regis, the 
king's court,and its members arejustitiarii, justiciars or justices 
of this court.  Under Henry I they are sent into the counties 
to collect  taxes and to hold  pleas;  they are then justitiarii 64  Coastitutiona  Z  History  PERIOD 
errantes, justitiarii  itinerantgs.  During the whole period  the 
term curia Regis seems loosely used to cover both the sessions 
of  this permanent body and the assembly of  the tenants  in 
chief;  the former  may  perhaps  be  regarded  as a  standing 
committee of  the latter. 
(iii)  I 154-1216. 
The reigns of  the first three kings of  the Angevin  house 
form another and a fairly definite period in the history of  the 
national  assembly-which  ends  with  the  Great  Charter  of 
121  5.  In its fourteenth clause we obtain for the first time some- 
thing that may be  called  a  distinct definition  of  that body. 
The twelfth  clause declares that no scutage or aid  shall be 
imposed  in  our  realm  save by the common counsel of  our 
realm, ilzisi per  conzmurze  consiLiztm  regni  nostri-except  the 
three  ordinary feudal  aids  for  redeeming  the  king's  body 
from captivity, for  knighting his eldest son, and  for  marry- 
ing his eldest daughter.  There follows  this-'  And  for  the 
purpose  of  having  the  common  counsel  of  the  realm  for 
assessing  an aid except in  the three cases aforesaid we  will 
cause  to  be  summoned  the  archbishops,  bishops,  abbots, 
earls and  greater barons (majores ba?*oaes)  singly (sigillatim) 
by our letters ; and besides we will cause to be summoned by 
our sheriffs and bailiffs all those who hold of us in chief; for a 
certain day, that is  to say, at a  term  of  forty days at least; 
and to a certain place ; and in all the letters of such summons 
we will express the cause of  the summons.'  Leaving out of 
sight, for  a  time,  the clerical members of  this body, we see 
that the national assembly is an assembly of the king's tenants 
in  chief.  But  we  see an important  distinction;  while  the 
archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls and greater barons are to 
be summoned severally by letters addressed to them directly, 
the other tenants in chief  are to be summoned not by name 
but by  general  writs  addressed  to the  sheriffs.  Now  this 
distinction has been  the subject of  much  disputation.  It is 
mentioned  in  the  Charter  as  an  already  well  understood 
distinction, as one already recognized in practice ;  the difficulty 
has been  to find  its foundation-what  makes a  man  a baro 
major?  The principle  cannot be found  in  feudal  theory, 
Greater a~zd  S?~zaZZer  Barons 
feudally  all  these  persons stand on the same level, they are 
tenants in chief  whether they hold  whole  counties or single 
knight's fees.  One small class may be definitely marked  off, 
namely the earls.  The earl of the Norman reigns is definitely 
the successor of the earl of the days before the Conquest, who 
again is the successor of  the older ealdorman.  To a certain 
extent under William  and his sons the earldom  was still an 
office implying a considerable though somewhat vague power 
in the county which gave to the earl his title :  but it had become 
less and less of  an office, more and more of  a  mere dignity. 
The royal policy had been to prevent great jurisdiction  falling 
into the hands of  powerful  nobles, and to rule the shires by 
sheriffs strictly accountable to the king and removable  at a 
moment's notice.  The  earls, however, are a quite distinct class 
and a  small class, for  the title had not been  lavishly given. 
As to the title of  baron  (baro) the clause before  us  is quite 
evidence  enough,  were  there  no  other,  that  it  was  not 
confined to those who were  entitled to the special summons, 
for this distinguishes not the barones but  the barotzes majores. 
It would seem that at this time the title baron covered all the 
military  tenants in chief of the crown.  This is in  accordance 
with the original meaning of  the word-baro  is  simply man : 
this meaning it long kept in our law French : husband and wife 
are baron  and feme;  but man is  the term opposed  to lord; 
the man does homage to his lord, homilzizim or homagium, from 
homo a man; and it seems somewhat of an accident that while 
we speak of  the homage of a manorial court, meaning thereby 
the body of  tenants owing suit and service, we  speak of  the 
baronage of  the king's  court; the king's  tenants in chief  are 
his homiilzes and his barones also.  A line has then been drawn 
which divides these persons  into two classes :-this  probably 
is  a  result  gradually attained  by  the practice  of  a  century. 
The greater men  had paid  their  feudal  dues directly  to the 
king's  exchequer, the smaller had  paid  through  the sheriff; 
the greater when serving in the army brought up their retainers 
under their own banners, the smaller served under the sheriff; 
the greater were  summoned  to the king's  court directly, the 
smaller through  the sheriff.  But when  we ask what greater 
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we cannot say that a certain definite extent or value of  land 
was either necessary or sufficient to make a man entitled to 
the special summons.  Then again in this same Magna Carta 
we find a distinction as to reliefs, the heir  of  the baron  is to 
pay  for  an  entire  barony  (haronia) a  hundred  pounds,  or 
according  to some copies  a hundred  marks, the heir  of  the 
knight  holding  in  chief  of  the  king  is  to  pay  a  hundred 
shillings for the knight's fee.  It seems that the baro who has 
a baronia in the one clause is the baro major who is to have a 
special summons in the other clause.  The process of narrowing 
the import  of  the word  baron  to those  who  are entitled  to 
the special  summons goes  on  during the following century. 
Tenancy in  chief  is not sufficient now  to give a man this title 
of  baro ; he may hold in chief and yet be merely miles.  The 
estate of  the baron  is a barony, but  though there may be a 
theory floating about that the barony  is or should  be related 
to the knight's fee as the mark  is  related  to the shilling, that 
is to say, that the barony should  consist  of  thirteen  knight's 
fees and a third-still  it seems certain that an estate of  this 
value was neither  necessary, nor  in  itself  sufficient, to entitle 
the holder to the special summons.  Certain particular estates 
had come to be regarded as baronies  and to pay  the heavier 
relief, we can say very little more. 
During the period  which  ends with  the charter  we have 
little evidence as to the constitution of the national assembly. 
The earliest writ of  summons that we  have is one addressed 
to the Bishop of  Salisbury in 1205 ;  of general summonses sent 
out through  the sheriffs we  have  none  preserved;  but  very 
possibly throughout the  reign of Henry thesecond the assembly 
had  been  constituted  after  the  fashion  prescribed  by  the 
charter.  During  that  reign  councils  had  been  frequent; 
Henry was  a  strong king, not afraid of  meeting his vassals, 
with  a policy  of  his own  and  a  policy which required  their 
support.  Some great laws, I may remind you, were made in 
his reign, though the text of them has too often perished-the 
Constitutions of  Clarendon, the Grand Assize, the Assizes of 
Clarendon  and  Northampton.  He professedly  legislates by 
the counsel and consent of  the archbishops, bishops, barons, 
earls  and nobles  of  England-by  the petition  and advice of 
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his bishops and all his barons and so forth.  The counsel and 
consent may still have been little more than a ceremony-the 
enacting power was with the king-and  he could put in respite 
or dispense with the ordinances that were issued.  The tyranny 
of John after the discipline of  Henry was what was needed to 
turn this right of joining  in legislation into a reality.  In form 
the Charter is a Charter, a free grant by the king, in reality a 
code of  reforming laws passed by the whole  body of  bishops 
and barons and thrust upon a reluctant king. 
It is  not  very  clear  that  in  theory  the  consent  of  the 
national  council  had  been  necessary  for  taxation  or that it 
had been in fact granted.  Henry the Second takes a scutage 
or an aid or a carucage ; the chroniclers do not  say that the 
consent of  his council or his  court  has been  given or asked. 
The feudal theory that the man makes a free-will offering to 
relieve the wants  of  his  lord  seems to  have  subsisted;  the 
consent  which  theory  requires  is  rather  a  consent  of  the 
individual taxpayer than that of the national assembly.  The 
notion that the majority  of  an  assembly  could bind  a recal- 
citrant  minority  or could  bind  those  who  were  not  present 
had hardly been formed and would have been as unpopular as 
the notion that the king himself can extort just  what he wants. 
We begin to hear of  opposition to taxation: in  I 163 Becket 
protests, in  I 198 Bishop Hugh of  Lincoln.  But these protests 
of S. Thomas and S. Hugh are rather the protests of individuals 
who  will  not  pay  a tax to which they have  not consented, 
than assertions that the power to tax is vested in the national 
assembly.  The  necessity  however  of  extending  taxation 
from  land  to  movables  occasions  a  new  organization  and 
a new order of  ideas.  The Saladin tithe of  I 188 is  perhaps 
the first attempt to tax personal property1.  Henry obtained 
from  a  great  national  council  a  promise  of  a  tithe  for  the 
crusade ; the assessment in such a case could not be left  to a 
transaction  between  the  individual  taxpayer  and  the  royal 
officers, so Henry's favourite machinery, a jury of  neighbours, 
was employed; in  I 198  this plan was applied to the assessment 
of  the carucage, the land tax levied on the carucate or plough- 
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land which had superseded the Danegeld l.  Thus taxation and 
representation are brought into connection-the  individual is 
assessed by his  neighbours, by a jury representing his parish, 
and so in  some sort representing  him.  The idea that repre- 
sentation should accompany taxation gains ground as personal 
property  is  brought  under  contribution.  In  1207 John 
attempted  to exact a  thirteenth of  movable  property.  The 
bishops refused this on behalf of the clergy ;  John had to give 
up this plan  of  taxing them.  The great crisis followed and 
the charter was won.  No scutage or aid, save the three regular 
aids, was to be levied without the common consent of the realm. 
Other forms of taxation, taxes for example on movables, were 
not mentioned, nor could the national assembly, as defined in 
the fourteenth article, be considered as adequately representing 
all classes: it was an assembly of  prelates and tenants in chief. 
This however was but a stage, and the principle that repre- 
sentation should accompany taxation was already outgrowing 
the terms in which for the moment it was defined.  Already 
in  1213, two  years  before  the charter, an  assembly  for  the 
discussion of  grievances had been held at S. Albans, to which 
were summoned not only the barons and bishops  but  also a 
body  of  representatives-four  men  and the reeve from  each 
township on the royal  demesne; already a  few months later, 
on 7 Nov.  I 2 I 3, John had summoned  to a council at Oxford, 
four  lawful  men  of  every  shire, ad Zoquendum  nobiscum  de 
negotiis repi  ~zostri. These are the first recorded examples 
of  the  appearance  of  local  representatives  in  the  national 
assembly.  Eighty years  were  yet  to  pass  however  before 
a representation  of  the commons or the communities  of  the 
realm would  become  for good  and all a constituent element 
of that great council of the realm which had meanwhile gotten 
the name of a Parliamenturn. 
Meanwhile the administrative and judicial  body, the curia 
Regz's  in  its narrower  sense, has  been  growing  more definite 
and has been  splitting up into various  bodies  with  distinct 
functions,  all  under  the  control  of  the  justiciar  and  the 
king.  There  is  the  Exchequer, a  fiscal  bureau,  and court 
of  law for all matters affecting the revenue-the  judges  in  it 
still keep the title barones Scaccarii, although they are by  no 
means always chosen from the ranks of the baronage.  There 
is the Chancellor  who  keeps the king's  great seal  and who 
stands  at  the  head  of  a  clerical  establishment,  the royal 
chancery.  There  is  now  a  small  compact body  of  judges, 
justices of  the king's court, professionally  learned  in  the law. 
The judicial work has enormously increased  owing to the law 
reforms  of  Henry 11.  This judicial  body  again  is  splitting 
into sections.  One party of  justices  attends the king in  his 
progresses,  and  here  we  see  the beginning  of  the court  of 
King's  Bench, another  sits term  after  term  at Westminster 
and is going to be the Court of Common Pleas-for  the Great 
Charter concedes that common pleas, i.e. suits between subject 
and subject, are not to follow the king's  person, but are to be 
heard in some certain place.  But a reserve of justice remains 
in the king to be exercised by him in the great council of  the 
nation,  or  in  some  smaller  council.  Judicial  visitations of 
the counties, eyres, itinera, have become  very frequent-the 
royal courts are becoming  the courts of  first resort  for  most 
cases; but  the old  local courts are brought into connection 
with the king's courts by these visitations.  When the justices 
in  eyre come into the county, the whole county must come 
before them ; every freeholder must be there or send  excuse, 
every hundred, every borough, must be represented by its jury 
of twelve, every township by the reeve and four men1. 
(iv)  1216-95. 
After I 21  5  the next great halting-place in  the history of 
the national  assembly is  the year  1295.  In the latter year 
there is, we  may say definitely, a  parliament ; the great  out- 
lines  have  been  drawn  once  for  all.  During  these  eighty 
eventful  years  a  new  principle  has  emerged  and  become 
dominant.  The assembly  contemplated  by the first  edition 
of the great charter is a feudal assembly.  It may be questioned 
perhaps in what right the archbishops, bishops and abbots find 
a place there-whether  as the heads of the national church or 
1 For an elaborate survey of the judicial system at the end of Henry 11's reign 
see Maitland, Srlcct Ph  of  th  Crown (Selden Soc.), Intr. 
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as great vassals of  the king ;  they were both ;  but the assembly 
is a court of  tenants in chief.  Now we  can  hardly say that 
the clauses  of  the charter which  require the consent  of  an 
assembly of  this kind  to the imposition  of  a scutage or aid 
ever  became  part  of  the law of  the realm.  They were not 
repeated  in  any later  edition  of  the  charter.  Henry  111 
at  his  coronation  was  a  child  in  the  hands  of  William 
Marshall the great Earl of Pembroke, rector regis et regni, the 
head  of  the English baronage, and the king's  guardians and 
ministers  may have  thought  it undesirable that their  hands 
should be bound  by such  clauses at a moment of  grave peril 
when  the foreigner  was  in  the realm,  and  bonds  may have 
seemed  needless.  This  is  not  to  be  regretted;  had  these 
clauses become a permanent part of the law Parliament might 
have formed itself on strictly feudal lines ; we might have had 
the Scottish  parliament  instead  of  the English.  As it was, 
the necessity for raising money forced the king to negotiate 
with all classes of his realm.  Henry was a thriftless, shiftless 
king, always extravagant and always poor.  The meetings of 
the national assembly during his reign were many.  Probably 
they were  summoned  in  accordance with  the principle  laid 
down  in  the charter of  1215, the major  barons  being  sum- 
moned individually, the lesser tenants in chief by general writs 
addressed  to the sheriff.  To such an assembly, held  on the 
occasion of the king's marriage in  I 236, we owe the Statute of 
Merton.  These meetings were realities ; counsel and consent 
could no longer be taken for granted ;  under John the baronage 
had learned to act together as a whole.  Demands for  money 
are met by demands for reform-demands  which sometimes 
seem startling even to us.  From  I234 onwards  Henry was 
trying  to  rule  without  great  ministers,  without  justiciar, 
chancellor,  or treasurer.  The scheme  which  from  time  to 
time pleases the baronage is that of a small number of  ministers 
or counsellors appointed  by and answerable to the common 
council of  the realm.  Henry was lavish with promises which 
are always broken. 
Meanwhile the representative principle was growing.  The 
notion of the representation  of  a community by some of  its 
members must have been old.  Already in the Leges Henrici 
Prjmj we  find  that  in  the  local  courts  the townships  are 
represented  by  the  priest, the  reeve  and  four  of  the  best 
men1.  This usage may already have been very old.  Certainly 
at a little later date we find that the county court when sum- 
moned  in  all its fulness to meet  the king's  justices  in  their 
eyres comprises not only all the free tenants of  the shire, but 
also  a  representation  of  the  boroughs  and townships, from 
every  township  four  lawful  men  and  the reeve,  from  every 
borough twelve lawful burgesses2.  The whole system of trial 
by jury  in  its earliest form implies representations-a  person 
is tried by the country, by the neighbourhood, yonit se super 
patriam, super  vicinetum.  The voice  of  the  jurors  is  the 
verdict  of  the country, veredictum patriae.  When  we  look 
at the eyre rolls of  this  time (there are plenty  of  rolls from 
the  first  years  of  Henry  111)  we  are  struck  by  the deep 
root  which  this  notion  has  taken :-the  whole  county  is 
present  and can  speak  its  mind, every  hundred  is  present, 
every  township-the  hundred  of  Berkeley  says  this,  the 
township  (villnta)  of  Stow  says  that;  the  county,  the 
hundreds, the townships can be amerced and fined for neglect 
of  their  police  duties  or  for  saying  what  is  false.  But 
representation  does  not  necessarily  imply  election  by  the 
represented ;  representatives  may  be  chosen  by  a  public 
officer or  by lot.  However  in  I 194 we  find  that  the juries 
for  the  various  hundreds  are  appointed  thus:  four  lawful 
knights  are elected from the county, who choose two lawful 
knights  from  each  hundred,  who  again  choose  ten  lawful 
knights  from  the  hundred  to  make  with  themselves  the 
twelve jurors  for  the hundred.  The coroners again from the 
first moment  of  their institution in  I 194 had been elected by 
the county.  This local organization had, we have seen, been 
made  use  of  for  fiscal  purposes ; assessments  to taxes  on 
movables  and even  on  land  had  been  made by local juries. 
At an exceptional crisis  in  121  3  four  lawful  men  with  the 
reeve  from  the vills of  the royal  demesne had  been  called 
on to meet the bishops and barons, and in the same year four 
discreet  men  from  each shire had been summoned ad  Zoquen- 
Sebct Charters, p.  105, VII,  7. 
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durn nohisczun de  negotiis regni nostril.  Throughout Henry's 
reign  the use  of  local  and representative  machinery for  the 
assessing  and collecting of  taxes granted by the assembly of 
barons and prelates becomes more constant  and more  impor- 
tant.  Distinct  progress  is  made in  1225, in  1232, in  1237. 
The documents you will find in the Select Charters2.  In 1254 
a great step was  made.  The king had gone to Gascony and 
was in  sore need of  money ; the regents, his wife and brother, 
summoned  a  great  council  to Westminster: to which  each 
sheriff was to send four knights from his county, '  four lawful 
and discreet knights from your county whom the county shall 
have chosen for this purpose in  the place of  all and singular 
of  the said counties to provide along with the knights from the 
other  counties  whom  we  have  caused  to be  summoned  for 
the same day what aid they will  give  to us  in  this our great 
necessity.'  Representatives  of  the  counties,  representatives 
elected  by  the counties,  then  are summoned  not  merely  to 
assess, but  to grant an  aid; there  is  to be  no  dealing with 
each  county  separately;  all  are  to  meet  together  and  to 
provide together. 
The great struggle which began  in  1258 and ended with 
the battle of  Evesham, 4 August  I 265, did not carry the history 
of  parliament  much  further.  The Parliaments between  that 
of  1254 and that of  1265-the  word parliamentztm  was  just 
coming into use, supplanting colloquium and other terms, and 
the assembly which forced the charter from John had recently 
been styled retrospectively parliamenturn Rz~fzimedae-did  not 
contain, SO  far  as we  know, any representatives  of  shires  or 
boroughs.  The national strivings have another  end in view : 
a  small  council  elected  by the barons  to control  the  king, 
ministers  elected  by  and  answerable  to  the  baronage,  the 
reform  of  a  miscellaneous  catalogue  of  abuses.  Beginning 
with  the parliament  held at Oxford in  1258, the Mad  Parlia- 
ment, we have complicated paper constitutions of an oligarchic 
1 SrZrct  Chavtcrs,  pp.  276, 287,  and  Constitutional History,  vol.  I,  5 154. 
Mr Davis [Engl. Hist. Rev.  April  1905,  pp.  289-901  argues that in  the earlier 
rase the jurors  were  summoned  not  to S. Albans but to  their respective  shire- 
courts. 
Sclcct Chavtcvs,  pp. 355-6,  360-2,  366-8. 
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character, some of  which  work  for  a while, from  which  the 
king frees himself when he can.  An important set of reforms 
redressing the grievances of  the smaller tenants in chief  was 
obtained in  1259, the Provisions of  Oxford ; but in the end it 
came to fighting.  When the parties were already arming in 
1261, the chiefs of  the provisional  government summoned to 
an  assembly  at S. Albans  three  knights  from  each  shire; 
Henry ordered the knights to be sent not to S. Albans, but 
to Windsor.  The battle of  Lewes was won on  14 May, 1264. 
Almost immediately Simon of  Montfort, who had the king in 
his hands, ordered the election of four knights to meet the king 
in  ~arliament  on  22 June.  At the end of  the year he sum- 
moned the famous parliament of  1265.  AS to bishops, abbots 
and  barons only such were summoned as were friends of  the 
party in  power-only  five  earls, only eighteen  barons.  But 
each sheriff  had a writ to return two discreet knights for each 
shire,  and  a  similar  summons  was  sent  to  the  cities  and 
boroughs.  What  was  newest  in  this  parliament  was  the 
presence of  representatives of the cities and boroughs.  Soon 
followed  the battle of  Evesham.  There is nothing to prove 
that  during the six last  years  of  the reign  the parliaments 
included  representatives  of  shires or boroughs ; but we  can- 
not  be  quite  certain  of  this ; and proctors  of  the cathedral 
chapters were present at the Parliament  of  Winchester  held 
immediately  after  the king's  victory.  One of  these  parlia- 
ments, that of  1267, passed the great Statute of  Marlborough 
or  Marlbridge,  which  conceded  many  of  the  reforms  for 
which  the nation  had  clamoured.  It professes to have been 
enacted  convocatis discretioribus regni  tam  majoribus  quam 
minoribus. 
The same doubt hangs over many of the early parliaments 
of Edward's reign, many of  the parliaments which passed the 
famous statutes.  In  1273 a great assembly was  held  to take 
the  oath  of  fealty  to  the new  king; there  came  the arch- 
bishops and bishops, earls and barons, abbots and priors, and 
from each shire four knights, and from each city four citizens. 
The Statute  of  Westminster  the  First  (1275) declares  the 
assent  of  archbishops, bishops,  abbots, priors,  earls,  barons, 
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(1278), the next  great Act, was,  as it  says,  made  with  the 
assent of  the most discreet men both of  high and low degree. 
In 1282 a curious expedient was tried ; the king was fighting 
in Wales ; he caused two provincial councils to be summoned, 
that for the northern  province, at York, that for the southern, 
at Northampton ; clergy and laity were  summoned  to each, 
four knights for each shire, two representatives for each town. 
This case was exceptional, and became no precedent.  Another 
somewhat anomalous assemblage was  held  at Shrewsbury in  . 
1283, with representatives  of  twenty-one selected  towns  and 
two knights of  each  shire.  It is  not certain  that any repre- 
sentatives  were  present  at  the  parliament  of  1285, which 
enacted  that  great code  which  we  know  as the  Statute of 
Westminster  the  Second;  the  very  important  Statute  of 
Winchester  in  the same  year  (1285) is  on  the  face  of  it 
merely the king's  commandment, and  we  do not  know  that 
any representatives of the commons were present at its making. 
Again, in  1290, the Statute of Westminster 111, the celebrated 
Quia Emptores, was  enacted  by  the king at the instance  of 
the  magnates.  Knights  from  the  shires  did  attend  that 
parliament, but  the statute was passed a week before the day 
for which they were summoned.  Two knights from each shire 
were summoned in  I 294. 
The next year gives  us  the model  for  all future  parlia- 
ments.  The archbishops and  bishops  are directed  to bring 
the heads of  their chapters, their archdeacons, one proctor for 
the clergy of  each cathedral and  two for the clergy of  each 
diocese.  Every sheriff is to cause two knights of  each shire, 
two citizens  of  each city and two burgesses  of  each borough 
to be elected.  Seven earls and forty-one barons are summoned 
by name.  The clergy and baronage  are summoned  to treat, 
ordain  and execute, the representatives  of  the commons are 
to  bring  full  powers  from  those  whom  they  represent  to 
execute (ad  facie~zdzrm)  what should be ordained by common 
counsel.  A body constituted in this manner is a parliament; 
what  the king enacts with  the consent of  such  a body  is  a 
statute.  Very soon indeed these two terms become specifically 
appropriated ; for  a very  short while they may be  used  in a 
laxer way :-parliament  of course merely means a conference, 
a meeting at which there is  to be talk, debate, deliberation. 
Now  and again  the name is given to meetings of  the king's 
ordinary council, or to meetings which would  afterwards have 
been called magna concilia as distinct from parliamenta-mcet- 
ings  of  the prelates  and  barons  to which  representatives  of 
the commons  were not called-or  again to some anomalous 
assemblages which  were  occasionally  summoned.  But  very 
quickly  indeed  usage  becomes  fixed:  a parliamentzmz  is  a 
body framed on the model of  1295, it is frequently, habitually, 
summoned, and with its consent the king can  make stattltal. 
Thus before the end of the thirteenth century the national 
assembly is ceasing to be  a feudal court; it  is becoming  an 
assembly of  the estates of  the realm, that is to say, according 
to the theory of  the time, of  all sorts and conditions of  men. 
Against the once common mistake of  calling the king one of 
the estates of  the realm, I need hardly guard you ;  it has been 
sufficiently denounced.  The three estates are clergy, barons, 
and  commons,  those  who  pray,  those  who  fight, those  who 
work;  this  seems  to  have  been  considered  an  exhaustive 
classification  of  the  divers  conditions  of  men.  A  similar 
idea seems to have been very prevalent throughout  Western 
Christendom and to have given rise to assemblies  of  estates ; 
but  the  institutions  to which  it  gave  rise  varied  with  the 
histories  and  circumstances  of  the  different  nations.  For 
instance it is particularly noticeable about the English parlia- 
ment that the burghers do not form a separate estate.  There 
was  perhaps  some  tendency towards  an arrangement  which 
would have drawn a broad line of  demarcation between them 
and the knights of  the shire, some danger (for such we  may 
consider  it) that  the king  would  be  able to get  money by 
negotiating  with  the merchants  grants  of  customs,  indirect 
taxes which would have fallen on the consumer.  There were 
such negotiations  in  Edward the First's day ; but the danger 
was counteracted ; the whole mass of  representative members 
sat  together  and  voted  together  and  represented  but  one 
estate, the commons  of  the realm. 
The growth of  parliament under Edward I is traced by Stubbs, Consl. Hist. 
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Of  course one such assembly as that of  1295  might well 
have been a solitary event which the historian would  note on 
passing  as an  anomaly.  Taking our  stand  at the death of 
Edward in  1307 we are not entitled to say that the sovereign 
powers which formerly were exercised  by the king, or by the 
king and  his  barons, have  definitely  been  transferred  to an 
assembly of  estates1.  It is only in the light of  what was at 
that time future history, that the parliaments of  Edward's last 
years  have their  vast  importance.  However, we  know  as a 
matter of fact that they did form precedents ;  that parliaments 
formed on the model of  1295 were constantly held during the 
coming  centuries; that  at  last  it  was  distinctly  recognized 
that the sovereign power  of  the realm  was  vested  in  a king 
and a parliament constituted after this model.  It is with such 
knowledge  in  our  minds that we will  examine the nature of 
this assembly. 
The first of  the three estates is that of  the clergy.  In the 
first place the bishops and a number of  abbots are summoned 
by name.  Their position is, we may say, somewhat ambiguous. 
The bishops were  the heads of  the clergy, the rulers  of  the 
church ; but they were also tenants in  chief of  the crown, and 
held  baronies.  They  had  therefore  a  double  claim  to  be 
present.  There can  be  little  doubt  that  their  claim  to  be 
there  as prelates  of  the  church,  apart  from  all  question  of 
baronial tenure, would have been fully admitted.  In the first 
place  there  is a difference between  the wording  of  the writs 
addressed to the temporal lords and that of the writs addressed 
to the bishops.  Usually  the lay baron  is  charged  to come 
upon 'the faith  and homage,' or the ' homage and allegiance 
whereby you  are bound  to us';  in the bishops' writs homage 
is not  mentioned, though the bishops had  to do homage for 
their  temporal  possessions; it  is  to  their  faith  and  love  to 
which the king appeals.  In the second  place when  a see is 
This proposition is amplified in Maitland's Memoranda dt Parliamento (Rolls 
Series), 1893, a  record  of  the parliament  of  1305.  'A session  of  the King's 
Council  is  the core and  essence  of  every parliamenturn,  the documents  usually 
called  parliamentary  petitions  are  petitions  to  the  king  and  his  council,  the 
auditors of  the petitions are committees of  the council,  the rolls of  parliament are 
the records of  business done by the council, sometimes with, but much more often 
without, the concurrence of the estates of the realm.'  Intr. p.  lxxxviii. 
vacant  the  guardian  of  the  spiritualities  of  the  see  was 
summoned instead of  the bishop ; that guardian was in  some 
cases  the archbishop,  in  others  the  cathedral  chapter;  the 
barony of  the vacant bishopric was not in  his hands.  How- 
ever,  the  double  right  of  the  bishops  provided  abundant 
material  for  controversy  in  later times. 
As to the abbots-whatever  their original title may have 
been, it  soon came to be regarded as title by baronial tenure. 
This was  brought about by the abbots themselves ; they had 
few interests in national politics, and attendance was burden- 
some.  They therefore  insisted  that  they  need  not  attend 
unless  they held  by  military  tenure.  The number  of  them 
summoned very  rapidly  decreases:  under  Edward  I it  is as 
high  as 72 ; under  Edward  I I I  it has fallen  to 27, where  it 
remains  until the monasteries are dissolved. 
But the representation  of  the clerical estate was not to be 
completed by the presence of the prelates.  The inferior clergy 
were to be represented.  Gradually the principle of  represen- 
tation  by elected proctors (p~~ocuratores)  had  been  making its 
way into the purely ecclesiastical  assemblies.  Owing to the 
rivalry between Canterbury and York, there never came to be 
any one ecclesiastical  assembly for the whole realm ;  just  for 
an occasional moment, under the authority of  a papal  legate, 
a body  representing the clergy of  all  England  might  meet 
but no such body became a permanent element in  the govern- 
ment of the church.  Gradually two convocations were formed, 
the one for Canterbury, the other for York.  The growth of 
representation  among the clergy was parallel with the growth 
of representation  among the laity.  The inferior clergy were 
directed  to send proctors to represent them in the councils of 
the church.  Towards the end of  the thirteenth  century the 
plan  adopted  in  the  province  of  Canterbury  was  that the 
parochial  clergy  of  each diocese  should  be represented  by 
two  proctors, the clergy  of  each  cathedral  by  one ; these 
elected proctors, together with the archbishop, bishop, abbots, 
priors,  deans  and archdeacons, constituted  the convocation. 
In the northern province a slightly different rule prevailed. 
Now  one must  carefully distinguish  these  provincial  con- 
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The convocations are two ecclesiastical assemblies summoned 
by the archbishops.  Edward attempted  to bring  the clergy 
to parliament.  The bishops  are to bring  with  them to the 
national  assembly the  heads  of  their  chapters, their  arch- 
deacons, one proctor  for  the clergy  of  each  cathedral, and 
two  proctors  for  the  clergy  of  each  diocese.  The  clause 
directing  the  bishops  to  do  this  is  known,  from  its  first 
words,  as  the praemunientes  clause.  It  has  been  in  use 
ever since, is in  use  even  at the  present  day, though  since 
the end  of  the fourteenth century  it  has been  steadily  dis- 
obeyed.  The clergy did not like this plan of being mixed up 
with the laity.  They were the holders of  great wealth; they 
had to bear a large share of  taxation-but  they preferred  to 
deal with  the crown  separately, to vote  their  taxes in  their 
own  provincial  and purely ecclesiastical  convocations.  Thus 
they missed  the chance of  becoming a large element in what 
was going to be the sovereign body of the realm.  Parliament, 
instead of  being an assembly of  the three estates, became  an 
assembly of lords, spiritual and temporal, and commons.  But 
thisrefusal of  the clergy belongs to a later time than that of 
Edward I; Edward made the attempt to get  them  to meet 
the laity, so that he  might  deal with  all estates of  men  con- 
centrated in one assembly. 
The history of the baronage, the second estate of the realm, 
is a matter  of  difficulty: controversy  has raged  around  it, it 
has become the theme of a large literature.  The difficulty has 
at least in part been created by the continued existence down 
to our  own  time of  this estate, and the high value  that men 
have  come  to set on  a  seat in  the House of  Lords.  From 
time  to time peerages  are claimed  by titles  which  rake  up 
the whole  mass  of  obscure  constitutional antiquities, and a 
committee of privileges  of  the House of  Lords is called  on 
to import into very remote  times some definite theory of  the 
baronage,  some theory  much  more  definite  than had  been 
conceived  by the men  of those  times.  No statute of limita- 
tions  bars  the claim  to a  peerage,  and  occasionally claims 
based on very ancient facts have to be discussed and decided. 
A  word  about the way  in  which  such claims  are settled. 
It seems admitted that  the  House  of  Lords has a  right  to 
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decide on  the validity  of  a  new creation, a  right which, for 
example, it exercised in  1856 when it decided that the patent 
of life  peerage  granted  to Baron  Parke,  Lord Wensleydale, 
did not entitle him to sit in the House of Lords.  On the other 
hand it seems certain  that the House has no jurisdiction  on 
claims to an old peerage.  The power of deciding such claims 
the crown has kept to itself.  As a matter of fact, in a case of 
doubt it refers the matter to the House of Lords, which refers 
it to a committee of  privilege-the  committee reports to the 
House, the House communicates the resolution  to the crown, 
the crown acts upon it-the  claimant is or is not suxnmoned. 
But  this is  constitutional  usage,  not  law, as has  been  very 
explicitly admitted by the lords in quite recent  times1.  Now 
that this should be so even in our own  day is,  I think, very 
instructive.  There is no law court into which the claimant of 
a  peerage  can  go  to  establish  his  claim.  Now-a-days this 
means next to nothing ; if  you think that by hereditary right 
you are entitled to be summoned as a peer of the land to the 
House of  Lords, doubtless  you  will get your  right.  But it 
points to what has been very important, the power of the king 
to determine the estate of the baronage. 
Lawyers  and  antiquaries  have  been  forced  to  seek  for 
a  strict  theory of  the baronage, and  have  never  been  very 
successful in  finding one.  Doubtless, however, tenure is  the 
quarter to which we must  look : the idea of nobility of blood 
is not the foundation.  That idea does occur all Europe over 
among the peoples of our own race if we go back far enough. 
The distinction between eorl and ceorl is a distinction between 
men  who  by  birth  are  noble,  and  those who- by  birth  are  , 
perfectly  free but still not noble; and in  the old  dooms this 
distinction  finds sufficient expression, it can  be measured  in 
numbers, the wergild of the noble is so many times that of the 
'  This  was  very  explicitly  admitted  by  Lord  Campbell  in  the  Wensleydale 
case  (Anson,  The Law and Custom of  the  Constztution.  Part  I:  Parliament. 
3rd  ed. p. 208), and again by Lord Chelmsford in the Wiltes case (1869, L. K. 4, 
H. L. 126).  Lord  Chelmsford went  so far  as to hold  that a committee of privi- 
leges, hearing such a claim, is quite unlike a jodic~al  tribunal in this respect, that 
it is not bound by the resolutions of  a previous committee ;  it may give diametric- 
ally  opposite  advice  in  one  case  to  that which  has been given in  another;  it 
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non-noble, the oath of the eorl will  outweigh the oaths of  so 
many  ceorls.  But  for a  long  time before  the Conquest the 
nobility of  birth had  been  supplanted by a nobility of tenure 
and of  office.  The thane is noble because  of  his  relation  to 
the king, a relation  intimately connected with the holding  of 
land, and a nobility of tenants in  chief, crown vassals, would be 
the natural outcome.  But as already pointed out, the Norman 
Conquest put  difficulties in  the way of  the formation of such 
a nobility.  The aggregate body of tenants in chief was a very 
miscellaneous mass, including very great men, and men  who 
might  relatively  be  called  very  small, the  tenant  who  dis- 
charged all feudal obligation by coming in person to the field, 
and he who was bound to bring twenty or fifty knights.  The 
grades were many and small; there was no one place at which 
a hard  line could  be drawn ; and probably it suited the king 
very well  that none should  be drawn, that he should  not  be 
hemmed  in  by  a close aristocracy ;  against the great feuda- 
tories  he relies  on  the smaller tenants in chief.  The practice 
of  the royal exchequer and of the royal army does in time draw 
a line ; on the one hand stand the barones  majores, who deal 
directly with  the exchequer, are summoned personally to the 
army or the council;  on the other hand stand barones minoyes, 
barones secundae dipzitatis, who deal with the sheriff, and are 
summoned  through  the sheriff; the lands which  the former 
hold  are recognized as forming baronies ; for the purpose of 
feudal dues they are treated as wholes, they pay a lump sum 
for  the  relief;  those  who  have  not  baronies  pay  on  each 
knight's fee.  Finally the word baro becomes appropriated to 
tenants of  the former  class;  the latter are tenentes zn  cafite; 
but the word baro is long used somewhat vaguely;  the barones 
of  one  clause  of  the great  charter  seem  to  be  the  barones 
vzajores  of  another. 
It has  been  contended  by  some  that  tenure  by  barony 
was a particular kind of tenure differing from tenure by knight 
service.  The dificulty, however, has  been  to  find  in  what 
respect  these tenures differed.  To say that the one implied 
the  right  to  the  special  summons while  the  other  did  not 
explains nothing, and brings us  back to the point whence we 
started, that tenure by barony is the tenure of those who are 
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specially  summoned.  When  the  law  of  tenures  attains  its 
fully developed  form  and a systematic expression, we do not 
find tenure by barony as one of the Kinds of tenure ;  Littleton 
(circ. 1480)  does not make it a kind of  tenure; a man may hold 
a barony, certain  parcels  of land have long ago been  recog- 
nized as forming a barony, but he does not hold by barony, he 
holds by knight service or by grand serjeanty.  In all private 
law the distinction has no  place, it  is utterly  unlike the dis- 
tinction  between  tenure  by  knight  service  and  tenure  by 
socage.  This  is  a  question  which  has  been  contested  by 
Selden, Madox and other very learned persons.  I will  state 
the cautious conclusion of Dr Stubbs : '  Whether the baronial 
honour or qualification was created by the terms of the original 
grant of  the fief, or by subsequent  recognition,  it is perhaps 
impossible to determine.  As we do not possess anything like 
an early enfeoffment of a barony, it is safer to confine ourselves 
to the assertion that in whatever form the lands were acquired 
or  bestowed,  the  special  summons  recognized  the baronial 
character of  the tenure, or in  other  words,  that  estate  was 
a barony which entitled its owner to such special summons1.' 
Thus we  seem  to  be  involved  in  a  circle-Who  is  entitled 
to the special  summons?  He who  holds  a  barony.  But 
what  estate is a barony ?  One which  entitles its owner to a 
special summons. 
The next point  is  this:-In  the course of  the thirteenth 
century  knights  representing the  shires  are summoned  to 
parliament.  As  this practice  is  introduced, so the  practice 
directed by John's charter of summoning the minor tenants in 
chief  by means of  general writs  addressed  to the sheriffs-a  , 
practice which may have been more or less carefully observed 
during the reign  of  Henry 111-was  abandoned.  The minor 
tenants in  chief  would  be represented  in  parliament  by the 
elected knights of  the shire.  Probably they were well  content 
with this ;  to attend at their own cost assemblies in which they 
had little or no weight was a burden.  They fell definitely into 
the mass of  the commons : there was no longer any political 
distinction between  the tenants in  chief  who do not get the 
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special summons (and who have now altogether lost the name 
of barons) and the tenants of mesne lords. 
The baronage then is the body of men who are summoned 
specially  to  parliament-they  are  summoned  because  they 
hold baronies, estates which  have been recognized as baronies 
by the special  summons, and by the baronial relief  Several 
questions  arise  at this  point, which  are difficult of  solution. 
First, was the Icing  restricted  to the summoning of those who 
really held what had already been regarded as baronies?  The 
answer seems to be that such must long have been the theory, 
but  a vague theory  by which  the king was  not  very  strictly 
bound.  In the  fourteenth  century, as  already  remarked,  a 
large number of abbots were relieved from the duty of  attend- 
ance on the ground that they did not hold baronies.  It is not 
known, however, that any temporal lord was  ever relieved for 
a similar reason.  On the other hand it is not known that the 
peers ever objected to the introduction into their midst of one 
who had no territorial barony-nor  for a long time do we hear 
of  anyone protesting  that he has  a  right  to  be summoned 
merely because  he  holds  a territorial  barony.  Probably the 
theory prevailed and was more or less regularly observed (how 
regularly is a difficult question, involving a terrible investiga- 
tion  of  pedigrees) until in the reign of  Henry VI the practice 
crept in  of creating barons by letters patent.  Not very long 
after  this it becomes  the definitely  established  doctrine that 
a writ of summons hllowed by an actual sitting in  the House 
makes a peer, barony or no barony.  This, however, left open 
the question whether the possession of  a barony did not give 
the  right  to  be  summoned, and  that  question  was  hardly 
settled  until  our  own  day.  During the Middle  Ages  lands 
could not be devised by will, the king's tenants in capite could 
not alienate without royal license, and no great absurdity could 
have resulted  from  the doctrine that the right to a summons 
could be conveyed along with the land.  Certainly it seems to 
have  been  thought  in  the fifteenth  century  that the dignity 
might be  made  the subject of  a  family  settlement, that the 
dignity along with the land  might be entailed.  But in  1669 
the contrary was  definitely laid  down  by the king in  council 
on  a claim  to  the barony  of  Fitzwalter.  Barony  by  tenure 
was  declared  to have been  discontinued  for many ages, and 
not  in  being, and so not  fit to be 'received  or to admit any 
right  of  succession  thereto.'  The question  was  reopened  in 
1861 by the Berkeley Peerage case, and what was by this time 
generally understood to be law was adopted and applied.  No 
one now can claim a seat in the House of Lords on the ground 
that he  holds a land  barony.  With our modern  freedom of 
alienation  some very  quaint  results  might  have  been  pro- 
duced by a contrary decision.  He must claim  under writ of 
summons or letters patent. 
As regards barony by writ of summons there are still some 
questions  which  remain  very  open.  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  Edward  I in  summoning a  baron  intended  to bind 
himself and his successors to summon that man and his heirs 
to the end of time.  But at least very soon it became the rule to 
summon those  and the heirs  of  those who had  already been 
summoned.  Whether  a  writ  of  summons  conveyed  a here- 
ditary  right  was  a  question  very  warmly  discussed  in  the 
seventeenth century between Coke and Prynne.  Prynne pro- 
duced a long list  of  cases in which  apparently a person  who 
was  summoned  once, or more than  once, was not again sum- 
moned, and in which the heirs of a person who was summoned 
were not summoned.  Dr Stubbs says that on careful exami- 
nation Prynne's list shrinks into very small proportions;  most 
of them  can  be accounted  for  by  the circumstances  of  the 
particular  cases, such  as minorities1.  At any rate it became 
the orthodox  doctrine that  the crown may not withhold  the 
writ from the heirs of a person who has been once summoned, 
and  who  has  taken  his  seat.  This  was  definitely decided 
in  1673 in the case of  the Clifton barony2.  It seems to have 
been  considered  law  already  in  Coke's  day3.  In  1677 the 
Freshville case decided the point that it is not enough to show 
that one's  ancestor has  been  summoned, one must show also 
that he took  his seat.  Until  he  takes his seat he is  no peer. 
In this respect barony by writ differs from barony by patent. 
Co?zsfzfutzonal  Hzstory,  111,  5  7  j I  note. 
Anson,  Parlzamefzt,  p.  196. 
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The patent  itself  makes  a  man  a  peer1.  On the face  of  a 
writ, you will  understand, there is nothing about any peerage, 
any future summonses, any summoning of  heirs-heirs  are not 
mentioned-simply  A. B. is  summoned to come to the next 
parliament.  A distinct theory of hereditary right has gradually 
been  developed, superseding an indistinct  theory of  right by 
tenure. 
But besides  the prelates  and the barons  there  are other 
persons who  are summoned by name, members  of  the king's 
council, in particular the judges, and these distinctly do not hold 
baronies and are not barons.  In the parliaments of  Edward's 
reign the royal council meets the estates of the realm.  Edward 
probably had  no  idea  of  restraining himself from seeking the 
advice of any whose advice might be worth having.  It is ollly 
very gradually and as a notion of  a hereditary right of peerage 
grows, that these councillors are recognized as having no  real 
place in the deliberations of parliament.  They continue to be 
summoned, even  at the present  day the judges  and  the law 
officers of  the crown  are summoned  by  name to attend the 
parliament :-but  before the end of the Middle Ages it became 
established  doctrine that  they had  no  votes, that they were 
not even  to  speak  unless  asked  for  their opinion.  Thence- 
forward their attendance became little more than a form-but, 
as just said, a trace of  it is retained at the present day :-the 
judges are summoned to parliament, there are places for them 
in the House of Lords, and that House has a right to compel 
their attendance and to take their opinion on matters of law, 
a right which it occasionally exercises even  now though only 
when  it is  sitting as a  court  of  law. 
The question  seems still open whether to prove the summons and sitting of 
one's ancestor at any time, however  remote, is  sufficient.  In one recent case (the 
de L'Isle Peerage) Lord Redesdale seems of opinion that the summons and sitting 
must have taken place on  this side the year 1382.  This year seems to be chosen 
because of  a statute,  5  Ric.  z,  stat. 2, cap.  4,  which  says that  'all  and singular 
persons and commonalties which from henceforth  shall have the summons of  the 
parliament, shall come from henceforth  to the parliaments in the manner as they 
are bound to do, and have been  accustomed within  the realm of  England of  old 
times.'  I much doubt whether that statute was directed to making the peerage more 
hereditary than  it was:  it seems to have had quite  another object.  Dr Stubbs 
would go back as far as 1295, or even further, should earlier writs be discovered. 
It is a small point, but rather instructive.  F. W. M. 
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It remains  to speak  of  the  commons  of  the realm-the 
third estate.  And first of the word 'commons.'  It seems to me 
that two ideas have been  blended.  The persons who  enjoy 
no  special  privilege, who  have no peculiar status as barons or 
clerks, are common  men.  Rut I do not believe that this was 
the notion  present  to  the minds of those who  first used  the 
term 'the commons' in contrast to 'the barons' and 'the clergy.' 
I do not think that the word 'a commoner' as opposed  to 'a 
peer' is old.  'The commons,' says Stubbs, 'are the communi- 
ties or zaziversitates, the organized  bodies  of  freemen  of  the 
shires  and towns, and the estate of  the commons is the com- 
mztnitas communitatzrm, the general  body  into which  for the 
purposes  of  parliament  these  communities  are combined1.' 
I  may  remind  you  of  the  French  commune, and  that  the 
language of  our  law just  at the time when  parliament  was 
taking shape was  French.  Any way  the representatives who 
appeared  in  parliament were not representatives of  inorganic 
collections of individuals, they represented shires and boroughs. 
It is a little too definite to say that they represented corpora- 
tions aggregate-the  idea of a corporation aggregate had not 
yet been formed by our law, and the English county has never 
become  a  corporation.  Still  this word  is  only  a  little  too 
distinct.  The county was  already a highly organized entity. 
County and county court were one.  The language of the time 
did  distinguish between the two-the  county court is the 
comitatus-there  is  no  such  phrase  in  our  books  as  curia 
comitatzrs,  curia  de  comitatu.  On  the judicial  rolls  of  the 
time complaints  are not  uncommon  of  what  the county has 
done; the county has  delivered a false judgment ; the county 
by four representative knights comes into the king's court and 
denies  that it has given  a  false judgment;  the county even 
wages battle by its champion ; if  the county does not appear 
then  the county is amerced.  It is well  to remember that all 
this had been so for a long time before the knights of  the shire 
were  summoned  to parliament.  In summoning  the  county 
to  send  representatives  Henry,  De  Montfort  and  Edward 
were only putting old machinery to a new use.  This helps us 
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to face a  question which  has often  been  discussed-namely, 
who  elected  the knights  of  the shire who  came to the early 
parliaments.  One answer has been, the king's tenants in chief 
-these  minor  tenants in  chief  who  were not  summoned  by 
name.  There is something to be  said for it.  The court  of 
a feudal king should consist  of tenants in chief-should  have 
no sub-vassals in it.  The assembly recognized or designed in 
John's  charter  was  an  assembly  of  this  sort.  It became 
impossible or  useless  to call  up all  the tenants  in  chief, so 
instead the lesser of them, those who had no special summons, 
were allowed or compelled to send representatives.  The con- 
stituency then of the knight of the shire was an assembly, not 
of  all freeholders, but  of tenants  in  chief: only gradually as 
tenure becomes of less importance, and as the working of the 
Quia  Ernptores  largely  increases  the  number  of  tenants  in 
chief,  are  the  tenants  of  mesne  lords  admitted.  But  this 
doctrine has been very generally rejected by modern historians, 
by Hallam and by Stubbs.  From the first the language used 
of  the knights is  that  they  are to be  elected  in  full  county 
court, by  the assent  of  the whole county, itz pleno comitatzb, 
fey  assensugn  totius cornitatus, and  so  forth.  Such language 
had  already a definite  meaning,  it had  been  constantly  used 
for other purposes; it referred to the county court; the county 
court  was  not  an  assembly  constructed  on  feudal  lines; it 
comprised the whole body of  freehold tenants holding whether 
by  mesne  or  by  immediate  tenure  of  the king.  Those who 
have  maintained  the opposite  opinion  have  been  forced  to 
imagine  another  county  court,  one  attended  only  by  the 
tenants in capite; to the existence  of  any such  assembly  no 
recofd  bears witness ;  such an  assembly could  not have been 
indicated  by  the well-known  phrases plenus  comitatz~s,  totzls 
comitntus.  If it be urged that a representation of  sub-vassals 
is  opposed  to the feudal spirit, the answer  is that Edward's 
legislation  is  pervaded  by  a  spirit  which  is  anti-feudal,  it 
strives to lessen the public, the political importance of  tenure, 
to  bring all  classes  into  direct  connection  with  king  and 
parliament.  This  is,  I  believe, the  general  opinion  at the 
present  day-but  it has some difficulties to overcome, for  it 
seems clear from a series of petitions in the fourteenth century 
that  the question  as to who  were  to pay  the wages  of  the 
knights of the shire was a somewhat open one.  The tenants 
of  mesne lords contended  that they were not  bound  to con- 
tribute, but  they do not,  I believe, urge as a reason  for this 
contention  that  they  are  not  represented.  It  seems  very 
possible  that  practice  differed  somewhat  widely  from  legal 
theory, that the smaller tenants, socagers and so forth, did not 
often attend the county court, that the office of representative 
was  by no  means coveted, and that the election was de  facto 
made by the great men.  But  it seems almost impossible  to 
believe in the face of existing documents that the electoral body 
was not from the first the whole body of  freeholders, the totus 
comitatz~s. The Act of  1430  (8 Hen. VI, c. 7), which regulated 
the county franchise for four centuries, was (as appears by the 
preamble) passed to prevent riotous and disorderly elections- 
it ordains that the electors are to be  people dwelling in  the 
county, whereof every one of them shall have free land or tene- 
ment to the value of 40  shillings by the year at the least above 
all charges.  The elector must be a freeholder, a forty shilling 
freeholder-he  must  have free land or tenement, but  no dis- 
tinction  is  noticed  between  tenure of the king and tenure of 
a  mesne  lord,  nor  between  military  tenure  and  tenure  by 
socage.  Certainly this act and some others of the two previous 
reigns do not favour the belief that such distinctions had ever 
been of importance. 
I have stated these two opinions, viz., that the persons who 
attended  the county court  for  the election  of  representative 
knights were (a) the tenants in chief of  the crown, (b) all the 
freeholders-and  I have said that the latter is the opinion which 
now  prevails.  For my own  part, however,  I  doubt whether 
either of them gives  us the real truth-reasons  for this doubt 
you can see, if you wish it, in the English Historical Review for 
July  1888.  Perhaps  I ought just to state what  I  believe  to 
be  the truth.  It seems to me that the duty of attending the 
county  court, the duty of  going there to sit as a judge, was 
conceived as being in  general incumbent upon all freeholders, 
but that it had become a burden annexed to particular parcels 
of land, so that when the number of freeholders was increased 
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was  not thereby increased.  This manor, or this township, or 
this tract of  land which belongs to A, owes a suit to the county 
court.  A enfeoffs B, C, D with parts of the land.  The whole 
manor, township, or tract still owes  one suit, must  send  one 
suitor, but  it  owes  no  more.  Who  shall  do that  suit  is  a 
matter that A, B, C, D can  settle among themselves, and they 
do settle it among themselves  by the terms  of the feoffment. 
As regards  the  king or  the sheriff they are all jointly  and 
severally liable for the coming of one suitor, as between them- 
selves  they  can  determine  who  shall  discharge  the burden. 
So again  in  a case of  inheritance-A  holds land which  owes 
a suit: he dies and it descends to his three daughters B, C, D : 
one  or other of  them  must  do the suit, and  in  general  the 
burden  falls on  the eldest  daughter. 
It was  in  this  manner that the county court, which  met 
month  by  month as a court  of  law, was  constituted.  Those 
who were bound to come there were not necessarily tenants in 
chief, nor  again were all  the freeholders  bound to come-the 
persons who were bound  to come were those persons who  by 
means of bargains between lords and tenants were answerable 
for that fixed amount of suit to which the court was entitled. 
The evidence of this consists  in  a large number of entries in 
documents  of  the thirteenth century, e.g. the Hundred Rolls, 
in  which  it is said that A  or B does  the suit to the county 
court  for a whole  manor or township.  Of  course it is  con- 
ceivable  that when  the county court  sat for  the purpose  of 
electing knights of  the shire, other persons attended and were 
entitled to attend, besides the regular suitors who came month 
by month-perhaps  all freeholders might come:-but  I do not 
see  the proof  of  it-such  phrases  as ple~zus  comitatzrs,  totus 
co?nitatzrs are  constantly used  of  the county court as consti- 
tuted  for  judicial  purposes,  the  court  which  sat  month  by 
month, and  my contention  is  that  by  no  means every free- 
holder  owed  suit to that court. 
A  similar question has been  raised  about the  boroughs. 
Were the boroughs which were  directed  to return  represent- 
atives  only  the demesne  boroughs  of  the  crown  or all  the 
boroughs in the shire?  Both Hallam and Stubbs have written 
in  favour of  the latter view.  The election  of  burgesses  to 
represent the towns was not a matter altogether distinct from 
the election of  knights  of the shire.  A writ was  sent to the 
sheriff of each county commanding him to procure the election 
of two knights from his county, two citizens from every city, 
two burgesses from every borough.  The election was probably 
made in the boroughs and then reported to the county court ; 
but  all was  under  the direction  of  the sheriff of  the county 
until  the  fifteenth  century, when  a  few  towns  succeeded  in 
getting  made counties  of  themselves  and having  sheriffs of 
their own.  Indeed, so late as  1872, no writ was addressed to 
any officer of the borough ;  the sheriff of the county, as of old, 
was  told to send  two knights for  the shire, two  citizens  for 
every  city,  two  burgesses  for  every  borough.  See the writ 
printed by Sir William Anson, where the sheriff of Middlesex 
is to  return  not  only two  knights of  the shire, but also two 
citizens  for  the  city  of  Westminster and  two  burgesses  of 
each  of  the boroughs  of  the Tower  Hamlets, Finsbury, and 
Marylebonel.  But  during  the Middle  Ages  the cities  and 
boroughs were not thus named.  A considerable power seems 
thus  to  have  been  left  in  the sheriff's  hand.  What  were 
boroughs  and what were  not was  to a  certain  extent ascer- 
tained  by  the ordinary  course  of  justice.  Some boroughs, 
but  by no means all, had  charters ; but when  the justices  in 
eyre came to the county court, every borough was represented 
by its twelve burgesses, while the common country village, viZ- 
Zata, township was represented  by the reeve and four best men. 
In telling the sheriff, therefore, to return burgesses from every 
borough, terms were  used which had an ascertained meaning. 
We do find the idea of  tenure cropping up at times, as though 
only the king's  demesne boroughs  had  a right to be  repre- 
sented, or rather  were  bound  to  be  represented.  But it is 
difficult to make the facts correspond  with  any theory,  and 
certain that the boroughs on one pretext and another evaded 
the duty of  sending representatives  and paying their wages 
whenever they could.  There is one case in which a borough 
(Torrington)  actually obtained  a  charter  absolving  it  from 
the obligation. 
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Ry whom were the representative  burgesses elected ?  As 
regards  Edward's  day,  and  indeed  much  later  times,  our 
materials  for answering this question  are very scanty.  The 
one thing that we  can  say with  some certainty  is  that the 
qualification varied  from  borough to borough.  When at last 
we get accurate information, we find that it varies very greatly. 
In this borough the franchise is extremely democratic, every 
person who has  a  hearth  of  his  own  may vote;  in  another, 
every one who contributes to the local rates, who  pays  scot 
and bears lot; in another, every one who has a free tenement. 
Elsewhere the franchise is confined to the members of  a small 
civic  oligarchy.  We can  say with  some certainty  also  that 
the  more  democratic  the  qualification,  the  older  it is.  In 
Edward's  day contribution  to the  local  burdens  may  have 
often qualified a man to vote ; in  other cases tenure was im- 
portant, he had  to be a tenant of  the manor  constituted  by 
the borough ; in  some cases, membership  of  the  merchant 
guild  may have been requisite ; but the small close corpora- 
tions belong to a later age.  The important  thing to notice 
is  that  this  matter  was  decided  by  no  general  law;  each 
borough  was  suffered  to  work  out  its  own  history  in  its 
own  way,  and  to  buy  what  privileges  it  could  from  the 
crown. 
That notions  of  tenure had  a  considerable, though  a  re- 
stricted, influence on the constitution  of  parliament is shown 
by the history of the counties palatine.  The  county of Chester 
returned  no  knights  until  1543 ; the county  of  Durham  re- 
turned none until 1672. 
At the time of  which we  are speaking (1307), the parlia- 
ment of  the three estates was  by no means the only organ of 
government; indeed, as we have seen, it was only just coming 
into  being.  Most  of  the  great  statutes  of  the  reign  were 
made  in  assemblies  of  the  older  type,  assemblies  in  which 
the commons  and the inferior  clergy  were  not  represented. 
Such  assemblies  of  prelates  and  barons  were held  in  later 
times, and got the name of Magna Concilia which distinguished 
them  from true Parliamentu ; only by slow degrees was  the 
line established  between  what could  be  done by  a Magnum 
Concilium and what could be done by a Parliamentum. 
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But besides these grand councils, the king had a permanent 
council in constant session. This permanent or ordinary council 
had  grown  out of  the curia Regis of  earlier times;  the word 
cz~ria  comes to be more and more definitely appropriated to a 
judicial  body, and the judicial  body becomes distinct from the 
administrative deliberative  body to which the king  looks  for 
advice and aid in the daily task  of  government.  A conciliz~m 
as distinct from the curia first becomes  prominent during the 
minority of  Henry 111-it  acts as a council of  regency.  It is 
generally  called  simply Concilit~m  Regis,  as  opposed  to the 
commune  conciliwn yeg~zi;  its  members are magnates  de  con- 
cilio, conciliatores.  It seems to comprise the great  officers  of 
state, justiciar, chancellor, treasurer, some or all  of  the judges 
of the royal curia, and a number of  bishops, barons and other 
members who  in  default of  other title  are simply councillors. 
The chroniclers now and again inform us  that one person was 
made a  member of  the council  and  another dismissed ; but 
(and  this is noticeable)  there is  from the first  something in- 
formal about its constitution ;-it  needs  no  formal document 
to make a man  a member of  the council;  the king can take 
advice in what quarter he pleases, and the so-called councillor 
has no right to be consulted.  Just while parliament is growing 
this council also is growing.  The task of government becomes 
always more elaborate ; it requires constant attention ; it can- 
not ~ossibly  be accomplished by the king without the help or 
interference of  a national  assembly summoned  from  time  to 
time.  During Henry's reign the scheme of reform constantly 
put forward by the barons is that they should elect the council ; 
Henry's  councillors  have  too  often  been  his  hated  foreign 
favourites.  This scheme breaks  down.  Under  Edward the 
council is  a definite body; its members take an oath; they 
are sworn  of  the council-swearing  to give  good  advice, to 
protect the king's  interests, to do justice  honestly, to take no 
gifts.  Under Edward the relations of  this  king's  council to 
the great council of  the realm  are still indefinite;  all  works 
SO  smoothly  that there  is  no  struggle, and consequently no 
definition.  Both in  his parliament and in his council the king 
legislates, taxes and judges-indeed  it is  often hard for us  to 
say whether  a given  piece  of work  is, has  or has  not  been Consf  ifu  f iona  Z  History  Taxation 
sanctioned  by  the  common  council  of  the  realm.  Let  US 
take  these  points  separately-(I)  legislation,  (2)  taxation, 
(3) judicature. 
(I)  That the king could not by himself or by the advice 
of  a  few chosen  advisers  make  general  laws  for  the whole 
realm  seems  an  admitted  principle.  The most  despotic of 
Edward's predecessors  had  not  claimed  such  a  power-it  is 
with  the counsel  of  prelates  and barons  that they legislate. 
On the other hand, that the commons  or inferior clergy must 
share in  legislation  was  not  admitted, was  not  as yet  even 
asserted.  As already said, the great laws  of  the reign-laws 
which made the profoundest changes in all parts of the common 
law, laws which all subsequent generations have called statutes, 
statutes which are in force at  the present moment-were  made 
in  assemblies  in  which  the  commons  were not  represented. 
But  again  it  seems  to  have  been  allowed  that  there  were 
regulations  which  might  be  made  without  the  sanction  of 
a  national  assembly  of any kind.  The king  in  his  council 
could  make, if  not statutes, at least ordinances.  Some even 
of  what we now call the statutes of Edward I do not on their 
face claim any higher authority than that of  the king and his 
council.  Here is a fruitful source of difficulty for future times. 
Can  any line be drawn  between  the province  of  the statute 
and the province of  the ordinance ?  Under Edward all works 
so smoothly that the question is not raised.  We can say no 
more than this-and  it is vague enough-that  important and 
permanent  regulations  which  are  conceived  as  altering the 
law of the land can only be made by statute, with the consent 
of  prelates and barons.  Minor  regulations, temporary regu- 
lations, regulations which do not affect the nation at large can 
be made by ordinance. 
(2)  We  turn  to  taxation,  and  may  begin  with  a  few 
general reflections as to past history.  In the first  place, the 
king had not been nearly so dependent on taxation as a modern 
government  is.  Indeed  it  is  not  until  the very  end  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon time that we hear of anything that can be called 
a tax, not  until  it is necessary  to pay  tribute to the Danes. 
Let us  briefly  reckon  up  the sources  of  income  which  the 
kings  enjoyed  after  the Conquest.  In the first  place  there 
were the demesne lands of  the crown.  The remnant of  the 
old  folk  land  had  become  terrn  Regis, and this constituted 
the  ancient  demesne1.  Then escheats  and  forfeitures  were 
constantly  bringing to the king's  hand  new  demesne  lands. 
Apart from his  being the ultimate lord  of  all  land, the king 
was the immediate lord  of  many manors-he  was by far the 
largest landowner of  the kingdom.  Secondly, there were his 
feudal rights-rights  which had steadily grown in some direc- 
tions, if  they had  been diminished  in others.  The charter of 
1215, by clauses which were never again repeated, forbad him 
to  impose  any scutage,  or  any  aid  save the three  regular 
feudal aids, without the common counsel  of the realm.  The 
charter defined the amount to be paid  for reliefs, but besides 
scutages, aids and reliefs, he  was  entitled  to wardships  and 
marriages-his  rights  in  this direction  had  steadily grown, 
and these were profitable commodities.  Thirdly, the profits of 
justice  in  the king's  courts must have been very considerable. 
Under John the sale of  justice  had  become scandalous.  By 
the charter, he promised  to sell justice to none-but  without 
exactly selling justice, there was  much  profit to be  made  by 
judicial  agencies : fees could be demanded from litigants, and 
in the course of proceedings, civil as well as criminal, numerous 
fines and amercements were inflicted.  Fourthly, the king had 
many important rights to sell, in  particular the right of juris- 
diction, and though the more far-sighted of the kings dreaded 
and checked the growth of proprietary jurisdiction,  there was 
always a temptation to barter the future for the present.  The 
right  to have  a  market  was  freely  sold,  and  many  similar 
rights.  Pardons  again  were  sold.  The towns  had  to  buy 
their privileges  bit by bit.  What is more, the grantee of  any 
privilege had  in  practice to get the grant renewed  by every 
successive king.  That the king was bound by his  ancestors' 
grants might be the law, but it was law that no prudent person 
would  rely  on.  Offices  too, even  the highest  offices of  the 
realm, were at times  freely  bought  and sold-this  does  not 
seem to have been thought disgraceful.  Fifthly, a good deal 
could  be  made out  of  the church-when  a  bishop  died  the 
king took the temporalities, the lands, of  the see into his own Constif  u  fional History 
hand, and was  in no hurry to allow the see to be filled ; this 
however  was  an  abuse.  Sixthly, the  king had  a  right  to 
tallage the tenants on his demesne lands, and on his demesne 
lands were found many of  the most considerable towns.  This 
seems the right rather of  the landlord than of the king ; other 
lords with the king's leave exercised a similar right over their  .  -.  . 
tenants in villeinage.  The tenants on the demesne lands had 
for the most  part held  in villeinage;  the burghers had very  - - . .  -  - - 
generally  bought  themselves  free  of  villein  services  in  con- 
sideration  of  an  annual rent, but  the king  had  retained  the 
right to impose  a  tallage  from  time to time-to  impose  a 
certain  sum  on  the  borough  or the  manor  as  a  whole-or 
rather an uncertain sum, for we hear of no limit to the amount. 
I.astly,  somehow or another, the process is obscure, the king 
had become entitled to certain customs duties : Magna Carta 
recognizes  that there  are certain  ancient  and  right  customs 
(aniiqzmae  et  recine  consueiudines)  which  merchants  can  be 
called  upon  to  pay,  and  with  these  it  contrasts  unjust  ex- 
actions,  or  maletolts.  To all  this  we  may  add  that  the 
obligations of  tenure supplied the king with  an  army which 
could be called up in case of war. 
Here we  shall do well  to note that at this time  and for 
several centuries afterwards, no distinction was drawn between 
national  revenue  and royal  revenue; the king's  revenue was 
the king's  revenue, no matter  the source whence  it came; it 
was his to spend or to save, as pleased  him best; all was his 
pocket money;  it is to later times that we  must look  for any 
machinery for compelling the king to spend his  money upon 
national objects. 
But  large as had  been  the king's  income, and free as he 
was  to deal  with  it  in  his  own  way, it had  not been  found 
large  enough.  Direct taxes had been  imposed: a land  tax, 
for some time called  Danegeld, afterwards carucage, a tax of 
so much on the carucate or plough-land ; then as already said, 
under  Henry the  Second  the taxation  of  movables  begins. 
We can hardly say that for such  taxation the theory  of  the 
twelfth century requires a decree of  the national assembly; it 
but slowly enters mens' heads that the consent of  a majority of 
an assembly, however representative, can be  construed  to be 
the consent of  all  men:-rather  the idea is that a tax ought 
to be  a  voluntary gift  of  the individual  taxpayer, and now 
and again some prelate or baron is strong enough to protest 
that he individually has not consented and will not pay.  The 
clauses of the charter of  12  I 5, to which reference has so often 
been  made,  mark  a  very  definite step :-no  scutage  or aid 
(save  the three  feudal  aids)  is  to be  imposed  without  the 
counsel of the prelates and tenants in chief.  But these clauses 
are withdrawn;  it seems  to be thought hard  that the child 
Henry should  be  compelled  to make  this  concession, par- 
ticularly  at a  moment  when  a  foreign  enemy  is within  the 
realm.  However, these clauses are in fact observed;  Henry, 
though he sometimes extorts money in irregular ways, does 
not attempt to tax without the common council of  the realm. 
This  council  is  as yet  but  an  assembly  of  prelates  and 
magnates;  it grants  him  taxes  on  land  and  on  movables, 
but we can see a doubt growing as to how  far it represents 
all classes of  men, how  far the consent of  the unrepresented 
classes is necessary.  Henry is driven to negotiate with the 
inferior clergy, and with the merchants.  In  1254  knights of 
the shire are summoned to treat about a tax.  That however 
remains an isolated precedent, and the parliament summoned 
by De Montfort can hardly be called a precedent at all.  It is 
not therefore until  1295  that a regular practice of summoning 
the representatives of the commons and of the inferior clergy 
begins1.  Each estate now taxes itself; thus in 1295  the barons 
and knights of the shire offered an eleventh, the burgesses a 
seventh, the clergy a tenth.  On this followed the great crisis 
of  1297. The rather elaborate circumstances  we  must leave 
undescribed ;  Edward was in great need  of  money:  the pope 
Boniface  VI  I I  had  published  the  Bull  Clericis  lnicos  for- 
bidding the clergy to pay  taxes to any secular power;  the 
barons, again led  by the Constable and Marshal, Bohun  and 
Bigot, refused to serve in Flanders. contending that they were 
not bound to do so by their tenure; Edward seized the wool, 
the staple commodity of  England,  and  exacted  an  impost 
on it;  he also obtained the grant of  an aid from an irregular 
assembly.  The barons armed against him, and he was forced 
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to withdraw  from hrs  position, to confirm the charters with 
certain additional articles.  The exact form of  those articles 
is of  some importance.  According to what in  all probability 
is  the  authentic  version  of  this  Confirnzatio  Cartarum, he 
granted that the recent exactions, aids and prises should  not 
be made precedents, that no such aids, tasks or prises should 
be taken for the future without  the common  consent of  the 
realm, that no tax like that recently set  on  wool  should  be 
taken  in  future without  the common  consent  of  the realm, 
saving the ancient aids, prises  and  customs.  We have also 
what seems to be either an  imperfect  abstract of this docu- 
ment, or  else a document which records  the demands of  the 
barons.  This in  after times came to be known as a statute, 
Stattrtunz  de  Tallagio  non  concedendo, though  as  just  said 
in all probability it had no right to this name1.  It  goes some- 
what further than the authentic version ; it contains the word 
'tallage'  which  the authentic version  does not, it does  not 
contain  a saving  clause  for  the king's  ancient  rights.  'No 
tallage or aid shall be taken without the will  and consent of 
all the archbishops, bishops, prelates, earls, knights, burgesses 
and other free men of  the realm!  Tallage, as we  have seen, 
was the name given to an impost set by the king on his  own 
demesne lands-in  origin  rather a right of  the landlord than 
of  the king.  Edward, it seems  pretty  certain, did  not  con- 
sider that he had resigned this right ;  in  I 304 he tallaged  his 
demesne lands.  But though  this particular  mode of  raising 
money may thus have been  left open  by the letter, if  not by 
the spirit of  the law, we  may  fairly say that after  1295  the 
imposition  of  any direct  tax without  the  common  consent 
of the realm  was  against the very  letter of  the law.  I  say 
of any direct tax, because subsequent events showed that the 
question of indirect taxes, of  customs duties and the like, had 
not  been  finally settled.  And  the common  consent of  the 
realm was now  no vague  phrase ; that consent had  now  its 
appropriate organ in a parliament of  the three estates. 
As to the administration of  justice by the parliament and 
the council, we  shall speak hereafter, but first a little should 
be said of  the general position of  the king.  And first as to 
his title ;- 
1 ~kt  Chart~~~,  pp. 487-98. 
The kingship had, I think, by this time become definitely 
hereditary. 
Before the Cotiquest  the English kingship was an elective 
kingship, but the usage hardening into law was  for the great 
men, the witan, to elect some near kinsman  of  the dead king. 
We ought to recollect  in  this context that the then existing 
law as to private inheritance was not primogenitary ; ordinarily 
at least a dead man's lands and his goods were partible among 
all his  sons ; all  primogenitary rules were but slowly worked 
out long after the Norman  Conquest.  We learn from Glanvill 
that even at the end  of  the twelfth century one of  the most 
elementary questions was still open-A  has two sons, B and C, 
the elder, B, dies during A's  lifetime, leaving a son, D ; then A 
dies; who  shall  inherit, C  or  D ?  English law has  not  yet 
made up its mind  about this very easy problem-for  primo- 
geniture  is  new.  So we  must  not  think  of  private  law  as 
setting a  model  for  the  succession  to  the kingship; much 
rather  is  it  true  that  the succession  to a  kingship or other 
office  became  the model  for  the succession to land; primo- 
geniture  spreads  from  office  to property.  It is  long  after 
the Conquest  before  the notion  that the kingship is  strictly 
hereditary becomes  firmly  rooted.  The Conqueror  himself 
could  not  rely upon hereditary right ; he relied rather on gift 
or  devise.  Edward  had  given  him  the kingdom.  I believe 
that the notion  that of right  the crown should have gone to 
Edgar the Ktheling only makes its appearance late in the day. 
Neither  Rufus  nor  IIenry I  could  rely  on  hereditary right 
even  according to the notions of  the time ; both had to seek 
election and to rely upon the support of the people.  Stephen 
again  was  compelled  to assert a title by election.  Probably 
the succession of  Henry the Third did  much  towards fixing 
the notion  of  hereditary right.  John has been  spoken of  by 
modern  writers as an usurper; some at least of his  contem- 
poraries treated him as an elected king.  Matthew Paris (who 
died  about  fifty  years  afterwards)  has  put  into  the mouth 
of  Hubert Walter, Archbishop of  Canterbury, a speech  made 
by him  before crowning  John-and  we  have other reason for 
believing  that something of  the sort was  actually said.  He 
distinctly said that no one could claim the crown by hereditary Constitutions  Z  History  Coroaation  Oaths 
right-kinship  to the late king would give a preference ; it is 
natural  and  proper  to  elect  a  near  kinsman,  and  we  have 
elected  Earl John'.  The succession of  Henry 111, a  boy of 
nine,  on  the  death  of  his  father  (there was  no  one  else to 
crown) is in many ways an important event.  From this time 
forward  the kingship is, I think, regarded  by contemporaries 
as definitely hereditary.  Then during a period of  nearly two 
centuries  the  late  king  has  always  an  obvious  heir  who 
succeeds him-Henry  111, the three Edwards and Richard I1 
follow each other in  strictly correct order, though we  have to 
remember  that  Edward  the Second  is  deposed.  Edward  I 
was the first king who reigned before he was crowned. 
Long  before  the Conquest  the  English  kings had  been 
crowned and anointed.  Whether this ceremony was borrowed 
straight from the Old Testament or became ours by a more 
roundabout  route  seems  uncertain ; but  clearly  it  was  not 
considered  to bestow upon  the king any indefeasible  title to 
the obedience  of  his  subjects ; the kings are easily put aside, 
and  no  bishop  objects  that the  Lord's  Anointed  cannot  be 
removed  by earthly power; still a religious  sanction is given 
to the relation between king and people.  Also the king swears 
an oath.  The oath taken by Ethelred the Unready we have, 
and it  is  in  these terms, ' In  the  name  of  the Holy Trinity 
three things do I promise to this Christian people my subjects: 
first  that  God's  church  and all the Christian  people  of  my 
realm hold  true peace ; secondly that  I forbid all rapine and 
injustice  to  men  of  all  conditions;  thirdly  that  1 promise 
and enjoin  justice  and mercy in  all judgments, that the just 
and  merciful  God  of  his  everlasting  mercy  may  forgive us 
all2.' 
Coronation oaths are of  considerable  interest, since they 
throw light on  the contemporary conception  of  the kingship. 
The oath of Ethelred may be taken as the model of  the oaths 
sworn by king after king in  the days after the Conquest.  The 
Conqueror, we are told, swore that he would defend God's holy 
churches and their rulers, that he would 'rule the whole people 
with righteousness and royal providence, that he would estab- 
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lish  and hold  fast right  law, and  utterly  forbid  rapine  and 
unrighteous  judgment.'  Rufus  swore a like oath.  The oath 
of Henry I seems to have been precisely that of Ethelred.  It 
is  probable  that  the oaths of Richard, John  and  Henry  I11 
differed  somewhat  from  this  ancient  form.  They promised 
to  observe  peace,  to  reverence  the church  and  clergy,  to 
administer right justice to the people, to abolish evil laws and 
customs,  and  to maintain  the good.  It is  to be  repretted 
that  about the oath  of  Edward  I  there  is  some doubt-to 
be  regretted  because  the  oath  of  Edward  I1  differs in  an 
important  manner  from  that  of  Henry  111-but  a  French 
form  has  been  preserved  which  is  possibly  that  used  by 
Edward  I, and  it  has  these words-'and  that he  will  cause 
to be made in all his judgments  equal and right justice with 
discretion  and mercy, and that he will grant to hold the laws 
and customs of  the realm which  the people shall have made 
and  chosen  (pue Zes  gentes  de  people  uveront faitz  et eslies), 
and will  maintain  and uphold  them  and will  put out all bad 
laws and customs1.'  The oath  of  Edward  I1 is  much  more 
definite  and precise than anything that has yet come before 
us.  The king is thus catechized by the Archbishop : 
Sir, will  you  grant and keep and by your oath confirm to 
the people of  England the laws and customs granted to them 
by the ancient  kings  of  England  your  righteous  and godly 
predecessors, and especially the laws, customs and privileges 
granted  to  the  clergy  and  people  by  the  glorious  King 
S. Edward  your  predecessor?  I  grant  and  promise. 
Sir, will  you  keep  towards God  and  holy church  and  to 
clergy and people peace and accord in God entirely after your 
power?  I will keep them. 
Sir, will you cause to be done in all your judgments  equal 
and right justice  and discretion in  mercy  and truth to your 
power ?  I will so do. 
Sir, do you grant to hold and keep the laws and righteous 
customs which the community of your realm shall have chosen 
(pas vuZgas  elegerit-Zes  qzdieZs  Lu  conzmunazdte  de  vostre 
roiuuwe  auru  esleu),  and  will  you  defend  and  strengthen 
1 Constitutzo;za.? Hzstory, vol. 11,  $  rig note. them  to the honour  of  God to the utmost of  your  power? 
I  grant and  promise1. 
You will observe the promise to confirm the laws of  Saint 
Edward.  The Confessor has by this time become a  myth- 
a  saint and hero  of  a  golden  age, of  a  good  old  time; but 
there are documents going about purporting to give his laws, 
which, if  they contain many things inapplicable to these later 
days and  even  unintelligible  about  wergilds  and  so  forth, 
contain  also  some  far  from  pointless  tales,  as  to how  the 
sheriffs were  once elected  by the people, and the like.  But 
the main  interest of  the oath centres in  the words leges quas 
vulgus  elegerit-les  quiels  la  commz~?zaz~te  de  ejostre  roiazm~e 
aura esleu.  Legislation, it is  now considered, is  the function 
of  the cornmunitas  reg~zi,  u?ziversitas regni, the whole body of 
the realm concentrated in a parliament. 
And  now  what  was  the  king's  legal  position?  I  think 
that we  may in  the first  place  say with some certainty that 
against him  the law had  no coercive process ; there was  no 
legal procedure whereby the king could either be punished or 
compelled  to make  redress.  This has been  denied  on  the 
ground  that in  much later days a certain judge  said that he ' 
had  seen  a  writ  directed  to  Henry  111-a  writ  beginning 
Praecipe Regi Henrico-a  writ of  course proceeding theoreti- 
cally from  the king, telling the sheriff  to order  King Henry 
to appear in  court and answer a  plaintiff  in  an action.  But 
this story is now very generally disbelieved.  On the contrary, 
from Henry 111's  reign we  get both from  Bracton and from 
the Plea  Rolls  the  most  positive  statements  that the king 
cannot  be  sued  or punished.  In this  meaning, the maxim 
that the king can do no wrong is fully admitted.  If  the king 
breaks the law then the only remedy is  a  petition  addressed 
to him  praying him  that he will  give redress.  On the other 
hand, it is by no means admitted that the king is above the 
law.  Bracton who, you will  remember, was  for twenty years 
a judge  under  Henry 111, repeats this very positively :-The 
king is below no man, but he is below God and the law ; law 
makes the king ; the king is bound to obey the law, though if 
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he break  it, his punishment must be left to God1.  Now to a 
student fresh from  Austin's  jurisprudence  this may seem an 
absurd  statement.  You  put the dilemma, either the king is 
sovereign  or  no; if  he be  sovereign  then he  is  not  legally 
below  the law, his  obligation  to obey the law is  at most  a 
moral  obligation ; on the other hand  if  he is  below the law, 
then he is not sovereign, he is below some man or some body 
of  men, he is bound  for  example to obey the commands of 
king and parliament, the true sovereign  of  the realm.  This 
may be a legitimate conclusion  if  in Austin's  way we  regard 
all  law as command; but  it  is  very  necessary  for  us  to re- 
member that the men  of  the thirteenth century had  no such 
notion  of  sovereignty, had  not  clearly  marked  off  legal  as 
distinct  from  moral  and  religious  duties, had  not  therefore 
conceived  that in  every  state there must  be some  man  or 
some body of  men above all law.  And well for us is it that 
this was so, for had they looked about for some such sovereign 
man  or  sovereign  body  as  Austin's  theory  requires,  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  our  king would  have become  an 
absolute monarch, a  true sovereign ruler  in  Austin's  sense- 
the assembly of prelates and magnates was much too vague a 
body, and a body much too dependent for its constitution on 
the king's will to be recognized as the depositary of sovereign 
power.  No, we have to remember that when  in  the middle 
of the seventeenth  century Hobbes put forward a  theory of 
sovereignty which  was  substantially that of  Bentham  and of 
Austin, this was a new thing, and it shocked mankind.  Law 
had  been  conceived  as  existing  independently of  the will 
of  any ruler,  independently even  of  the will  of  God; God 
himself  was  obedient  to law; the most glorious  feat of  his 
Omnipotence was to obey law:-so  the king, he is below the 
law, though he is  below no man ; no man  can  punish  him  if 
he breaks the law, but he must expect God's vengeance. 
While we  are speaking of  this  matter of  sovereignty,  it 
will be well to remember that our modern theories run counter 
to the deepest convictions of the Middle Ages-to  their whole 
manner of  regarding the relation  between  church and state. 
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Though  they may  consist  of  the same units, though  every 
man  may have his place in  both organisms, these two bodies 
are distinct.  The state has its king or  emperor, its laws, its 
legislative assemblies, its courts, its judges ;  the church has its 
pope, its prelates, its councils, its laws, its courts.  That the 
church is in  any sense below the state, no one will  maintain ; 
that the state is below the church is a more plausible doctrine ; 
but  the general  conviction  is that  the two are independent, 
that neither derives  its authority from  the other.  Obviously 
while men think thus, while they more or less consistently act 
upon  this  theory, they have no  sovereign  in  Austin's  sense; 
before the Reformation Austin's doctrine was impossible. 
But to return.  The troubles  of  Henry's  reign,  troubles 
which he brought upon himself by his shiftless faithless policy, 
give  rise  to  other  thoughts.  Bracton  himself  in  one  place 
hints that possibly if  the king does wrong and refuses justice 
the universitas regni represented by the barons may do justice 
in  the king's  name and  in  the king's  court.  In the printed 
text of Bracton's book there is a passage, probably interpolated 
by some annotator, which goes far beyond this, which declares 
that the king is not only below God  and the law, but  below 
his  court, that is to say, below  his earls and barons,  for the 
earls (comites) are so called because they are the king's fellows 
(socii), and he who has a fellow has a master (pi  kabet sociuwz, 
kabet  magistr7mz) ; they therefore  are bound  to set  a  bridle 
upon him and constrain him to do right1.  This passage clearly 
was written during the time of  revolt, the revolt which led to 
the battles of Lewes and of Evesham.  The ideal of that revolt 
was a small council of  magnates, chosen by the barons, whom 
the king would  be  bound  to consult, who, if  need  be, would 
exercise  the  royal  powers.  That  ideal  was  not  realized- 
happily, I think we  may say, for it was an oligarchical  ideal. 
The law was left as it was, as it is at this very moment-that 
against the king law has no  coercive power, it has no punish- 
ment for the king, it cannot compel him to make redress-or, 
as we say, the king can do no wrong.  It was left to later ages 
to work out consistently the other side of our modern doctrine, 
namely, that though the king can neither be punished nor sued, 
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no other person, no servant  of  the king, is protected  against 
the ordinary legal  consequences  of  an  unlawful  act by  the 
king's command. 
The power  of  deposing  a  king  is  a  somewhat different 
matter.  The next  century  presents  us  with  two  cases  of 
deposition, that of Edward I1 and that of Richard 11.  There 
was talk of deposing John, there was talk of deposing Henry 111. 
Apparently the common  opinion of  the time was  quite pre- 
pared  for  the  deposition  of  a  king  who  would  not  rule 
according  to law-any  notion  of  divine hereditary right not 
to be set aside by any earthly power does not belong to this 
age.  But the only precedents  for deposing a  king belonged 
to an already  remote  time, and  in  all  probability  were  but 
little  known.  The events  of  I327  and  1399, though  they 
prove clearly enough  that the nation  saw no  harm in setting 
aside a bad or incompetent king, prove also that there was no 
legal machinery for doing this.  We shall see this more clearly 
when these events come before us hereafter.  The idea current 
in  the thirteenth  century is not so much  that of  a power to 
try your  king and punish  him, as that of  a right of  revolt, a 
right to make war upon your king.  It is a feudal  idea and a 
dangerous one; the vassal who  cannot get justice  out of  his 
lord  may  renounce his  fealty and his  homage, may  defy his 
lord, may, that is,  renounce his  affiance, his  fealty.  This  is 
not the remedy of an oppressed nation, it is the remedy of an 
oppressed vassal. 
This would  naturally  lead  us  to speak of  feudalism  as a 
political or anti-political force ; that is a subject which we will 
still postpone; but a little more may here be added about the 
theory of the kingship.  Already in  Henry 111's reign it is the 
doctrine of  the royal judges, who  would  not  be disposed  to 
narrow  unduly  the scope of  their  master's  powers, that the 
king  cannot  make laws without  the consent  of  his  prelates 
and  barons.  This is brought  out by the treatment which  a 
famous passage in the Institutes receives at their  hands-sea! 
et  quod princ$i  placuit  legis  habet  vigorem.  Now  under 
Henry 11, the writer whom we  call  Glanvill  does, as it seems 
to me, hint that these words are true of  the king of  England ; 
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he did not wish them to be very plain ; however he brings out 
clearly the matter of fact that Henry legislates with the counsel 
of  the magnates, colzsilio $7-ocerz~?nl. In Bracton we  may see 
a distinct step-he  cites the words of  the Institutes, but so as 
to give them  a quite new meaning ; this I take to be a bit of 
deliberate  perverseness,  something  not  far  removed  from  a 
jest; he  knows that the words  in  their  proper  sense are not 
true of  King Henry-the  law  has  made  him  king, it  is  by 
virtue of  the law that he reigns, and this law sets limits to the 
$lncita$rinc+is2.  Undoubtedly, however, during Henry 111's 
long  reign  a great deal  of  what  we  should  call  law  making 
was done without the assent  of the national  assembly.  The 
common  law  grew  very  rapidly; it could  grow  very  rapidly 
because  the opinions of  the time conceded  to the king or to 
the king and his selected  councillors a considerable power  of 
making  new  remedies-new  modes  of  litigation, new  forms 
of  action.  It is  not at once seen  that to give new remedies 
is  often  enough  to  alter  the  substantive  law  of  the  land. 
Gradually however this  is seen, and complaints against these 
new  actions  become  loud, chiefly because  they  draw  away 
litigants  from  the  feudal  courts and from  the ecclesiastical 
courts.  Bracton writing towards the end of  the reign has left 
us a curious transitional doctrine.  The king can  make new 
writs, new forms of  action ; in  strictness such a writ requires 
the consent  of  the magnates, at least  if  it concerns land (for 
land is the subject of the feudal jurisdictions); still the consent 
of  the magnates  may be taken  for granted ; they consent  if 
they do not expressly dissent; and  after all it is  the king's 
duty to find  a  remedy  for every  wrong-his  solemn  sworn 
duty.  Such a theory could hardly be permanent, and one of 
the definite  results attained by what we call the Barons' War 
was that a limit was set to the king's writ-making power.  In 
Edward's  day we  find  it admitted that new writs  cannot  be 
made without the action of the national assembly-they  must 
Tractatus de  Leg-ibur  A~zgliae. ProZogzu.  "  Leges namque Anglicanas, licet 
non scriptas, Leges appellari tlou videtur  absurdum (cum hoc ipsum lex fit  'quod 
principi  placet,  legis  habet  vigorem')  eas  scilicet, quas super dubiis  in  consilio 
definiendis, procerum  quidem consilio,  et principis  accidente authoritate, constat 
esse promulgatas." 
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be sanctioned by statute; indeed so strict has this rule become 
that in  1285 it requires  a statute to permit the clerks in the 
King's Chancery to vary the old writs slightly so as to fit new 
cases  as they arise, but only new cases which fall under rules 
of  law already established  and which  require remedies which 
are already given.  Henceforth the sphere for judge-made law 
is  hemmed  in  by the existing  remedies, the writs  that  have 
already been made; to introduce a new form of action requires 
a statute.  Henceforth  for nearly two centuries the growth of 
unenacted law is very slow indeed. 
E.  Ad~nitzistratiolz  of  Jastice. 
This brings us to the administration of justice.  We have 
already  had  occasion  to  speak  of  courts  of  various  kinds. 
Some repetition  is unavoidable.  The further back  we  trace 
our  history  the more  impossible  is  it  for  us  to draw  strict 
lines of  demarcation between the various functions of the state: 
the same institution is a legislative assembly, a governmental 
council and a court of  law ; this is true of  the witenagemot; 
it is true, though perhaps less true of the Curia of the Norman 
kings ; traces of its truth are left in our own time ; our highest 
court of law is to this day an assembly of prelates and nobles, 
of  lords  spiritual  and  temporal  in  parliament  assembled ; 
everywhere, as we pass from the ancient to the modern, we see 
what  the  fashionable  philosophy  calls  differentiation.  We 
will now take a brief review of  the whole system of law courts 
as it stands in Edward the First's day. 
There are we may say courts of four great kinds.  (I) There 
are  the very  ancient  courts  of  the shire  and  the hundred ; 
these  we  may  call  popular  courts, or  still better, communal 
courts-they  are courts which in time past have been  consti- 
tuted by the free men  of  the district; they are courts which 
are now  constituted by the freeholders of  the district:  but  a 
good  many  of  the  hundred  courts  have  fallen  into  private 
hands.  (2)  There are the feudal  courts,  courts which  have 
their origin in tenure, in  the relation  between  man  and lord ; 
there is the manorial court  baron  for the freehold tenants of 
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or customary court of  the manor for the tenants in  villeinage, 
in which (at least according to the theory of  later times) the 
lord's steward is the only judge.  (3)  There are the king's own 
central courts.  (4)  There are the courts held  by the king's 
itinerant justices-visitatorial  courts, we may for the moment 
call them.  We  leave out of  sight the ecclesiastical courts, or 
courts Christian, though  these were  important courts for  the 
laity as well as for the clergy. 
Now the preliminary notions with which we ought to start 
are, I think, these :-(a)  The communal courts of the shire and 
the hundred  are, to start with, fully competent courts for all 
causes criminal as well as civil.  The  kings of the pre-Conquest 
period  had apparently  no desire  to draw away justice  from 
these courts.  Over and over again they ordain that no one is 
to bring his suit before the king before justice  has failed him 
in  the hundred  and  the shire.  We must  not  think  of  the 
witenagemot  even  as a  court  of  appeal-to  introduce  the 
notion of  an appeal from court to court is  to introduce a  far 
too modern conception.  The  suitor who comes before the king 
comes there not  to get a  mistake corrected  but to lodge a 
con~plaint  against his judges;  they have wilfully denied him 
justice. 
(b)  By the side of the ancient courts there have grown up 
the feudal  courts.  This process had  in  all probability been 
going on for a  century before the Conquest.  After the Con- 
quest  the principle  seems admitted  that any lord  who  has 
tenants may, if he can, hold a court for them.  In this disputes 
between  tenants  are  adjudged;  in  particular  if  land  is  in 
dispute and both parties admit that the land is holden of  this 
lord,  then his court is  the proper tribunal.  A great deal of 
jurisdiction  has thus been  taken  away  from  the communal 
courts, but jurisdiction  of a  civil  kind.  Mere tenure cannot 
give a criminal jurisdiction ; if  the lord has this, he has it by 
virtue of some grant from the king. 
(6)  After the Norman Conquest the king's  court has, we 
may say, three main  functions: (i)  as of  old  it is  a court of 
last resort in case of default of justice,  (ii)  on feudal principle 
it is a court for the tenants in  chief,  (iii)  it is  admitted that 
there are certain causes in which the king has a special interest 
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and which must come either before his own court or before  a 
court held by some officer of  his :-these  are the pleas  of  the 
crown. 
We  have now to watch the growth of this royal jurisdiction 
and will begin by speaking of the pleas of the crown. 
Already  before  the  Conquest  we  find  that  there  are 
certain criminal cases in which the king is conceived to have a 
special interest.  Thus in the Laws of Canute it is said 'These 
are the rights which  the king has over all men in Wessex- 
fg~und-bgce,  hdm-sbcne, forstal,$ymena-fyrm6e  and  fyrd-wile1.' 
Apparently in case of any of these crimes no lord may presume 
to exercise jurisdiction-unless  it has been expressly granted 
to him ; such cases must come before the king, or his officer 
the sheriff,  and the consequent  forfeitures  are  specially  the 
king's.  A  word  as to the  nature  of  these crimes:-mund- 
bryce is breach  of  the king's  special  peace or protection, this 
as we shall soon see becomes a matter of the utmost moment; 
hdm-sbctze  is  housebreaking,  the  seeking  of  a  man  in  his 
house ; forstal  seems  to mean  ambush ; Jynzetzn-fyrm8e  the 
receipt of  outlaws ; fyrd-wite the fine for  neglecting the sum- 
mons to the army.  In these cases, it is  conceived  there is 
something more than  ordinary crime, e.g. homicide  or theft, 
there is  some injury to the king, some attack upon  his  own 
peculiar rights. 
The next list of pleas of the crown that we get is found in 
the Leges Henrici Primi  (I  108-18,  $  10).  It is  much  longer 
and so instructive that I will translate it : ' Breach of the king's 
peace given by his hand  or writ ; danegeld ; contempt of  his 
writs or precepts; death or injury done to his servants; treason 
and breach  of  fealty; every contempt  or  evil  word  against 
him; [castle building-castellatio  triunz scannorz~m;]  outlawry; 
theft  punishable  with  death ;  murder ;  counterfeiting  his 
money ;  arson ;  katzsoke~z  ;  forestal;  fyrdwite ;  3ymena- 
fyrm'6e ; premeditated  assault ; robbery;  streetbreach; taking 
the king's land or money; treasure trove; shipwreck; waif  of 
the sea; rape; forests; reliefs of barons;  fighting in the king's 
house or household ; breach of peace in the army; neglecting 
to repair  castles  or bridges;  neglecting  a  summons  to the 
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army;  receiving  an  excommunicate  or  outlaw;  breach  of 
surety; flight in  battle; unjust  judgment; default of  justice; 
perverting the king's law1.'  It is a most disorderly list.  The 
writer has apparently strung together all cases in which either 
in  ancient  or modern  times  the king  has asserted  a special 
interest.  Observe how criminal cases are mixed  up with  the 
king's fiscal rights-by  fiscal rights I mean such rights as that 
to treasure trove, to shipwreck and goods thrown  up by the 
sea.  This is very instructive ; one of  the chief  motives that 
the king has for amplifying his rights is the want  of  money ; 
the criminal is regarded as a so,urce of  income.  It will strike 
you  that  by  a  little ingenuity  on  the part  of  royal  judges 
almost all criminal cases and very many  civil cases also can 
be brought within the terms of  this comprehensive  list.  But 
you will  further observe that no  such generalization has yet 
been  made,  it is  not  yet  said  that  all crime,  or  all  serious 
crime, or all acts of  violence are causes for royal cognizance. 
There is  one term, however, which  occurs  in  both  these 
lists which can be so extended as to cover a very large space- 
that is the  mund-bryce of  Canute's  laws, which  in the Leges 
He~zrici  appears as infortio pacis  regiae per  manum vel breve 
datum.  Let us go back a little.  The idea of  law is from the 
first very  closely  connected  with  the idea  of  peace-he  who 
breaks the peace, puts himself  outside the law, he is outlaw. 
But besides the general peace which exists at all times and in 
all places, and which  according to ancient  ideas  is the peace 
of the nation rather than of  the king, every man has his own 
special peace and if  you break that you  injure him.  Thus if 
you slay A in B's  house, not only must you  pay A's price  or 
wergild  to his  kinsfolk, but  you  have broken  R's  peace and 
you  will  owe  B a sum  of  money, the amount of  which  will 
vary with B's rank-you  have broken B's peace or mund; the 
mu~zd  of an archbishop is worth so much, that of  an ealdorman 
so much, and so forth.  Like other men the king has his peace. 
In course of  time, we  may  say, the king's  peace devours all 
other  peaces-but  that has  not  been  effected  until  near  the 
end of  the twelfth century.  In the Leges Edwardi Confessoris 
($  12)  which represent the law of  the first half  of  the century, 
Liebermann, Gesetze o'er  A9zgeZsachsetz, vol. I, p.  556. 
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the king's peace covers but certain times, places, and persons. 
Pax Regis mzdtiplex est-the  king's peace is manifold.  First 
there is that which he gives with  his  own  hand.  Then there 
is the peace of his coronation day,  and this extends eight days. 
Then the peace of the three great festivals, Christmas, Easter, 
Pentecost:  each endures  for  eight  days.  Then  there  is  the 
peace  of  the four  great  highways-the  four  ancient  Roman 
roads  which  run  through  England.  To commit  a  crime in 
one of these peaces is to offend directly against the king. 
Before  the end  of  the  century  there  has  been  a  great 
change, a great simplification ; apparently it has been effected 
thus:-Under  the  Norman  kings, the  mode  of  bringing  a 
criminal to justice was called an appeal (appelZz~m);  this word 
is not used  in our modern way to imply the going from one 
court to a superior court-but  means an accusation  of  crime 
brought  by  the person  who  has  been  wronged-the  person, 
e.g., whose goods have been  stolen or who has been wounded. 
Well, the king's justices seem to have allowed any appellor to 
make use  of  the words  ' in  the king's  peace'  whenever  he 
pleased, and did  not allow the appellee to take exception to 
these words-did  not allow him to urge that though he might 
have committed theft or homicide still he had not broken the 
king's peace, since the deed was not done against a person, or 
at a time  or place  which  was  covered  by  the king's  peace. 
Fictions of this kind  are very common  in  our  legal history, 
they  are the means  whereby  the courts amplify  their  juris- 
diction.  Any deed of violence then, any use of  criminal force, 
can  be  converted  into a breach  of  the king's  peace  and be 
brought  within  the cognizance  of  the king's  own  court. 
Further, under Henry I1 we find a new criminal procedure 
growing up by the side of the appeal, once a specially royal 
procedure-this  is  the procedure  by  way  of  presentment  or 
indictment.  Under  the Assize  of  Clarendon  royal justices 
are sent throughout  England, to inquire by  the oaths of  the 
neighbours of all robberies, and other violent misdeeds ; those 
who are accused, presented, indicted  by the sworn  testimony 
of  the neighbours, by the juries of the hundreds and the vills, 
are sent to the ordeal.  This is an immense step in the history 
of  criminal law.  A crime is no  longer regarded  as a matter I 10  Constitutional History  PERIOD 
merely  between  the  criminal  and  those  who  have  directly 
suffered by  his  crime-it  is  a wrong  against the nation, and 
the king  as the nation's  representative.  This procedure  by 
indictment the king keeps in his own hands; it is a specially 
royal procedure ; those who are thus accused  of  crime must 
be brought before the king's own justices. 
A parallel movement, the details of  which are as yet very 
obscure, has been giving to all the graver crimes the character 
of  felony1.  The origin and original meaning of  the word are 
disputed, but the best authorities now tell  us  that it is Celtic 
and carries at first the meaning of  baseness ; it is said to be 
connected with the Latin fallere, and our verb to faid.  Be that 
as it may, two things seem fairly clear, (I) that the word came 
to us from France with the Normans, (2) that it then meant the 
specifically feudal crime, the most heinous of all crimes in the 
opinion  of  that age, the betrayal  of  one's  lord, or treachery 
against one's lord.  For some time it is thus used in England; 
thus in the Leges He~zrici  felony is still one crime among many. 
We observe two things about it, that it is a crime punished  by 
death, and that it is a crime which  causes  an escheat of  the 
land  which  the criminal holds.  But  before  the  end  of  the 
twelfth  century  we  find  that this word  has  lost  its  specific 
signification, that it has a wide meaning.  Whenever an appeal 
is made, be it for homicide, or wounding, or theft, the appellor 
always  states  that  it  was  done  not  only  in  pace  domini 
Regis,  but  also  in fdonia.  We even  find  that  these words 
are absolutely  essential;  if  they  are not  used  the appeal  is 
null.  Here again, I  take  it,  fiction  has been  at work-the 
judges  have encouraged  the use  of  this term, and have not 
allowed  accused persons to protest that though there  might 
be homicide, wounding  or robbery, still there was no  felony. 
Two motives made for this :-the  old  system of  money com- 
positions was breaking down ; at the beginning of the twelfth 
century it is still in existence, though capital punishment has 
been  gaining  ground; at the end  of the century it  has dis- 
appeared-every  crime of  great gravity has become a capital 
offence.  Secondly,  the  principle  that  felony is  a  cause  of 
The subject is  treated  at length  in the  History  of  English  Law,  vol.  I, 
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escheat, made it very desirable in the king's eyes, and the eyes 
of the lords, that as many crimes as possible should be brought 
under this denomination.  Thus all the graver crimes became 
felonies.  We never get to a definition  of  felony ; but we do 
get to a list  of  felonies. 
I  think  we  may  say  that  from  the  beginning  of  the 
thirteenth  century onwards, all  causes  that are regarded  as 
criminal are pleas of  the crown,placita coronae, save some petty 
offences which are still punished in the local courts, but even 
over  these the sheriff is  now  regarded  as exercising a royal 
jurisdiction.  To this point  we  shall  return  once more; we 
have meanwhile to watch the growth  of  royal  jurisdiction  in 
civil causes. 
This is by no means a simple matter ; the process is very 
slow, and indeed even in the present century our civil procedure 
bore witness of a time when the king's court had not yet taken 
upon  itself  to act as a  court of  first instance in the ordinary 
disputes of  ordinary people.  We may, however, indicate six 
principles which serve to bring justice  to the king's court. 
(I)  From the outset it is a court  to which  one may  go, 
for  default  of  justice  in  lower courts.  Under  the Norman 
kings we find that frequently a litigant, who  in  the ordinary 
course is going to sue in the court of a feudal lord, will  go to 
the king in  the first instance, and procure a writ, a mandate 
directing the lord, ordering him  to do justice  in  his court to 
the applicant, and adding a threat, quod nisi feceris  vicecomes 
mezrs faciet-if  you  won't  do  it my  sheriff will-the  action 
will be removed out of  your court into the county court, and 
thence it can be removed into the king's  own  court.  This is 
a writ de recto tenendo, a writ of  right. 
(2)  Henry I1 must, it would seem, have ordained that no 
action  for freehold  land  shall  be  begun  in  a manorial  court 
without  such  a writ.  I say he  must  have ordained  it: we 
have no direct evidence of  this : but Glanvill  lays down  the 
principle  in  the broadest  terms, no one need  answer  for  his 
freehold without the king's  writ, a writ  directing the lord  to 
do right-and  we can say pretty positively  that this was  not 
law before Henry's day.  You will  notice that it is a serious 
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lord cannot hold his court or do justice until the king sets him 
in motion-the  jurisdiction may spring out of tenure, but it is 
not beyond royal control.  The excuse for such an interference 
may lie in that royal protection of possession  of  which we are 
soon to speak. 
(3)  In an action for land in  a  manorial  court begun  by 
writ of right, Henry I1 by some ordinance, the words of which 
have not come down to us but which was known as the grand 
assize, enabled the holder of  the land to refuse trial by battle 
and to put himself upon the oath of a body of twelve neighbours 
sworn to declare which of the two parties had the greater right 
to the land.  This was  called  putting oneself on the grand 
assize ; and the body of  sworn neighbours was  known as the 
grand assize. 
(4)  Henry  11, as we  have  before  remarked, took seisin, 
possessio~~  as distinct from  ownership, under his special pro- 
tection-men  who  consider  that  land  is  unjustly  withheld 
from  them  are not  to help  themselves;  there  is  to  be  no 
disseisin  without  a  judgment.  He who  is  thus  disseised 
shall be put back into possession  without any question  as to 
his  title.  This  protection  of  possession  is,  I  think,  closely 
connected with  that extension of  the king's  peace which  we 
have  been  watching.  He who  takes upon  himself  to eject 
another from his freehold, breaks the peace, and the peace is 
the king's.  This possessory procedure the king keeps in  his 
own hands-it  is a royal matter, the feudal courts have nothing 
to do with it.  Thus there grows up a  large class of  actions 
(the possessory  assizes)  relating to land, which  are beyond 
the cognizance of any but the king's justices, and these justices 
take good  care  that the limits of  these actions shall not be 
narrow; perhaps indeed they are not always very  careful  to 
draw the line between  disputes about possession which belong 
to them, and disputes about  ownership  which  should  go to 
the royal courts. 
(5)  If  we turn back to the list of royal rights contained in 
the Leges Hetzrici, we find among them-$laciturn  breviwn. ved 
praecepton~m ejzrs  corztem@torz~m-pleas  touching  the  con- 
tempt of his writs or precepts.  Now here is an idea of  which 
great use  can be made : B detains from  A  land or goods or 
owes A a debt ; this may not be  a case for the royal jurisdic- 
tion-but  suppose  that  the  king  issues  a  writ  or  precept 
ordering B to give up the land  or goods or to pay the debt, 
and B disobeys this order, then at once the royal jurisdiction 
is attracted to the case.  The king's chancellor begins to issue 
such writs with a liberal hand.  A writ is sent to the sheriff in 
such words as these: Command B (Praecz$e  B) that justly and 
without  delay he give  up to A the land  or the chattel or the 
money which, as A says, he unjustly detains from him, and if 
he will not do so command him to be before our court on such 
a day to answer why he hath not done it.  Thus the dispute 
between  A  and B is  brought within  the sphere of the king's 
justice;  if  B is in the wrong he has been guilty of contemning 
the king's writ.  Such writs in Henry 11's time are freely sold 
to litigants : but this is somewhat too high-handed a proceed- 
ing to be stood, for  in the case of land being thus demanded, 
the manorial  courts are deprived of  their legitimate jurisdic- 
tion.  So we  find  that one of the concessions extorted from 
John  by Magna Carta is  this: The writ called Praec$e  shall 
not be issued for the future, so as to deprive a free man of  his 
court, i.e. so as to deprive the lord of the manor of cases which 
ought to come to his court, his court being one of his sources 
of income1.  To a  certain  extent in  cases of  land  this  puts 
a check on the acquisitiveness of the royal court.  But even as 
regards land, it is evaded in many different ways, in particular, 
by an extension  of  the possessory actions which  make them 
serve the purpose of proprietary actions.  As regards chattels 
and debts the king has a freer hand. 
(6)  The notion  of  the  king's  peace  is  by  no  means 
exhausted  when  it  has  comprehended  the  whole  field  of 
criminal law : mere civil wrongs, '  torts ' as we  call  them, can 
be brought within  it-a  mere wrongful  step upon  your  land, 
a mere wrongful touch to  your goods or to your person can be 
regarded  as a breach  of  the peace; any wrongful application 
of force, however  slight, can be said to be made vi  et armis et 
contra pacem  domini Regis: in  such cases there  may be  no 
felony and no intention  to do what is wrong-I  may believe 
the goods to be mine when they are yours, and carry them off 
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in that belief;  still this may be called a breach of  the peace. 
Hence in the thirteenth century a large class of  writs grows up 
known  as writs of  trespass ; for  a long  time the procedure is 
regarded as half-civil, half-criminal : the vanquished defendant 
has  not  only to pay damages to the plaintiff, he  has to pay 
a fine to the king for the breach of the peace.  Gradually (but 
this is not until the end of  the Middle Ages) the fine becomes 
an unreality : actions of  trespass  are regarded as purely  civil 
actions-and  in  course of  time this form of action and forms 
derived out of it are made to do duty instead of all, or almost 
all, the other forms. 
Armed  with  these  elastic  principles  it  was  easy  for  the 
king's  courts to amplify their province.  By the beginning of 
Edward's  reign we may, I think, say that all serious obstacles 
to the royal jurisdiction  had been removed.  The royal courts 
had  in one way  and another become  courts of  first instance 
for almost all litigation.  But the extremely active legislation 
of  his  reign and the growth of  parliament  set a limit to the 
invention of  new actions.  It was now  recognized that  there 
were a certain number of  actions to which no addition could 
be made except by statute.  There were a certain number  of 
writs  in  the royal  Chancery;  these  were  at the disposal  of 
every subject; they were to be had  on  payment  of  the cus- 
tomary fees ;  they could not be denied ;  by these writs actions 
were  began,  were  originated;  they  were  brevia  originalia, 
original writs.  A  certain  power  of  varying  the stereotyped 
forms was allowed by the Statute of Westminster I1  (1285), and 
of  this in  course of  time some good use was made; but from 
Edward's day down to the middle of  the present century the 
development  of  common law was fettered  by this system of 
original writs-writs  which had  been  devised  for the purpose 
of  bringing  before  the king's  court litigation  which  in  more 
ancient times would have gone to other tribunals. 
But  the  king's  court  could  not  have  succeeded  in  thus 
extending the sphere of  its activity if  it had not been able to 
offer to suitors advantages which they could not get elsewhere. 
Royal justice was a good  article-that  is to say, a masterful 
thing not to be  resisted.  There were many processes which 
the king could give which were not to be had in lower courts. 
Anciezzt  Methods of Proof 
To describe some of  these would  take us too deeply into the 
technicalities of legislation.  But there is one royal boon, regale 
be~ze$ciunz, as Glanvill calls it, which has had a most important 
influence on the whole of  our national  history-trial  by jury. 
In order to understand  its  history we must  say a little about 
these modes of trial and of proof which in course of time gave 
way before it. 
Now  the  first thing to note about  the procedure  in  the 
courts before the Conquest is that proof comes after judgment. 
This may sound like a paradox.  It may seem to us that the 
judgment  must  be  the outcome of  the proof.  By  proof  the 
judges  are  convinced,  and  being  convinced  give  judgment 
according  to their  conviction.  Rut  the  old  procedure  does 
not  accord with  this to us very natural notion.  Suppose two 
persons  are litigating-A  charges B with  having done some- 
thing unlawful-we  find that  the judgment  takes  this  form, 
that it is for A (or as the case may be for B) to prove his case. 
The judgment  decides  who  is  to prove, what  proof  he  is  to 
produce-and  what will be the consequence of  his  succeeding 
or failing to give the requisite proof.  This  matter  becomes 
clearer when we  consider the known  means of  proof.  They 
are oaths and ordeals-and  of  oaths again  there are several 
different  kinds: there is the simple unsupported  oath of  the 
party, there  is  the oath of  the party supported  by  compur- 
gators or oath-helpers, and there is the oath of witnesses.  We 
must look at these modes of proof a little more closely. 
In some few cases A having  brought some charge against 
B, it will be  adjudged that B do prove his case simply by his 
own oath.  This being so, B has to swear solemnly that he 
has not done that which is alleged against him.  If he can  do 
this then the charge against him fails.  This may seem a very 
easy way of meeting an accusation, and such probably it was, 
and in but few cases would so simple a proof as this have been 
sufficient.  Still even in this ceremony it was  possible to fail : 
the swearer had  to use  exactly the right  words, and  a slip 
would be fatal to his cause.  I have said that we have no text- 
book  of Anglo-Saxon  law.  But one of the things that looks 
most  like a text-book  is  a brief collection of the oaths to be 
sworn on different occasions.  They are very formal and, as it Constitutionnl History 
seems,  half-poetical.  Probably  the  utmost  accuracy  was 
required  of  the swearer.  Besides we  should  remember  that 
an oath was very  sacred.  One may hope  that in  the course 
of history  the respect  for  truth  increases-but  just  for  this 
reason, as it  seems  to me,  the respect  for  an oath as such 
diminishes.  We think  that we  ought  to tell the truth, that 
this obligation  is so strict that no adjuration, no imprecation 
can make it stricter.  To reverence an oath as an oath is now 
the sign  of  a low morality.  Not so in  old time:-the  appeal 
to God makes all the difference ; men will not forswear thern- 
selves though they will freely lie; between mere lying and the 
false  oath  there  is  a  great gap.  But generally  a  defendant 
was not allowed to meet a charge in a fashion quite so simple; 
he was  required  to swear, but  to swear with  compurgators. 
Now  a compurgator or an oath-helper is a person who  comes 
to support the oath of  another by his  own.  For instance A 
charges  B with  a  debt; it  is  adjudged that B do go to the 
proof  with  twelve  oath-helpers.  This being  so  then  B will 
first swear in denial of the charge, and then  his compurgators 
will  swear that they  believe  his  oath-'By  God the oath  is 
clean  and  unperjured  that  B  hath  sworn1-they  swear not 
directly  that  B does  not  owe  the  money,  they swear  to a 
belief in his oath.  Now this process of compurgation is found 
not  only in  Anglo-Saxon  law, but  in  all the kindred laws of 
the German and  Scandinavian nations, nor in  these only, for 
the Welsh laws about compurgation  are particularly full and 
particularly  interesting.  Occasionally we  come across  a  re- 
quirement that the oath-helpers shall be of kin to the principal 
swearer, and  this  has  led  to  some  interesting  speculations 
as to the origin of this procedure.  Obviously  if  what  were 
wanted was :he  testimony of impartial persons to the truthful 
character of the accused, one would  not  naturally seek  this 
from his  next of kin, who will  very naturally  stand  by their 
kinsman.  In days when  the bond  of  blood-relationship was 
felt as very  strict, when  men  were  expected  to espouse the 
quarrel  and  avenge  the death  of  their  kinsman,  they  can 
hardly have been  thought the best  witnesses  to his honesty. 
It has therefore been thought by some (and if we may refer to 
the Welsh laws they will  fully bear  this out) that compurga- 
tion  takes us back to a time when the family is an important 
unit in the legal system.  Any charge which primarily affects 
an  individual  is  secondarily  a  charge against  the family  to 
which  he belongs:-that  family is  bound  to make compensa- 
tion for the wrongs that he does, and even to pay his  debts if 
he will not pay them.  But if this theory be true-and  I think 
that there is much in its favour-our  ancestors had passed out 
of  this primitive condition before  they appear in the light of 
clear  history:  the  family  was  no  longer  so  important,  the 
state had  a direct  hold  on  the individual.  It is  but  rarely 
that  we  hear  of  kinsmen  as compurgators.  Generally  it  is 
only required  that the swearer shall produce good and lawful 
men  to  the  requisite  number.  That  number  varies  from 
case to case-sometimes  it  is  as high as 48; but  12 is a very 
common  number-a  fatally common  number, for it misleads 
the unwary  into seeing a jury,  where in  truth there are but 
compurgators.  But the system is very elaborate.  For instance 
we  find a sort of tariff of oaths-the  oath of a thane is worth 
the oaths of  six ceorls, and so forth.  Again in cases of grave 
suspicion  the swearer  has  to repeat  the oath over and over 
again with  different  batches  of  compurgators.  In compara- 
tively  recent  times, the  thirteenth  and fourteenth  centuries, 
compurgation still flourished in the city of London, which had 
obtained  a chartered  immunity from legal reforms:-we  read 
how the Londoner may rebut  a charge even of murder by an 
oath  sworn with  36  compurgators-how,  in another  case, he 
must  swear  nine  times  before  nine  altars  in  nine  churches. 
Then again in the Anglo-Saxon days we find that occasionally 
the judge  names  a  number  of  men  from  among whom  the 
defendant  has  to select  his  compurgators.  This  seems  the 
outcome of  an attempt to make the procedure more rational, 
to  obtain  impartial  testimony.  But  normally  the  person 
who  has  to swear  chooses  his  own  compurgators, and if  he 
produces  good  and  lawful  men, i.e. free  men  who have  not 
forfeited  their  credibility  by  crime,  this  is  enough.  Then 
again the compurgatory oath is sometimes made more or less 
difficult by  the  requirement  or  non-requirement  of  perfect 
verbal  accuracy-sometimes  it is  sworn  in  verborurn  obser- 
vanciis, sometimes not-that  is, sometimes a slip will be fatal, Constitutio~ad  History  Witnesses 
sometimes not.  The oath with  compurgators, made more or 
less onerous in  these various ways according to an  elaborate 
system of rules, seems the general proof of Anglo-Saxon law 
-both  in  the cases which we  should  call civil, and  in  those 
which  we  should  call  criminal.  The man  of  unblemished 
reputation  is in  general  entitled  to clear himself of  a charge 
in this manner : the man who has been  repeatedly accused or 
who cannot find compurgators must go to the ordeal. 
But the law knows of other witnesses besides compurgators 
-or  if we  do not choose to consider  these compurgators as 
witnesses, then  we  must  say that  it  knows  of  witnesses  as 
distinguished  from  compurgators.  But these witnesses, like 
compurgators, do not  appear until  after judgment-they  do 
not come to persuade the court to give this or that judgment 
-they  come there to fulfil the judgment  already given to the 
effect that the plaintiff, or (as the case may be) defendant, do 
prove  his  case with  witnesses.  It has  been  adjudged  that 
A do prove his assertion by witnesses: A brings his witnesses; 
they do not come to be examined ;  they come to swear, to swear 
up to a particular  formula, to swear up to A's  assertion-this 
is  all  that  is  required  of  them.  They  must  be  good  and 
lawful  men-but  if  they  are  this,  then  B  cannot object  to 
them, cannot question them; if  he thinks them forsworn, then 
his  remedy,  if  any, is  against  them-he  must  charge  them 
with  perjury.  Their evidence is not  put  before the court as 
material  for a judgment; judgment  has been  already  given. 
To  decide  a  dispute  by  weighing  testimony,  by  cross- 
examining witnesses, by setting evidence against evidence and 
unravelling facts-this  is modern ; the ancient mode is  to fall 
back  at once on  the supernatural, to allow one party  or the 
other  to appeal  to  Heaven-to  leave  the rest  to 'whatever 
gods there  be.'  This '  formal  one-sided  witness  procedure ' 
(that is the best phrase that I can find for it) is not so common 
in  Anglo-Saxon law as the procedure by compurgation-but 
there  are occasions  for  it.  For  instance  many  transactions 
such  as sales  of goods are required  to be  completed  in  the 
presence  of witnesses and official  witnesses.  This is part  of 
the police  system.  The typical  action  of  Anglo-Saxon law 
seems  the  action  to  recover  stolen  cattle-doubtless,  cattle 
lifting  was  an  extremely  common  form  of  wrong-doing- 
and  many  of  the dooms  are concerned  with  its  prevention. 
A man who buys cattle must buy them in the presence of the 
official witnesses chosen for each hundred and borough, other- 
wise should he buy from  one who is a thief, he is like to find 
himself treated  as a thief  And there are other purposes for 
which witnesses  may be produced ; but it seems that there is 
no power to compel a person to come and give evidence unless 
at the time when the event took place he was solemnly called 
to bear witness  of  it.  If something happens and you  think 
that hereafter you may need the testimony of  the bystanders, 
you  must  then  and there call  upon  them to witness the fact, 
otherwise you will have no power of compelling them to come 
to  court  and  prove  your  case.  But  the  matter  on  which 
I would  chiefly insist  is the one-sided character of procedure, 
because here is the gulf-the,  as it seems, insurmountable gulf 
-between  the Anglo-Saxon witnesses and the jurors of Henry 
the Second's  reign.  The witness  is  called  in by the party- 
the party to whom the proof has been awarded-to  swear  up 
to his case; the juror  is called in by the sheriff or by the court 
to swear to the truth whatever the truth may be. 
The ordeal was  used  chiefly, though not, I think, exclu- 
sively, in  the case of  the graver charges, criminal charges as 
we  should  call  them.  This of  course  is  a  direct  and  open 
appeal to the supernatural, the case is too hard for man, so it 
is left to the judgment of God.  There seems little doubt that 
ordeals  were  used  by  our  forefathers  in  the  days  of  their 
heathenry, though unfortunately almost all our evidence comes 
from  a  time when  they  have  become  Christian  ceremonies 
practised  under  the sanction  of  the church'.  Four ordeals 
are known  to Anglo-Saxon  Iaw; the ordeal of hot iron: the 
accused is required to carry hot iron in his hand for nine steps, 
his  hand  is then  sealed  up and the seal broken  on  the third 
day, if the hand has festered then he is guilty, if  not, innocent; 
the ordeal of  hot water: the accused is required  to plunge his 
hand  into hot  water, if  the ordeal  is  simple, to  the wrist, if 
threefold,  then  to the cubit ; the ordeal  of  cold  water:  the 
accused  is thrown  into water, if  he sinks he is innocent, if he 
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floats he is guilty ; the ordeal of  the morsel : a piece of bread or 
of cheese an ounce in weight  is given to the accused, having 
been solemnly adjured to stick in his throat if he is guilty.  I do 
not wish  to dwell on these antiquities, which are sufficiently 
described  in  many  accessible  books1.  Certainly  it  is  very 
difficult to understand how  this system worked  in  practice. 
One form of  the ordeal seems to have been unused by the 
Anglo-Saxons, namely, trial by battle, the judicial  duel.  This 
is  a very  curious  fact,  for  I  believe  that in  all  the kindred 
systems  of  law  the  duel  has  a  place.  Perhaps  we  may 
attribute this to the action of the church, for against this form 
of  ordeal the church very  early set its face, and in  England 
the church was very strong, popular  and national.  At any 
rate this seems the fact-there  is no mention of trial by battle 
in the Anglo-Saxon laws, and I believe  no  evidence that any 
such trial took place in England before the Norman Conquest. 
Besides  we  have  an  ordinance,  I  believe,  an  undoubtedly 
genuine ordinance of William the Conqueror, which treats the 
duel as the form of trial appropriate for  Normans.  Now this 
probably  constituted  the  one  great  difference  between  the 
Norman  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  procedure.  Compurgation 
and the other ordeals are common to both systems, but in  the 
Norman many questions are decided by battle, while the place 
of  the duel in the Anglo-Saxon system is filled partly by the 
other ordeals, partly  by those  very  elaborate  forms  of  corn- 
purgation  of which I have spoken.  I speak of trial by battle 
as an  ordeal, and this it seems  to be.  In theory it is not an 
appeal to brute force, but an appeal to Heaven. 
We cannot  find  the germ  of  trial  by jury  either  in  the 
Anglo-Saxon  procedure, or  in  the ordinary procedure of  the 
Norman  courts.  Still  the germ  must  be found  somewhere, 
and the research  of these last days has gradually been  con- 
centrating  itself  on  one  particular  point,  the  prerogative 
procedure  of the court  of  the  Frankish  kings. 
I  cannot  speak  of this  matter  with  any  minuteness.  It 
must  suffice that the Franks had  occupied  provinces  of  the 
Roman Empire far more thoroughly Romanized than our own 
References  nlay  be found in  what  is  now the best  and most  accessible  of 
these books,  The History of  E~zglzsk Law, vol.  11,  p.  596. 
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country; that a powerful monarchy grew up, that the Frankish 
king became  Roman  Emperor.  Already I have  said  some- 
thing about the growth of kingship and kingly power in  this 
country.  Abroad the same process went  on, but much more 
rapidly, fostered by imperial Roman traditions.  The Frankish 
king  seems  to have  inherited  many  of  the  powers  of  the 
Roman government, and among these many procedural pre- 
rogatives ; the formal  procedure  of  the old Germanic courts 
did not apply to him, he could dispense with it, could for his 
own  purposes  make use of speedier and more stringent pro- 
cesses.  We see something of  the same kind in the England 
of a much later day.  In litigation the king enjoys all manner 
of  advantages.  What  is  more  we  find  phrases  used  of  the 
Frank king's  court which incline  us to say that it was in the 
old  English sense a Court of  Equity, as well as of Law-that 
is to say, when  compared with  the popular communal  courts 
it seems unhampered, untrammelled by procedural rules, it can 
devise new expedients for doing justice, for eliciting the truth. 
Then we  find further that these Frankish kings and emperors 
to protect their own rights, the rights of  the crown, make use 
of a means of getting at the truth not employed by the older 
courts.  For instance, there  being  question  as to some land 
whether it be demesne of the crown  or no, an  order will  be 
given to a public officer to inquire into this by the oaths of the 
neighbours.  It seems  that  such  inpuisitiortes  (for  such  is 
the term  usually employed) were  frequently ordered  for  the 
ascertainment of crown  rights.  The crown thus places itself 
outside the ordinary formal  procedure; for its own  purposes 
it will make a short cut to the truth1.  Nor is this all : these 
Frankish  kings assume the power  of  granting to others the 
privileges  which  they  themselves  enjoy-in  particular  in 
granting to the religious houses which they have founded, an 
immunity from the formal  procedure of the ancient courts:- 
if  the title of  the monastery to its lands be called in question, 
then the matter is to be tried by a royal judge;  there is to be 
We are here forcibly reminded  of  our  own inquests of  office-the  sheriff or 
the escheator summoning a jury to testify whether someone has died without an 
heir,  or has forfeited his land, in order that the rights of the crown may be known 
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no  judicial  combat ; the judge is to summon the neighbours, 
and by their oath the question is to be decided.  Here seems 
to be  just  what  we  want  as  the  germ of  trial  by jury.  A 
body of neighbours is summoned by a public officer to testify 
the truth,  be  the  truth  what  it may, about facts and  rights 
presumably  within  their  knowledge.  Lastly,  a  somewhat 
similar process is used for the detection of crimes.  Procedure 
by private accusation is found insufficient for the peace of  the 
realm, and the king finds himself strong enough to order that 
the men  of  a district be sworn to accuse before royal officers, 
those  who  have  been  guilty of  crime.  These royal officers 
(missi they are called) sent out  to receive  such accusations 
and  to  hold  inquisitions,  remind  us  strongly  of  our  own 
itinerant justices,  and  indeed  it  seems  very  likely  that  our 
justiciarii itinerantes are in spirit the direct descendants of the 
Frankish ~nissi. 
It is now very generally allowed that this is the quarter in 
which  we  must  look  for the first rudiments  of  trial  by jury, 
the prerogative procedure of the courts of the Frankish kings 
and emperors.  Rut it must at first sight seem a very strange 
thing that an institution,  which  in  its  origin  was  peculiarly 
Frankish, became  in  course of time distinctively English.  In 
France  this  inquisition  procedure  perished,  transplanted  to 
England it grew and flourished, and became that trial by jury 
which after long centuries Frenchmen introduced into modern 
France as a foreign, an English institution.  How was this ? 
The Frankish  Empire, let  us  remember, went  to wreck 
and ruin and feudal anarchy.  But in one corner of its domain 
there settled a race whose distinguishing  characteristic  seems 
to have been a wonderful power of  adapting itself to circum- 
stances, of  absorbing  into its own life the best and strongest 
institutions  of whatever race it conquered-Frankish,  Italian, 
or English.  The Normans  conquered  England;  they  had 
previously  conquered  Normandy:  for  150 years  or  there- 
abouts they  had  been  settled  on  Frankish  territory.  And 
in  their  civilization  they  had  become  Frankish;  they  had 
thrown  aside  their  heathenry  and become  Christians;  they 
had  forgotten  their  Scandinavian  tongue  and  learned  the 
Romance language sf those whom they conquered.  The legal 
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history  of  Normandy  during those  I 50 years,  from  912 to 
1066, is particularly  obscure, but  it seems  sufficiently proved 
that the  Norman  dukes assumed  and  exercised that  power 
of  ordering  inquisitions  which  had  been  wielded  by  the 
Frankish  kings,  of  establishing  a  special  procedure  by  way 
of  inquest  for  the  ascertainment  and  protection  of  ducal 
rights,  and  of  the  rights  of  those  to  whom  the duke had 
granted  a  special  immunity  from  the  formal  procedure  of 
the  ordinary  courts.  We find, for  example, ducal  charters 
giving such privileges  to religious  houses, very similar to the 
charters of  the Frankish kings. 
Then so soon as England is conquered we find the Norman 
dukes,  now  kings  of  England,  ordering  inquisitions  within 
their  new  domains.  One  of  these is  very  famous, for  it  is 
the Doomsday inquest.  The king sent out barons who made 
the great survey on  the oath of  the sheriff, and all the barons 
and Norman landowners of  the shire, and of  the priest, reeve 
and  six villagers  (viZZanz)  from  every  township.  This was 
a  fiscal  inquisition  on  a  very  large  scale;  the  prerogative 
procedure  whereby  the  Frankish  kings  had  protected  the 
rights of the crown, ascertained the limits of the royal domain 
and so forth, was  now  applied  to the whole  of  a conquered 
kingdom.  This is a splendid  and notorious  instance,  but  it 
does not stand alone, and we  find the Norman kings ordering 
inquisitions not merely  to protect their own  rights, but  also 
to protect  the rights  of  those who  acquired  this  privilege- 
acquired  it for the most  part  for valuable  consideration, for 
such  privileges  are  vendible.  Thus  we  have a  writ  of  the 
Conqueror himself, ordering  an  inquisition  in  favour  of  the 
church  of  Ely;  a  number  of  Englishmen  who  knew  the 
state of  the  lands  in  question  in  the days of  Edward  the 
Confessor are to be chosen and are to swear what they know1. 
There are other instances of such writs. 
Hitherto, whether  we  have  looked  at the  Frank  empire, 
the Norman  duchy  or the English  kingdom, the inquisition 
by  the oath  of  neighbours  has  appeared  as  something  ex- 
ceptional-a  royal  or ducal privilege, no part of  the ordinary 
procedure of ordinary litigation : indeed it is rather a fiscal or 
'  Libn* Eliensis,  I,  256. administrative, than a judicial  institution.  But in Normandy 
and in  England it became  a  part of  the ordinary procedure 
open  to  every  litigant.  This  no  doubt  was  the  work  of 
Henry I1 ; of  this we  have ample evidence, though  we have 
not in  all  cases the text of  the ordinances whereby the work 
was  accomplished.  Let us  see the various  forms which  the 
inquisition or inquest now assumes. 
(I)  In the first place we have the grand assize.  When A 
demands  land  from  B, B  instead  of  fighting  or obtaining a 
champion  to fight for him, may  put himself  upon  the grand 
assize  of  our  lord  the king.  Four knights  are then  chosen 
by the parties and they elect twelve knights, who come before 
the king's justices to testify whether A or B hath the greater 
right to this land.  These jurors  or '  recognitors '  you  see are 
called in not as judges of fact who are to hear the evidence of 
witnesses, but as witnesses, and a strict line between questions 
of  fact and questions of law has not yet  been  drawn-they 
speak as to rights, not merely as to facts. 
Glanvill in a memorable passage brings out the character, 
the royal  origin, of this  new  procedure1.  The grand assize, 
he  says, is a  royal  boon  by which  wholesome provision  has 
been  made  for  the  lives  of  men  and  the  integrity  of  the 
state, so that in  maintaining their  right to the possession  of 
their freeholds the suitors may not be exposed to the doubtful 
issue of trial  by battle.  This institution  (he adds) proceeds 
from the highest equity, for the right which after long delay 
can scarcely be said to be proved by battle, is by the beneficial 
use  of this constitution  more rapidly and more conveniently 
demonstrated.  We have  here  then  no  popular  institution 
growing  up  in  the customary  law  of  our race,  but  a  royal 
boon, regale pioddam bene$cium. 
(2)  Then again Henry institutes those possessory assizes 
which  we  have  more  than once mentioned.  A  person  who 
has been ejected from possession of his freehold, who has been 
'disseised,'  can  obtain  a writ directing the sheriff to summon 
twelve  men  to testify before the king's justices whether there 
has been a disseisin or no.  Here we approach one step nearer 
De  Legibus Angliae, 11,  7.  Select Charters, p. 161. 
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to the trial by jury of later times ;-the  question submitted to 
these recognitors  is  more definitely  a  question  of  fact-has 
there been seisin and disseisin-not  who has the greater right; 
but  still these recognitors  are summoned in  as witnesses, as 
neighbours who are likely to know the facts. 
(3)  By the establishment of the grand  assize and of  the 
possessory assizes, a great step is made in the history of  trial 
by jury.  The royal  process  of  ascertaining  facts and rights 
by the sworn testimony of a body of neighbours is now placed 
at the disposal  of  ordinary litigants;  partly this  may  be  in 
the interests of justice, but also it is in  the interest of  a  king 
consolidating  his  realm, struggling  with  feudalism,  desirous 
of  making  himself  the one fountain  of  justice.  But  as yet 
this  procedure  by  inquisition  or  recognition  has  a  very  de- 
finite scope:  it is appropriate to certain  actions and only to 
certain  actions, and  the form  of  the recognition  varies with 
the form of  the action-thus  in the grand assize four knights 
elected  by  the  parties  elect  the  twelve  recognitors, in  the 
possessory  assizes  the twelve  recognitors  are  directly  sum- 
moned  by the sheriff.  And  the question  for the recognitors 
is determined  by the form of  the action.  Thus in the grand 
assize it is whether demandant or tenant hath the better right 
to  hold  the  land;  in  the  novel  disseisin, it  is  whether  the 
defendant unjustly and without judgment disseised the plainti& 
These assizes are the outcome of  definite legislation, but the 
procedure by recognition, once made common, spreads beyond 
the original bounds-gradually  and without legislation.  We 
find  plaintiffs  and  defendants in  all manner  of  actions  pur- 
chasing  from  the king  the  right  to  have  a  recognition  or 
inquest to determine some disputed point.  By slow degrees 
what  has  been  a  purchasable  favour  becomes  an  ordinary 
right, and the sum which  the party has  to pay to the king 
becomes  less  and  less  a  variable  price,  more  and  more  a 
definite  tax or court fee fixed  by custom.  It is a slow pro- 
cess  by  which  this  recognition  procedure  makes  head  and 
displaces the older  methods  of  proof, the unilateral witness, 
procedure  and  compurgation.  There  is  no  one  moment  at 
which we  can  say that it becomes  law that questions of  fact 
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forms of  action, the older processes  maintained their footing. 
Thus even  in the present century, there were certain  actions 
in which  a defendant might have recourse to compurgation; 
and for this  reason those actions were never brought : means 
had long ago been discovered of bringing other actions in their 
stead.  However, the new procedure  slowly became the rule, 
and the  old  procedure  the  exception;  in  general  disputed 
questions would  be settled  by the oath of  the country, would 
be  settled  by  trial  by jury-by  a jury  (jarata);  gradually 
this  word  came  into  use  and  was  contrasted  with  assisa. 
The  word  assisa,  as  already  remarked,  implies  a  positive 
ordinance;  it  is  a  procedure  which,  as  we  should  say,  is 
statutory, and  you  should  understand  that  the  old  assizes 
might  have  been  used  and  were  occasionally  used  even  in 
the  present  century.  They were  not  abolished  until  1833, 
but  long  before  that  had  become  uncommon,  their  work 
being  done  for the  most  part  by  less  cumbrous  and  anti- 
quated  machinery.  Hut  by  the  side  of  the  assizes,  there 
grew  up  the  practice  of  sending to a  body  of  recognitors 
questions  of  fact  which  arose  out  of  the  pleadings  in  an 
action ; a  body  of jurors  thus called  in  was  a jury, jurata, 
as contrasted  with  an assize, assisa.  In  an assize, the very 
first step was to obtain a writ directing the sheriff to summon 
twelve  men  to answer  a  particular question, e.g. whether A 
disseised  B; the question  for  the  assize  was  formulated  in 
the  original  writ.  Take  another  action,  e.g.  an  action  of 
trespass-; the original  writ  says nothing of  any recognitors, 
nothing  of  any mode  of  trial;  A  is  summoned  to  answer 
before the king's  court why  he assaulted  and beat  B; then 
A  and  B  plead  before  the  court  until  they  come  to  an 
issue  about  some  question  of  fact  or  question  of  law;  if 
it be  a  question  of  fact,  then  a jury  (jurata) is  summoned 
to answer this question-a  question  which  has arisen out of 
the pleadings-not  a question formulated in the original writ. 
(4)  In dealing with  civil, before criminal, procedure  we 
have been  following the historical  order.  What we  are apt 
to think the very typical case of  trial by jury, the trial  of  a 
man for crime by a petty jury after a grand jury has indicted 
him, is the last development of  the institution which has been 
under our examination.  But we  have  first  to speak  of  the 
accusing jury, of  what comes to be the grand jury of  modern 
times.  Here again, it is an ordinance of  Henry the Second 
that establishes the procedure as normal.  If any trace at all 
of  a jury, or of anything that is  on its way to become a jury, 
is to be  found  in the Anglo-Saxon  laws, it is the trace of  an 
accusing jury.  In one of  the laws of  Ethelred, we read  how 
in  a  particular  case the twelve  eldest  thanes  are to go out 
and swear on the relic that they will  accuse no  innocent man 
and conceal  no  guilty man.  It is  conceivable that this  law 
has a general import, and that by the end of  the tenth century 
it was part of  the procedure of  the local courts that a body of 
neighbours  should  be  sworn  to  present  the  crimes  which 
had  come to their  knowledge.  But it is difficult for want  of 
continuous evidence to connect this law with the measures of 
Henry the Second, and the meaning of  Ethelred's law is much 
disputed.  On  the other hand, as already said, the accusing 
jury was  an  element in the procedure of  the Frankish courts 
under  the  Carolingian  kings,  and  produced  in  Normandy 
under  the Norman  dukes.  It may  be  then  that  Henry re- 
formed  or revived  an  ancient  English  institution,  but  more 
probably  we  have  here  another  offshoot  of  the  royal  and 
fiscal inquisition.  To ascertain and protect the rights of  the 
crown is the main object, and it seems  almost a by-end that 
incidentally  crime may  thus  be  discovered  and  suppressed. 
The  itinerant  judges  are  supplied  with  lists  of  inquiries 
which  they are to lay before juries  representing the various 
hundreds which they visit.  These lists of  inquiries are known 
as articles of the eyre, capitukt itineris, and in the main they 
are  fiscal  inquiries;  the royal  revenue  is  the  chief  end  in 
view.  The jurors  are to swear as to what profits have fallen 
to the crown, as to escheats, forfeitures, marriages,  wardships, 
widows,  Jews, treasure  trove  and  other  sources  of  income; 
also as to the misdoings  of  the sheriff and his bailiffs;  also 
as to murders, robberies  and  so forth,  for  crime  also  brings 
money  to  the royal  exchequer-for  instance  there  are the 
murder  fines to be collected.  It is not  improbable that our 
Norman  kings occasionally directed inquisitions  of  this  sort. 
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and  Northampton, the presentation of crimes by twelve men 
representing each hundred was made a regular permanent pro- 
cedure.  The twelve sworn hundredors are to present crimes ; 
the persons  whom  they accuse  are to go to the ordeal;  if 
they fail at the ordeal they are to be punished by mutilation. 
What is more, the Assize of Northampton betrays some mis- 
trust of  the efficacy of  the ordeal as a means of  eliciting the 
truth, for even if  a person thus accused  satisfies the test, and 
thus has the judgment  of  God  in  his favour, he is  to abjure 
the realm, that is, he is to leave the realm  swearing never to 
return.  You observe that these twelve sworn hundredors are 
sworn accusers ; their testimony is not conclusive ; their oath 
does not lead to immediate condemnation;  it leads to trial ; 
it puts the accused  on  his trial;  he  must go to the ordeal. 
In short they are the ancestors of  our grand jurors,  not  of 
our petty jurors, and their sworn accusation is  an indictment. 
For the rise  of  the petty jury we must look  elsewhere.  But 
let  us  pause  to remark  that these  measures  of  Henry the 
Second institute  a new mode of  procedure in criminal cases, 
they put the indictment by the side of the appeal.  Thence- 
forward English law has two criminal procedures;  there is the 
appeal-a  private accusation brought by the person primarily 
wronged by the crime, the person, e.g., whose goods have been 
stolen, or the nearest  kinsman  of  the murdered  man;  then 
there is the indictment-the  sworn accusation of  twelve men 
who have sworn to present the crimes committed within their 
hundred.  These two modes of procedure  live  side by side 
until  modern times;  the appeal of felony was  not abolished 
until 1819;  the indictment we  still have, though in course of 
time its real nature has undergone a great change. 
(5)  And  now  as  to the  petty  jury  or  trying jury  in 
criminal cases.  We cannot trace this  back  to any positive 
ordinance;  it  makes  its  way  into  our  procedure  almost 
insensibly  and that too at a comparatively recent  time-by 
which  I  mean  that the system of  assizes and juries  in  civil 
cases was in full swing before it became common that persons 
accused of  crimes should be tried by the oath of  their neigh- 
bours.  From  the  Norman  Conquest  onward  the  regular 
means of  bringing  a  criminal to justice  was  the appeal,  or 
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private accusation, and this led to trial by battle.  Gradually, 
however, in the reigns of  Henry I1 and his sons, we  find that 
appellees can purchase from the king the privilege  of  having 
questions  tried  by an  inquest  of  neighbours.  At first  the 
questions thus tried  seem  merely to be incidental questions 
arising  out  of  the  pleadings,  as  for  instance,  whether  the 
appellee is  a  maimed  man  who need  not  fight, or is  above 
the fighting age.  The questions thus tried  become in course 
of  time more substantial and touch the real issue  of  guilt or 
innocence : thus the appellee sets up an alibi and obtains an 
inquest to prove this ; or again he asserts that the appellor is 
moved to the appeal by no honest  motive, but by spite and 
hatred, and obtains an  inquest to prove that this is  no true 
appeal but is the outcome of  odium et atya.  Lastly, we  find 
the  appellor  putting  himself  on  an  inquest  for  the  whole 
question of  guilt and innocence-ponit  se super pntriam  et de 
bono  et de malo-he  puts himself  on  his country, i.e.  on his 
neighbourhood for good  and for  ill.  An article of  the Great 
Charter (the meaning of  which  has been contested) seems to 
provide that thenceforward an appellee is  to have a right to 
put himself  upon an inquest without having to purchase  this 
as a  privilege  from  the king1.  By  the  time when  Bracton 
wrote (circ.  1250) it seems to be law that an appellee has two 
alternatives open to him ; he can defend himself  by battle or 
he can put himself  upon  his  country, occasionally (as e.g. if 
the appellor be beyond  the fighting age) the appellee must 
be forced to put himself  upon  his country. 
Thus much as to trial by jury  in  the case of  an appeal ; 
but  as  already  said  Henry  JI  established  by  the  Assizes 
of  Clarendon  and  Northampton  another criminal procedure, 
namely  the  indictment.  Now  under  these  ordinances  the 
person  indicted  went  to  the  ordeal, but  as  already  noted 
some distrust  of  the ordeal  was  already  shown, for  even  if 
there was supernatural testimony in  favour of  innocence still 
the  accused, si fuerit  de pessiwzo  tcstimo~iio  et publice  dif- 
&matus,  had  to abjure the realm.  Half a century  later the 
ordeal went out of use.  The Fourth Lateran Council, held in 
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1215,  prohibited  the clergy  from  taking part  in  the ordeal, 
and  thus  in  effect  abolished  it,  for  the ordeal  was  nothing 
if  not  a  religious  ceremony.  We  find  the  council  of  an 
English  king (Henry the Third had  just  become  king  and 
was yet a boy) at once accepting the abolition  as an  accom- 
plished fact and making provision for the new state of  affairs. 
It seems to become law that a person  indicted  by the twelve 
hundredors must submit to be tried by an inquest of neighbours 
or else must remain in gaol.  I think that during the first half 
of  the thirteenth century some at least  of  the king's  judges 
held that, even if the accused would not voluntarily put himself 
upon the oath of his neighbours, nevertheless he could be tried, 
an inquest could be sworn, and, if it made against him, he could 
be  sentenced  and  punished.  It seems  to me  that this  was 
Bracton's opinion, but that he did not care to express himself 
very plainly.  Doubtless there was a very strong feeling that 
to try a man by a jury, when  he had  not submitted to be  so 
tried, was  thoroughly  unjust.  We moderns, especially  if  we 
come to the subject with the too common  belief  that trial  by 
jury  is a process of popular  customary origin  of  immemorial 
antiquity,  the birthright  of  Englishmen  and so  forth, must 
find it hard to realize this sentiment, but, if we fail to do this, an 
important tract of legal  history will  be  for us a stupid blank. 
The mere  oaths of twelve  sworn  witnesses  (remember  that 
the jurors  of  the thirteenth  century  are witnesses)  are not 
enough to fix a man with guilt, unless indeed he has voluntarily 
submitted his  fate to this  test; he ought  to be  allowed  to 
demonstrate his  innocence  by supernatural  means, by some 
such process as the ordeal  or the judicial  combat ; God  may 
be  for  him, though  his  neighbours  be  against  him.  It is 
interesting  to  find  that  this  notion  was  not  confined  to 
England ; Brunner has shown that it crops up in Normandy 
and in other parts of France-a  man is not to be  condemned 
on the evidence of  his  neighbours unless  he has put himself 
upon  their oath'.  I think, as already said, that some of  the 
judges of Henry 111's reign had  risen  above this notion  and 
sent to trial  by  jury  men  who  distinctly and  emphatically 
Brunner, Schwurgerirhte, pp. 469-77. 
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refused trial ; but before the end of  the century it had become 
established  that  the  indicted  person  could  not  be  sent  to 
trial unless he put himself  upon  his  country.  He could  not 
be tried, but  he  could  be  tortured  into saying the requisite 
words; superstitions  look  odd when  they  have  ceased  to be 
our own superstitions : it became law that an indicted  person 
who, when asked how he would be tried, stood mute of malice, 
that is, refused to answer ' By God and my country,' might be 
pressed and starved to death.  I need not give the details of 
this, the peifze  forte EL dz~re,  but one should think of it whenever 
one hears talk of trial by jury as of an obviously just institution. 
Our ancestors did not think so. 
At the end of  Edward  1's reign, the moment at which we 
have placed  ourselves, the situation therefore  is  this.  In all 
civil actions, trial by jury-i.e.  by a body of neighbour witnesses 
-has  become the usual mode of  trial, though  still  in  certain 
cases, not very common, the defendant can  have recourse  to 
compurgation or to trial  by battle.  As to  criminal  cases- 
a person appealed may if  he pleases put himself upon a jury 
instead of fighting; jurors also are sworn in to indict criminals, 
the person thus indicted must consent to be tried  by  another 
jury ; if  he will not consent, he is pressed or starved to death. 
All  jurors, however, are as yet witnesses, or  sworn accusers; 
the process  which  turns  them  into judges  of  fact, judges  of 
fact testified by others, by witnesses  produced  and examined 
in their presence, has hardly yet begun.  The fact that jurors 
are regarded  as witnesses  is  brought  out  by  this; in  many 
cases, and their number is increasing, the person against whom 
the jurors  have given a verdict may take proceedings  against 
the jurors for perjury : these proceedings are called an attaint; 
the verdict  of  the twelve jurors  is  brought  before a jury  of 
twenty-four, and if  these twenty-four find that the verdict was 
false, it is set aside and the twelve perjured jurors are heavily 
punished.  Also we may remark that as yet it  is hardly well 
established that the jurors  must  give an unanimous verdict ; 
in old times the verdict of a majority has been accepted. 
We have now taken account of  the doctrines whereby the 
royal jurisdiction had extended itself, and of the new institution, 
regale be~zeficiurn,  which had  made royal  justice  preferable to Constitutional History  End of the Justiciar 
all other justice.  We may  now  loolc  at the courts as they 
stand in Edward's reign. 
(a)  The old local courts still exist; as a political assembly 
the county court is still of  first-rate importance, it is this that 
is represented  in parliament by the knights of  the shire ; but 
as a court of  law it has lost much of  its importance.  Almost 
all civil causes of  any great importance can now be  begun  in 
the king's court, where there can be trial by jury.  Nor is this 
all ; a statute has lately been passed, the Statute of  Gloucester 
(1278), which has been  construed to mean that no action  for 
more than 40 shillings can be  brought in  these local courts1. 
The statute does not say this; what  it says is very different, 
viz. that no action for less than 40 shillings is to be  brought 
before  the  king's  justice-apparently  it  was  felt  that  the 
centralization  of  justice  had  already  gone  too  far;  it  was 
a  hardship  for  men  to be  brought  to Westminster  for  less 
than 40 shillings.  However, the king's justices  seem to have 
at once  construed  this  to  imply  that  suits  for  more  than 
40 shillings were not to be brought in the local courts.  Thus 
the competence of  those courts was now restricted  by a bar- 
rier, which  grew  narrower  and  narrower  as the value of  40 
shillings became  less and less.  As to  criminal proceedings 
the county court had  lost  its jurisdiction.  The first steps in 
appeals of  felony were  taken  in  the local  courts,  but  those 
courts could try no cases in which  there was talk of  a breach 
of  the king's peace.  Presentments also and indictments were 
taken in the local courts; but they could not try the indicted. 
Quite petty offences could be punished  however by pecuniary 
amercements in  the hundred  court  and  the courts leet, that 
is, hundred  courts which had  fallen  into private  hands;  but 
even in these cases the penal jurisdiction  was now deemed to 
emanate from the king, and was exercised by his sheriff or by 
some  lord  claiming under  royal  grant.  The private  penal 
jurisdictions  Edward  had  tried  to suppress  by  demanding 
that all those who claimed them  should  prove  a title derived 
from  the crown-they  seldom extended beyond  the hanging 
of a thief caught in  the act with the stolen goods upon him. 
See, for  a  fuller  account  of  the decline of  manorial  jurisdiction,  Maitland, 
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(6)  The manorial courts as regards freehold had  perhaps 
not lost much in theory-it  was still the rule that a proprietary 
action for land freehold of  the manor should be begun  in  the 
manor court, but this rule, though sanctioned by Magna Carta, 
was  easily  and successfully evaded.  My  impression  is  that 
before the end of  the thirteenth  century it  was  a  very rare 
thing for an action concerning freehold to be begun, tried, and 
ended  in  a manor court.  But the king's  courts had  not yet 
undertaken to protect the tenant in villeinage  against his lord 
or to regard  him  as having any right in  his  land.  Disputes 
as to lands  holden  by villein  services  were  still  heard  and 
determined by the customary court of  the manor, and in  such 
courts alienations were effected, the old tenant surrendering the 
land to the lord who admitted the new tenant. 
(c)  The king's  court, as we  have seen, has  by Edward's 
time split itself up into three different courts of  law, the King's 
Bench, the Court of Common Pleas and the Exchequer.  The 
stages in this process can be  dated, but  we  must  not go into 
details.  The last  stage  is  reached  when  the office  of  chief 
justiciar was extinguished.  This we may say happens at the 
end of  Henry 111's reign.  In  1232 Henry dismissed Hubert 
de Burgh, who is the last chief justiciar in the sense of  being 
the king's  first  minister  and lieutenant-general.  Henry was 
then under the influence of the foreign party, and he appointed 
one Stephen Segrave to the justiciarship:  but two years after- 
wards the barons revolted against the foreigners and Segrave 
was dismissed.  Henry then tried  for many years to rule with- 
out a justiciar, without ministers.  For a short time near the 
end of the reign there was again a justiciar, but in  I 268, shortly 
before Henry's death, the office became empty and was never 
again filled up.  Thenceforth each of  the three courts had  its 
chief justice-there  was the chief justice of the King's Bench, 
the chief  justice  of  the  Common  Pleas,  the  chief  Baron  of 
the Exchequer.  The extinction of  the chief justiciarship  is 
important in many ways.  It marks a stage in the separation 
of  judicial  from  governmental  functions:  the  head  of  the 
court of  justice is no longer the prime  minister.  This leads 
to the rise of the chancellor; Edward's first minister, probably 
the chief  adviser  in  his legislative scheme, is his chancellor, CoPzstitutionaZ History  Com~~zo~  Pleas  and Exchequer  I 35 
Burnell.  But from this time forward  we  may say there is  a 
body of judges who are expected to be non-political, who are 
to  hold  the  balance of  justice  evenly  not  merely  between 
subject and subject, but also when  the king himself  is  con- 
cerned.  Still we must  not, for a long time yet, think  of  the 
judges  as enjoying any great degree of  independence ; they 
are still the king's servants; they hold their offices for centuries 
to come during the king's  good  pleasure,  and  occasions on 
which the royal will is allowed to interfere with  the course of 
royal justice  are but  too frequent.  Of  each  of  these courts 
a word :- 
(i)  The King's Bench is theoretically a court held  before 
the king himself, and for a long time yet, its justices  journey 
about  with  the king.  It is  very  clear  that both  John  and 
Henry I11 did justice in person.  The th7ory of the time saw 
no harm in this.  Bracton explains that all justice flows from 
the king; it is merely because he has not strength enough and 
time enough that he delegates some of  his powers to justices. 
It was  but  gradually that the king  abandoned  the practice 
of  sitting in  court;  but  in  the  fourteenth  century  it  had, 
I think, become uncommon for him to do so.  Still to the very 
end of  its career in  1875 the King's Bench was theoretically a 
court  held  coram  ipso  domi~zo  Rege;  any  suitor  ordered  to 
come before it, was bidden  to appear coram  nobis  ubicunqz~e 
fuerimus  in Anglia.  As to its functions :-it  was  in  the first 
place the central court for pleas of  the crown.  Criminal cases 
had to be begun in  the counties in which the crime was com- 
mitted, before those itinerant justices of whom hereafter ; but 
the King's Bench had criminal jurisdiction  as a court of  first 
instance over the county in which it sat.  But further it had a 
general superintendence over criminal  justice ; it could order 
that any criminal case should be  removed  from  the courts of 
the itinerant judges and brought before it.  Secondly, it had a 
large power of superintendence over all royal officers, sheriffs, 
and the like-would  entertain complaints against them  and 
bid them do their duties.  Thirdly, it had  a large civil juris- 
diction;  it  could  entertain  any  civil  action  in  which  the 
defendant  was  charged  with  a breach of  the king's  peace- 
and  as  I  have  already  said,  this  idea  of  the  king's  peace 
had  been  so  enormously extended  that  any unlawful  use  of 
force, however  small, could  be regarded  as a breach  of  the 
king's  peace  and could be brought before  the King's Bench. 
Not  content with  this it  proceeded  by  means  of  fictions  to 
steal business from the Common Pleas.  A  - reat deal of  our 
legal history is to be explained by the fact that for centuries 
the judges  were paid by fees ; more businecs therefor?  meant 
more money, and they had a keen interest in  attracting cases 
to their courts. 
(ii)  The Court of  Common  Pleas  was  the central court 
for all cases between subject and subject.  The  charter provided 
that such cases should not follow the king, bi  ' should be heard 
in some certain place; as a matter of fact, this ,ourt  was seldom 
removed from Westminster.  It had  ? concurrent jurisdiction 
with the King's Ber,:h  in actions of tresp3cs in which mention 
was  made  of  the  king's  peace,  while  all  nthnr  civil  cases 
belonged of  right to it.  In course of  tirr-  however, both the 
King's  Bench  and the  Exchequer  contrived  to  rob  it  of  a 
great  deal of  work. 
(iii)  The Exchequer of  Edward's reign was as yet a some- 
what  ambiguous  institution-both  a  CourL  of  law  and  an 
administrative bureau.  In its former  capacity it heard  suits 
relating  to the royal  revenue.  In its  latter it collected  the 
revenue  and  paid  it  out.  Gradually  these  functions  were 
separated.  The  fiscal  work,  the  receipt  and  collection  of 
revenue, was under the control of  the lord  treasurer, assisted 
by the chancellor of  the exchequer, while  a chief  baron  and 
three or four other barons heard and determined  the litigious 
proceedings, and in course of  time stole a great deal of  work 
from  the  court  of  common  pleas.  The separation  in  this 
finaqcial department of the administrative from  the judicial 
work took, however, a long time :-the  modern treasury is an 
offshoot  of  the  ancient  exchequer,  and  down  to  1875  the 
chancellor  of  the exchequer was  entitled  to  sit  as a  judge 
along  with  the  barons,  and  just  for  form's  sake  a  newly 
appointed chancellor of the exchequer used  to sit there and 
hear a case or two.  The barons of the exchequer of  Edward's 
day, and  even  of  a  much  later  time,  were  not  as  a  rule 
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Such were what came to be known  as the three superior 
courts of common law:-this  phrase 'of common law' has not 
as yet acquired one part of  the meaning which it had in later 
times: for the present we hear nothing of any court of 'equity.' 
The evolution  of  these definitely judicial  bodies did not, 
however,  exhaust  the  fount  of  royal  justice.  If  all  other 
courts failed the king might still do justice  in  his council or 
in  his  parliament.  The king's  court  of  the  Norman  reigns 
had  been, we  have  seen, in  theory  a  court  of  prelates and 
barons ; it is not until we have come to the days of Henry I1 
that we find a smaller group of  professional judges doing the 
ordinary and rapidly increasing work of the curia Regis.  We 
have seen also that during the thirteenth century there grows 
up a contrast between the king's permanent council (concilium 
Regis) and the great council of  the nation (commune concilium 
regni).  In either of  these assemblies the king can do justice, 
and during the reign  of  Edward I the machinery of  govern- 
ment works  so easily, and there is (except at the one great 
crisis of  I 297) so little opposition to the king, that men are not 
very  careful  to distinguish  between  these two bodies.  We 
have noticed this as regards legislation ; the contrast between 
statute and ordinance is not emphasized; of some of Edward's 
laws it is hard to say whether they proceed from the king in 
parliament or from the king in  council.  So with judicature ; 
the  errors of  all  inferior  courts  may be  brought  in  the  last 
resort for correction before the king in parliament or before the 
king in council.  Looking a little forward we see that this work, 
the work of  an ultimate court of error, becomes definitely the 
work of parliament, but is transacted only by that part of  the 
parliament which is  of  ancient date.  The representatives of 
the commons, though they make good their claim to share in 
all  legislation, never  take part  in  this judicial  work.  Thus 
the  House  of  Lords,  the assembly  of  prelates  and  barons, 
becomes the ultimate court of error-still  in name and theory 
the jurisdiction is that of the king in parliament.  On the other 
hand  jurisdiction  is  also claimed  for  the  king  in  council- 
a long and stormy history lies before  this claim, the history 
of  the Star Chamber, the history of  the Court of  Chancery; 
but for the present  under  Edward's  just  and steady rule all 
works well-there  is no great need to distinguish between the 
permanent group of  advisers  and the occasional assembly of 
prelates and magnates-the  one may be treated as a standing 
committee of the other. 
(d) It remains to speak of the visitatorial courts :- 
From  an  early  time  a  great deal of  the  work  of  royal 
justice  is  done not  by the central  tribunal  but  by itinerant 
justices,  sent  out by royal  commission  to hear  cases  in  the 
various  counties.  We hear  of  such judges  in  the  reign  of 
Henry  I ;  their  visitations  become  normal  and  systematic 
under the rule of  Henry 11.  The king commissions justices 
to transact  this  and  that  judicial  business  in  the  various 
counties of England.  These commissions take various forms 
more or less comprehensive.  First, justices  may be sent out 
ad  omnia  placita,  that is,  to entertain  all  manner  of  pleas 
belonging to the county  in  question.  Justices acting under 
this  comprehensive  commission  are known  pre-eminently  as 
justices in eyre-their  journey is an iter or eyre.  When such 
a commission is issued, then all the business  belonging to the 
county in  question  which  is  pending in  the king's  court  is 
adjourned  out  of  that  court  into  the eyre-so  that  if  the 
parties to a suit would otherwise have been  bound  to appear 
before the Bench at Westminster and take some step in  the 
action, they will now be bound  to appear before the justices 
in eyre.  Further, these justices are armed with lists of inquiries 
which they are to lay before jurors  representing the various 
hundreds of  the county and to which such jurors must return 
answer  on oath.  Such cnpitula  itineris, articles  of  the eyre, 
relate chiefly to crimes and to royal  rights-the  criminal and 
financial inquiries seem curiously  mixed up together-for  in 
truth crimes are pleas of  the crown, and  a  source  of  royal 
revenue.  So the justices in eyre inquire of murders, robberies 
and other felonies, also of  escheats, wardships, marriages and 
the like, also (and this must have been  important business) 
of the illegal profits of  sheriffs and other royal  officers.  The 
whole  of  the county is summoned to meet the justices.  In 
fact  the justices  hold  a  very  solemn meeting of  the county 
court and do royal justice therein.  Now eyres of this kind were 
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were usually  made once in every seven years ; but  certainly 
this period was not strictly observed ;  the king could order an 
eyre  when  and  where  he pleased.  An  eyre seems to have 
been regarded as a sore burden on the county, the attendance 
of all freeholders was required, and the justices exercised large 
powers of fining and amercing the county, hundreds, townships 
and individuals for neglect of police duties, small infringements 
of royal  rights  and other  minor  misdoings.  Complaints  of 
the frequency of these eyres were  often  made.  They seem 
to have gone out of  use  in  the  time  of  Edward  111.  AS 
machinery  for  collecting  revenue  they  were  becoming  un- 
necessary:  the  king  was  beginning  to  depend  more  and 
more on taxes granted  by  parliament,  less  and  less on  the 
profits of jurisdiction  and the income derived from his  feudal 
rights,  escheats,  wardships  and  so forth.  Justice  could  be 
done in  the counties under less comprehensive commissions, 
commissions of a purely judicial kind. 
By this  time, besides  the commission  for  a  general eyre 
there  were  three  other  commissions  in  use-commissions 
which  are still  in  use  at the  present  day.  Of these  a  few 
words  must  be said. 
(I)  The  Corn!  1:  :ion  of  Assize.  We have  seen  that 
Henry  I1  instituted  certain  actions  for  the  protection  of 
possession,  the  three  possessory  assizes of  Novel  Disseisin, 
Mort D'ancestor and Darrein Presentment.  Justices were sent 
out to take these assizes, that is, to hear and determine these 
possessory  actions.  Evidently  circuits  under  such  a  com- 
mission,  unlike  the general  eyres, were  popular.  John  was 
obliged to promise in the charter of  1215 that justices for this 
purpose should be sent four times a year-in  the charter of 
12 17  this was  changed to once a year.  This promise seems 
to have been fairly well kept.  At first it was  the practice to 
commission  as justices  some four  knights of  the shire; but 
gradually  during  Henry  111's  reign  this  work  falls  more 
and more  into the hands  of  the professional  judges  of  the 
royal  court.  It becomes  the practice to commission one of 
them  and  such  knights of  the county as he shall  associate 
with himself.  The opinion gains ground that such work  can- 
not properly be left to amateurs, and divers statutes from  the 
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end of the thirteenth and from the fourteenth century provide 
that one of the justices hearing the assize must be a judge of 
the King's Bench or Common Pleas or a serjeant at law. 
Then in  1285 the Statute of Westminster I1 threw a great 
deal of new work upon these justices of  assize.  By this time 
trial  by jury had become  the common mode of trying actions 
other than the assizes.  When an action in one of the courts at 
Westminster was ready for  trial, when, that is, the parties by 
their pleadings had raised some issue of fact, it had  been the 
practice to summon to Westminster a jury from the county to 
which  the case belonged-thus  if  it was  a  Cornish  case  the 
sheriff of  Cornwall  would  be  directed  to  send  jurors  from 
Cornwall.  It is to me very surprising that Englishmen should 
so long have borne this heavy burden.  But so it was; we still 
may read on the contemporary rolls  how  jurors  from  the re- 
motest corners of England journeyed up to Westminster to give 
their verdicts.  But in 1285 it was ordained that the trial of such 
actions  should, at least  as a  general  rule, take place  before 
the justices of assize.  The  court then in which the action was 
depending, instead of  bidding the sheriff  send Cornishmen to 
Westminster, would tell him to have the jurors at Westminster 
on a certain day, unless before that day (nisiprius)  justices of 
assize should come into Cornwall.  The  same statute (West. 11, 
I 3 Edw. I, c. 30) directed that assizes should be taken thrice a 
year, but at sorne time or  another it became the practice to 
send them only twice a year-only  once a year into the four 
northern counties.  As a matter of course, then, the justices of 
assize would come round before the day named in the writ, and 
then the case would be tried at ?zisipyizrs.  Now it is well  to 
understand that though as a matter of fact the justice of assize 
sitting to try a case at ~zisipyius  was usually one of the judges 
of one of  the three courts  of  common  law, he sat there not 
as such a judge but merely as a  royal  commissioner sent out 
for this one occasion to take the assizes of a particular county. 
For instance  the  queen  (I am speaking of  what  happened 
twelve years ago) might commission a judge of the Common 
Pleas to take the Cambridgeshire assizes1.  He would  come 
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to Cambridge,  and  under  the  Statute  of  Westminster  he 
would  try with a jury  all  the  Cambridgeshire actions which 
were  ready for  trial, no matter  in  which  of  the three courts 
they were  depending.  The court he held  would not be  the 
court  of  Common  Pleas  nor the King's  Bench nor  the Ex- 
chequer.  He would  be  sitting  as  a  royal  commissioner, 
empowered to try these cases.  His one business would be to 
preside  at the trial.  In  general, though  to this there were 
some statutory exceptions, he could not give judgment.  The 
action  was  an  action  pending in  one of  the central  courts, 
the Westminster  courts,  and  it  was  for  that court  to give 
judgment. 
(2)  The Commission of Gaol Delivery.  Even while eyres 
nd omlzia placita  were still in  use we find commissions of gaol 
delivery.  These can  be traced  to the very beginning of  the 
thirteenth century.  The king by such a commission directed 
certain justices to deliver a certain gaol ; that is to say, to try 
all the prisoners who were in  that gaol.  This must in  times 
past have been comparatively light work, for accused persons 
were seldom imprisoned unless they were charged with homi- 
cide,  and  this  commission  did  not,  I  think,  authorize  the 
taking of  indictments  against those  who  were  not  in  gaol. 
Such commissions are still issued in very much their old form 
-they  are directed  to the judges  of  the Westminster courts, 
the serjeants, queen's counsel and circuit officers, and empower 
them  or any two of  them  (of  whom  one must  be  a judge, 
serjeant or queen's  counsel) to deliver the gaol. 
(3)  General Commissions of  Oyer and Terminer are not, 
I  think, so  ancient;  they  come  into  use  as  the  eyres  are 
dropped.  They  are  directed  to  the  same  persons  as  the 
commissions of gaol delivery, and  usually, I believe, to some 
great noblemen, landowners of  the district.  They authorize 
these commissioners to hear  and  determine all  felonies  and 
other crimes in  the county.  According to the interpretation 
put upon these two commissions in  modern times there is but 
little difference between them ; they authorize almost exactly 
the same things; but it seems to me clear that in old times 
the Oyer and Terminer was a far more comprehensive authority 
than the Gaol Delivery, since the latter did not empower the 
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commissioners to receive indictments against those who were 
not in gaol. 
Now the cases  which  came before  justices  sitting under 
these  two  last-mentioned  commissions  were  criminal  cases, 
pleas of the crown, and they were not, you should understand, 
cases depending in  courts at Westminster like the civil cases 
heard at nisiprius.  The  whole procedure-indictment,  plead- 
ing, trial-took  place before the commissioners, and they could 
pass judgment and sentence-and  thus completely dispose of 
the whole case. 
The general result of this system of commissions was that 
a great deal of  royal justice was done not by the permanent 
central courts, but iri the counties, by commissioners sent out 
just for that occasion.  They could completely dispose of  the 
criminal  business of  the county, and could  preside  over  the 
trial  by jury of  civil  actions depending in the central courts. 
In course  of  time more  and  more  of  this  circuit  work  was 
done  by the judges  of  the  king's  permanent  courts.  The 
details  of  the system, which  was  still  in  working order  but 
a  few years ago, you will  have to learn at some future time: 
the  importance of  it  in  the  history  of  our  law  has  been 
immense ; owing to this system is it that we have never had 
powerful local tribunals and what follows from such tribunals, 
a  variety  of  provincial  laws;  and  again  it was  under  the 
discipline of  the eyres that the counties and boroughs learnt 
the first rudiments of  representative government. 
F.  Retrospect  of  Feudalzsm. 
Before quitting the first of  our historic  periods it will be 
' 
well for us to take a brief  review of what we call feudalism- 
in  the first place to come to some understanding about the 
meaning of  the word, and then  to see how far England was 
ever subject to what can  properly be called a feudal system. 
We shall thus have occasion  to speak of  the growth of  that 
system of land law which hitherto we have considered merely 
as an existing fact. 
And first we will observe that in this country any talk of a 
feudal system is a comparatively new thing : I should say that we do not hear of  a feudal system  until long after feudalism 
has ceased to exist.  From the end of the seventeenth century 
onwards our English law grew up in  wonderful isolation ; it 
became very purely English and insular.  Our lawyers seem 
to have  known  little  and  cared  nothing  about  the  law  of 
foreign countries, nothing about Roman jurisprudence.  Their 
English authorities were  all  sufficient  for  them, and neither 
our parliaments  nor our courts were subjected to any foreign 
influence.  Coke in his voluminous works has summed up for 
us the law of the later Middle Ages, but in all his books, unless 
I am mistaken, there is no word about the feudal system.  If, 
we  may say, he expounds that system in full detail so far as 
that system  was  English, he is  quite unconscious  that he is 
doing anything of the kind ; he has no thought of  a  system 
common  to the  nations  of  Europe,  he  is  speaking  of  our 
insular  law.  No,  for  'a feudal  system' we  must  turn  from 
Coke to a  contemporary of  his,  that learned  and  laborious 
antiquary, Sir Henry Spelman.  Coke was born  in  1552 and 
died in  1633 ; Spelman was  born  in  I 562  and died  in  1641  : 
so they were just contemporaries.  Now were an examiner to 
ask who introduced the feudal system into England? one very 
good answer, if properly explained, would be Henry Spelman, 
and if there followed the question, what was the feudal system? 
a good answer to that would  be, an early essay in  compara- 
tive  jurisprudence.  Spelman reading continental books saw 
that  English  law, for all  its  insularity, was  a  member  of  a 
great European family, a  family between  all the members of 
which  there  are  strong  family  likenesses.  This  was  for 
Englishmen  a  grand  and  a  striking  discovery; much  that 
had  seemed  quite  arbitrary  in  their  old  laws,  now  seemed 
explicable.  They learned of feudal law as of  a medieval ]us 
gentium, a  system  common  to all  the nations  of  the West, 
The new learning was propagated among English lawyers by 
Sir Martin Wright; it was  popularized  and made orthodox 
by Blackstone in his easy attractive manner.  If my examiner 
went on with his questions and asked me, when did the feudal 
system attain its most perfect development ?  I should answer, 
about the middle  of  the last century.  It was then, I should 
add, that  the  notion  of  one  grand  idea  and  a  few  simple 
principies underlying the mass of  medieval law, English and 
continental,  was  firmly  grasped  and  used  as  a  means  of 
explaining all  that seemed  to need  explanation  in  the old 
English  law.  Now  this  was  an  important  step-this  con- 
necting  of English  with  foreign  law,  this  endeavour to find 
some  general  intelligible  principles  running  through  the 
terrible  tangle  of  our old  books.  Most  undoubtedly  there 
was  much  in  our old  law which  could  be explained  only by 
reference  to ideas which  had found a completer development 
beyond seas, and to Blackstone and to Wright, and above all 
to Spelman, we  owe  a  heavy  debt.  But  since  Blackstone's 
day we  have learned  and  unlearned  many things about the 
Middle  Ages.  In  particular  we  have  learnt  to  see  vast 
differences  as well  as  striking  resemblances, to distinguish 
countries and to distinguish  times.  If  now we speak of  the 
feudal system, it should be with a full understanding that the 
feudalism  of  France  differs  radically  from  the feudalism  of 
England, that the feudalism of  the thirteenth is very different 
from  that  of  the  eleventh  century.  The phrase  has  thus 
become for us so large and vague that it is  quite possible to 
maintain that of  all  countries England was the most, or for 
the  matter  of  that  the  least,  feudalized ; that William  the 
Conqueror  introduced, or for  the matter of  that suppressed, 
the feudal system. 
What do we  mean by feudalism?  Some such answer as 
the followillg is the best  that I  can  give-A  state of  society 
in  which  the main  social bond  is  the relation  between  lord 
and man, a  relation  implying on  the lord's  part protection 
and  defence;  on  the  man's  part  protection,  service  and 
reverence,  the  service  including  service  in  arms.  This 
personal  relation  is  inseparably  involved  in  a  proprietary 
relation, the tenure of  land-the  man holds land of  the lord, 
the man's  service is  a  burden  on the land, the lord has im- 
portant  rights in  the land, and (we may say) the full owner- 
ship of  the land is split up between man and lord.  The lord 
has jurisdiction  over his men, holds courts for them, to which 
they  owe  suit.  Jurisdiction  is  regarded  as property,  as a 
private right which  the lord has over his land.  The national 
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there  stands  the  king  as  lord  of  all,  below  him  are  his 
immediate vassals, or tenants in  chief, who again are lords of 
tenants, who again may be  lords of  tenants, and so on, down 
to the lowest possessor  of  land.  Lastly, as every other court 
consists of  the lord's  tenants, so the king's  court  consists of 
his tenants in  chief, and so far as there is any constitutional 
control over  the  king  it  is  exercised  by  the body  of  these 
tenants. 
That seenis our idea of  a feudal state.  It is vague, it can 
only be described  in very abstract terms ; the concrete actual 
realities  to which  it  answers, the Germany, France, England 
of different  centuries may differ from each other very widely. 
A  state which  has these  characteristics  may  be a  powerful 
compact  centralized  kingdom; it  may  be hardly  more than 
a  loose  confederation  of  principalities,  a  practical  denial of 
national  unity. 
Now  towards  such  an  organization  English  society  had 
been  making  progress  for  centuries  before  the  Norman 
Conquest-and,  as it seems, with  an  ever increasing velocity. 
The general  nature  of  the  process  I  shall  describe  in  the 
words  of  Stubbs. 
'  The general tendency of the movement may be described 
as a movement  from the personal  to the territorial organiza- 
tion, from  a state of  things in  which  personal  freedom  and 
political right were the leading ideas, to one in which personal 
freedom  ahd  political  right  had  become  so much  bound  up 
with the relations created by the possession of  land, as to be 
actually  subservient  to  it  ....  The  main  steps  are  apparent. 
In  the primitive German  constitution  the free  man  of  pure 
blood is the fully qualified political unit; the king is the king 
of the race; the host  is  the people in arms; the peace is the 
national peace; the courts are the people in council ; the land 
is the property of  the race, and the free man has a right to his 
share.  In the next stage the possession of  land  has become 
the badge of  freedom ; the free man  is fully free because he 
possesses land, he does not  possess  the land  because  he  is 
free; the host  is the body of  landowners  in  arms, the courts 
are the courts of  the landowners.  But the personal  basis is 
not lost  sight of: the landless man may still select his lord ; 
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the hide is the provision of  the family ; the peace implies the 
maintenance of  rights and duties between man and man ; the 
full-free  is  the  equal  of  the  noble  in  all political  respects. 
In a further stage the land becomes the sacramental tie of all 
public relations, the poor man depends on the rich, not as his 
chosen lord, but as the owner of  the land  that he cultivates, 
the lord  of  the court to which he does suit and service, the 
leader  whom  he  is  bound  to follow  to  the host; the great 
landowner has his own peace, and administers his own justice1.' 
If for one moment we  trespass outside the bounds of  legal 
history, we may, I think, observe that one main  cause of  this 
movement is economic.  The distribution of  wealth becomes 
more  and  more  unequal.  Conquest  and  feuds  may  have 
something to do with  this, but  we  need  not, indeed cannot, 
ascribe it  chiefly to violence.  The better the peace is kept, 
the better the law is administered, the more progress  is  made 
towards  free  contract  and  free  alienation, the more  rapidly 
will  great  inequalities  become  common.  In  a  time  when 
there  is  little manufacture  this  will  mean  that land  will  be 
unequally distributed ; land becomes amassed in the hands of 
the  rich,  and  wealth  breeds  wealth.  But  the  rich  do not 
really want  the land, they want  the produce  of  land.  They 
want  their  lands cultivated.  What is  more, they are willing 
to let out their lands on very permanent terms.  There is no 
speculation, no  buying to sell or selling to buy ; to grant out 
land  for  ever  at  a  perpetual  rent-to  receive  it  on  those 
terms  is  no  imprudent  bargain-no  rise  or  fall  in  prices  is 
anticipated.  I think it is well to bear this in mind ; for there 
seems to me a tendency to lay too much stress on the military 
and  political,  too little on  the  economic  side  of  feudalism. 
When  considered  it  seems  not unnatural  that a society con- 
sisting  of  landowizers,  free  and  barbarous,  should  by  quite 
peaceful causes become transmuted into a society of landlords 
and tenants.  But if  we may look to such abstract considera- 
tions  for  the cause, we  must  look elsewhere for  the facts of 
feudalism. 
Now that personal  relation  between  lord  and man which 
is one ingredient of  feudalism, is  indeed  old ; we  may see it 
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in the first page of  the history of  our race.  It can be traced 
to the relation  between  the German pri~lceps  and his comites 
described by Tacitus.  Attached to the chieftain by the closest 
ties is a body of warlike companions-in  many cases the sons 
of  nobles, ambitious of  renown : he provides their equipment, 
entertains them  at his  board.  In war  they  fight  for  him, at 
once his  defenders and the rivals of  his prowess.  They are 
bound  to  protect  him,  perhaps  they  even  swear  to  do so. 
The comes  is a dependent, but  such dependence is  glorious ; 
such  service  is  preferable  to the  most  perfect  freedom.  It 
was  under  leaders surrounded  by such bands of  comites that 
England  was  conquered  by  the German  tribes.  The comes 
of Tacitus may be recognized in thegesith of the Anglo-Saxon 
laws, a  name which gradually gives way  to that of  thegn, a 
word which to start with  means simply servant.  But at first 
we cannot call this a feudal institution;  it seems utterly uncon- 
nected with any tenure of land.  The  comes is not a landowner 
or  land-holder, he  is  an  inmate of  his  leader's  household. 
But  in  England  the  thegn  does  come  to be a  landowner. 
The folk-land, the national  land  not yet appropriated, seems 
regarded  as the natural  fund  out of  which  rewards  may be 
provided  for  those  who  in  war  or  otherwise  have  deserved 
well  of  the state1.  The king with  the counsel and consent 
of  his wise  men  confers  land  on  his distinguished followers. 
In  England thegnage tends to become territorial.  It seems 
expected  that a  thegn  will  naturally be  a  large  landowner. 
The  process  goes  further-the  large  landowner  is  worthy 
of  thegn  right;  he  who  has  five  hides  of  land  and  certain 
other  rights  which  seem  to  be  rights  of  jurisdiction  over 
his  dependents is  entitled  to  be  deemed  a  thegn,  and  so 
receives  certain  privileges  such  as an  increased  wergild,  or 
an  increased  value  for  his  oath.  Then again  from  the be- 
ginning, the thegn  is  the warrior;  all  free  men  are  bound 
to  fight; the  army  is  the nation  in  arms ;  but  the  thegn 
is  specially  bound  to  fight-bound  to  fight  for  his  leader. 
As then  the thegn  becomes a  large  landowner, and  as the 
large  landowner  as  such  comes  to  be  regarded  as  worthy 
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of  the  privileges  of  the  thegnage,  so  the  special  duty of 
fighting, and  fighting for  the king,  comes  to be a  duty in- 
cumbent on the large landowners.  We know too that the folk- 
land, the unappropriated  land which  according to the older 
idea  had  belonged  to the nation, had  been  becoming  more 
and more the king's  demesne land  in  fact, if  not  in  theory. 
Stubbs  notices  that from  Alfred's  time  onwards  the clause 
in  the  deeds  granting  this  folk-land,  which  expresses  the 
counsel  and  consent  of  the witan, becomes  rarer  though  it 
never disappears altogether.  The wise men rather witness the 
grant than authorize it.  After the Conquest, all this folk-land 
became  simply terra Regis, the king's  demesne; but large as 
the change  may  seem  to us, very possibly  it  was  a change 
rather  in  terminology  than  in  anything  else;  it  was  a  re- 
cognition of what had well-nigh become an accomplished fact. 
The thegn then who  has received  a grant of  such land and 
who is bound to military service-it  takes but a small change 
of  ideas, a change in the point of  view from which the facts 
are seen, to regard him as holding land of the king by military 
service.  Exactly wherein consisted the special military obliga- 
tion of the thegn, we do not well know.  According to the old 
order of  ideas, every man was  bound to serve in the national 
army, the king's thegns were bound to fight round him and for 
him.  As the thegnage became connected with the possession 
of  land-so  that the owner of five hides was worthy of thegn- 
right-so,  it  would  seem, a  special  obligation  to serve  and 
find  soldiers was  laid  on  the great landowners and in  some 
way,  which  we  cannot  now  precisely  determine,  was  pro- 
portioned  to their  holdings.  But to the last, to the day of 
the Conquest, the old national  army could  be called out, and 
it is very  necessary  to remember that the Conquest did  not 
put an end to this; the old national army exists alongside of 
the feudal army. 
But  it is  not  only the king who  has thegns-great  men 
may  have  them:  indeed  it  seems  that  a  thegn  may have 
lesser thegns  dependent  on  him-just  as  in  after-days the 
Icing's  tenant  in capite  might  have  tenants  holding  of  him 
by knight's service ; still the idea of tenure is not the essence 
of  thegnship.  The history  of  the thegnship  is  brought  out Constitutions  Z History 
by laws concerning  heriots.  Now in  its origin  the heriot  is 
the  equipment  of  arms which the prince@  has provided  for 
the comes ; on the death of  the latter, it must be given back 
-the  word just  means equipment  for  the army.  The thegn 
ceases  to be  a  member  of  the  household,  becomes  a  land- 
owner  and  provides  his  own  arms;  but  still  on  his  death 
the heriot  is  rendered.  It now takes the form  of  arms and 
money, due to the king on the thegn's  death.  Thus in  the 
laws of  Canute, on  the death of  a king's  thegn  four horses 
-two  saddled, two unsaddled-two  swords, four  spears, as 
many shields, a  helm, breastplate  and  50  mancuses of  gold 
are due1.  This is important under the Norman kings : these 
heriots come to be regarded as reliefs, sums paid  by the heir 
on his taking up the land  which  had  been  his  ancestor's,  a 
burden of  tenure.  The payment  may remain  the same, the 
mode of  regarding it is different.  Thus the way of  feudalism 
is prepared. 
This tie of  man to lord was regarded  as a tie of  the most 
sacred  kind.  While  many  offences which  we  should  think 
very  grave  can  still  be  compounded  with  money,  treason 
against the lord, be he the king or another lord, is  a capital 
crime.  This is  laid down in the laws of  Alfred, and to these 
laws there is a curious  preface which shows the strength of 
the  feeling.  The king  explains that  after  the  nations  had 
accepted  the  Christian  faith,  it  was  ordained  by  the  wise 
men  (spiritual and lay) that for  almost every  first offence a 
money  payment  might  be  accepted, save  for treason  to the 
lord for which no mercy should be shown, since God Almighty 
showed  none  to those who  despised  him, and  Christ, God's 
son, adjudged  none to those who sold  him, and commanded 
that a lord should be loved as one's self.  The crime of Judas 
is the crime of one who betrayed his lord2. 
This relation  of  man  and lord we  find  in  all parts of  the 
social  structure.  To start  with  it  is  a  relation  into  which 
men  enter  voluntarily.  Then,  however,  we  find  the  legis- 
lators  requiring  that  men  shall  have  lords.  This rule  is 
laid down is  the laws of  Athelstan (925-940)-every  landless 
'  Select  Charters, p.  74, Liebermann I, pp.  357-9. 
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man  must  have  a  lord:  if  he  has  not  got  one,  one  must 
be found  for  him  by  his  kindred1.  This  we  may  regard 
as a  police measure.  The law has no hold  on  the landless 
man ; too often he can break  the law and laugh at it ; there 
is nothing of  his that you  can  take from  him; escape from 
justice  is  easy; he  must have  a  lord who will  be  bound  to 
produce  him  in  court  should  he  be wanted.  Thus positive 
legislation  extends the relation  of dependence;  it is required 
that men  must either have land or have lords.  The landless 
man  may  still  be  fully  free,  may  have  political  rights,  but 
he is  dependent.  The change has begun which makes  free- 
holding, and not personal  freedom, the qualification for poli- 
tical  rights.  The landless man  is represented  in  the courts 
by his lord ; his  lord  begins  to answer for him, he is  losing 
his  right to attend  on  his  own  behalf, to sit there as judge 
and declare the law. 
Probably he  finds  this  very  convenient.  Attendance  at 
the courts is a sore burden  for the poorer men ; they would 
go there to little  purpose,  merely  to  see things  settled  for 
them  by the richer folk ; while as to their  private rights the 
lord will  look  after  these, for they are much  implicated with 
his  own  rights.  We can  see  that  it  must  have  been  con- 
venient to have  a  lord; for what  the  landless  are bound  to 
do by law, the smaller landowners  do of  their own  free will ; 
they commend themselves to lords.  We learn from Domesday 
that in  some parts of  England  this practice  of  commending 
oneself had become common, especially in the eastern counties. 
The smaller  landowners had  placed themselves  in  a relation 
of  dependence on superior lords.  What exactly was  implied 
by  this  we  do not  know-and  very  possibly  commendation 
meant different things in different cases-sometimes,  it would 
seem, the dependent was  still  able to transfer himself  and his 
land from  one lord to another; sometimes being personally 
quite  free, he  could  leave  his  lord  but  then  must  leave  his 
land, and in  such cases it is  a delicate and  a verbal question 
whether  the land  is  his  land or has  become his lord's.  No 
legislation  had  turned  the  smaller  owners  into  tenants  of 
other  men's  lands or  even  compelled  them  to have lords- 
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the change had  been  brought  about by the private  acts of 
individuals  and  the  result,  as  sketched  for  us  by  modern 
writers, is intricate  and confused. 
But  very  often  indeed, something  which  we  cannot  but 
call  a tenure of  land, a  holding by one man of  another, must 
have been created  in  a simpler fashion.  By means  of  grants 
of  folk-land  territories  were  being  amassed  in  the  hands  of 
great  men  and religious  houses1.  These  again  granted  out 
their  land  to cultivators.  Generally  such  grants were  of  a 
permanent  kind:  grants to a  man  and  his  heirs,  or  grants 
to a man  and a certain specified number  of  successive heirs 
in  return  for labour  services, ploughings and reapings of  the 
lord's  own  demesne lands,  or  rents  payable  in  money  or  in 
kind.  We do not find  grants or leases for years-I  believe 
that among all  the Anglo-Saxon  charters,  there  is  but one 
specimen of  such a bargain.  Permanence is desired  on  both 
sides-there  is no speculating for a rise  or fall of  prices or of 
rents.  And here we have something very like the estate in fee 
simple of  later law-the  feudal division  of  complete owner- 
ship between  lord  and tenant.  The cultivator  has  perhaps 
under the terms of  the grant an  estate that is to endure for 
ever, or at least so long as he has heirs ; but the services are 
burdens on the land-very  possibly if  his heirs  fail the land 
will  again become the land  of  the giver, very possibly if  the 
services fall into arrear, the giver may resume the land.  We 
know very  little about  all this-for  the titles  of  the smaller 
people, the cultivators of  the land, were seldom evidenced by 
written  instruments.  But it is very probable that before the 
Norman Conquest, a large part of  England was holden prac- 
tically on the terms of that socage tenure that we find existing 
at a  later  day-the  possessor  of  the  land  being  bound  to 
perform  services more  or less onerous  in return  for the land, 
to plough  the lord's  own  land,  to pay  rent  in  money  or in 
kind.  All that seems wanting to turn such a possession into 
a tenure by one man  of  another is just  the technical  termi- 
Maitland would  possibly have rewritten this sentence somewhat as follows : 
'By means of  royal  and  other books  (or charters) superiorities over  land  were 
being  conferred  upon  religious  houses  and  great  men.'  Domesday  Book  and 
Bcyond, pp. 226-58,  293-318. 
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nology-and  to a uniform technical terminology Anglo-Saxon 
land law  had  not  yet arrived.  So far as we  can now see, it 
had no theory of tenure. 
We approach here  a  difficult subject-perhaps  the most 
difficult in  the history  of  English  law-namely,  the history 
of villeinage,  the history  of  that  servile  land-holding which 
is  brought  to  our  notice  in  the  books  of  the  twelfth  and 
thirteenth  centuries.  It seems  highly  probable  that at the 
date  of  the  Norman  Conquest  there  was  a  large  mass  of 
unfree tenants cultivating lands on  much the same terms as 
those which  constitute the villeinage  of  later  days.  Slaves 
there most certainly were throughout the Anglo-Saxon period 
-the  existence of  a class of  persons half-servile, half-free, is 
a more disputable point. 
Another  element  of  feudalism  is  plainly  visible.  For 
some  time  before  the  Norman  Conquest-how  long  is  a 
debated question-jurisdiction,  the right  to hold  courts, had 
been  passing  into  private  hands.  The doctrine  had  long 
been  gaining  ground  that  justice  was  the  king's,  that  he 
could  grant it  to  others,  could  grant to them  the  right  of 
holding  courts.  Certain  it  is  that  Edward  the  Confessor 
I-ad  made  such  grants  on  a  lavish  scale.  Our  evidence 
chiefly  consists  of  grants  made  to churches  and  religious 
houses-ecclesiastical  bodies  were  careful  to  preserve their 
title deeds, and so  they  have  come  down  to  us-but  there 
can  be  little doubt  that  similar  grants were  made to great 
lay  landowners.  England  was  fast  becoming  a  land  of 
private  courts-courts  in  which  the lord  did  justice  among 
his dependents, those dependents being bound to come and sit 
there, and help in making of  judgments.  Nothing, I believe, 
is  more  the  essence  of  all  that  we  mean  when  we  talk  of 
feudalism  than  the private  court-a  court which  can  be  in- 
herited  and sold  along with  land.  Looking at this we  may 
say that England was plunging into feudalism, and feudalism 
of  a  dangerous  kind-for  during the  Confessor's  reign  the 
central power was growing weak, the great lords were growing 
strong.  The facts  of  feudalism  seem  to be  there-what  is 
wanting  is  a  theory  which  shall  express those  facts.  That 
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The Conqueror came from a land which had  formed  part 
of  the  territory  of  the  Frankish  Empire,  and  within  that 
Empire the process which we  have seen  at work  in England 
had  gone  on  faster  and  further.  The soil  had  long  been 
Roman.  The  Frankish  conquest  of  Gaul  had  differed  es- 
sentially from the English conquest of  Britain.  It had  been 
effected  slowly  by  a  German  nation  which  had  become 
Christian  during the  conquest.  A  large  population  of  the 
old  inhabitants-Celtic  by  blood,  Roman  in  language  and 
in  law-became  subject to Teutonic rulers.  In England the 
small landowner was,  at least  generally, a free  Englishman; 
in  Gaul  he  was  a  conquered  provincial.  What is  more,  in 
course of  time the Romance tongue prevailed in France over 
the  German  speech  of  the  conquerors, and the customs  of 
the Franks were  impregnated  by Roman  law.  This Roman 
influence is apparent at once when we compare our old dooms 
with the still older Lex Salica, the code of the Salian Franks ; 
the former are written  in  Anglo-Saxon, the latter is written 
in Latin. 
Now  on  the  continent  the history  of  feudalism  centres 
round  the benefciurn,  or, as it came to be called, the  feodum. 
It is this, of course, which has given us the word feudal.  The 
word feodum  does not, I believe, occur before the end  of  the 
ninth century.  It is derived from the German word for cattle, 
which, like the Roman pecunia  derived  from peczds,  comes to 
mean  money or property in  general.  It is somewhat curious 
that  the  two  words  which  English  lawyers  very  frequently 
contrast  as  quite  opposed  to  each  other, the fee  and  the 
chattel,  should  both  refer  us  back  to what  is  perhaps  the 
oldest  form  of  property,  namely  cattle, for  chattel  is  from 
the  low  Latin  catallurn, cattle.  But  the  beaefciunz  was  an 
old  institution ; it  appears very soon after the German tribes 
overrun  the  Roman  Empire.  It is  a  gift  of  land  made by 
the king out of  his  own  estate, the grantee coming under a 
special obligation to be  faithful-not,  it seems, a promise  of 
definite service, but  a  general promise  to be  faithful in  con- 
sideration of the gift.  Such grants were  freely made by the 
Frankish  kings  to  their  great  men.  At  first, it  seems  the 
grant was made merely for the life of the grantee.  Gradually, 
however, the benefice assumed a hereditary character : it was 
considered that the heir  of  the dead  beneficiary had  a claim 
to a renewal of the benefice.  The hereditary ch~racter  of the 
benefice is  already recognized  in  a capitulary (an ordinance) 
of 877-two  hundred years before the Norman Conquest.  All 
offices in  the  Middle Ages tend  to become  hereditary-the 
kingship tends to become, actually becomes, hereditary;  our 
sheriffdoms tend to become hereditary, in a few cases actually 
become  hereditary;  the  English  peers  gradually acquire  a 
hereditary right to be called to meet the king in  parliament. 
So also  the  benefciurn  or feodzdrn  became  hereditary-and 
yet the heir  did  not at once  step into his  ancestor's  shoes: 
he  did  not  hold  the fief until  he  had  been  invested, put  in 
seisin  by  the  king, and  a  payment  fixed  more  or  less  by 
varying  custom  might  be required  of  him  on  thus relieving 
or taking up the fallen inheritance.  This was the relief. 
To express the rights thus created, a set of technical terms 
was  developed :-the  beneficiary or feudatory holds  the land 
of  his  lord,  the  grantor-A  tenet  terrtzm  de  B.  The  full 
ownership (dominiurn) of  the land  is  as  it  were  broken  up 
between  A  and  B; or  again, for  the  feudatory may  grant 
out part of  the land to be held  of  him, it may be  broken  up 
between  A, B,  and  C, C  holding of  B and B  of  A, and so 
on, ad infiniturn. 
The genesis  of  this idea of  tenure, of  divided  ownership, 
has been and still is very warmly disputed among continental 
writers.  I may refer  you to the writings of  Maine-Ancient 
Lnw, chap. viii (last part), and Ear&  La.zu and Custom, chap. x. 
Very possibly some ideas of  Roman  law helped towards the 
result, but the result is a notion which is not Roman-that  of 
a dominizdrn split up between lord and tenant. 
Then also jurisdiction  passed into private hands-the  king 
granted  it out along with the land to be held  of  him.  The 
idea  that  jurisdiction  is  the  king's  property  and  may  be 
alienated by him had become current in  France earlier than in 
England, the kingship had been stronger, and from the middle 
of the ninth  century onwards such  grants became common. 
This, it  is  to be  remembered,  is  the time  when  the  great 
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little more than a name-the  effective courts were the courts 
of  the great proprietors.  Also, it  is  to be  remembered  that 
this is the time when the Northmen subdued Normandy-the 
Norman  duke became  the vassal of the king of  the French, 
became  so by commendation-Duke  Richard  of  Normandy 
commended  himself to Hugh duke of  the French, whose de- 
scendants became kings.  But the king's power in  Normandy 
was hardly more than  nominal.  A disciple of  Austin would 
probably  say that  Normandy  was  an  independent political 
community, though this was not quite the theory of  the time. 
The process of  feudalization had  gone on within the duchy; 
the lords  of  Norman  extraction  dominated over a people  of 
another  blood  and  formed  a  powerful  aristocracy-only  the 
personal  character, the  heavy  hand  of  the  dukes, kept to- 
gether the duchy as a whole. 
William came from Normandy to claim the English crown 
which, as he alleged, was his  by right as the heir whom  the 
Confessor had  chosen.  It was his own personal right that he 
came to seek-no  right  that Normans  had  to England, but 
a right that he, William, had to be king of the English.  The 
claim  may  have  been,  seemingly  was,  indefensible,  but  its 
nature should  be remembered.  To have asserted  a title by 
victory would have encouraged very dangerous  ideas:  if  the 
duke had fought and won, had not his earls and barons fought 
and  won  also?  No,  an  air  of  legality  was  given  to  the 
whole affair-William  succeeded to Edward's  position.  The 
Conquest threw into his hands a vast quantity of  land.  Those 
who  fought against him  were rebels, and their land was  for- 
feited  by  their  rebellion ; each  new  outbreak  led  to  fresh 
confiscations.  His followers  had  to be rewarded,  and they 
were rewarded liberally.  But there was no general scramble: 
the new  owners step into the places  of  old  owners;  a  for- 
feiture and then  a grant by the king is  the link  in  the title. 
Still by means of a quiet assumption  feudal tenure becomes 
universal.  All land is held of the king. 
It is, I suppose, of  this that an English lawyer first thinks 
when  he  hears  any talk  of  feudalism.  For some centuries 
past all the feudalism that has been of importance in England 
has been merely land law, real property law, a part of  private 
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law.  Our land law we still say is feudal ; all land is still held 
of the king mediately or immediately;  this  is as true to-day 
as it ever was.  But the mere fact that it is true to-day shows 
that a legal theory of this sort is not the essence of feudalism, 
for  no  one would  think  of  calling  the England  of  our  day 
a feudal state.  If  we  examine our notion of  feudalism, does 
it not seem  this, that land  law is  not private  law, that public 
law  is  land  law, that  public  and political  rights  and  duties 
of all  sorts and kinds are intimately and quite inextricably 
blended  with rights in land ?  Such rights carry with them the 
right to attend the common council or court of the realm, the 
common council or court of the county; jurisdictions, military 
duties, fiscal  burdens  are consequences of  tenure;  the con- 
stitution of  parliament,  of the  law  courts, of  the army, all 
seems  as  it  were  a  sort  of  appendix  to  the  law  of  real 
property. 
Now this theory that land in  the last resort is held of  the 
king, becomes the theory of our law at the Norman Conquest. 
It is assumed  in  Domesday Book, the outcome of  that great 
survey of  which we  are now  keeping the 800th  anniversary: 
quietly  assumed  as  the basis  of  the survey.  On the other 
hand we  can  say with  certainty that before the Conquest this 
was  not the theory of  English law.  Towards such  a theory 
English  law  had  been  tending  for  a  long while  past,  very 
possibly the time was fast approaching when the logic of facts 
would  have generated  this  idea; the facts,  the actual  legal 
relationships, were such  that the wide principle  'all !and  held 
in the last resort of  the king' would not greatly disturb them. 
Still this principle had not been evolved.  It came to us from 
abroad ; but it came in  the guise of  a quiet assumption ; no 
!aw  forced it upon the conquered country; no law was neces- 
sary; in  Normandy lan-1s were held  of  the Duke, the Duke 
again held of the king ;  of course it was the same in England; 
no other system was conceivable.  The process of confiscation 
gave  the  Conqueror  abundant  opportunity  for  making  the 
theory  true  in  fact; the  followers whom  he  rewarded  with 
forfeited lands would of course hold of him; the great English 
landowners,  whose  lands  were  restored  to  them,  would  of 
course hold of him.  As to the smaller people, when looked at from the point of view natural to a Norman, they were already 
tenants of  the greater  people,  and when  the greater people 
forfeited their  rights, there was  but a change of  lords.  This 
assumption  was  sometimes  true  enough,  perhaps  in  other 
cases quite false ; in  many cases it would seem but the intro- 
duction of  a new and simpler terminology;  he  who formerly 
was  a landowner personally bound  to a lord, became a land- 
tenant holding land of  a lord.  There was no legislation, and 
I  believe that no  chronicler refers to the introduction of  this 
new theory.  As to the later lawyers, Glanvill  and  Bracton, 
they  never  put  it  into words.  They never  state as a  note- 
worthy  fact  that all land  is held  of the king ;  of  cozwse  it is. 
This  is  very  remarkable  in  Bracton's  great  treatise.  His 
general  learning about  property  he  draws  from  the  Roman 
books, and propounds in  the language of  Roman law.  The 
ultimate  tenant of  land, the lowest freeholder  in  the feudal 
scale, is  the  owner  of  the  land,  he  has  dominium  rei, pro- 
prietatem,  he  is  proprietarius ; but  of  course  he  holds  of 
someone, tenet  de some lord; if  he  holds  of  no  other,  then 
tenet  de  domino  rege;  there  is  nothing  here  that  deserves 
explanation. 
Now  if  feudalism  consists  only  in  this  legal  theory  of 
tenure,  then  I  believe  we  may  say  that  of  all  European 
countries England was  the most  perfectly feudalized.  Every 
inch  of land  was brought within  it.  The great shock of  the 
Norman  Conquest  rendered  the  material  very  plastic;  all 
could  be  brought  under  one  idea.  If  for example we  look 
at the law of medieval  Germany, we find it otherwise ; there 
is  feudal  land  and non-feudal  land, there are feudal holders 
and non-feudal  owners side by side.  There are two different 
bodies of  law, Landrecht and Lehnrecht, Common  Land Law 
and Feudal Law.  We Englishmen can hardly translate these 
terms ; our Landrecht is all Lehnrecht, all our land  law is law 
about land  holden by feudal tenure.  But we must not forget 
to look at both sides of this truth; our Lehnrecht is Landrecht, 
law not for a particular class of persons  holding  military fiefs, 
but  the general  law of  rights  in  land.  This I think  of great 
importance ; the wide extension of the feudal idea deprives  it 
of  much  of  its  most  dangerous meaning;  it does not  create 
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a caste ;  it has to serve for the tenant in  socage, the agricul- 
tural  classes  as  well  as  for  the  tenant  by  knight  service. 
Many  things  in  our  legal  history  are  thus  explained,  for 
instance, the growth of primogeniture.  In origin it belongs to 
a  military system ; slowly it spread from the military tenants 
to the socagers, it ceased to be the mark of a class, it became 
common law1.  How consistently the idea of tenure was carried 
through the whole land  law, and how little that theory might 
mean, is best  seen when  we  look  at the tenure  by  frankal- 
moign.  The monastery  pays  no  rent, none  of  the ordinary 
profits of  tenure can  accrue to the lord,  for his tenant  never 
dies, never  leaves an heir, never  commits felony ; but to save 
the theory he is still a tenant holding by the service of  saying 
prayers for the lord. 
The Norman Conquest then introduces the general theory 
of tenure-makes  it the theory of the whole land law.  Also it 
draws tighter the bond which already is beginning to connect 
military service with  the holding of  land.  Still we  must not 
suppose that the Conqueror definitely apportioned the quan- 
tum  of  military  service  to be  exacted  from  his  feudatories. 
'We have,'  says  Stubbs,  'no light  on  the  point  from  any 
original  grant  made  by  the Conqueror  to any lay follower; 
but judging  from the grants made to the churches we cannot 
suppose  it  probable  that such  gifts  were  made  on  any ex- 
pressed  condition,  or  accepted  with  a  distinct  pledge  to 
provide  a certain  contingent of  knights for the king's service. 
The  obligation  of  national  defence  was  incumbent  as  of 
old  on  all  landowners, and  the  customary  service  of  one 
fully-armed  man  for  each  five  hides  was  probably  the  rate 
at which the newly  endowed follower  of  the king  would  be 
expected  to  discharge  his  duty.  The  wording  of  the 
Doomsday  survey does  not  imply  that  in  this  respect  the 
new  military  service  differed  from  the  old ;  the  land  is 
marked  out, not  into knight's  fees, but  into  hides,  and the 
number  of  knights to be  furnished  by a particular feudatory 
would be ascertained by inquiring the number of hides that he 
held, without  apportioning the particular  acres  that were  to 
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maintain  a  particular  knight1.'  This apportionment  seems 
rather  the  result  of  the  process  of  sub-infeudation.  The 
great landowner  whose wide estates oblige him to furnish a 
large  body  of  knights  parcels  out  the  duty  among  his 
followers, definitely  providing  that A  or  B  shall  hold  this 
parcel of land by the service of one knight or of three knights. 
The system seems hardly  to have been  worked  into perfect 
detail  until  the  feudal  array  was  already  losing  some  of 
its importance.  The imposition  of  scutage in  the reign  of 
Henry 11, the commutation of military service for money pay- 
ment, makes every particular definite ;  the obligation can now 
be expressed  in  terms of  pounds, shillings and pence.  This 
district constitutes a knight's fee ; this is a  fifth of  a  knight's 
fee ;  when the scutage is two marks on a knight's fee this land 
pays two shillings, and so forth.  No general plan is imposeda. 
As regards what  are generally called the burdens  or in- 
cidents of  feudal tenure-here  again  we ought not to think 
of  William the  Conqueror  bringing  over  with  him  a fully 
developed law.  The  state of the English law when it becomes 
manifest  in the pages of  Glanvill  and  Bracton is the result 
of i slow  process  which  went  on  during  the eleventh  and 
twelfth  centuries, and which  gradually  defined  the rights of 
lord and tenant.  This process one can trace as regards each 
separate burden-relief,  marriage, wardship, aids, scutages, and 
so forth.  The final result we have already sketched.  Some of 
our ordinary text-books encourage the notion  that originally 
the  English  feudatories  were  merely  tenants  for  life,  but 
that  in  course  of  time,  to use  the  common  phrase,  'fiefs 
became hereditary.'  Now  it is perfectly  true that long ago 
such a process as this had  gone on abroad.  The benejcium 
or feodum  as it came to be called, was, to start with, only a life 
estate;  but  already in  the ninth  century  the claim  of  the 
heir  to inherit  or take up  his  father's  fief  had  been  gener- 
ally  admitted.  There seems  no  doubt  whatever  that when 
the Conqueror gave English land to one of  his great followers, 
1 Constitufionol History, vol. I, 5 96.  The number of knights does not seem 
10  have borne any close relation to the size of the tenant's estate.  Round, Fcudal 
En&and,  p. a47 ff. 
For  Maltland's  developed  views  on scutage see  History  of  English Law, 
vol.  I,  pp. 166-71,  where it is proved that the tenant in  chief could not commute 
his service. 
I  Reliefs  aand  Inkerita?zce  I59 
the gift was in  terms the gift of an hereditary estate-a  gift to 
the donee  and  his heirs.  Still doubtless the past  history  of 
the bene$ciuwz  clung about the gift.  The heir's  claim, though 
an admitted claim, was still rather a claim  to be placed in his 
ancestor's  position,  than  a  claim  that  by  mere  death  and 
inheritance he was  already in  that position.  He had a right 
to have the land, but  the land was  not as yet quite his.  He 
must do homage and swear fealty; what is more, money may 
be  expected of  him  if he is to fill the position of his ancestor. 
There is  still something of  grace and favour in  letting him 
hold  what  his father held.  We know little of  what  was  the 
practice of  the Conqueror himself; but it is plain that William 
Rufus would  have  liked  to treat the feudatories  as mere  life 
tenants, to have  insisted  that  the heir must  repurchase the 
father's land, &en  that the new bishop or abbot must repur- 
chase  the land  held  by his predecessor.  He wished, we  are 
told, to be  the heir of every man in England.  His demands, 
however,  were  clearly  regarded  as  oppressive  and  illegal. 
Henr~  I  on  his  succession to the throne  found  it  necessary 
to renounce the evil  customs of  his brother.  The coronation 
charter  in  which  he  did  this is  one of  the main  landmarks 
in  the history  of  English  feudalism-even  in  the history  of 
England.  Thus in  particular we  have  this  clause:  ' If any 
of  my earls, barons or other tenants shall  die, his  heir  shall 
not  redeem  (redimet, buy  back)  his  land, but  shall  relieve 
it (take up the inheritance) by a just and lawful relief.'  This, 
you  will  see, on  the one hand  declares in  an  emphatic way 
that fiefs are hereditary, while on  the other hand  it declares 
no less em-phatically that a relief is due.  The amount, how- 
ever, is not fixed.  It is to be remembered that something like 
the relief had been paid in England before the Norman  Con- 
quest-namely  the heriot-and  though (as I have already said) 
the heriot had originally been of a different nature (the return 
of the thegn's military equipment to the lord who provides it); 
it had  come to look much like the foreign  relief.  The thegh 
had become a landowner; bound by special obligation to serve 
the king ; on his death arms and money were rendered to the 
king:-a  Norman accustomed to the beneficiary system would 
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Ranulf  Flambard, the minister of  William  Rufus (of  whose 
doings the contemporary chroniclers complain very bitterly), 
had much to do with shaping this part of English feudalism. 
The  just  and lawful reliefs of Henry's charter may have been 
equivalent to the heriots, a tariff of which is given in  the laws 
of Canute.  But it took a century and more from the coronation 
of  Henry  I  to reduce  the  king's  claims  within  any  very 
definite bounds.  What I have said of reliefs may be said also 
of those extremely onerous burdens which we  know as ward- 
ship and marriage.  The  Coronation Charter of  Henry I makes 
large promises  about them, and  lays down  rules  which  are 
considerably  less  heavy  on  the  tenants  than  those  which 
ultimately become the rules of  the common  law.  From the 
accession  of  Henry  I  to the  Magna  Carta  of  1215  these 
matters are very unsettled-the  king gets what  he can, often 
he can get much.  At length the Great Charter wrung from 
John sets precise bounds to his rights, though as a  matter of 
fact another half century goes by before  the charter is very 
carefully observed, and even  the Great Charter is  not  in  all 
respects  so favourable  to the  tenants  as  is  the  charter  of 
Henry I : this in  particular  is  the case as regards wardship 
and marriage-the  king's  rights as ultimately fixed are, to say 
the least, very ample. 
What has been  said  of the king and his tenants in chief 
is true also of  the barons and their tenants.  Henry I  at the 
opening of his reign was  compelled  to throw himself  on the 
whole nation for its support.  His charter carefully stipulates 
that his behaviour  to his tenants is to be the model  for  their 
behaviour  to their tenants.  They are to take no more than 
a just and lawful relief, and are to be content with such rights 
of wardship and marriage as suffice  for the king.  The rising, 
again, which won the charter of 121  5, was distinctly a national 
rising, and  the rights  which  were  secured  to the tenants  in 
chief  as against  the king, were  secured  as against  them  for 
their tenants.  The period  from 1066 to 121  5 we may regard 
as the age during which the feudal burdens are defined, partly 
by charters  obtained  by the king,  partly by  the practice  of 
the king's exchequer, which gradually develops into a regular 
routine ; but  many points  are unsettled,  the king will  take 
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what  he can get, his  tenants will  pay as little as possible- 
will  now  and  then  revolt.  In  Glanvill's  time,  to give  one 
example, the relief  due from  a  knight's  fee was  fixed at IOO 
shillings; for  socage land, one year's  rent.  He goes  on  to 
say that as to baronies no certain rule has been laid down, for 
baronies are relieved jtlxta  voluntatem et misericordiam domini 
regis  I. 
Let us  now  recount  the limitations which  are set in  this 
country to the development of  what  can  properly be  called 
a  feudal  system. 
(I)  First and foremost, it never becomes law that there is 
no  political  bond  between  men  save  the  bond  of  tenure. 
William  himself  seems  to have seen  the danger.  We read 
that  in  1086 he came to Salisbury, 'and there came to him 
his witan and all the landowning men that were worth aught 
from over  all  England, whosesoever  men  they were,  and all 
bowed  themselves  down  to him  and  became  his men,  and 
swore oaths of fealty  to him  that they would  be  faithful  to 
him against all other men.'  He exacted an oath of fealty not 
merely from his own  tenants, but from  all  the possessors  of 
land,  no  matter  whose  men  they  were ; they  were  to  be 
faithful to him against all other men, even against their lords. 
This became fundamental law: we have before  this seen its 
result; whenever  homage or fealty was  done to any mesne 
lord, the tenant expressly saved the faith that he owed to his 
lord the king.  The oath of allegiance we find is exacted from 
all men ; this exaction becomes part of  the regular business of 
the local courts. 
(2)  English law never recognizes that any man is bound 
to fight for  his  lord.  The sub-tenant who  holds  by military 
service is  bound  by his tenure to fight  for  the king; he is 
bound  to follow  his  lord's  banner, but  only  in  the national 
army:-he  is  in  nowise  bound  to espouse his lord's quarrels, 
least  of  all  his  quarrels with  the king.  Private war  never 
becomes  legal;  it  is  a  crime  and  a  breach  of  the  peace. 
Certainly there was a great deal of private war; certainly men 
felt it their duty to follow their lord against his enemies, even 
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against  the  king;  but  this  duty never  succeeds in  getting 
itself acknowledged as a legal duty.  If that seems to you too 
natural to be worth mentioning, you should look at the history 
of  France; there  it  was  definitely  regarded  as law  that  in 
a just  quarrel the vassal must follow his immediate lord, even 
against the king. 
(3)  Though the military tenures supply the king with an 
army, it never becomes law that those who  are not bound by 
tenure need  not  fight.  The old  national  force, officered  by 
the sheriffs, does not cease to exist.  Rufus had called it out 
for  compulsory  service;  more  than  once  it was  cal -.J out 
against  the  Scots ; in  I 181 Henry I1 reorganized  it  by  his 
Assize of  Arms; it was  reorganized  again  under  Edward  I 
by the Statute of Winchester in  1285 ; it is the militia of later 
days.  Every  man  is  bound  to  have  arms  suitable  to  his 
degree, down to the man who need but have bow and arrows. 
In this  organization  of  the common folk under royal officers, 
there  is  all  along a  counterpoise  to the  military  system  of 
feudalism, and it serves the king well.  The great families of 
the Conquest are at length pulverized between the hammer of 
the king and the anvil of the people. 
(4)  Taxation is  not  feudalized.  The king for a while is 
strong enough  to tax the nation, to tax the sub-tenants, to 
get straight at the mass of  the people, their lands and their 
goods,  without  the  intervention  of  their  lords.  When  the 
time for putting a  restraint upon  his power comes, it is only 
for  a  brief  while,  if  ever,  the  restraint  of  a  purely  feudal 
assembly of  tenants in chief.  The king deals with the smaller 
landowners in  the county court, until at last the county court 
is  represented  at Westminster by  knights of  the shire.  On 
the other hand, the king relying on the nation is strong enough 
to insist that the lords shall not tax their tenants without his 
consent. 
(5)  The  administration  of  justice  is  never  completely 
feudalized.  The old  local courts are kept alive, and are not 
feudal  assemblies.  The jurisdiction  of  the  feudal  courts  is 
strictly limited ; criminal jurisdiction  they have none save by 
express royal grant, and the kings are on the whole chary of 
making such grants.  Seldom, indeed, can any lord  exercise 
more than what on the continent would have been considered 
justice  of  a very low degree.  The two counties palatine  are 
exceptions; but  one  of  these,  Durham, is  in  the hands  of 
a bishop, and the appointment of bishops is practically in the 
king's  hands.  As to  Chester, our best  representative of  real 
feudalism; about the middle of the thirteenth century a series 
of lucky  accidents  brings  the earldom  into  the king's  own 
hands.  The king again, as we have seen, rapidly extends the 
sphere of  his own justice : before the middle of the thirteenth 
century  his  courts  have  practically  become  courts  of  first 
instan:?  for  the  whole  realm-from  Henry  11's  day  his 
itinerant justices  have been  carrying a common  law through 
the land. 
(6)  The  Curia Regis, which  is to become  the commune 
conciZiz~?n  regmi,  never  takes  very  definitely  a  feudal  shape. 
The body of tenants in chief is too large, too heterogeneous for 
that.  It is much  in  the king's  power  to summon whom  he 
will, to take the advice of  whom  he  will.  The tradition  of 
a council  of  witan is not  lost.  Only slowly does a  body of 
barons, or major  barons, separate itself  from the larger body 
of  tenants in  chief, and  it long  remains in  the king's  power 
to decide who these major barons are, who shall be summoned 
by name to his councils.  The residue of  the tenants in  chief 
is not keen  about  going to court ; gradually it is lost in  the 
body  of  freeholders.  When  the  time  for  a  representative 
parliament has  come, the smaller tenants in  chief are mixed 
with  their own  sub-vassals, and the bodies which  are repre- 
sented  by  the  knights of  the  shire  sre  the county  courts 
in which all freeholders find a place.  The model  parliament 
of  I295 follows  closely  on  the great statute of  1290 (Quia 
Emptores), which  puts  a  stop to  subinfeudation, and  vastly 
diminishes the public  importance of  tenure. 
Speaking generally then, that ideal feudalism of which we 
have spoken, an ideal which was pretty completely realized in 
France during the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries, was 
never  realized in England.  Owing to the Norman  Conquest 
one part  of  the theory was  carried out in this  country with 
consistent and unexampled  rigour; every square inch of land 
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law becomes a law of feudal tenures.  In France, in  Germany, 
allodial owners might be found : not one in England.  Also 
the burdens of  tenure were heavier here than elsewhere; the 
doctrines of  wardship and marriage  were,  I  believe,  severer 
here than in any other country in Europe.  On the other hand 
our public  law  does  not become  feudal;  in  every direction 
the force of  feudalism is limited and checked by other ideas ; 
the public rights, the public duties of the Englishman are not 
conceived  and cannot be conceived  as the mere outcome of 
feudal compacts between man and lord. 
PERIOD  11. 
PUBLIC  LAW  AT  THE  DEATH  OF HENRY  VII. 
IT may seem strange to you that I should choose the year 
1509 as our next point of  view.  Certainly it would  be more 
in  accordance with  tradition  were  we  to pause at 1399, the 
deposition  of  Richard  11,  the  accession  of  the  House  of 
Lancaster; again at 1461,  the accession of the House of York, 
and again at 1485, the accession of the House of  Tudor.  But 
for  one thing our time  is  short.  In the second  place  it is 
well to break  with  tradition  even  though  that  tradition  be 
reasonable ; we  ought to accustom  ourselves  to  review  our 
constitution from many different points of  view, and I do not 
wish to repeat exactly what is in the books that you  ought to 
read.  In the third place a moment of crisis, when, so to speak, 
our constitution is thrown out of  gear, does not seem the best 
moment at which to halt in order that we  may inquire  what 
the constitution is,-the  end  of  the four and twenty peaceful 
years during  which Henry VII governed  England seems  to 
me a  time  at which  we  may profitably  place  ourselves  in 
order to survey the  permanent  results  of  the  eventful  two 
centuries  which  have  elapsed  since the death of  Edward I. 
The internal English history  of  these  two  centuries  is  very 
largely a history of the relation between  king and parliament; 
that relation has varied  very  much  from  time to time, it has 
varied  with  the character of  the kings, the character of  the 
parliaments, it has been affected by foreign wars  and by civil 
wars; still there is a certain permanent outcome, a constitution, 
a  body  of  public  law., Our first  duty must  be  to consider 
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A.  Parliament. 
I.  Its  Constitution. 
We  find  that  the  great  precedent  of  1295  has  been 
followed, that assemblies  modelled  on  the assembly of  that 
year  have  been  constantly  holden,  that  these  have  quite 
definitely  acquired  the name of  parliaments.  Parliament  is 
still, at least in  theory, an assembly  of  the three  estates ; we 
must examine its component parts. 
(i)  The Clergy. 
In the first place  the two  archbishops and the eighteen 
bishops  are there, and as of  old  it  may  still  be  questioned 
whether they are there as holding baronies or as the heads 
of the national  church.  The number  of  abbots has sunk  to 
27;  in  I305  it  was  as  high  as  75;  but  the abbots  have 
insisted  that  unless  they hold  territorial  baronies  they  are 
not  bound  to  attend;  they  have  cared  little  for  national 
politics;  no abbot has made himself conspicuous as a states- 
man : in  I 509 their doom is at hand.  The inferior clergy are 
summoned by means of  the praemunientes  clause;  but they 
have  systematically  refrained  from  attending;  they  have 
preferred to vote  their taxes in  their convocations.  In time 
their attendance has been  required  for  the same purpose  as 
that  of  the  commons;  they  have  been  told  to  come  ad 
faciendum  et  consentie?zdum;  this  was  the  form  down  to 
1340;  gradually  it  was  supplanted  by  ad consentiendurn, 
which  in  I 377  became  the invariable  form : a  consent  to 
legislation  might  be  given  by  silence.  We know  that  the 
clerical proctors did  occasionally attend throughout the four- 
teenth century, but even when they appeared they apparently 
took but little part in the proceedings of  the parliament. 
(ii)  The Lords  Temporal. 
The lords  temporal  are now  divided  into various  ranks. 
In  I307  we  had  only to  speak  of  earls  and  barons ; but 
now  above  the  earls  there  are  marquesses  and  dukes, and 
between the earls  and barons there are viscounts.  The first 
English  dukedom  was  created  in  1337, when  Edward  I11 
gave that dignity to the king's  eldest  son ; the dukedoms  of 
Lancaster,  Clarence,  Gloucester  and  York  were  bestowed 
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upon  members of  the royal  house,  and  in  1397 Richard  I1 
gave dukedoms to some who were not members of that house. 
He also made our  first marquess,  Robert de Vere, marquess 
of  Dublin.  The title  of  viscount  was  not  given  until  the 
fifteenth century.  These titles  were imported  from  abroad. 
They were  at first used  in  order to give some nobleman a 
precedence  over  his  fellows.  They have  never  given  more 
than  this, and have  been  legally  unimportant.  They never 
implied  any territorial  power  or  jurisdiction  over  the  place 
whence  the title  was  derived.  Even  the old  title  of  earl 
though always taken from a county or county town had  long 
ceased to imply anything of  the sort.  The creation of  these 
new  dignities had, however, an  important  effect on  the usual 
mode of  creating peers.  The dukes, marquesses and so forth 
were created by patent, that is, by letters under the great seal 
definitely giving this rank to them and their  heirs.  Hitherto, 
as we have seen, barons had not been created in this way, the 
writ summoning him or his ancestors to a parliament  was  all 
that  the  baron  could  show.  In  1387 Richard  I1 created  a 
baron by patent : this example was occasionally followed, and 
from  1446 onwards was  regularly  followed.  We thus get to 
the law of our own day, that a peerage must be created in one 
of  two ways, either by writ  of  summons or  by letters patent, 
and  it  may  save  repetition  hereafter  if  we  now  trace  this 
matter  to an end. 
Since the fifteenth century a patent has been the regular 
means  of  creating  a  new  peerage: it  is  now  the means  in- 
variably  used.  Such a  patent  usually  confers  the peerage, 
barony,  earldom,  dukedom,  or  whatever  it  be  upon  a  man 
and  the heirs  male  of  his  body.  The  House  of  Lords  in 
1856 advised  the crown that a  patent which  gave no  more 
than  a  peerage  for life  would  not  entitle the grantee to be 
summoned to parliament.  A peerage created by patent must 
be  descendible,  inheritable:  at this  moment  I  can  say  no 
more, because to go further would  be  to enter the domain  of 
real property law; but you will read more of it in Sir William 
Anson's book1.  I believe that it must be admitted that as a 
matter  of  fact  ever  since  the  practice  of  creating peers  by 
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patent had been in use  no distinct precedent  could be found 
for an attempt to make a man a peer without  giving him an 
inheritable  right ; the decision  of  1856 in  the Wensleydale 
peerage case was to the effect that this practice had  begotten 
a rule  of  law.  But  secondly  I  may  claim  a  peerage  and a 
right to be summoned  on  the mere ground  that an ancestor 
of  mine, whose heir I  am, was  once summoned  and took  his 
seat.  It is  held  that a  mere  writ  of  summons  directed  to 
A.B.,  if  obeyed  by  him,  confers  on  him  a  right descendible 
to his heirs.  Whether  the kings of  the thirteenth and  four- 
teenth centuries  meant that this  should be so, may  well  be 
doubted, but  on  the whole  the  practice  of  summoning  the 
heir was regularly observed, and in the sixteenth century the 
rule  that summons and sitting gives a descendible right was 
regarded  as fixed.  A  peerage  may  descend  to a  woman, 
although in modern  times  the patent usually prevents this by 
mentioning the heirs male of  the body, or the king can confer 
a peerage  upon  a woman.  Thus a woman  may be a peeress 
in her own right.  No woman however has ever, says Dr Stubbs, 
sat in  a full and proper  parliament.  The nearest  approach 
to such a summons is that of  four abbesses who in  1306 were 
cited to a great council held to grant an  aid on the knighting 
of the Prince of  Wales. 
We have  before  referred  to the complicated  question  of 
barony by tenure.  In I 509 the problem had not yet presented 
itself  in any very definite shape.  There can be no doubt that 
it was the general impression among both lawyers  and  others 
that the right to the writ of  summons was in many cases still 
annexed  to the holding  of  certain  lands  forming  a  barony. 
Such land  baronies  however  were  so  seldom  alienated  that 
the question  had  hardly  arisen  whether  the  alienee  or  the 
alienor's  heir  would  have  the better  right  to  the summons. 
Freehold lands, we must remember, could not as yet  be given 
by will.  As lands became more easily alienable the question 
was forced to the front and the decision was that the right  to 
the summons was  not annexed  to the property  in  the land, 
and  consequently  could  not  be alienated. 
Even  when  some  definite  rules  as  to  the  right  to  a 
summons were being evolved, the number of  lords summoned 
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varied  greatly  owing  to  minorities,  attainders, extinction  of 
baronies and  similar  causes.  Under  Henry  IV the number 
never  exceeded  50,  under  Henry  V  it  only  once  reached 
40,  under  Henry  VI it  fell  as  low  as  23  and  reached  55, 
under  Edward IV 50 was  the maximum.  The Wars of  the 
Roses  thinned  the baronage,  but  not  so  much  as  is  often 
supposed ; only  29  lay  peers  were  summoned  to  the  first 
parliament  of  Henry VII, but  in  a  few  years  the number 
again reached 40, though only five new peerages were created. 
It is  well  to remember  this, for  we  are too apt to think of 
the  House  of  Lords  as  an  assembly  of  hereditary  nobles. 
Throughout the Middle Ages the spiritual and non-hereditary 
peers  must  often  have  been  in  a  majority; even  when  the 
number  of  abbots had  sunk  to 27  they, with  the two  arch- 
bishops  and  28  bishops,  could  frequently  have  voted  down 
the whole  lay peerage. 
We have been using the terms peers and peerage.  These 
terms  but  gradually  came  into  use  during  the  fourteenth 
century.  Originally of  course pares only  meant equals.  A 
new  significance is  given  to the term  by  a  principle deeply 
imbedded  in  our  old  law,  namely,  that  a  man  who  is  to 
be  judged,  must  be  judged  by  those  who  are at least  his 
equals-the  free man  is  not  to be judged  by  villeins.  Thus 
in  Leg. Hen.  Prim. 31 5  7,  Unusquispue per pares suos  est 
jz~dicandusl. So in feudal courts the vassal is not to be judged 
by sub-vassals.  Thus a man'spares came to mean those who, 
standing on the same level with him, are competent to be  his 
judges-the  body  of  judges  is the pares curiae, the body  of 
peers which sits in the court in question.  This principle, as we 
all know, is solen~nly  sanctioned by Magna Carta: the free man 
is not to be arrested nor imprisoned, disseised of his freehold, 
nor  in  any wise  destroyed :  tzisi per Zegale judicium parztlm 
suorz~m  71eZ  per legem  terrae2.  These words  are  apparently 
borrowed from the constitutions of German emperors.  Do not 
be  persuaded  that they  have  reference  to trial  by jury; the 
verdkt  of  a  jury,  the  testimony  of  a  body  of  neighbour 
Select  Cha;-ters,  p. roo. 
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witnesses, was  in  no  sense a jzbdiczu7rz.  The demand  is  of 
a  quite  different  kind;  the  barons  want  a  court  of  their 
equals-they  are to be judged  by  barons.  Theoretically  the 
curia Regis had  probably  been  such  a  court; practically  it 
had  become  something very different, a  tribunal  constituted 
by a few royal  servants, some  at least  of  whom were  not of 
baronial rank, but were mere clerks and professional  lawyers. 
The struggle of the barons for ajzfdiciz~m  parizt~n  is a long one; 
it can be traced through the thirteenth century and in  the end 
it  is  not  very  successful ; against  it  the  king  opposes  the 
assertion  that  his justices  are  good  enough  judges  for  any 
man.  Ultimately it succeeds  thus far, that  the lords  get a 
right to trial by lords  in  case  of  treason  and felony ; that is 
all; if  they  are  to  be  tried  for  any  lesser  crime, any mis- 
demeanour, the king's  justices  shall  try them, and  all  their 
civil litigation  comes  before the king's  justices.  Even as to 
treason  and  felony  the demand  seems  to have  been  often 
disregarded.  The  modern  principle  that  I  have  just  laid 
down  is  in  truth a  compromise-only  in  case  of  treason  or 
felony  has  the peer  any  privilege.  It seems  to  have  been 
settled in the course of  the fourteenth century.  It required a 
statute of  1422 to secure the same privilege  for noblewomen. 
Further, it should be observed that even  in case of  felony or 
treason  there  is  a  distinction-the  peer  accused  of  such  a 
crime  was  tried  by  his  peers  in  parliament,  if  parliament 
were then  sitting, and the assembled  lords are in such a case 
judges  of  both  fact  and  law; but  if  parliament  were  not 
sitting, he was tried by  a select  body  of  peers  chosen by the 
Lord High Steward, in what came to be called a Court of the 
Lord High Steward.  The steward's office had at an early time 
become  hereditary  in  the  house  of  Leicester;  it  fell  in  to 
Henry IV and was merged  in  the royal  dignity; thenceforth 
if  a  steward  was  wanted  for  the  trial  of  a  peen  he  was 
appointed  for the occasion by  the king ; he  chose  a  small 
body of  lords, seemingly  23 was the usual  number.  In such 
a  case  the lords  thus  summoned  were  considered  only  as 
judges of fact, the Lord High Steward laid down the law.  Not 
until after the Revolution of  1688 was it made necessary that 
all peers  should  be  summoned to form  the  High  Steward's 
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court,  and  then  only  in  case  of  treason.  It will  probably 
strike you  that  the  privilege  of  being  tried  by  some  lord 
nominated for the purpose by the king and a  small selection 
of peers nominated by  this royal nominee  cannot have been 
a  particularly  valuable  privilege,  but  this  is  all  that  the 
baronage  got with  all  its  strivingsl. 
This privilege, however, served  to define a class of  peers 
or pares.  It was  not  the only  privilege  of  peerage.  The 
peer enjoyed  a certain  freedom  from  arrest, he could not be 
arrested and imprisoned for debt, though he might be arrested 
and  imprisoned  upon  a  charge of  felony  or  treason.  It is 
well to observe how few were the privileges of  peerage : how 
little of  a caste was  our estate of  lords temporal.  It became 
the fashion late in the day to talk of  noble blood, of  a man's 
blood  being  ennobled  when  he  was  called  to  parliament. 
But  this  is  nonsense  unless  it  be  held  that  the  ancestor's 
blood  flows only  to his  heir,  and unless the heir only begins 
to have his ancestor's  blood  in  his veins when  that ancestor 
dies.  The sons and daughters  of  lords  have  from  the first 
been  commoners  during  their  father's  lifetime,  and  on  his 
death  only his  heir  becomes entitled  to any  legal privileges. 
Whatever social pre-eminence the families of  peers may have, 
has  no basis  in  our law:  we  have never  had  a noblesse.  It 
has been asserted that bishops  are not entitled  to demand a 
trial by  the House of  Lords, on the ground that their  blood 
is not noble.  The House of  Lords asserted this in  1692, and 
it  is a very  doubtful question  what  would  now  happen  if  a 
bishop committed felony or treason ; but  as a  matter of  fact, 
so soon as the word  'peers' came into use, the bishops were 
regularly  recognized  as peers  of  the land, and  it  is  in  the 
case of  Archbishop Stratford in  I341 that we  find the earliest 
definite formulation of  the principle that peers  are to be tried 
in parliament. 
It is well  to remember that during the Middle  Ages the 
king had  considerable powers over  the constitution  of  what 
For further light on  this subject see L. 0. Pike,  Conshtutional History of 
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had  come to be  the upper  House of  Parliament.  As to the 
lay peerage, even though usage hardening into law may have 
obliged  him  to summon the heir  of  the late baron,  he  had 
a power, to which the law set no limit, of  creating new  peers. 
This  power  was  not,  I  think,  very  freely  exercised;  the 
advantage of  a picked  House of  Lords was counterbalanced 
by the danger of  creating new  noble houses which  would  be 
dangerous  to their  creator.  Over  the spiritual  part  of  the 
peerage the royal power  was at least as great.  The manner 
in  which  bishops  were  made  had  a  long  and  complicated 
history.  Theoretically the bishop ought  to have been elected 
by  the cathedral  chapters; the Great  Charter  promised  that 
such elections should be free ; practically, however, the making 
of  a new bishop was  an affair for  the king and the pope;  if 
they worked together they had their way; when they quarrelled 
sometimes  one, sometimes the other, was  successful.  When 
a see fell vacant the king sent the chapter his  licence to elect 
(co~zgk  d'kire),  accompanied  by  a  letter  (letters  recommen- 
datory) nominating the person who was to be elected.  Under 
Henry VI,  a weak and pious king, the pope had his own way; 
he provided bishops, though such provisions were contrary to 
English  Acts  of  Parliament.  Under  Henry  VII the royal 
nominees  were  invariably  chosen.  As  to  the  abbots  they 
were elected  by the monks, and  neither  king nor  pope often 
interfered with the election.  As already said, the abbots play 
no distinguished part in  parliament or politics. 
(iii)  The  Commons. 
First  let  us  consider  the  knights of  the  shire.  There 
are 37  counties  returning two members  apiece;  Chester and 
Durham  are not yet  represented.  We have  seen  that from 
the  first  the  representatives were  to  be  elected  in  the  full 
county  court.  As to the mode of  election  during the four- 
teenth  century  we  know  little  more  than  this;  though  we 
may  gather  from  complaints  of  the  commons  that  often 
enough  the influence  of  the sheriff was  all-powerful.  It is 
but  gradually  that  the  counties  appreciate  the  privilege 
of being  represented,  or  that  the  duty  of  representing  the 
county is regarded  as an honour.  In  1406 (7 Hen. IV, c.  I 5) 
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a statute directs  that the election  shall be made in  the first 
county  court holden  after the receipt of  the writ ;  it is to be 
made in  full county court.  In 1410 (11 Hen. IV, c.  I) the 
conduct  of  elections  is  placed  under  the cognizance  of  the 
justices of  assize, and a penalty of  AIOO  is demanded against 
a sheriff who makes an undue return.  In 1413 (I Hen. V, c. I) 
residence  within  the  counties  is  made  a  qualification  both 
for  the electors  and the elected.  From  1430 we  have  the 
important  act (8 Hen. VI, c. 7) which  regulated  the county 
franchise for the next four centuries:-the  electors are to be 
persons resident in  the county, each of  whom  shall have free- 
hold to the value of 40 shillings per annum at the least above 
all charges.  The act complains  that elections  have of  late 
been  made by 'very great, outrageous, and excessive number 
of  people, of  which most part was people  of  small substance 
and of  no  value, whereof  every  of  them  pretended  a  voice 
equivalent as to such election  with the most  worthy  knights 
and esquires.'  To start with, this must have been what would 
in  our  eyes  be a  fairly high  qualification:  the great change 
in  the value  of  money caused  by the discovery  of  silver in 
America  rendered  it  in  course  of  time  very  low  and  very 
capricious;  the forty shilling freeholder  had  a vote, the copy- 
holder, the leaseholder, had none, no matter how valuable his 
land  might  be.  In  I432  another  statute explains that the 
qualifying  freehold  must be situate within  the county.  The 
king  at various  times  exercised  a power  of  inserting clauses 
in  the  writs  directed  to the  sheriff  specifying  the sort  of 
persons  who were  to be chosen-generally  they  were to be 
two  knights girt with  swords ; this order, however, seems to 
have been  pretty generally disobeyed, many  of  the so-called 
knights  of  the  shire  were  not  knights-in  1445  it  is  con- 
sidered sufficient  that they should be  knights of  the shire or 
notable  squires,  gentlemen  of  birth,  capable  of  becoming 
knights; no  man  of  the degree of  yeoman  or below it is  to 
be elected. 
The number  of  knights of  the shire was, we  have  seen, 
constant, that of the citizens and burgesses fluctuated, diminish- 
ing pretty steadily as time went on.  For the maximum number 
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when  166  was reached; during the first half  of  the fifteenth 
century it had fallen to 99.  After  1445  it begins to increase 
a little, Henry VI added 8 new boroughs, Edward  IV added 
or restored  5.  It should be remarked that during the Middle 
Ages no writ was sent to the boroughs-the  writ went to the 
sheriff of  the county, commanding him  to return two knights 
from  his  shire, two  citizens  from  every  city, two  burgesses 
from every borough.  It was  much in  his power therefore to 
decide what  towns  should  be represented.  The towns  very 
often desired not to be represented.  According to the regular 
practice a borough was taxed at a heavier rate than the shire 
-thus  when  a fifteenth  was  laid on the counties, a tenth was 
laid  on  the boroughs ;  also  if a  borough  sent  burgesses  to 
parliament  it  had  to pay  their wages.  In  one  case, that of 
Torrington, in  I 368, we find a borough successfully petitioning 
the  king  that  it may  not  be  compelled  to send  members. 
It is  very  probable  that  other  boroughs  effected  the  same 
object  by  negotiations  with  the  sheriff.  A  statute of  1382 
(5 Ric. 11, c. 4) denounces a punishment  against the sheriff if 
he  omits  boroughs  which  have  heretofore  sent  members. 
During the fifteenth century the privilege of being represented 
seems to have been a little more highly prized.  We find the 
king conferring the right to send members upon new boroughs, 
or restoring  it  to boroughs  which  have been  represented  in 
former  times.  This power  made  it  possible  for the king to 
pack the House of  Commons ; but we do not find it liberally 
exercised  until  the  reign  of  Mary.  The  first  House  of 
Commons  of  Henry  VIII  consisted  of  298  members-74 
members for the shires, 224 for the cities and boroughs.  The 
number of borough members had largely exceeded that of the 
knights of  the shire, nevertheless through the Middle Ages it 
is  the  knights  of  the  shire  who  are  the  most  active  and 
independent  element  in  the  parliament ; every  movement 
proceeds  from  them-to  them  it  is  due that  the House  of 
Commons takes its place beside the House of Lords. 
As  to the  qualification  of  electors  in  the boroughs, we 
have seen  that from the first it  had  varied  from  borough  to 
borough.  Lapse of  time had  done nothing to make it more 
uniform;  quite the  reverse, no  general  law  was  made  and 
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each borough was left to work out its own destiny by the aid 
of  charters  purchased  from  the  king.  The  only  general 
principle  that  can  be  laid  down  is  this, that  the later  the 
charter the more oligarchic is the constitution of the borough. 
A  few  towns  acquired  the right of  being  counties of  them- 
selves, of  having their  own  sheriffs, and being  exempt from 
the powers of the sheriff of  the surrounding county.  London 
had  acquired  this  privilege  under  Henry  I-no  other town 
succeeded  in getting it until Bristol became a county in  1373. 
York followed in  1396 and then Newcastle, Norwich, Lincoln, 
Hull, Southampton, Nottingham, Coventry, Canterbury.  In 
such cases the writs were sent to the sheriffs of  these counties 
corporate and in  some of  thein  the county qualification, the 
forty shilling freehold, was adopted as the qualification for the 
electors.  In other boroughs the qualification varies between 
a wide democracy and the narrowest oligarchy. 
Long ago parliament  had  taken the shape familiar to us, 
an assembly consisting of  two houses which  sit, debate, and 
vote  apart-the  one containing the lords, spiritual and tem- 
poral, the other all the representatives of  the commons.  How 
high  this separation  can be  traced  has been  disputed; there 
is no doubt  that we  can  carry it  back  to the middle  of  the 
fourteenth  century:-as  regards  the  preceding  half  century 
there  is  some  doubt,  but  Stubbs holds  that very  probably 
from the very first moment  the lords and commons sat apart. 
In the later Middle Ages they certainly sat in separate build- 
ings, the lords in the Parliament Chamber of the king's palace, 
the commons generally in the Chapter House or the Refectory 
of  the  Abbey  of  Westminster.  Westminster had  long ago 
become the usual seat of  parliament, though during the four- 
teenth and fifteenth centuries there were a not  inconsiderable 
number of  sessions at York and other towns ; it was  for the 
king to decide when  and whether he would  summon a parlia- 
ment.  It is  a  noticeable  fact  that  at  a  very  early  time, 
perhaps  from the very beginning, the citizens and burgesses 
sit together  with  the  knights;  there  seems  certainly  for  a 
long while a feeling that as it  is for the barons to tax them- 
selves, and for the clergy to tax themselves, so the boroughs 
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the shire ; and as a matter of  fact the boroughs and counties 
are usually  taxed  at different  rates-a  10th is  imposed  on 
boroughs, a  I 5th on counties : nevertheless we soon find that 
the two sets of representatives act together-they  are regarded 
as representing but one estate of  men, the commons  of  the 
realm. 
The members of the common's house were paid wages by 
their  constituents ;  the  knights  of  the  shire  received  four 
shillings a day, the burgesses  two shillings ; in  I427 we find 
the townsmen of  Cambridge making an agreement with their 
members to take one shilling. 
It is  worth looking at the words of  the writs  whereby  a 
parliament  is  summoned ; they  bring  out the fact that  the 
two houses  had  not  originally been  co-ordinate  assemblies; 
a lord is told  that the king intends to hold a parliament at a 
certain  place  and  time,  et  ibidem  vobiscz~m et  cum  ceteris 
prelatis, magnutibus, et proceribus regni nostri colloquiz~m  habere 
et tractatzrm ; he is  then  enjoined, in fide et ligeancia  quibzrs 
nobis tenemini, if  he be a  temporal  lord, in $de  et ddectiorze, 
if  a  spiritual  lord  to be present cum pyaelatis, ~nagnatibus,  et 
proceribus praedictis superpraedictis negotiis tractatzui, vestrum- 
que  consilizrm  imnpenszbri.  A  writ  to a  judge  or to another 
councillor who is not a peer omits the word  ceteris-he  is  not 
one of  the magnates  or proceres  of  the  kingdom,  and  the 
opinion is  growing, as we  have  before  said, that he had no 
vote, and indeed no voice in  debate, but is simply to give his 
advice if  that is  wanted.  But the function  of  the  lords  as 
distinguished  from  that of  the  commons is  marked  by the 
words tractaturi vestrumpue comzsiliz~m  impensari ; they are to 
treat with the king and give their counsel.  The writ  to the 
sheriff  recites the king's  intention of  treating with the lords, 
theprelati, magnates, and proceres, and then directs the election 
of  knights, citizens and burgesses who  are to have power  on 
behalf  of  their  constituencies,  county,  cities,  boroughs,  to 
consent  to  and  to  do  what  may  be  determined  by  the 
common counsel of  the kingdom-ad  faciendzrm  et consentien- 
dum  hiis  quae  tunc  ibidem  de communi  consilio regni nostri 
favente  domino  ordinari  contigerit  super  negotiis  antedictis. 
They are not to treat with  the king; it is  not their counsel 
that  the king  wants,  it is  their consent-an  active consent 
which  shall be extended to doing (ad  faciendum)  what shall 
be  determined by the common  counsel of the kingdom.  As 
to the clergy,  we  have already seen  that  from  the  time of 
Richard  I1 onwards  the word  faciendum  drops out of  the 
praemunientes  clause-they  will  not  come  to parliament- 
their absence will be consent enough. 
I I.  Frepz~ency  and  Duration of  Parliament. 
Such then  is  a  parliament :-but  how  far  is it necessary 
that there should be parliaments, and have parliaments been 
frequently and  regularly  holden?  The question  of  law  is 
intimately connected with the question of fact.  Starting with 
the assembly of  1295 parliaments soon become very frequent. 
Already in  131  I  one  of  the  ordinances  decreed  that  there 
should be a parliament twice in every year; but this was part 
of  a  baronial scheme and  it may be doubted whether more 
than an assembly of  barons  was  desired ; but when  in  I322 
Edward  I1 had  succeeded  in  casting  off  the yoke  of  the 
baronial ordainers, the ordinances were  repealed  on the plea 
that  the  consent  of  the  estates  had  not  been  given.  The 
parliament  of  that year, 1322, published  the following note- 
worthy  declaration, the first declaration  we  may say of  the 
supremacy  of a  full  representative parliament-'  the matters 
which are to be established  for the estate of  our lord the king 
and of  his heirs, and for  the estate of  the realm  and of  the 
people shall be treated, accorded and established in parliament 
by our lord the king and by the consent of the prelates, earls 
and  barons, and the commonalty of  the realm, according as 
hath been heretofore accustomed.'  In I 330 at the beginning 
of  the new  reign  we  have  a  statute for  annual parliaments 
(4 Edw. 111, c.  14).  It is accorded that a parliament shall be 
holden in  every year, or more often if  need be.  There can, I 
think, be little doubt that these words require that there shall 
be a parliament at least in every year-if  need  be parliament 
may be held  more often, but at least once a year it must be 
holden.  The slight ambiguity of the phrase should be noticed 
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another  statute ordains  that 'a parliament  shall  be  holden 
every year, as another time was ordained by statute.'  These 
provisions  were  fairly  well  kept for a long while; but there 
were  no  parliaments  in  1364, 1367,  1370, between  1373-6, 
1387, 1389, 1392,  1396, or between  1407-10.  On the other 
hand  in  a  considerable  number  of  years  there  were  two 
parliaments, in  I340 there were three, in  1328 four.  Each of 
these parliaments, you  should  understand, was  a new  parlia- 
ment, involving a new  election.  The time was not yet when 
the same parliament  would  be  kept alive year after year by 
means  of  prorogations.  The  frequency  of  parliaments,  if 
theoretically  secured  by  the  statutes  just  mentioned,  was 
practically  secured  by  the king's  need  of  money.  He was 
coming to be very  dependent on supplies granted  to him by 
parliament, and seldom  was  a tax imposed  for  more  than  a 
single year.  Under Edward  IV, however, parliaments  grow 
much less frequent ; in his reign of  twenty-two years he held 
but  six; five years passed without  any parliament.  A  con- 
siderable revenue  from the customs duties linown as tonnage 
and poundage had been  granted  to Henry V for his life ; this 
grant  was  repeated  in  the  reign  of  Henry  VI  and  of' 
Edward  IV;  Edward  also  had  other  means  of  getting 
money, of  which hereafter.  Henry VII seems to have meant 
to rule  like  his  Lancastrian  ancestors  by  means  of  con- 
stant parliaments; before 1498 he had  held  six parliaments ; 
thenceforward  to  the  end  of  his  reign  there  was  but  one 
session, namely  in  1504.  The statutes of  Edward  111, how- 
ever,  remained  on  the  statute  book,  and  very  important 
they became  at a future time.  I am not sure, however, that 
Edward IV and Henry VII were considered  by their contem- 
poraries to be breaking the law in not holding annual sessions, 
however illegal  might  be the means which  enabled  them  to 
get  on  without  parliament.  From  our  present  standpoint 
then  we  see  that  the  letter  of  the  statute  book  probably 
requires annual parliaments ; we  see, however, what  is  more 
important than this, that for the last two centuries parliaments 
have,  as a  matter  of  fact, been  very  frequent, though  their 
frequency has  somewhat decreased  of  late years. 
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I I I.  Business of Parliament. 
And  now  for  what  purposes  were  parliaments  neces- 
sary?  It is with no  general statement of  the sovereignty (in 
the modern  sense)  of  the body  composed  by  the king,  the 
lords and the representatives  of  the commons, that we  must 
begin  our  answer.  Such a  theory there cannot be,  at least 
to any good  purpose, until a foundation  of  fact has been laid 
for  it,  until  the  body  thus  composed  has  habitually  and 
exclusively exercised  the  powers  of  sovereignty.  We have 
to  see how  this foundation  of  fact  was  gradually laid, and 
we  have to remember that at the beginning of  the fourteenth 
century the king in  parliament  was  by  no  means  the only 
possible claimant of  sovereign power.  Representatives of the 
commons had  but newly been called to meet the prelates and 
barons.  Looking back  now it may seem to us quite possible 
that sovereignty will  ultimately  be  found  to be  in  the king 
and the baronage, or in the king and his council, or again in 
the king alone. 
(i)  The  field of work in which the cooperation of a parlia- 
ment seems most  necessary is that of  taxation.  In I297 the 
principle has been enounced that the common  consent of  the 
realm  is  necessary to the imposition of  aids, prises, custon~s: 
saving  the  king's  right  to  the  ancient  aids,  prises  and 
customs.  The  highroad  of  direct  taxation  is  thus  barred 
against the king, though at least  one bypath  is  open.  The 
right to tallage the demesne has not been surrendered, and in 
1304  Edward  I  exercised  that  right.  Edward  I1  did  the 
same in 1312, and so did  Edward  I11 in 1332.  But on this 
occasion parliament  remonstrated  and the king had  to give 
up his  project.  This seems  the last  attempt  on  the king's 
part to set a tallage.  In I340 (14 Edw.  111, stat. 2, c.  I) a 
statute was  obtained which declares that the people shall be 
no more charged or grieved  to make any aid or sustain any 
charge, if it be not by the common consent of the prelates, earls, 
barons and other great men  and commons of  the realm and 
that in the parliament.  Just at this time too the scutage, the 
composition  for  military  service, was  becoming  unprofitable 
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Aids for knighting the king's  son and marrying his daughter 
could still be collected ; but the amount of these was fixed by 
statute in  1350, expressly applying to the king the rule  laid 
down  for  other  lords  (1275),  namely  20 shillings from  the 
knight's  fee, and 20  shillings  from A20 worth of  socage land. 
These were an insignificant resource.  On the whole, therefore, 
before the middle  of  the fourteenth century it was definitely 
illegal for the king to impose a direct tax without the consent 
of parliament. 
The history  of  indirect  taxation  is  more  complicated. 
However,  customs  on  wool,  wine  and  general  merchandise 
were levied  in  the twelfth  century.  Magna  Carta says that 
merchants  are  to  be  free  from  any  'maletolt'  or  unjust 
exaction,  saving the  ancient  and  right  customs  which  are 
referred  to as well known things.  In I275 parliament grants 
to Edward a certain definite custom  on wool ; but during the 
reigns of the first two Edwards the regulation  of  the customs 
is still constantly in dispute between the king and the nation. 
There is  considerable danger that the king will get his way; 
it takes some little reflection  to see that indirect  taxes, such 
as  customs  duties,  are  taxes  at all :-if  the king  can  by 
negotiation, by grants of privileges, induce the merchants  to  , 
grant him  such dues, may he not do so-is  not this a matter 
between them and him ?  The commons however seem early 
to have  seen  to the bottom  of  this question.  Edward  I11 
had  to make important  concessions.  In  1362 (36 Edw. 111, 
stat.  I,  cap.  I I) it  is  provided  that  no  subsidy  or  other 
charge  should  be  set  upon  wool  by  the  merchants  or  by 
any  one  else  without  the  assent  of  parliament.  In  1371 
(45 Edw. 111, c. 4) no imposition or charge shall  be set upon 
wools, woolfells  or  leather, without  the assent of  parliament. 
This was re-enacted in  1387  (I  I Ric. 11, c. g)  but with a saving 
of  the king's ancient right.  The legislation on this subject of 
indirect  taxation  is  not  quite so  emphatically clear  as that 
which  forbad  direct  imposts-some  loopholes were left-still 
we may say that before the end of  the fourteenth century the 
contest was at an end.  There were at least no obvious ways 
in which the king could  tax the community without breaking 
the  law.  The  Lancastrian  kings  seem  to  have  admitted 
this.  Even  Edward  IV may  be  said  to have admitted  it; 
in  his  reign  it  is  that  we  begin  to hear  of  benevolences, 
extorted freewill offerings.  A statute of  the only parliament 
of  Richard  I11  (1483, I  Richard  111, c.  2)  was  designed  to 
stop this gap.  The commons complain of  new and unlawful 
inventions--of  a  new  imposition  called  a benevolence-and 
it is ordained  that the subjects be in  nowise charged  by an 
imposition  called  a benevolence or any such like charge, and 
that such exactions shall be no example, but shall be damned 
and annulled for ever. 
Under the Tudors the danger is of a different kind-it  is 
not  so  much  that  the king will  tax without  parliamentary 
consent, but that parliament will consent to just whatever the 
king wants and will  condone his illegal acts.  Thus in  1491 
Henry VII had recourse to a benevolence which brought him 
in  a large  sum.  Very  possibly  the act of  Richard  I11 was 
considered  null  as  being  the  act  of  a  usurper,  though  it 
remained  upon the statute book.  Rut at any rate the parlia- 
ment  of  1495 made  this  benevolence  lawful  ex  Post fncto; 
the king was  empowered  by statute to enforce the promises 
of  those who had promised money but not yet paid it.  Such 
an  act, extremely dangerous as it was  to the liberties of  the 
nation, was  none  the less  a  high  exercise  of  parliamentary 
sovereignty-parliament  undertook  to make legal  what had 
been illegal.  That is one peculiarity of the Tudor time and a 
very remarkable one ; parliaments  are so pliant  to the king's 
will  that the king is very willing to acquiesce in every claim 
that parliament may make to be part  of  the sovereign  body 
of  the realm.  All  the statutes against taxation  by virtue of 
prerogative are left unrepealed upon the statute book, to bear 
fruit in a future age-at  present  the king has no need to wish 
them repealed. 
But  not  only  had  parliament  repeatedly  asserted  that 
taxes were not to be imposed without its consent, it had  also 
exercised  to the full a power of  imposing taxes of  all kinds, 
both  direct  and indirect.  Further as  regards  taxation, the 
House  of  Commons  had  won  a  peculiar  importance.  We 
have to remember that, to start with, there are in theory three 
estates of  the realm : (I)  clergy, (2) lords, and (3) commons. Constitutional History 
On this theory it would be reasonable that each estate should 
tax itself;  and  this  for  some time  takes place-the  clergy 
make a grant, the lords another, the commons  another.  But 
before  the  end  of  the  fourteenth  century  the  lords  and 
commons join  in  a grant, and a formula  is used which  puts 
the commons (upon whom the bulk of taxation falls) into the 
foreground-the  grant  is  made  by  the  commons  with  the 
assent of the lords spiritual and temporal.  This form appears 
in  1395 and becomes the rule.  In  1407 Henry IV assented 
to the principle  that money grants are to be  initiated  in the 
House of  Commons, are not to be reported to the king until 
both Houses are agreed, and are to be reported by the Speaker 
of  the  Lower  House.  Thus a  long  step has  already been 
made towards that exclusive control over taxation which the 
House of  Commons  claimed  in  later  ages-the  taxes upon 
the laity are granted  by the commons with  the lords' assent. 
On  the  laity-the  clergy  still tax themselves  in  their  con- 
vocations and no act of  the parliament  is as yet requisite to 
give validity to such a tax ; to this extent the theory of  the 
three estates still prevails ; as a matter  of  fact, however, the 
convocations  pretty  regularly  follow  the  example  of  the 
commons, making  a  corresponding  grant  to that which the 
commons have made. 
Another  point  of  importance  is  this,  that  during  the 
Middle Ages permanent taxes are very seldom imposed.  In 
general a tax is granted just  for this occasion only : the king 
is granted  a tenth of  movables, or a customs duty, or it may 
be  a  poll  tax just  to  meet  the  present  demands upon  his 
resources.  Sometimes  taxes  are granted for  two  or  three 
years to come, but this is rare.  This renders an annual parlia- 
ment  a  practical  necessity,  particularly  after  the  long war 
with  France  has  begun:  every  year  now  the  king  wants 
money, and can only get it by summoning a parliament.  His 
non-parliamentary  revenue  which  comes  from  his  demesne 
lands, his  feudal  rights and  so forth, is  quite  insufficient to 
meet  the drain of  a war.  Some of  the customs duties were 
permanent  taxes.  In 1414 parliament  granted to  Henry V 
tonnage and poundage for his  life.  No similar grant for life 
was made to Henry VI until 1453-the  3Ist year of  his reign 
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-but  they were  granted  for  life to Edward  IV in  1465, to 
Richard  I11 in  1484, and  to Henry VII by  his first  parlia- 
ment.  Such  repeated  grants  of  permanent  taxes  were 
dangerous precedents, as we  find when we  come to the reign 
of  CharIes I. 
Henry  VII,  it  is  said,  left  behind  him  a  treasure  of 
£I,~OO,OOO.  Edward  IV also  had  been  rich.  Their prede- 
cessors  had  been  habitually  poor.  The Wars of  the Roses 
were in  a great degree due to the poverty of  Henry VI-he 
could  not  afford  to  govern  the  country  thoroughly.  This 
change  in  the king's  financial  circumstances  is  of  course a 
very important matter-it  absolves him from the necessity of 
convoking parliament.  In two-and-twenty years Edward IV 
held but six parliaments;  Henry VII held  but seven  parlia- 
ments during his 24 years.  Whence did  he get his treasure? 
To a  large  extent  it  would  seem  from  the  escheats  and 
forfeitures  consequent on the Wars of  the Roses ; to a  large 
extent also by pressing to their uttermost  the crown's  claims 
for  fines.  It was  believed  that  his  ministers,  Empson  and 
Dudley, had  trumped  up  all  manner  of  accusations  for  the 
purpose  of  swelling  the revenue,  and  were  guilty  of  unjust 
exactions under  colour  of  the feudal  rights to reliefs, ward- 
ships and marriage.  At the beginning of the next reign they 
were sacrificed to the popular outcry. 
One of  the burdens which has lain heavy on  the mass of 
the people  has been  that of  purveyance and preemption, the 
right of  the king and his  servants to buy provisions  at the 
lowest  rate, to compel the owners to sell, and to pay at their 
own  time-which  often  enough  meant  never.  It was  an 
admitted royal  right;  over  and  over  again  parliament  had 
sought by statute to bring it within  reasonable bounds and to 
prevent  abuses  of  it.  Legislation  begins with  Magna Carta 
and goes on through the Middle Ages ; one sees in such legis- 
lation at once the admitted claim of  parliament  to set limits 
to royal rights, and on the other hand  the extreme difficulty 
that there  is  in  getting  the king to observe any laws which 
make against his pecuniary interests. 
In another direction parliament has interfered with finance. 
In the first place it has claimed the power  to appropriate the Constitutio?zal History 
supplies granted to the king, to say that they  shall be  spent 
in this or that manner.  Already in  1348 the money is  to be 
applied  to  the  defence  against  the  Scots,  in  1353  to  the 
prosecution  of  the  war.  In  1390  there is  more  elaborate 
appropriation out of  the 40 shillings laid on the sack of  wool, 
10 shillings  the king  may  have  for his  present  needs, while 
the other 30 shillings are only to be expended in case of  the 
continuance of the war.  This practice is  continued with  in- 
creasing elaboration  under  the Lancastrian  kings.  Rut  it is 
one thing to say that money shall only be spent in this way, 
another to prevent its being spent in other ways.  Parliament 
begins  to demand the production  of  the royal accounts; we 
hear  of  this  in  I340  and  1341.  In  1377 two  persons  are 
appointed by  parliament  to receive  and expend  the money 
voted  for  the war.  In 1379 the king presented his accounts, 
and thenceforward  treasurers  of  the subsidies were  regularly 
appointed  in  parliament  to account  to the next parliament. 
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In  1406  the  commons  were  allowed  to  choose  auditors; 
Henry IV told them that 'kings do not render accounts,' but 
in  the next year he rendered  them.  But the principle had 
to be contested over and over again ; it was a principle of  no 
value unless parliament  had a will  of  its own which it would 
exert year  by year-this  the parliaments  of  Edward IV and 
Henry VII had not. 
(ii)  We turn from finance to the wider subject of  legisla- 
tion.  First  let us  observe, what  is  of  great importance, the 
legislative  formula  of  a statute.  In the reign of  Henry VII 
it has  come  to be  almost  exactly what  it  is  at the present 
moment.  'The king our sovereign  Lord  Henry VII at his 
Parliament  holden  at  Westminster ...  by  the  assent  of  the 
Lords  spiritual  and  temporal  and the commons in  the said 
parliament  assembled  and  by  the  authority  of  the  same 
parliament  hath done to be  made certain statutes and ordi- 
nances in  manner and form following.'  It is  the king's  act, 
done with  the assent (sometimes the form  runs  'advice and 
assent') of the lords  spiritual and temporal and commons  in 
parliament assembled and by the authority of  the said parlia- 
ment.  These last words are pretty new, '  by the authority of 
the same parliament' ; they occur, it is said, for the first time 
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as a part of  the preamble  in  1433, although they occur in  a 
more casual way  as early as  1421.  It is admitted therefore 
that a statute derives its authority from the whole parliament. 
Also we  observe that the commons now stand on  the same 
footing as the lords ; their  function  in  legislative work  is  of 
the same kind-they  give advice, assent and authority.  But 
this  form  has not always been  used.  Throughout the four- 
teenth  century  the  commoners  generally  appear  in  a  sub- 
ordinate position-the  statute is  made by the king with  the 
assent of the prelates, earls and barons, and at the request of 
the knights of  the shire and commons in the said parliament : 
sometimes  it  is  at the instance and special  request  of  the 
commons-occasionally  the assent  of  the con~mons  is men- 
tioned.  This becomes more common in the fifteenth century ; 
in  1435 and  1436 we  have 'by the advice and  assent of  the 
lords  at the special  request  of  the commons ' ; in  1439 '  by 
the advice and assent of lords and commons '  ; and this form 
is  used  for  several years.  But in  1450 we  revert to 'advice 
and assent of lords and request of commons '-we  get the one 
form  in  1455, the other in  1460.  Throughout the reign  of 
Edward IV the two are promiscuously used.  It is not until 
the House of  Tudor is  on  the throne and the Middle Ages 
are at an  end  that all trace of  the original  position  of  the 
commons  has  vanished.  Nevertheless  it  had  long  been 
admitted  that the assent  of  the commons was  necessary  in 
order to give  to a  legislative act the quality of  a  statute- 
that  this was  necessary at least  if  the law was  to deal with 
temporal affairs. 
Let us  first  take the  point  raised  by  these  last  words. 
We have  to  remember  that at starting the commons could 
hardly claim any higher place than that of  the clergy, and we 
must remember that the theory of the time partitioned human 
affairs into two provinces-spiritual  and temporal.  It must 
long  have  remained  a  doubtful  question  whether  the  king, 
with the advice of  the lords, co.uld not make a statute on the 
petition  of  the clergy, just  as well  as on  the petition of  the 
commons-if  the statute deals with the state the voice of  the 
commons  must be heard, if  with  the church  the voice  of  the 
clergy.  Practically the clergy solved the difficulty by neglect- Statute and Ordi~ance 
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ing to accept the place that was offered them  in the national 
assembly; but there are not wanting some signs that in  the 
fourteenth  century the accepted  theory allowed  the king  to 
make a statute with the assent of  the lords on a petition of the 
clergy without consulting the commons.  In 1377, however, the 
commons definitely demanded  that neither  statute nor ordi- 
nance should  be  made on  the petition of  the clergy without 
the  consent  of  the  commons:  this  demand  seems  to  have 
been  tacitly  conceded.  Turning  to  the other  side  of  the 
theory, it does not seem to have been very seriously contended 
that legislation approved by lords and commons required also 
the consent of the clergy ; but still the practice of summoning 
them to parliament seems to have been  maintained chiefly in 
order to prevent their asserting that they were not bound  by 
laws to which  they  had  not  consented.  The fact  that  the 
prelates  were  a  majority  in  the House of  Lords  prevented 
collisions  between  church  and  state, and  was  a  guarantee 
that the interests  of  the clergy would  not be  neglected.  It 
is worth  notice,  however, that, from  an early time, the lords 
spiritual and temporal were conceived as forming one body- 
a statute might be made though the prelates had voted against 
it.  In  1351 they withheld  their  assent  from  the statute of 
Provisors ; they are not mentioned in it as consenting parties, 
but still it was a statute. 
And now to the larger question as to the whereabouts of 
legislative  power.  We have  seen  that already  in  1322 the 
principle was announced that legislation required the consent 
of  the prelates, earls, barons  and  commonalty  of  the realm. 
Such consent  was  necessary  for  a  statute ;  and  from  that 
time onwards it seems an admitted principle that the consent 
of  both  houses  was  necessary for  a  statute: for a long time 
to come indeed the function  assigned to the commons was, as 
we  have  seen, that  of  petitioning,  not  that  of  advising  or 
assenting ; but of  course '  petition ' is  assent  and  something 
more.  Rut then we have to notice that a statute was  not  the 
only  known  form  of  legislation ; we  have  to  distinguish  it 
from an ordinance.  Now from Edward  1's  day onwards a set 
of  rolls known  as statute rolls was  kept.  What was entered 
upon them was a statute, and by the beginning of  Edward 111's 
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reign it was  an established  principle  that nothing was to go 
on to the statute roll save what  had  received  the consent of 
king, lords  and  commons.  We cannot  apply this to earlier 
times ;  we to this day receive as statutes many laws made by 
Edward  I  in  assemblies  to  which,  as  far  as  we  know,  no 
representatives of the commons were summoned; it is exceed- 
ingly doubtful whether those two pillars of  real property law, 
the Quia  Emptores  and  the De Donis  Conditionalibus, were 
made with the assent of  any such representatives.  However, 
the principle is conceded under Edward 11.  Rut although it be 
allowed that a statute may require the consent of both houses, 
this  does  not  decide that  in  no other  manner  can  laws  be 
made.  Beside the statute there might be room for ordinances 
made by the king with  the advice of  the lords, or  made by 
the king in his council.  '  Great councils,' magna concilia, are 
still held  under Edward I1 and Edward 111, meetings  of  the 
king and his  council with  the lords  spiritual  and  temporal. 
Such assemblies, however, are  chiefly  held  for  deliberative 
purposes-they  were not serious rivals for parliament ; on the 
whole the royal will was likely to find  the lords as intractable 
as the commons.  The rival that parliament had  seriously to 
fear  was  the king  in  council.  Now  it seems  to have  been 
admitted  during  the  fourteenth  century  that  the  king  in 
council  enjoyed  a  certain  amount-or  rather  an  uncertain 
amount-of  legislative  power.  He could not revoke or  alter 
statutes ; he did so on  more  than one occasion, but this was 
generally  regarded  as  an  abuse.  But  without  revoking  or 
overriding statutes there was still a field for legislation; regard 
being had to past history we cannot be surprised at this.  We 
find that parliament  acknowledges the existence of  this sub- 
ordinate legislative  power, even  on  occasions  desires  that  it 
may be  used.  A statute is regarded  as a very solemn  affair, 
not  easily  to be repealed ; temporary  legislation,  legislation 
about details, should be by ordinance.  As time goes on, how- 
ever, the existence of  two legislative powers leads to frequent 
disputes.  Richard I1 presses the ordaining power  beyond all 
bounds: '  What is the use,'  asks a contemporary, '  of  statutes 
made in  parliament?  They have no  effect.  The king and 
bis  privy  council  habitually  alter and  efface what  has  pre- Constitutional History 
viously  been  established  in  parliament,  not  merely  by  the 
community but even by the nobility1.'  In 1389 the commons 
pray that the chancellor and council may not make ordinances 
contrary to common law and statute.  The king answers that 
what  has  been  done shall  be  done  still,  saving  the  king's 
prerogative.  Richard  had  a  theory  of  absolute  monarchy, 
and he  was  deposed.  One of  the charges against him  was 
that he had  said  that the  laws were  in  his  own  mouth  and 
often enough in his own breast.  The Lancastrian kings were 
kings by Act of  Parliament ; they meant to rule and did rule 
by  means  of  parliaments.  Under  them  we  hear  few  com- 
plaints  about  the ordaining power-they  seem to have used 
it sparingly.  At the close of  the Middle Ages  its limits are 
still very indefinite ; in  this  lies one of  the great dangers for 
future times.  The king, it is clear, cannot revoke or override 
a statute, at least in  a general fashion ; but still by ordinances 
made in his council he has a certain  power of  adding to the 
law of the land.  We have been obliged to say that he cannot 
override  a statute in  a general  fashion.  But  here  again  is 
another danger-is  there a dispensing power ?-can  the king 
exempt this or that person from the scope of a statute?  That 
he has some such power it is difficult to deny; parliament has 
quietly submitted to its exercise ; as regards  certain statutes 
the king has habitually exercised it, has given  his  license to 
A.B. to do something forbidden  by statute: in  particular  the 
anti-papal  statutes have habitually  been  dispensed  with, so 
have  the statutes of  mortmain  which  forbid  religious bodies 
to acquire land.  What is the limit to this power?  It is hard 
to say.  The question is made the more difficult by this, that 
very  often  the sanction  established  by  the  statute  is  some 
fine or forfeiture  of  which  the king is  to have  the benefit- 
may  not  the king renounce this benefit  in  advance, may  he 
not  say that he  will  not exact it from  A.B. if  A.B. infringes 
the statute?  It is  difficult to say that  he  may  not.  Two 
indefinite  powers, an ordaining and  a  dispensing  power, are 
at the end of the Middle Ages part of  the king's inheritance. 
Another point connected with these last questions has been 
cleared up.  Throughout the fourteenth century there is danger 
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that though the king, with the lords' assent, grants the petition 
of  the commons, the consequent statute will by no means do 
just  what the commons want.  The statute is not drawn  up 
until after the parliament is  dissolved ; its form  is settled in 
the king's  council, and  it  may not  correspond  very  closely 
with the petition.  The commons over and over again protest 
against this; the petitions are tampered with  before  they are 
turned  into statutes.  In  I414 this  point  is  conceded.  The 
commons pray 'that there never be no law made and engrossed 
as statute and law neither by additions nor diminutions by no 
manner  of  term or terms the which  should  change  the sen- 
tence  and the intent asked.'  The king in  reply grants that 
from  henceforth  'nothing  be  enacted  to the petition  of  the 
commons contrary  to their  asking, whereby  they should  be 
bound without their assent1.'  Thus gradually the practice is 
introduced  of  sending up to the king not a petition  but a bill 
drawn  in  the form  of  a statute, so that the king shall  have 
nothing  to do save  to assent  or  dissent.  This  became  the 
regular  practice, and  under Henry VII was  adopted in  most 
cases of  importance  2. 
It is needless  to say that the  king still retains and often 
exercises the power of  refusing to legislate.  A statute is still 
very really and truly the king's act.  The form  of  assent  has 
already  become  what  it  still  is  le roy  le  veut;  the  form  of 
dissent  is  le  roy  s'avisera-a  civil form  of  saying No, but  a 
form not unfrequently used. 
It should be remembered that legislative power  is by this 
time a power  that has  been  constantly and freely exercised. 
The  statute book  is  already  a  bulky  volume.  King  and 
parliament  have  taken  upon  themselves  to  interfere  with 
every  department  of  law-even  to  regulate  the  wages  of 
labourers, the price  of  commodities, the dress which  may be 
worn  by  men  and women  of  different  stations in  life.  The 
statutes of  Edward I11 and Richard I1 have hardly the deep 
permanent interest which we find in  the statutes of  Edward I; 
they do not  in  the  same  way  go  to the  very  root  of  the 
Rot. Parl. vol.  11,  22. 
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ordinary law, the land  law, the  law of  civil  procedure; still 
they are very  miscellaneous  and  high-handed.  Under  the 
Lancastrian kings there is less legislation-this  is one of  the 
causes of  their  fall : the maintenance of  peace  and order is 
not sufficiently attended to-the  great men are becoming  too 
great for  the law.  The few  parliaments  of  Edward  IV do 
little.  Under  Henry VII, though  parliaments  are few,  still 
they pass valuable statutes; it is recognized  that a good  deal 
of  the medieval  common law sadly needs amendment-there 
are new wants  to be  attended  to-and  above all order is to 
be re-established and preserved. 
B.  The King and  his  Council. 
The succession  to the throne has had  a  stormy  history. 
Before  the end  of  the  fourteenth  century  two  kings  have 
been deposed, and one king has succeeded to the throne who, 
according to our  ideas, had  no hereditary right.  A modern 
constitutional lawyer has no  great difficulty with the case of 
Edward  11, he can  say that  Edward  resigned  the kingdom 
and  that  he  was  at  once  succeeded  by  his  rightful  heir; 
if  this  be  a  precedent  at  all,  it  is  a  precedent  for  what 
should  happen  in  case  a  king abdicates.  Still there  can, I 
think,  be  little  doubt  that  the  parliament  which  met  in 
January, 1327, conceived  that it  had  full  power to depose a 
worthless king.  It had been  summoned  in a way which was 
at least  outwardly regular-the  king was  in fact a captive in 
the hands  of  Isabella  and Mortimer-the  great seal  was  in 
their power and the summons was issued in  the king's  name. 
The proceedings, however, were tumultuary.  In the midst of 
a noisy mob it was resolved  to reject the father  in  favour of 
the son.  Articles justifying the deposition were  drawn  up- 
the charges are very  vague and  general, amounting to this, 
that Edward was  incompetent and incorrigible1.  His resig- 
nation was  then  procured.  On the whole, as it seems to me, 
these proceedings, so far  from strengthening  the notion  that 
a king might legally be deposed, demonstrated  pretty clearly 
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that there was  no body empowered  by law to set  the king 
aside.  The device of  issuing writs  in the king's  own  name, 
to summon the parliament which is to depose him, the extor- 
tion of a formal resignation, make the case rather a precedent 
for revolution than a precedent for legal action'. 
We come  now  to the events of  1399.  The deposition, 
for  such  for a moment we  may  call  it, of  Richard 11, has, I 
think, a greater constitutional significance than the deposition 
of  Edward  11-that  is  to say, the complaints  against  him 
which  found  expression  in  a  series  of  formal  charges, are 
not vague complaints of  badness and uselessness, but accuse 
him  of having  broken  the  law.  He has  tried  to play  the 
absolute  monarch ; he  has  been  acting on  a  theory  of  the 
kingship which is contrary to our  laws-he  has  said  that the 
laws were in his own mouth and often in  his own  breast, that 
he by himself could change and frame the laws of the kingdom, 
that the life  of  every  liegeman,  his  lands, tenements,  goods 
and  chattels, lay  at his  royal  will  without  sentence  of  for- 
feiture, and he has acted  on  these  sayings.  The revolution, 
if  such we call it, is in this case a  protest  against absolutism. 
We must  not  plunge  into  the general  histoiy  of  the time; 
the forms observed  are what  chiefly concern  us.  Henry of 
Lancaster had landed, the nation  as a whole had  determined 
that  he  should  be  king-Richard  had  no party,  made  no 
serious  effort, delivered  himself  up  to  Henry,  and  offered 
to resign the crown.  A parliament was then summoned, the 
writs  being  attested  by  Richard  and  the  council.  It was 
proposed that the king should  execute a  deed of  resignation 
before the parliament met.  It was objected that in  such case 
the  parliament  would  be  dissolved  so  soon  as  it  met  by 
the act of  resignation.  The expedient was  then  adopted  of 
issuing  new  writs  on  the day on  which  the resignation  was 
declared, summoning  the parliament  to meet six days later. 
It will  not  be impertinent  to mention  that  the idea of  an heir inheriting, 
while yet  his father is physically alive, was  not  unfamiliar  to our medieval  law. 
There was such a thing as civil death.  If a man entered religion-that  is to say 
became  a molik-he  died to the world; his heir at once inherited, his will took 
effect, and his executors might sue for debts that had been due to him.  It might 
well be considered that a king who had abdicated was dead to the law.  F. W. M. 192  Co~zstitutiolzal  History  PERIOD  The  Yorkist TitGe 
Before the Parliament met  Richard  executed  a  formal deed 
of  abdication, renouncing  all  royal  rights, and absolving  all 
his people from homage, fealty and allegiance, and declaring 
himself  worthy to be deposed.  On the meeting of parliament 
the deed  was  produced.  The question  was  put  whether  it 
should  be  accepted.  It  was  accepted.  The long  list  of 
charges was  read,  and parliament voted  that they formed  a 
good  ground  for  deposing the king and  that ex  abundnnti 
they would  proceed  to  depose  him.  A  sentence was  then 
drawn up and read declaring that Richard  was  deposed  from 
all royal dignity and honour.  Commissioners were then sent 
to read this sentence to him.  Apparently it did not enter the 
heads of  any concerned  that the estates lawfully  summoned 
could not depose a  king for  sufficient cause-though  he had 
resigned, they put it to the vote whether his resignation should 
be accepted and ex abzrndanti, as they said, proceeded formally 
to depose him.  Perhaps they  feared  to let  the matter  rest 
upon an act  of  resignation,  for  this  might  leave  it open  for 
Richard  to say at some future time,  and not without truth, 
that the act was  not  voluntary,  but had been  extorted from 
him  by  duress.  Still  the  deposition  could  really  stand  on 
no better footing than the abdication; if  Richard was coerced 
into resigning he was coerced into summoning the parliament, 
and only by virtue of  the king's summons had the parliament 
which  deposed  him  any legal  being.  This perhaps  is  the 
reason why very soon afterwards Richard disappears from the 
world. 
Richard  deposed, Henry  formally  claimed  the crown  as 
descended  in  the right  line  of  descent  from  Henry 111 and 
as sent by God to recover  his  right, when  the realm was  in 
point  to be  undone for  default  of  governance  and  undoing 
of the good laws.  It was proposed and carried that he should 
be  king.  The fact  that  Henry  IV should  have,  though  in 
vague terms, asserted an hereditary right is certainly important 
-showing,  as it does, that there  was  by  this  time a  strong 
sentiment  in  favour  of  strict  descent.  He seems  to  have 
stooped  to  encouraging  the story which  had  been  trumped 
up that his ancestor, Edmund of  Lancaster, was  the firstborn 
son of  Henry 111-older  therefore  than  Edward  I.  A  title 
as heir to Richard I1 or Edward 111 he did not assert.  Such 
an assertion would have opened a grave problem.  Of  course 
according to  what  became  the  orthodox  legal  theory  the 
House of York had a better right.  It traced its title to Lionel 
of  Clarence, a son of  Edward 111, older  than John of  Gaunt, 
from whom  Henry was  descended-but  then  it had  to trace 
this title through a woman, through Lionel's daughter Philippa. 
Now certainly the analogies of  private law  were  by this time 
in  favour  of  the daughter of  an elder son.  Hut  it  is  to be 
remembered  that a  title  to the crown  of  England had  not 
yet  been  transmitted  by  a  woman,  except  in  the  case  of 
Henry 11, whose  right came to him  through  his  mother the 
Empress.  But in that case the only competitor was Stephen. 
Stephen  himself  claimed  through  a  woman.  It was  quite 
possible  therefore  to  contend  that  so long  as  there  was  a 
male claiming solely  through males, no woman, and no man 
claiming through  a  woman,  could  be  admitted.  In  favour 
of  that  doctrine  Fortescue, chief  justice  under  Henry  VI, 
wrote  an elaborate treatise;  he was  prepared  to defend  his 
master's title even as a matter of  pure hereditary right.  But 
Henry IV at his accession seems to have shrunk from  raising 
this  question;  he sought  to  evade  it by  hinting  at a  title 
derived  through his mother and Edmund of  Lancaster from 
Henry  111.  However,  it  is  to be  noticed  that  in  1399 and 
for  many years  afterwards  we  hear  nothing  of  the Yorkist 
claim, those  who have  what  we  regard as the best  blood  in 
their  veins  acquiesce cheerfully  in  the parliamentary  settle- 
ment; the Earl of York lives in close friendship with Henry V. 
There is  no impression, at least no general impression,  that 
the transactions of  13gg  were not perfectly lawful or that the 
parliamentary  title  of  the  Lancastrian  kings  is  disputable. 
Had  Henry  V  left  a  decently  competent  son,  even  had 
Henry VI married any woman but Margaret of  Anjou, nothing 
might  ever have been  heard  of  the Yorkist title.  It is only 
in  the course of bitter political  strife  that liichard  of  York 
begins  to put forward  his  title  as heir  to Edward  111.  At 
first he is only anxious as to what is  to happen  when  Henry 
dies,  as probably  he will  die  without  issue, for  he has been 
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putable  succession  because  the  Beauforts  have  claims  of  a 
sort  derived  from  John  of  Gaunt.  The queen  gave  birth 
to a  son, and, though  not  at once, the claim  to be  Henry's 
successor  becomes  a  claim  to  supplant  Henry.  When  in 
1460 the  Duke  of  York  laid  his  pedigree  before  the  lords 
with  a  formal  denland  for  the  crown, legitinlism  makes  its 
first  appearance  in  English  history.  A  compromise  was 
patched  up for a while-Henry  was to remain  king, but  the 
Duke  was  to succeed  him.  War  broke  out, the Duke  was 
killed.  His son  Edward, Earl  of  March,  seized  the  crown 
and  sceptre  and  had  himself  proclaimed  king  Edward  IV. 
He reckoned his reign from 4 March, 1461,  the day on which 
he  proclaimed  himself  king.  There  had  been  no  formal 
election, no parliamentary recognition : he reigned by hereditary 
right.  A parliament recognized the justice of  the claim.  The 
three Henrys became  pretended  kings, kings de facto but  not 
u'e  ju  m. 
So far as I can understand it, the confusing struggle which 
we  call  the  Wars of  the  Roses  is  not  to any considerable 
extent  a  contest  between  opposite  principles-it  is  a great 
faction fight in  which the whole nation takes sides.  Still the 
House  of  Lancaster  was  in  a  measure  identified  with  a 
tradition  of  parliamentary  government,  had  been  placed  on 
the  throne  to supplant  a  king  who  had  a  plan  of  absolute 
monarchy, had been obliged  to rely  on parliament  and more 
especially on the commons, perhaps owed its fall to its having 
allowed both lords and commons to do what  they  pleased, to 
get on without government.  On the other hand, the claim of 
the  House of  York  was  bound  up  with  a  claim  to rule  in 
defiance of statutes.  It might be urged that the statutes were 
void as having never received the assent of  any rightful king, 
but an assertion that the laws under which a nation  has  been 
living  for  the last half-century  are not  laws, because  you  or 
your ancestors did not assent to them, is practically an assertion 
that you have a right to rule in defiance of  any laws however 
made. 
It is fortunate for us that Edward  IV did not leave a son 
old enough to step into his  father's  shoes, and that no sooner 
had the crown been acquired by the legitimist family than the 
succession was again disturbed by the crimes of  Richard  111. 
Henry  VII had  according  to our  ideas  little that even  by 
courtesy could be called hereditary right.  Probably he would 
not  have  got  the crown  had  he  not  undertaken  to  marry 
Elizabeth, the daughter  of  Edward  IV.  Still  an hereditary 
right  he did  assert, and  Stubbs has  argued that  according 
to the notions of the time the assertion was not absurd'.  He 
was  accounted  to have  reigned  from  the day of  Bosworth; 
'  before  his  marriage parliament  declared that the inheritance 
of  the crown  should  rest  and  remain  in  the then  sovereign 
lord, king  Henry VI  I?  and the heirs  of  his body ; he refused 
to be  king  merely  in  right  of  his  wife. 
The king's powers we might consider under various heads, 
but  repetition  must  be  avoided.  We  have  already  seen 
that it is for him  to summon  parliament; parliament  cannot 
meet  unless  he  issues  writs.  Again  he  could  prorogue 
parliament,  suspend  its  sessions  and  dissolve  parliament. 
We  have  seen  too  that  the  constitution  of  a  parliament 
.  depended  in  no  small degree upon  his will; it  was  for him 
.  to create peers-but  the hereditary principle was here a check 
on his power ; the bishops  were practically  his  nominees ; he 
had assumed the power  of  granting to boroughs  the right to 
send representatives; disputes over  contested  elections  came 
before  him  and  his  council.  His  assent  was  absolutely 
necessary to every statute ; besides  this, he  had a somewhat 
indeterminate  power  of  making  ordinances  and  dispensing 
with  statutes.  Certain things he  certainly could not  do; he 
could not repeal a statute, he  could  not  impose a  tax, it  had 
become unlawful for him to meddle with  the ordinary  course 
of  justice.  He was  bound  by  law-true  the  principle  still 
held good, it holds good at the present day, that 'the king can 
do no wrong '-law  had no  coercive process  against the king, 
he could not be sued or  prosecuted ; the only way of  getting 
justice out of  him was by a petition, an appeal to his conscience. 
But  means  had  already been  found  to  reconcile  this  royal 
immunity with  ministerial  responsibility-if  he  could not be 
sued  or  prosecuted  his  servants  could be, and his  command 
would  shield no one who had broken the law.  What is more, 
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as  we  shall  see, a procedure  by  way  of  impeachment  had 
been evolved whereby  parliament  could  bring home their  re- 
sponsibility to his ministers. 
Rut then again, the executive or administrative or govern- 
mental power was the king's.  You will be familiar with  such 
terms as these, they pass current in  modern  political  life and 
of  course they have  a meaning.  When we have marked off 
the work  of  legislation, the imposing  of  general  laws  upon 
the community, and also  the work  of  judicature, the hearing 
and determining criminal charges and civil actions, there yet 
remains a large sphere of  action, which  we indicate by such 
terms as these.  Governmental seems to me the best  of  these 
terms; execative and administrative suggest  that the work  in 
question  consists  merely  in  executing  or  administrating the 
law, in putting the laws in  force.  But  in  truth a great deal 
remains  to  be  done beyond  putting  the laws  in  force-no 
nation  can  be governed  entirely  by  general  rules.  We can 
see this 1r-r~  plainly  in  our own  day-but  it  is quite as true 
of the Middle Ages:-there  must be rulers or officers who have 
discretionary  powers, discretionary coercive powers, power to 
do or  leave undone, power  to command  that this or that be 
done or  left  undone.  The law  marks  out  their  spheres  of 
action, the law (as we  think) gives them  their  powers.  I do 
not wish you to think that a definite theory to the effect that 
while  legislative  power  resides  in  king  and  parliament,  the 
so-called executive power is in the king alone, was a guiding 
theory of  medieval politics.  On the contrary, the line between 
what  the king could  do without  a  parliament,  and  what  he 
could  only  do with  the  aid  of  parliament,  was  only  drawn 
very gradually, and it fluctuated from  time to time.  On  the 
one hand we find  that the king has a  certain, or perhaps  we 
should  say  uncertain,  power  of  making  general  ordinances 
which shall have the force of  law.  On the other hand even 
at an early time  parliaments interfere  with  what  a political 
theorist would consider to be purely executive or governmental 
work : for instance they are sometimes strong enough to dictate 
to the king who  shall  be  his  councillors-as  we  should  say, 
they appoint the ministry.  Such a power as that our modern 
parliaments  do not openly exercise, but it  was  exercised  in 
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the Middle Ages.  Again we find a parliament ordaining that 
the taxes  shall  be  paid  to  two  particular  persons  and  be 
expended by  them  on  the war.  The production  and  audit 
of  the  royal  accounts  is  also  insisted  on : this  we  cannot 
call  legislative  business.  In  short,  the  more  we  study our 
constitution  whether  in  the present  or  the past,  the less do 
we  find  it  conform to any such  plan  as a philosopher  might 
invent  in  his  study. 
Still parliament, even when the king is weak, leaves him  a 
large  field  of  action  and expects  him  to be  busy  in  it.  A 
do-nothing king, or a king who is merely a moderator between 
contending parties, or  a  king who  merely  executes  the ex- 
pressed  desires  of  parliament,  is  not  the  ideal  king  of  the 
Middle Ages.  He is the ruler of  the nation, the commander 
of its armies and its fleets, the national treasure is his treasure, 
and in  very general terms does  parliament  interfere with  his 
expenditure ; it is for him to keep the peace, the peace  is  his 
peace ;  all public officers, high and low, with but few exceptions 
are appointed  by  him,  dismissible  by  him ; they  hold  their 
offices  during  his  good  pleasure-this  is  true  of  the  high 
officers  of  state, the  chancellor  and  treasurer,  it  is  true  of 
the justices  of  the  king's  courts, it  is  true  of  the sheriffs, it 
is expected  of  him  that  he  will  supervise  the  work  of  his 
servants, that he will call them to account, that he will dismiss 
them when they offend. 
It is somewhat unsatisfactory  work, this attempt to speak 
in general  terms of a  long and eventful period  like the two 
centuries which divide the accession of  Edward  I1 from  that 
of  Henry VIII. Changes in the letter of the law are, it may be, 
few  and gradual, but the real  meaning of  the kingship varies 
from decade to decade.  The character of  the king, the wants 
of  the time, these decide not merely what he will do but what 
he  can  do: this  we  must  learn  by  tracing  history  step  by 
step,-by  seeing  that  the kingship  is  practically  a  different 
thing  in  almost  every  reign ; it  changes  as  we  pass  from 
Edward I11 to Richard 11, again as we  pass  from  Richard I1 
to Henry IV, and so on.  To watch this  process in  the detail 
of practice we  have here no time, rather let us speak of theory, 
and  theory  we  shall  find  is  more  permanent  than  practice. 
Richard  11, there  can  be  little doubt, not  only  determined Constitwtiona  Z  History  The Council 
to act as though  he  were  an  absolute  monarch,  but  had  a 
theory of absolute monarchy.  He made  'a resolute  attempt 
not  to evade but to destroy  the limitations' which had been 
imposed  upon  his  predecessors, and he  had  a theory  which 
justified  him  in  the attempt ; such  limitations were vain, idle 
efforts to limit  a  limitless  prerogative?  When  he  falls it is 
not merely  his  practice  but  his  theory  that is  condemned- 
not merely has he been guilty of  many illegalities, but  he has 
held himself above law : he has said that the laws are in  his 
own  breast, that the lives,  lands  and goods  of  the  subjects 
are  the  king's-in  short,  puod  principi  placuit  legis  habet 
vigorem.  He is  deposed,  and  it  is  as representatives  of a 
different theory-that  of  a  king  below  the  law-that  the 
House of  Lancaster is  to reign.  The king, as Bracton had 
said  more  than  a century ago, has above  him  the law which 
makes  him  king.  This  principle  is  stated  repeatedly  and 
very  clearly  by  the greatest  English  writer  on  law  of  the 
fifteenth  century.  Sir John Fortescue was made chief justice 
of  the King's  Bench  in  1422 and  he  served  the  House  of 
Lancaster  in  good  and  evil fortune  until  all  was  lost.  He 
did  not  die  until  after  1476.  His  most  famous work, De 
Laz~dibus  Legz~m  Arzgliae, was  written  about  1469.  In  this 
and in  other  treatises  he  keeps  repeating  that  the king of 
England is no absolute monarch.  The state of  France gives 
him  an  opportunity of explaining by  way  of  contrast  what 
he  means.  The king  of  France  is  an  absolute  monarch- 
in  France  that  saying  of  the  civil  law  holds  good, puod 
princ+i  placuit  legis  habet  vigorem.  But  it  is  not  so  in 
England.  ' Ther bith ij kindes of  kingdomes of  the wich that 
on is a lordship callid in laten dominiurn r~gale  and that other 
is callid dorniniugn politiczcm  et  regale.  And thai  diversen  in 
that the first kynge may rule his peple  bi  suche lawes as he 
makyth himself, and therefor he may sette uppon  them tayles 
and other  imposicions, such as he woe hymself, without their 
assent.  The secounde king may  not rule his peple  bi other 
lawes than such as thai assenten unto.  And therefore he may 
sett upon  them  non  imposicions without  thair  own  assent2.' 
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The kingdon1 of England is of this second kind.  This doctrine 
Fortescue maintained even after the hopes of  the Lancastrian 
party  were  at  an  end  and  he  himself  had  made  his  peace 
with  Edward IV-and  I  believe we  may say that it was the 
generally  accepted  doctrine  of  the  time.  Edward,  however 
arbitrary might be his acts, asserted no theoretic  claim  to be 
above the law.  The same may  be said of  Henry VII.  The 
danger during the whole  Tudor period  is  not  that  the king 
will assert such a principle but that practically he will be able 
to get  exactly what  he wants  by  means  of  submissive  and 
subservient  parliaments.  It is  the  fashion  now  to speak  of 
Edward  IV as beginning  'the New  Monarchy,'  and there is 
point enough in this title-but  the legal limits of  royal  power 
erected in earlier  centuries remain  where they were.  In the 
changed circumstances the king is beginning to find out that 
parliamentary institutions can be made the engines of his will. 
We turn  from  the  king to the king's  council,  the early 
history  of which we  have  already traced1.  The king had  at 
a  his  side a body of  sworn councillors.  During the fourteenth 
century this body becomes definitely distinct from parliament 
on the one hand, and from the Courts of Law on the other.  The 
composition of  the council depends as a  general rule on  the 
king's will, though occasionally parliament has interfered with 
it.  We have the list  of  the council  as it was  in  I404 under 
Henry IV; it contains  three bishops, nine  peers, seven com- 
moners, in  all  nineteen  persons.  They can be dismissed  by 
the king whenever he pleases ; they are sworn to advise the 
king  according  to the best  of  their  cunning  and  discretion. 
They receive salaries of large amount.  They meet constantly; 
the king  is  not usually  present  at their  deliberations.  The 
proceedings  of  the council  are  committed  to writing;  this 
begins  at least as early as 1386-the  proceedings  from  that 
year  until  1460 have  been  printed  by  the Record  Commis- 
sioners.  The  function  of  the  council,  we  may  say,  is  to 
advise  the  king  upon  every  exercise  of  the royal  power. 
Every  sort  of ordinance,  licence, pardon  that  the king  can 
issue  is  brought  before  the council.  Sometimes  parliament 
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trusts it with extraordinary powers of  legislation and taxation, 
allows it to suspend or dispense with  statutes, to raise loans, 
and the like.  It is to the advice of the council that the king 
looks in all his financial difficulties, which are many. 
But though the royal  council has thus  become a perma- 
nent  part  of  the  machinery  of  government,  and  a  most 
important part, still it is, we may say, an unstable  institution 
--that  is, its real power  is  constantly changing from  time to 
time.  Under  a  strong king  it is really no  check  upon  his 
will ; he  can  appoint  it  and  he  can  dismiss  it; he  is  not 
obliged  to take its advice, he is  not  even  obliged  to ask  its 
advice.  This Henry VII has discovered ; he does not  bring 
the weightiest  matters before  the council, or does not do SO 
until he has made up his own  mind : the council then  has to 
register  foregone conclusions.  But  under weak  kings it has 
been otherwise, and under infant kings the council has ruled 
England.  It will be no digression therefore if  we say a little 
of royal minorities. 
Since the Norman Conquest there have been  three  cases. 
Henry  111 was  nine  years  old  when  he  began  to  reign ; 
Richard  I1 eleven  years;  Henry VI was  but  nine  months. 
We  have  further  to  remember  that  during  a  considerable 
part of  his  reign  Henry VI was  perfectly  imbecile.  When 
Henry I11 succeeded to the throne there was  no member of 
the royal  house  capable  of  urging  any claim  to be  regent. 
This is  an important fact, for  it  gave  rise  to an important 
precedent.  The barons, in whose power the young king was, 
appointed William  Marshall,  Earl of  Pembroke, rector  regis 
et  regni, and  associated  certain  councillors  with  him.  We 
have already seen how it is to this time that we can definitely 
trace the existence of  a concili~tvz  Regis  that is distinct from 
the cztria  Regis.  Within three years the regent  died.  No- 
one was  appointed  to fill his place,  but the government was 
carried on by the council, at the head of  which  stood Hubert 
de  Burgh, the  chief  justiciar.  Our  public  law  had  made 
great  advances before the next case arose, the  accession  of 
Richard  11.  On  his  coronation  the  assembled  magnates 
appointed  no regent,  but  named  a  council  of  government. 
Before long, troubles set in and the king had to submit to the 
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restraint  of a council  appointed by parliament; not until  he 
was  three-and-twenty was  he able to free himself  from this 
control.  When Henry VI succeeded  his father we  hear of  a 
definite claim to the regency.  His uncle, the Duke of  Glou- 
cester, claimed the regency both as next of kin and under the 
will  of  the late king.  But this claim was  disallowed  by the 
lords assembled in parliament ; after searching for precedents 
they pronounced  that he could not claim the regency on the 
score of relationship, and that Henry V  could  not dispose of 
the  government  of  the  kingdom  by his  will.  An  act  of 
Parliament constituted the Duke  of  Bedford  protector  and 
defender of the realm and church of England.  The assent of 
the king to this act of  parliament must of  course have been a 
mere fiction-he  was but a few months old.  This precedent 
sanctioned what has since been regarded as law, namely, that 
our law makes  no provision  for any regency, that the king's 
nearest kinsman  has not as such any claim to be regent, that 
a king cannot by his will declare effectually who is to govern 
England  after his  death.  If  such  a  case  arises  parliament 
must provide for it.  Further, the king, no matter how young 
he is, can give his assent to an act of  parliament--this,  it is 
true, may be a  fictitious assent, but  a  king  is  bound by the 
acts of  parliament  done during his minority: obviously this 
doctrine has difficulties  before it, with which however we  are 
not  at  this  moment  concerned.  'During  the  minority  of 
Henry VI the council was  a  real council of regency and by 
no  means  a  mere  consultative  body  in  attendance  on  the 
protector.  It defined  its own  power  in  the statement  that 
upon  it during  the  king's  minority  devolved  the  exercise 
and execution of  all  the powers of  sovereignty1.'  Rut then 
when  Henry came of  age the council  became  once  more a 
new  instrument  in  the hands of  the king, or  of  those who, 
for the time being, could  gain an ascendancy over the king. 
In  1454  Henry became  quite  imbecile;  it  was  impossible 
to get  a  word  from  him.  The lords  chose  the  Duke  of 
York  protector  and  defender  of  the  realm ; this  resolution 
was  embodied  in  an  act  to which  the commons  gave their Colrstitzctiorznl History 
assent; the king had  just  sense  enough  to place  the great 
seal  in  the hands  of  the Earl of  Salisbury, and in  this way 
the  royal  assent  was  given.  In  the  next  year  the  king 
recovered  his  senses, but  in  a  few  months he  again  fell  ill, 
and the same ceremony  of  appointing a protector  by act of 
parliament  was  enacted. 
Under Edward IV and the Tudors the council ceases to be 
any real restraint upon the king.  Its  power, it is true, increases, 
but this merely means an increase of  the royal  power.  It is 
powerful against all  others, but weak against the king.  It is 
but  an assembly of  the king's  servants, whom  he  appoints 
and dismisses as pleases him best, whom  he consults when it 
pleases him, and only when it pleases  him.  Henry VII, says 
Bacon,  in  his  greatest  business  imparted  himself  to none, 
except it were to Morton  and Fox.  No  law compelled  him 
to ask advice ; all the powers which any council could exercise 
were simply the king's powers, powers which the king himself 
might exercise if and when he pleased. 
A  certain  limitation  to this  principle  was  found  in  the 
practice  regarding the king's  seals.  From the Norman  days 
onward  the king's will  had  been  signified  by writs, charters, 
letters patent, letters close and so forth, sealed with the royal 
seal.  No document without the king's seal could be regarded 
as an authentic expression of the king's command.  The king's 
Great Seal was committed to the Chancellor-he  was the head 
of  the whole secretarial establishment, (as we now might say) 
the  Secretary  of  State for  all  departments.  When  in  the 
middle of the thirteenth century the chief  justiciarship  came 
to an  end, the chancellorship grew  in  dignity and  in  power. 
During the later Middle  Ages and  far on through the Tudor 
time the chancellor is the king's first minister-prime  minister. 
The possession of  the royal  seal makes  his  office  of  the first 
importance.  Gradually  we  begin  to  hear  of  other  seals 
besides the great seal.  The chancellor  has so much  miscel- 
laneous work  to perform  as a judge  and otherwise, so much 
routine  business  requires  the  great  seal,  that  for  matters 
directly  affecting the king a  privy  seal is in  use.  The king 
under  his  privy seal gives  directions to the chancellor as to 
the use of the great seal.  Then this  privy seal is committed 
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to the keeping of  an  officer, the Keeper  of  the  Privy  Seal. 
In  course  of  time a  yet  more  private  secretary  intervenes 
between the king and these high officers of  state, namely, the 
king's clerk or king's secretary, as he comes to be called, who 
keeps  the  king's  signet.  In  the  Tudor  time  we  find  two 
king's secretaries, who before the end of  that time are known 
as secretaries of  state.  A regular routine establishes itself- 
documents signed  by  the  king's  own  hand,  the  royal  sign 
manual, and countersigned  by the secretary are sent to the 
keeper  of  the privy seal, as instructions for documents  to be 
issued under the privy seal, and these again serve as instruc- 
tions for the chancellor to issue documents bearing the great 
seal of  the realm.  This practice begets a certain ministerial 
responsibility  for  the king's  acts.  The law  courts  will  not 
recognize  any document as expressing the royal  will  unless 
it bears the great seal or at least the privy seal.  This insures 
that  some  minister  will  have  committed  himself  to  that 
expression of  the royal  will.  The ministers  themselves  are 
much  concerned  in  the  maintenance  of  this  routine;  they 
fear being  called  in  question  for  the king's  acts and having 
no proof  that they are the king's  acts.  The chancellor  fears 
to affix  the great seal  unless  he has  some document  under 
the privy seal that he can procluce as his warrant; the keeper 
of  the privy  seal  is  anxious  to have  the king's  own  hand- 
writing attested  by the king's secretary.  For the king again 
this is a useful arrangement; it is the duty of these officers to 
remember the king's  interests, to know how the king's affairs 
stand; as the king's  affairs  grow  more  manifold, division  of 
labour  becomes  necessary;  there  must  be  an  officer  at the 
head of every department bound  to see that  the king is not 
cheated  or prejudiced, and the danger of  his interests  being 
neglected  is decreased, if  in  the ordinary course  of  business 
his letters have to pass through several different hands.  Thus, 
even when there is on the throne a strong-willed  king with  a 
policy of his own, ministers are necessary to him.  At present 
we  may  say this  is  a  matter  of  convenience,  but  in  this 
doctrine of  the royal  seals we  can see the foundation for our 
modern  doctrine of  ministerial responsibility-that  for  every 
exercise of  the royal power some minister is answerable. Constitutiovzal History 
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Hitherto we have said nothing of  what  in general estima- 
tion  constitutes  the  most  important  side  of  the  council's 
history, the history  of  its  judicial  powers ; but  to  this  we 
shall best come by first taking a short review of the adminis- 
tration of  justice as a whole. 
More and  more  the king's  courts  have  become  the only 
courts of  the first importance.  Of the feudal and the ancient 
communal courts we  need  say but  very little ; by one  means 
and another business has been drawn away from them.  That 
an  action  for  freehold  land  should  be  begun  in  the  court 
baron  of  the lord  of  whom  the land  is holden  is a principle 
unrepealed-it  remains  indeed  unrepealed  until  I 833 ; but 
many ways of evading it have been  devised  by the ingenuity 
of lawyers, and it has in truth become a dead letter.  \Ve may 
indeed  doubt  whether  in  Henry VII's reign  there  are many 
courts baron which have more than a nominal existence. 
Even  the customary  court  of the  manor  has  suffered  a 
heavy blow.  It was, you  will  remember, the court for  those 
who,  whether  personally  villeins  or  no,  held  their  land  by 
villein tenure.  In Henry VII's day personal villeinage, owing 
to causes which we cannot here discuss, has practically become 
extinct.  But  further,  and  this  is  of  great  importance,  the 
king's courts have at length  decided  to protect the tenant  in 
villeinage  in  his  holding.  He is  now  getting a  new  name, 
derived  from  those  copies of  the court  rolls  which  serve  as 
evidence of his title ; he is a tenant  by copy of  court roll, in 
shorter  phrase  a  copyholder.  At  length  the  king's  courts 
have decided that he shall no longer be left with merely such 
protection in his holding as the manorial courts afford-if  the 
lord contrary to the custom  of  the manor  turns him  out, he 
shall have an action against his  lord, an action of  trespass in 
the king's courts.  In 1457 we  get  a  hint  that  this  is so; in 
1467, and  again  in  1481, it  is definitely  said  that  the copy- 
holder can bring an action against his lord if  ejected contrary 
to the manorial custom.  The manorial custom  thus becomes 
a recognized  part of  the law  of  the land, to be  enforced  in 
3  and  4  Will.  IV,  c.  27. 
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the  king's  court.  This  of  course  was  a  serious  blow  to 
the  manorial  courts-contentious  business  was  taken  from 
them-anyone  who  claimed  copyhold  land  instead  of  going 
to them would  go to the king's  courts, where he would  get a 
more certain justice.  A great deal of  business remained, and 
still in  theory  remains, for  the customary court  to do.  The 
copyholder when he wishes to convey his land must surrender 
it into the hands of  the lord, who then  admits a  new tenant ; 
such  surrenders  and  admittances  took  place  in  court-in 
theory they took place in court until very lately-but  all this 
business became more and more a matter of  routine now that 
the king's  courts had fully recognized the rights of  the copy- 
hold  tenant.  If the customary dues were  paid  the lord  had 
no  choice but  to accept  the  surrender  and  admit  the new 
tenant,  and  these  surrenders  and admittances  were  in  fact 
accomplished  in  what  only  by  fiction  and  figure  of  speech 
could  be  called  a  court-practically  there  was  but  a  trans- 
action between the tenant and the lord's  steward.  However, 
our present point is that before the end of  Henry VII's day, 
owing rather to the ingenious devices of  lawyers  in  search of 
business  than  to  any  legislation,  the  manorial  courts  had 
ceased  to be of  any great  importance as tribunals for  con- 
tentious  business. 
As regards what  I  have  called  the communal courts, we 
have seen that before the end of  Edward 1's reign a rule had 
been established which made them courts for small cases : they 
were not to entertain cases in  which  more  than  40 shillings 
was  at stake1.  In  Henry VII's time  the county court  was 
still held  month by month, and the sum of  40  shillillgs had 
not yet become a trivial sum ; but  long before  this the free- 
holders of  the shire had  been allowed to discharge their duty 
of  appearing at the monthly court by sending their attorneys 
instead of  coming in  person, and it  is very probable that the 
judicial  business  was  practically  transacted  by  the  sheriff 
without  much  interference  on  the part of  the freeholders  or 
their representatives.  Trial by jury has not, we see, made its 
way into the procedure  of  these courts; they still make use 
of the ancient system of  compurgation. 
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But we  have  now  to notice  a  new  institution which  has 
grown up since the days of  Edward I, an institution which  is 
to play a very large part  both in the administration of  justice 
and in local government, namely, the justices of the peace.  In 
the thirteenth  century we hear occasionally of  knights of  the 
shire being assigned, that is, appointed, to keep  the peace- 
sometimes  they  seem  to  be  elected  by  the county  court. 
Their  duty seems  to  be  that  of  assisting,  perhaps  also  of 
checking, the sheriff  in  his  work  of  preserving  the  peace, 
arresting malefactors, and the like.  Then  immediately  after 
the  accession  of  Edward  111  a  statute  is  passed  (1327, 
I  Edw.  111, stat.  2, c.  16) to the effect that  in  every  shire 
good  and lawful  men  shall  be  assigned  to keep  the  peace. 
In 1330 (4 Edw. 111, c. 2) it is repeated that good  and lawful 
men  shall  be  assigned  in  every  county  to keep  the peace; 
those who are indicted before  them are to be imprisoned, and 
they  are  to  send  the  indictments  to  the  justices  of  gaol 
delivery.  These  cz~stodes  pacis, conservators  of  the  peace, 
have  therefore  already  power  to  receive  indictments,  the 
accusations  preferred  by juries,  but  they  do not  as yet  try 
the indicted ; they commit them  to prison  to take their trial 
before  the king's  judges  on their  circuits.  In  1360 another 
step is  taken.  A  statute (34 Edw. 111, c. I) repeats that  in 
every county there shall  be  assigned  for the keeping  of  the 
peace  one  lord  and, with  him,  three  or  four  of  the  most 
worthy  of  the  county,  with  some  learned  in  the law, and 
they are to have power to arrest n~alefactors,  to receive indict- 
ments against them, and to hear and determine at the king's 
suit all manner of felonies and trespasses done in their county 
according  to the law  and  customs  of the realm.  The con- 
servators  of  the  peace  are  now  authorised  not  merely  to 
receive indictments, but to try the indicted.  Very soon  after 
this, having been trusted with these high judicial  powers, they 
come  to be  known  as  justices;  they  are  no  longer  mere 
conservators of  the peace, they are justices  of the peace.  In 
1388 it  is  directed  by  statute  that  they  are to hold  their 
sessions four times a year-this  is the origin of those  Quarter 
Sessions of  justices  of  the peace which  are still  held  in  our 
own day.  Now this new ~nstitution  soon becomes very popular 
with  parliament  and flourishes ; parliament  constantly adds 
to the powers of  these justices ; they are in truth men  drawn 
from  the  same  class  of  country  gentlemen  which  supplies 
parliament with knights of  the shire.  For a long time there 
are persistent  demands that the justices  shall  be  elected  by 
the  freeholders;  this  demand  finds  expression  in  many 
petitions  presented  by  parliament  to  Edward  111.  But  on 
this point the king will not give way, he will keep the appoint- 
ment of  justices in the hands of  himself and his council.  It 
is so common now-a-days to regard our constitutional history 
as one long triumph of  the elective principle, that it is well to 
notice that at two points this  principle was  persistently urged 
and  finally defeated.  Our ancestors wanted  elected  sheriffs, 
and they wanted elected justices of the peace; to this day our 
sheriffs and our justices  are appointed by the king, and I do 
not  suppose that one would wish them elected.  The justices 
of  the  fourteenth  century  were  paid  wages-four  shillings 
for  each  day of  session ; they were  entitled  to these  wages 
until very lately ; here again the great change in  the value of 
money  which  took  place  in  the  sixteenth  century  has  had 
important effects on  our constitutional law.  In Richard  11's 
day a form of  commission was settled which,  in  all  the most 
material respects, is that still in use.  The king assigns certain 
persons  by  name to be  his  justices  in  a  particular  county; 
he  empowers  every  one of  them  to keep  the peace  and  to 
arrest  malefactors,  and  he  empowers  every  two  of  them  to 
hold  sessions  for  the trial  of  indicted  persons. 
Now  at the period  with  which we  are dealing these are 
the main duties of  the justices of  the peace :-(I)  they are to 
keep the peace by putting down riots, arresting offenders and 
so  forth, and  (2)  in  their  quarter  sessions  they  are  to  try 
indicted  persons-the  trial  is  a formal trial by jury.  Their 
power extends over pretty well all  indictable offences except 
treason  only, but  the more difficult cases they are directed to 
reserve  for  the king's  judges  on  their  circuits.  These  are 
their  main  duties, but  parliament  has been  gradually adding 
many  other  duties  of  a  very  miscellaneous  character.  In 
particular,  parliament  has  long been  engaged  on  elaborate 
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the Black Death of 1349,  one of  the greatest  economic catas- 
trophies  in  all  history;  the guess  has  been  made  that  it 
destroyed not much less than half  the population.  It utterly 
unsettled  the medieval  system  of  agriculture and industry: 
wages  of  course  rose  enormously ; parliament  endeavoured 
by statute after statute to keep them down, to fix a legal rate 
of  wages.  This attempt produced  many  of  the grievances 
which burst into flame in the revolt of  1381,  'one of  the most 
portentous phenomena to be found in the whole of our history. 
But still parliament did not abandon the effort: to gain its end 
it  endowed  the justices  of  the peace, representatives  of  the 
landowning class, with very large  powers of  compelling men 
to work  for  the legal wage.  After  a while, in  1427, it even 
delegated to these justices the power of  fixing the legal rate : 
the justices of  the peace were the justices  of  labourers also- 
in  our  language  they have  not  merely judicial  powers, they 
have governmental  powers  also.  And  this  matter  of  wages, 
though  it  is  the most  important, is  by  no  means  the  only 
specimen of  governmental duties cast upon the justices of  the 
peace.  More  and  more  the  quarter  sessions  of  the  peace 
begin  to supplant the old  county court as the real governing 
assembly of  the shire; the old county court sinks into a mere 
tribunal for small civil suits.  In 1494 we find that the justices 
have even  got a  control  over  the sheriff:  by  I I  Hen. VII, 
c.  I 5, they are empowered to entertain complaints against the 
sheriff as to extortions practised  by him  in  the county court, 
and  to convict  him  and  his officers  in  a  summary fashion. 
This power  to convict  persons  in a summary fashion, that is 
to say, without  trial  by jury,  is, we  observe, being  given  to 
justices  in  a  number  of  cases.  The practice begins  in  the 
fifteenth  century  and  becomes  very  usual  in  the sixteenth : 
parliament is discovering that for  petty offences trial  by  jury 
is  a much too elaborate procedure.  An  instance or two  may 
be given :- 
In 1433 (11 Hen. VI, c. 8) the justices  are empowered  to 
punish  in  a summary way  those  who  use  false  weights  or 
measures ; in  1464 we have an elaborate statute (4 Edw. IV, 
c.  I) about  the making of  cloth, regulating  matters  between 
master and man ; upon complaint made of any offence against 
this  ordinance, the justices  of  the peace  may  send  for  the 
party and examine him, and if the party by examination or 
other due proof  be  found guilty he is  to be  fined; in  1477 
(17 Edw. IV, c. 4) we have a similar statute about the making 
of  tiles; in  I503 the justices  are to punish  those  who  take 
young herons  from their nests-they  are to call the suspected 
person  before  them  and  by  their  discretion  examine  him. 
The statutes, of  which these are specimens, seldom lay down 
any rules of  procedure, only it is made clear  that there need 
not  be  trial  by jury, and that the suspected persons may be 
questioned. 
We see here then a yet young but very strong and healthy 
institution, one which  has a great future before it.  Country 
gentlemen  commissioned by the king are to keep the peace 
of the shire, are to constitute a court of  quarter  sessions with 
high criminal jurisdiction,  are to punish the pettier offences in 
a summary way, are to exercise miscellaneous  governmental 
powers and police powers-to  fix the legal rate of  wages  for 
example.  They are to be substantial men.  In 1439 a statute 
(18 Hen. VI, c.  11)  says  that  they  are to  have  lands  or 
tenements to the value of  A20 a year.  At present their number 
is  small, some six or eight  for  the shire: during the Tudor 
time it increases.  The Tudor kings find here a useful institu- 
tion for the purposes of their  strong policy-for  from the first 
a  stern check  has  been  kept  upon  these justices;  not  only 
have  the courts  of  law been  ready, perhaps  eager, to notice 
any transgression  by  the justices  of  their  statutory  powers 
(for  the old courts will not suffer any rivalry, and will put the 
narrowest construction upon any statute which authorizes any 
departure  from  the procedure  of  the common law), but  also 
these justices are specially under the eye of the royal council. 
A  statute  of  1388 (12  Ric.  11,  c.  IO), when  giving  them 
certain new powers of dealing with labourers, threatens them 
with punishment at the discretion of  the king's council if they 
do not hold their sessions.  We shall have much more to say 
of  Justices of the peace hereafter. 
The three old courts-the  three superior courts of common 
law,  King's  Bench,  Common  Pleas  and  Exchequer-have 
grown  in  power and  dignity.  The number  of  the judges  is DeveZojment  of the Jzqy 
small,  though  it  has  not  yet  become  fixed  at  the  sacred 
twelve-and  they are  now  erudite  lawyers,  men  who  have 
made  their  fame  by  practising  at  the  bar.  The  line  of 
demarcation  between  the provinces  of  these three  courts  is 
not so plain as once it was, for by the use of  ingenious fictions 
the King's Bench has been stealing business from the Common 
Pleas, and the Exchequer is  beginning to follow its example. 
But to one or the other of  these three courts goes almost all 
of the civil litigation of the realm-all  that the local courts are 
incompetent to entertain.  The King's  Bench is the supreme 
court  for  criminal  cases,  and the Exchequer  still  keeps  its 
monopoly  of  all  cases  touching  the  royal  revenue.  These 
courts have by this time become  purely judicial  institutions, 
they have little or nothing to do with governmental work ; it 
is  their  function  to hear  and determine causes  according  to 
the law of  the land, and  they are very conservative of  all the 
formalities  of  their  procedure.  Already  the  Year  Books 
contain  vast  masses  of  decided  cases,  and  these  cases  are 
treated  as binding  authorities. 
Then again the ambulatory or visitatorial courts have been 
maintained.  Twice a year or so the counties are visited  by 
justices, whose commissions enable them  to deliver the gaols 
and to hear and determine all the criminal business, or all such 
part of  it as is not disposed of by the justices of the peace at 
their  quarter sessions-whose  commissions enable them  also 
to  take  the  trial  of  civil  cases  which  are depending in the 
king's  courts at Westminster.  A great deal of  this work  is 
done by the judges of  the three common law courts-indeed, 
by statute, much  of  it must now  be  done by them-though 
other persons, landowners of the county, are associated  with 
them in the commissions.  The work of  these itinerant justices 
has now become purely judicial work-to  preside at trials, to 
hear and decide causes ; they no longer, like their predecessors 
of  the twelfth  century, add to this duty that of  looking after 
the royal  revenue and conserving  the king's interests.  What 
is more, we  no longer find that the whole county is summoned 
to  meet  them,  with  all  its  hundreds,  boroughs  and  town- 
ships represented.  A  single grand jury  now  represents  the 
county:  the  older  plan  had  been  found  very  burdensome, 
and seems  to  have  been  abandoned  late  in  the fourteenth 
century 
A great change has been  coming over trial by jury since 
we  Iast  looked  at it, and trial by jury  has  become of great 
importance in  national history.  The change has been a slow 
one,  and it  is hardly  yet  completed.  Turning  first  to civil 
cases we  may formulate the change thus:-the  twelve jurors 
are ceasing to be witnesses  and are becoming judges of fact ; 
it  is  no  longer  the theory that  before they come into court 
they will know the truth about the matters at issue, but when 
they come  into court the parties  put  evidence before them, 
produce witnesses who testify in the judge's hearing.  We see 
that  this  is  so  from  a  book  already  mentioned:  Sir  John 
Fortescue, De  Lnz4dibu.s Legzrnz  AngZiae.  He describes how 
'  each of the parties by themselves or their counsel in presence 
of the court, shall  declare  and lay open  to the jury  all and 
singular the matters and evidences whereby  they think  they 
may  be  able  to  inform  the court  concerning  the  point  in 
question,  after  which  each  of  the  parties  has  a  liberty  to 
produce before the court all such witnesses as they please1'- 
in  short, trial by jury is taking that form in which we now-a- 
days  know  it,  the  jurors  try  questions  of  fact.  Still,  in 
Fortescue's book the change is not yet perfect, he sometimes 
speaks of  the jurors  as though they were witnesses-they  are 
drawn  from  the district  in  which  the events  took  place,  in 
order that they may bring their own knowledge to bear  upon 
the question ; if  they give a false verdict they are liable to be 
attainted,  the  case  can  be  tried  over  again  by  twenty-four 
jurors,  and  if  the new  verdict  contradicts the old,  the first 
jury of  twelve is very severely  punished.  In civil cases  this 
mode of  trial has  become almost  universal, though there are 
still  certain  cases  respecting  property in  land  in  which  trial 
by battle can be claimed, and there are some other cases in 
which recourse  is  still  had  to compurgation. 
The commonest  procedure in  civil cases involves the use 
of two  juries,  an indicting  and a  trying jury,  or, as we  say, 
a  grand  and  a  petty  jury.  The grand  jury  is  a body  of 
twenty-three persons representing the county, sworn to present 
criminals.  In the past the theory has  been that such a jury 212  Coutstitutioga  Z History  PERIOD 
accuses men of its own knowledge, and, even  in  our own day, 
this form  is preserved-an  indictment even  in our own  day 
states that the jurors  say upon  their oaths that A, of  malice 
aforethought did slay and murder  B.  As a  matter of  fact, 
however,  what  happens now  is  this-and  we  may  perhaps 
carry  back  the  change as  far  as  Henry  VII's  day-some 
person  who  believes  that  A  has  committed  a  crime  goes 
before  the  grand  jury  and  profers  a  bill  of  indictment,  a 
document stating that A has murdered B.  The grand jurors 
hear the evidence  for the prosecution, and if  they think  that 
this makes it probable that A is guilty, then without hearing 
any evidence for  the defence  they write  on  the bill  'a true 
bill,'  and then A has to take his  trial before a petty jury; if, 
however, they think that there is no ground for suspicion, they 
write  ' no  true  bill '-the  old  phrase  was  ' Ignoramus '-we 
know nought of this-the  bill is said to be ignored, and A goes 
free, though  he is  liable to be  indicted  another time for  the 
same offence:-he  has had  no trial, and is not acquitted.  A 
majority  of  the  body  of  twenty-three  grand  jurors  decides 
whether  the bill  shall be  ignored or no.  So much as to the 
grand jury. 
In the present day, a person who has been indicted  must, 
as a matter of course, stand his trial before a petty jury ; he is 
tried, as we all know, by a jury of twelve, and the jurors  are 
judges  of  fact-their  verdict  is  based  on  the  evidence  of 
witnesses  given  before  them  in  court.  But  in  Henry VII's 
day this was  not quite the case-an  indicted  person was  not 
tried  by  jury  unless  he  consented  to  be  so tried,  but  this 
consent was  extorted from him  by torture, by thepeine forte 
et dure.  If, when asked 'how will you be tried?' he refused to 
say '  By God and my country,' if  (as the phrase went) he stood 
mute of malice, he was  pressed  under heavy weights until he 
either died  or  said  the necessary  words.  So late  as  1658 
a man was pressed to death, so late as 1,726 a man was pressed 
into  pleading,  not  until  1772 was  the peine  forte  et  dzwe 
abolished.  This horrible process was a reminder that trial by 
jury  was  not  native to English law-there  had  been  a  time 
when  to convict  a  man  of  crime  without  allowing  him  to 
appeal to God by  means of  battle or ordeal, had  seemed an 
impossible injustice.  The reason why men were found hardy 
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enough to submit to the terrible torture of  being  pressed  to 
death, instead of escaping with a mere hanging, was this, that 
if  they were  convicted  they forfeited  lands  and chattels,  if 
they died unconvicted  there was  no  forfeiture, and thus their 
families were not ruined. 
Another point that we may note is that before Henry VII's 
day the law had  come to demand unanimity of the jurors- 
unless the twelve agreed there could be no verdict.  This rule, 
as we  all  know,  prevails  at  the  present  day; but  it  only 
became  fixed  in  the  course  of  the later  Middle  Ages;  it 
certainly looked at one time as if  the law would  be  content 
with  the verdict  of  a  majority. 
We have already seen that procedure by indictment  had 
once been a novelty in  English law-a  novelty introduced  by 
Henry I1 : it had  taken its place beside the older procedure 
of an appeal by the party wronged1.  In Henry VII's day this 
older alternative still existed, and was still in use-the  appellee 
could either claim  trial  by  battle, or submit to trial  by jury. 
Trial by battle was, however, becoming very unusual.  Appeals 
were not, however, abolished  until 1819: their  abolition  was 
due to the fact that in  1818,  in the celebrated case of Ash]bra' 
v.  Thornton, an appeal was brought, and the appellee claimed 
trial by battle-the  appellor refused to fight. 
It is necessary, in order to explain what follows, to under- 
stand that before the end of  the Middle Ages trial by jury had 
taken  a  deep root  in  the English  system, and had  already 
become the theme of national boastings.  Fortescue contrasts 
it favourably with  the procedure of  the French courts, where 
there was  no  jury,  and  where  torture  was  freely  employed. 
It is a very curious point in European history, that an institu- 
tion which  was  once  characteristically  Frankish,  became,  in 
course  of time, peculiarly  English, and  underwent, without 
losing  its identity, the great change which turned  the body 
of  neighbour-witnesses into judges  of  the evidence  given  by 
other witnesses. 
But to return  to the courts-we  have yet to speak of  the 
judicial functions of the parliament, of the king in parliament. 
In this sense 'the king in parliament' comes to mean the House Constitutiozznl History 
of  Lords.  In the fourteenth century, as we have already seen, 
we  must regard the presence  in  parliament of  representatives 
of  the  commons  as  something  new.  These  newcomers 
gradually  improve  their  position,  they  will  not  be  mere 
granters of  taxes, they claim  to share in  deliberation and in 
legislation.  But now we have to note that they never obtain, 
hardly attempt to obtain, any share in the judicial work which 
from  of  old  had  been  done by  the king in  the assembly of 
prelates and barons.  The jurisdiction  of  the king in  parlia- 
ment  remains the jurisdiction  of  the king with  his  prelates 
and barons ; in  other words, since the king does not himself 
take part in  judicial  proceedings  (in  the fourteenth  century, 
to say the least, it  is  most  unusual  for him  to do so, in  the 
fifteenth  century, as we  learn  from  Fortescue, it  is thought 
distinctly improper that he  should  do so), the jurisdiction  of 
the king in  parliament  has come to mean the jurisdiction  of  . 
the House of Lords.  This we find is of three kinds. 
(i)  The House of  Lords acts as a  court  for the trial  of 
peers  accused of  treason  or of  felony.  Of this we  have said 
something already1.  If the parliament be not sitting, the peer 
is tried by the Lord High Steward, assisted by a body of  peers 
chosen  by  him.  Very  probably  it  is  because  this  work  of 
trying peers was one very principal field  for the jurisdiction  of 
parliament,  that  the  commons  took  no  part  in  the judicial 
work.  At any rate, in  I 399 the commons, fearing perhaps that 
they might be called in question  touching  some of  the very 
irregular proceedings  of  Richard's  reign, protested  solemnly 
that  they  had  no  part  in  judicial  work-the  judgment  of 
parliament was  the judgment  of  the king and the lords ; this 
protest established a permanent principle. 
(ii)  We have  what is called the jurisdiction  in  error, the 
jurisdiction  of  the king  and parliament  as a court  of  error, 
a  court  which  could  correct  the errors  in  law  of  all  lower 
courts.  This we  may  trace back  far-the  last  resource  for 
royal justice was the king surrounded by the magnates of  the 
realm.  We find  it settled in the fifteenth century as a juris- 
diction  to correct errors in matters of  law, as contrasted with 
matters of  fact.  The notion  of  trying  the same facts  twice 
over,  except  by  attainting the jury,  is  quite foreign  to our 
1 See pp. 169--171. 
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medieval  law-but  if  the king's  courts of  common law make 
errors  in  law, it  remains  for  the  House of  Lords  to correct 
those errors.  During the fourteenth century this jurisdiction 
seems  to  have  been  freely  used,  but  for  some  reason  or 
another, not very easy to  understand, it went  out of  use  in 
the fifteenth  century.  Between  Henry V and James  I  there 
are hardly any known cases of  error being brought before the 
lords: however, this procedure, though for a time disused, had 
a great future before it, as we shall see hereafter. 
(iii)  The parliament, that is to say, the lords, had gradually 
abandoned all attempt to act as a court of  first  instance  in 
criminal or civil cases, save when  a peer was  to be tried  for 
felony or treason-but  to this there was one great exception. 
They  had  entertained  accusations  both  against  peers  and 
against  commoners when  preferred  by the commons.  Such 
accusations preferred by the commons to the lords came to be 
known as impeachments.  The first case of what can definitely 
be called an impeachment, occurs in  the Good  Parliament of 
1376; Lord Latimer, the king's chamberlain, and one Lyons, 
were impeached.  In  1386 we  have the impeachment of  the 
Duke of Suffolk ; some other cases follow rapidly during the 
troubled reign of Richard 11.  A few more cases followed, just 
sufficient to establish the outlines of  a procedure-the  last is 
in  1459.  After this there is a long break from  1459 until this 
ancient weapon was  furbished  for a new use in  1621 ; during 
the interval parliaments were hardly in a position  to impeach 
the king's  ministers, for  it was  as a  check  upon  the king's 
ministers that the impeachment was chiefly valuable, and came 
to be  afterwards valued ; smaller  offenders  could  be  left  to 
their  fate in  the ordinary  courts. 
One other parliamentary process  remains to be noticed- 
but it must be carefully distinguished from an impeachment- 
I  mean  an  act  of  attainder  or  of  pains  and  penalties.  A 
statute, we  say, can  do anything-such  acts as I  have just 
mentioned  are statutes, acts of  parliament for putting a man 
to death, or otherwise punishing  him without any trial at all. 
It is not a judicial act, it proceeds with the legislative authority 
of  king, lords and commons.  At the Coventry parliament  of 
1459 the Yorkist lords were attainted.  Two years afterwards Cogzstitutionn  Z History 
the turn  for the Lancastrians comes, and Henry VI, his wife, 
and a large number of  his supporters are attainted.  In 1477 
the Duke of  Clarence was  attainted-these  were  miserable 
precedents, acts  of  anarchy  and  of  revenge.  It was  under 
Henry VIII, who could obtain anything from parliament, that 
the act of attainder came into common use:  of  this hereafter. 
But distinguish such an act, a statute passed by king, lords and 
commons, without any trial, without any judicial  formalities, 
from the trial before the House of  Lords of a person who has 
been impeached, i.e., formally accused by the commons. 
We  have  yet  to  speak  of  the jurisdiction  of  the king's 
council, a matter with which  it is  difficult to deal, because  it 
was  constantly the subject of  bitter  controversy.  We have 
seen that in  Edward 1's time the council exercised a jurisdic- 
tion, which it is somewhat difficult to mark off from that of the 
parliament ; the two work  together so harmoniously that the 
couricil at times seems a standing committee of the parliament, 
or the parliament a particularly full and solemn meeting of the 
council.  But  this  harmony  is  soon  dispelled : throughout 
the fourteenth  century there is constant conflict between the 
council and  the parliament,  and the latter seeks time  after 
time  to  set  limits  to  the  judicial  functions  of  the  former. 
We  may  distinguish  three  different  kinds  of  jurisdiction, 
(I) the power to correct the errors of  the ordinary courts of 
law, (2) an original jurisdiction, jurisdiction  as a court of  first 
instance in  criminal  cases, (3) an  original jurisdiction  in  civil 
cases. 
(I)  The  first  of  these  has  the  shortest  history.  The 
function  of  correcting the errors in law of the ordinary courts 
of law became definitely the function of the parliament (i.e., as 
we  have seen, of  the House of  Lords), and the council had to 
forego it.  In 1365 we have a case in which the judges of  the 
Court  of  Common  Pleas  refused  to  pay  any heed  to  the 
reversal  by  the  council  of  a  judgment  of  the  justices  of 
assize-the  council, they said, is  not  a  place  in which  judg- 
ments  can  be  reversed1.  Again  in  1402 we  have  a statute 
(4  Hen.  IV, c.  23)  which  shows  that  the council  had  been 
calling in  question  the judgments  of  the  lower  courts, had 
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not  been  regarding  them  as  final-it  is  therefore  ordained 
that after judgment  the parties  shall be  in  peace, until  the 
judgment  be  reversed  by  attaint  or  by  error.  However, 
without  interfering  with  judgments  already  delivered,  the 
council had a wide field of  action, and it is over its jurisdiction 
as a court of first instance that controversy rages. 
(2) Already in  1331 parliament attempts to put  a stop to 
legal  proceedings, other than those  in  the ordinary courts of 
law.  It is  enacted (5  Edw. 111, c. g) that no man  is  to be 
attached by any accusation, nor forejudged of life or limb, nor 
his lands, tenements, goods or chattels seized  into the king's 
hands, against the form  of  the Great Charter and the law of 
the land.  In 1351 we  have  a  second  statute (25 Edw. 111, 
stat. 5,  C.  4): ' None  shall be taken by petition or  suggestion 
made to our lord the king, or to his  council, unless  it be by 
indictment or presentment of  good  and lawful people of  the 
same neighbourhood, where such deeds be done in due manner 
or by process made by writ original at the common law; and 
none shall be put out of  his  franchise or his  freehold, unless 
he be duly brought in to answer, and forejudged of  the same 
by the course of  the law.'  Then again in  1354 (28 Edw. 111, 
c. 3), 'no man  of  what  estate or condition  that  he  be, shall 
be  put  out of  land  or tenement, nor  taken, nor  imprisoned, 
nor  disinherited, nor  put  to death without  being  brought  in 
answer  by due process  of  law.'  In  I 363  and  1364 we  have 
other statutes (37 Edw. 111, c.  18; 38 Edw.  111, c. 9,) which 
denounce  punishment  against  persons who  make  false  sug- 
gestions to the king, statutes which  seem  to be aimed at the 
jurisdiction  of the council.  Then again in  I 368 (42 Edw. I I I, 
c. 3) we have the old story-it  is  established that '  no man be 
put to answer without  presentment  before justices, or matter 
of  record, or  by due process  and writ  original  according  to 
the old  law of  the land.'  But all these statutes which  seem 
devised  to curb the council, and to sanction the procedure of 
the common law courts, indictments and original writs, as the 
only  legal  procedure, have  apparently but  little  immediate 
effect.  Under Henry IV and Henry V the commons are still 
petitioning  against  the jurisdiction  of  the  council; but  the 
king does  not  assent to their petitions.  They then  become Constitz~tional  History 
silent; and it would  seem that under the constitutional  rule 
of  the Lancastrian house, the jurisdiction  of  the council  was 
not  oppressively  exercised.  The series  of  statutes at which 
we  have glanced  remained  unrepealed, if disregarded, during 
the  whole  of  the  Tudor  period.  They  became  of  vast 
importance under the Stuarts, for they were the base for the 
contention  that  the  Court  of  Star  Chamber  was  no  legal 
tribunal. 
Still the convenience of  a  tribunal which  was not  bound 
down  to a  formal  procedure  (and  we  must  remember  that 
the procedure of the common law courts was extremely formal) 
made  itself apparent from time to time, and  we  find parlia- 
ment  admitting  that  the  council  has  a  certain  sphere  of 
jurisdiction.  This we  may see in  several  different  quarters. 
In I 35 I parliament began its course of anti-Roman legislation; 
we have those statutes of Provisors  and of  Praemunire, which 
play  a  large  part  in  the  history  of  our  church,  statutes 
directed  to  excluding  the  interference  of  the  Pope  with 
English  benefices.  In  1363 (38  Edw.  111, stat. 2,  c.  2)  we 
find  parliament  ordaining that  persons  who  offend  against 
these statutes are to answer for it before the council, and to 
be punished according to the discretion of the council.  Lords 
and commons  are in great earnest about this matter, and are 
therefore quite content that justice  shall be done rapidly and 
without  any dilatory formalities.  In  1388 parliament  is  so 
very desirous that justices shall hold their quarter sessions for 
the enforcement of the statutes of labourers, that it (12 Ric. 11, 
c.  10) enacts that if justices  do not hold  sessions they are to 
be punished  according to the discretion of the king's  council. 
In 1453 we find a temporary but very severe act (31 Hen. VI, 
c. 2), passed after Jack Cade's insurrection, which fully admits 
the  lawfulness  of  writs  directing  persons  guilty  of  riots, 
oppressions  and  extortions,  to  appear  before  the  council. 
Contempt  of  such writs  is  to be severely  punished  by  for- 
feiture; this  is  to endure for  seven  years.  A  more general 
admission  we  find  in  certain  articles  for  the council  of  the 
infant  king  agreed  to  by parliament  in  1430-all  petitions 
to  the  council  dealing  with  matters  determinable  by  the 
common law are to be sent to the common  law courts, unless 
the discretion  of  the council feel too great might on the one 
side, too great unmight  on the other, or else other reasonable 
cause that shall move them1. 
If we  place  ourselves at the accession of  Henry VII, and 
ask ourselves whether the criminal jurisdiction  of  the council 
was  legal, we  shall  find  it hard  to come  by a  very  definite 
answer.  On  the  one  hand  there  were  statutes  unrepealed 
which  might  be  read  as  condemning it  entirely.  Our  law 
knows not now, and knew not then, any such principle as that 
statutes can grow obsolete-a  statute once enacted remains in 
force until it is repealed.  Still it is a hard thing to pronounce 
illegal that which parliament and the great mass of the nation, 
including probably the judges, regard  as legal ; and it seems 
probable that at Henry's accession this was true of the council's 
jurisdiction.  It was generally admitted that it  could punish 
those offences which the courts of  common  law  were incom- 
petent to punish, offences falling short of  felony (the council 
seems  always to have shrunk  from pronouncing the penalty 
of  death)  in  particular,  offences  which  consisted  in  an 
interference with  the ordinary course of justice, riots, bribery 
of jurors,  and so forth.  It was, I  think, felt that there were 
men  who  were  too big  for  any court  but the council: they 
would  bribe jurors  and even judges.  The statutes to which 
we  have referred were, we  may say, protests  in favour of  trial 
by jury-but  there are other statutes which show very plainly 
that trial  by jury  often  meant  the grossest  injustice:  there 
were  men  whom  no jury  would  convict.  This, I think,  was 
admitted, and  the  remedy  was  seen  in  a  reserve  of  extra- 
ordinary justice  to  be  found  as of  old  in  the king and his 
immediate advisers, justice which could strike quickly and not 
have to strike again, justice which  could  strike even the most 
powerful offenders. 
It is with this in  our minds that we  approach  the statute 
of 1437 (3 Hen. VII, c.  I), which has been regarded as creating 
the Court of  Star Chamber.  It recites  that certain offences 
are very common, riots, perjury, bribery of  jurors,  misconduct 
of sheriffs and some others of the same class ; then it empowers 
Nicolas, P~*oreedings  and Ordinances qfthe Privy  Cozmcil IV,  61, § I I I. 220  Constit  utiona  Z History  PERIOD 
the chancellor, treasurer, and keeper of  the privy seal, calling 
to them  a  bishop and a  temporal  lord  of  the  council, and 
the two chief justices  or other  two justices  in  their absence, 
to  call  before  them  persons  accused  of  these  offences  to 
examine them, and to punish them according to their demerits 
as they ought to be punished, if  they were thereof convict in 
due  order  of  law.  The  statute  says  nothing  of  the  Star 
Chamber; but  for a long time past a room  in  the palace of 
Westminster bearing that name had been commonlyused bythe 
council for its judicial sessions.  It names, we observe, certain 
particular  offences-and  it names certain persons who are to 
hear the charges  and  punish  the offenders.  Now, in  later 
times (of this we shall have to speak again) we find a tribunal 
which  is  known  as  the  Court  of  Star Chamber; it  is  not 
exactly constituted  on  the lines marked out by the statute of 
Henry  VII, and  it  does  not  confine  itself  to  the offences 
mentioned in that statute.  It consists apparently of the whole 
council,  or  of  a  committee  of  the council,  and  must  have 
generally comprised all or most  of  the officers mentioned in 
the statute : chancellor, treasurer, keeper of the privy seal, two 
judges, one temporal lord of the council and one bishop ; and 
though it does punish  the offences mentioned  in  the statute, 
still 'it  punishes  many  other  offences  as  well-in  short, it 
exercises a very comprehensive penal jurisdiction, practically 
an unlimited  jurisdiction, or limited only by this, that it does 
not attempt to inflict the penalty of death.  Under the Stuarts 
we  have bitter  controversy  as to the legality  of  this  court: 
if  on  the one hand  it is  regarded  as created  by the Act of 
1487, then  it  habitually  exceeds  the  powers  which  were 
entrusted  to  it  by  parliament:  if  on  the other hand  it be 
regarded  as exercising  a  jurisdiction  inherent in  the  king's 
council,  then  it  may  well  be  argued  that  it  acts  in  direct 
defiance of  those unrepealed statutes of  Edward 111's reign, of 
which we have already spoken1. 
To this  point  we  must  come back  hereafter; let us  now 
notice  that Henry VII and his successors have ready to their 
hands a most efficient engine of government.  The same body 
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which issues ordinances, which  controls the execution of  the 
law and the administration of  the state, acts also as a court 
of  justice  with  a comprehensive  penal jurisdiction-one  day 
it  can make an ordinance, and the next punish  men  for not 
obeying it.  Its jurisdiction  it exercises without any lengthy 
formalities-there  is  no  trial  by jury  before  it-the  accused 
person  is  examined on his oath, a procedure quite strange to 
the courts of  common law, in which (as the phrase goes) no- 
one can be compelled to accuse himself.  And it uses torture. 
Fortescue, the Lancastrian chief justice, to whose writings we 
have more  than once referred, speaks of torture as foreign to 
English  law-this  is  one  of  the respects in which  he  extols 
the English law at the expense of  continental law1.  But  in 
Edward IV's reign torture begins to make its appearance ;  we 
hear of it in 1468.  It never becomes part of  the procedure of 
the ordinary courts, but  a free  use  is  made of  it by council, 
and the rack  becomes one of  our political  institutions.  The 
judicial  iniquities  of  Edward  IV's  reign  are evil precedents 
for  his  successors. 
(3)  We have been speaking in the main of  the penal  or 
criminal jurisdiction  of  the  council.  But  it  had  exercised 
a civil jurisdiction  as well, and this has a history  of  its own. 
If in one direction we see the power of  the council represented 
by the Court of Star Chamber, in another we  see it represented 
by the Court of  Chancery. 
We must go back  a little way.  Ever since the Norman 
Conquest  every  king has his chancellor, who  has the custody 
of  his great seal, and is at the head  of  the whole secretarial 
body of  king's clerks.  When at the end of  Henry 111's reign 
there ceases any longer to be  a  chief justiciar, the chancellor 
becomes the king's first minister.  Robert Burnel1,the chancellor, 
is Edward 1's chief  adviser.  The chancellor is almost always 
an ecclesiastic-there  are a  few  instances of  lay chancellors 
in the fourteenth century-generally  he is a bishop.  In many 
different  ways  he  has  for  a  long time  past  been  concerned 
in  the administration of  law.  In  the first place it has been 
his duty, or that of  his  clerks, to draw up those  royal  writs 
(original writs) whereby actions are begun in the king's courts 
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of  common  law.  He has also  had  some judicial  powers  of 
his  own-in  particular,  if  it  be asserted  that  the king  has 
made  a grant  of  what  does not belong to him,  it is for  the 
chancellor to hear the matter, and  if  need  be to advise the 
king to revoke  his  grant.  Then  again  he has  always been 
a member of the king's council, and what is more, the specially 
learned  member-that  he  should  be  acquainted  with  canon 
law  and  Roman  law,  as  well  as  with  the  common  law  of 
England, was very desirable.  Naturally then  if  questions of 
law came before the council, the chancellor's  opinion  would 
be  taken. 
As the fourteecth  century goes  on  we  find  that a  good 
deal  of  civil  litigation  comes before  the council  in  one way 
and another.  Persons who think themselves injured and who 
think  that, for some reason  or another, they cannot get their 
rights by the ordinary means, are in  the habit of  petitioning 
the king,  asking  for  some extraordinary relief.  We  must 
remember  that  besides  the ordinary  writs  whereby  actions 
at  law  were  begun,  writs  which  were  obtained  from  the 
Chancery  as a  matter  of  course  upon  payment of  the fixed 
fee, there  was  a  certain  power  reserved  to the  Chancery of 
making  new  writs  to suit new  cases, of  introducing  modifi- 
cations in the established forms.  Sometimes the relief  which 
a  petitioner  desired  was  of  this  kind ;  at other  times  he 
wanted  more  than this-he  wanted  that the council  should 
send for his adversary and examine him up011 oath.  Various 
excuses for the king's  interference are put forward-the  sup- 
pliant  is  poor, old, sick ; his  adversary  is rich  and powerful, 
will bribe or intimidate the jurors, or has by accident or trick 
obtained  some  advantage of  which  he  cannot  be  deprived 
by  the ordinary courts.  The tone of  these  petitions is very 
humble, they ask relief for the love of  God  and that peerless 
Princess his  Mother, or for  His sake who died  on  the  Rood 
Tree on  Good  Friday.  A  common formula is-for  the love 
of  God  and  in  the  way  of  charity.  Thus  the  petitioner 
admits that strictly  speaking he  is  not  entitled  to what  he  .  - 
asks-he  asks a  boon,  a  royal  favour1. 
1 Select  Cases in Chancery (A.D.  1364-1471)~  ed.  for the Selden Society by 
W. P. Baildon,  1896. 
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Now  the series of  statutes and petitions of  parliament, to 
which  we  have already refefred, seems to have been directed 
quite as much against the interference of  the council in civil 
litigation as against its assumption of  criminal jurisdiction- 
the view  of  parliament  is that  the courts of  common law are 
sufficient.  Gradually,  in  the  fifteenth  century,  the  council 
seems to have abandoned  the attempt to interfere with  cases 
in  which  there was  a  question  which  the courts of  common 
law  could  decide,  but  it  became  apparent  that  there  were 
cases in which no  relief  at all could be got from these courts, 
and yet  cases  in  which  according  to  the  ideas  of  the time 
relief  was  due.  I  cannot  say very  much  about  this  matter 
without plunging into the history of private law-still  some- 
thing  ought  to  be  said.  It  had  for  many  reasons  and  in 
many cases become a common  practice for a landowner (A) 
to convey  his  estate to some  friend  (B),  upon  the  under- 
standing that  though  that  friend  (B)  was  to  be  the  legal 
owner of  it, nevertheless  (A) was to have all  the advantages 
of  ownership:-B  was  then  said  to  hold  the land  'to the 
use of  A, or  upon trust or in  confidence for A.'  This dodge, 
for  such  we  may  call  it,  was  employed  for  a  variety  of 
purposes.  Thus, for example, A  has some reason  to believe 
that  he  will  be  convicted  of  treason-during  the  Wars  of 
the Roses  many persons  must  have regarded  this  as highly 
probable-he  desires  to prevent  his land  being  forfeited, he 
desires to provide  for his  family :-he  conveys his land  to B 
upon the understanding that B is to hold it  upon  trust for, or 
to the use of, him, A.  Then A commits treason,-there  is no 
land to be forfeited-the  land is B's  and B has committed  no 
crime-still  B is in honour bound to let A's heir have the use 
and enjoyment of  the land.  The same device was  used  for 
the purpose of  evading the feudal  burdens;  the same device 
was used for defrauding creditors-the  creditor comes to take 
A's land and finds that it is not A's but B's.  The same device 
was largely used by the religious houses in order to evade the 
statutes of  mortmain ;  they  were  prohibited  from  acquiring 
new lands-but  there was nothing to prevent a man conveying 
land  to  X  to be held  by  him  upon  trust  for the monastery. 
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is commonly laid at the door of  the religious houses.  At any 
rate,  in  the early part of  the fifteenth century  this state of 
things became very common: B  was the legal  owner  of  the 
land, but  he was  bound  in  honour  and  conscience to let A 
have the profit  of it and to do with  it what A might direct. 
His  obligation  was  as yet  one  unsanctioned  by  law-the 
courts  of  conlmon  law  had  refused  to give A  any remedy 
against B; they would not look behind  B; B was  the owner 
of  the land and might do what he pleased  with  it regardless 
of A's wishes. 
By this  time (we  are speaking  of  the early part of  the 
fifteenth  century)  it had  become  so much  the  practice  for 
the king's council to refer all petitions relating to civil cases to 
the chancellor-the  king's chief legal adviser-that  petitioners 
who wanted  civil  relief  no longer addressed their complaints 
to the king, but addressed  them  to the chancellor, and  the 
chancellor seems to have commonly dealt with them without 
bringing the matter before the king  and council.  Now  this 
device of  '  uses, trusts or confidences ' of  which  we  have just 
spoken provided  the  chancellor  with  a  wide  and open  field 
of  work.  In Henry  V's  reign  we  find  that the  chancellor 
will enforce 'a use'  (as it is called)-if  I3 holds land to the 
use  of  A, the chancellor on the complaint of  A  will  compel 
B  to fulfil the understanding, will  compel  him  to deal  with 
the land as A  directs-will  put him  in  prison  for  contempt 
of court if  he refuses to obey the decree :-though  B is legally 
the owner  of  the  land,  it is  considered  unconscionable,  in- 
equitable, that  he should  disregard  the trust  that has  been 
put  in  him-the  chancellor steps in,  in  the name of  equity 
and good  conscience.  No doubt this was convenient ; if  the 
chancellor had not given help, in  course of  time the common 
law courts would probably have had to modify their doctrines 
and to find  some means of  enforcing these 'uses.'  But the 
common law  was a  cumbrous machine, and  could  not easily 
adapt itself  to meet  the new  wants  of new  times.  On the 
other  hand  the chancellor  had a  free  hand, and it is  by no 
means impossible that for  a  long time past  the ecclesiastical 
courts  (and  the  chancellor  was  an  ecclesiastic)  had  been 
struggling  to enforce  these  equitable  obligations.  At any 
rate when  once it had become clear that the chancellor was 
willing  and able to enforce  them, a  great mass of  business 
was brought before him.  It was found highly  convenient  to 
have land  'in use.'  Parliament  and the common  lawyers do 
not  like this equitable jurisdiction  of  the  chancellor-some- 
times they plan to take it away and to provide some substitute 
-but  it justifies  its existence by its convenience, and in  the 
reign of  Henry VII we  must reckon  the Court of  Chancery 
as one of  the  established  courts of  justice,  and  it  has  an 
equitable jurisdiction; beside the common law there is growing 
up another mass of rules which is contrasted with the common 
law and which is known as equity. 
The establishment of  such a system of  rules is  an affair 
of time.  Of the equity of the fifteenth century, even  of  the 
sixteenth,  we  know  but  little,  for  the  proceedings  in  the 
chancery  were  not  reported  as those  of  the common  law 
courts had  been  ever since the days of  Edward I.  But this 
fact alone is  enough to suggest  that the chancellors  did  not 
conceive  themselves  to be very  strictly bound  by rule,  that 
each  chancellor  assumed  a  considerable  liberty  of  deciding 
causes  according  to  his  own  notions  of  right  and  wrong. 
Probably, however, the analogies of the common law and the 
ecclesiastical  jurisprudence  served  as a guide.  In course  of 
time (this belongs rather to a subsequent stage of  our history 
but should be mentioned here) the rules of equity became just 
as strict as the rules  of  common  law-the  chancellors held 
themselves  bound to respect the principles to be found in  the 
decisions of  their  predecessors-a  decision  was  an authority 
for  future decisions. 
Thus it came about  that until very  lately, until  1875, we 
had alongside of the courts of  common law, a court of equity, 
the Court of  Chancery.  I shall attempt to describe hereafter 
the sort of thing that equity was in the present century before 
the great change which  abolished  all our old  courts and the 
sort of  thing that it is at this moment.  We are now  dealing 
with past  time and  must think  of the chancellors  as having 
acquired a field of work which constantly grows.  They are sup- 
plementing the meagre common law, they are enforcing duties 
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those  understandings known  as uses  or trusts, and they  are 
giving remedies which the common  law does not give, thus if 
a man will not fulfil his  contract, all that a court of  common 
law can do is to force him to pay damages for having  broken 
it-but  in  some  cases  the Chancery  will  give  the more ap- 
propriate  remedy  of  compelling  him  (on  pain  of  going  to 
prison  as  a  contemner  of  the court) to specifically perform 
his contract, to do exactly what he has promised.  Then again 
the  procedure  of  the  Court  of  Chancery differed  in  many 
important respects from that of the courts of  law; in particular, 
it examined the defendant on oath, it compelled him to disclose 
what he knew about the facts alleged  against him.  Popular 
the Court  of  Chancery  never was,  but  the nation  could not 
do without  it-and  so gradually our  law  acquired  what  for 
centuries was to be one of its leading peculiarities; it consisted 
of a body of  rules known as common law supplemented by a 
body of  rules known as equity, the one administered  by  the 
old courts, the other by the new Court of  Chancery. 
D.  General  Characteristics of  E~zgLish  Lazu. 
As time does not permit me to carry out the whole of  my 
plan, I will  this morning take notice  of a  few  miscellaneous 
points which are of some importance1.  And, in the first place, 
I turn  to criminal  law  in  general  and the law of  treason  in 
particular. 
At the head  of all  crimes  stands high  treason.  In  1352 
this crime  was  defined by a very famous statute.  It recites 
that  there  had  been  doubts  as  to  what  was  treason  and 
proceeds to declare that treason is : if any compass or imagine 
the death of  the king, his wife or their eldest son and heir, or 
violate  the king's  wife or his  eldest  unmarried  daughter, or 
levy war against the king in  his  realm  or  be  adherent to his 
enemies in  his realm, giving to them  aid  and comfort  in  his 
realm  or elsewhere, and if this shall be provably attainted by 
men of  his  [the accused  person's]  own  condition.  And  if  a 
man  counterfeit the king's  great or privy  seal or his money, 
or bring  false money  into the realm, or slay the chancellor 
For the omitted topics see Analysis,  p.  xvii. 
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treasurer, or justices  of  the one bench  or the other, justices 
'  being in their place  doing their offices.'  Omitting the rarer 
cases we may say that there are three main modes of  treason: 
(I) imagining  the king's  death,  i.e. forming  an  intention  to 
kill the king and displaying this intention  by  some overt act, 
(2) levying  war  against the king, (3) adhering to the king's 
enemies.  From  1352  to  the  present  day  this  statute has 
formed  the basis  of  the law  of  treason.  However, in  every 
time  of  political  disorder  new  treasons  have  been  created, 
which  generally  have  been  abolished  when  the danger  has 
passed away.  Thus in I 397, at the troubled close of Richard 11's 
reign, it was  made treason  not merely  to compass  the death 
of  the king, but to compass to depose him.  Two years after- 
wards,  when  the  House of  Lancaster  had  succeeded  to the 
throne, this  statute was  repealed.  So in  1414 it was  made 
treason to kill or rob persons having  the king's  safe-conduct ; 
but  this was  repealed  in  1442. No  other  new  treason  was 
created by statute during the fifteenth century; but the judges 
were  discovering  that  the words  of  the Act of  Edward  111 
could be stretched.  Then with the Reformation we ha;e  new 
statutory  treasons:  nine  Acts  of  Henry  VIII create  new 
treasons-four  directed  against  the  supporters of  the  pope, 
five devoted  towards maintaining the royal  succession as  it 
stood after the king's  various marriages :-thus  it was made 
treason to publish and pronounce by express writing or words 
that the king is an heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel or usurper; 
obstinately to refuse the oath abjuring the papal  supremacy ; 
to imagine to deprive  the king of  his title as supreme  head 
of  the church ; to assert the validity  of  the king's  marriage 
with  Anne of Cleves.  At the beginning  of  the  next  reign 
(I  547) all these new treasons were swept away-but  some new 
ones  were  created-in  1549 it was  made treason  for twelve 
or more persons  to make a  riot  with  intent to kill, take or 
kill any of the Privy Council.  Then these were abolished  in 
Mary's reign : but some new treasons were created, thus it was 
treason  if  any by  express words  shall pray  that God would 
shorten the queen's life-or  to affirm that Philip ought not to 
have the title of king jointly  with the queen.  Under Elizabeth, 
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the queen's dominions to remain in the realm.  But all along 
the statute of  1352 remained the normal measure of  treason. 
It was  discovered,  however,  that  its  words  were  elastic 
enough.  We have  some extraordinary  stories, for  the truth 
of  which I cannot vouch, of  what under Edward IV was held 
treason by imagining the king's death.  Thus Walter Walker, 
dwelling at the sign of  the Crown, told  his little child that if 
he  would be quiet he  would  make him  heir to the  Crown- 
this was treason.  Thomas  Burdett had  a white  buck  in  his  . 
park, which  in  his  absence was  killed  by  Edward  IV when 
hunting ; Burdett expressed a wish that the buck  were, horns 
and all, in the belly of  him who counselled the king to do it- 
this was treason, though Markham, C. J., refused to be a party 
to so iniquitous a judgment1.  Whether these stories be true or 
no, it certainly became established  doctrine under  the Tudors 
that an attempt manifested  by  some overt act to depose the 
king, or compel him by force to govern in a particular  way, is 
an imagining of the king's death.  In the case of  Lord Essex, 
in 1600, the judges declared that in case a subject attempts to 
put himself  into such strength that the king shall not be  able 
to resist  him, and to force  and  compel  the king  to  govern 
otherwise  than  according  to  his  own  royal  authority  and 
direction, it  is  manifest  rebellion,  and  in  every  rebellion  the 
law intendeth as a consequence the compassing the death and 
deprivation of the king, as foreseeing that the rebel will never 
suffer  the king  to  live  or reign  who  might  punish  or take 
revenge of  his treason or  rebellion.  So again  the term ' levy 
war against the king' was extended so as to include  riots  for 
political objects; thus Coke holds that it is treason to assemble 
for the purpose of pulling down not this or that enclosure, but 
enclosures generally, and in  the seventeenth  century (1668) a 
riot for the purpose of  pulling down brothels was held  to be 
treason.  Thus by the process  of  interpreting  the statute of 
I 352 what came to be  known  as '  constructive treasons ' were 
created.  For the most  part  these interpretations remain law 
at the present  day ; it has  become unusual to put this part of 
the law in  force, riots  are generally  punished  under  statutes 
Stow's  Chronicle, p.  430.  See  also  Reeve,  History of  Enghsh  Law, ed. 
F~nlason,  vol.  111, p.  32  note. 
merely as riots-but  still in the main the so-called constructive 
treasons are still treasons. 
One measure of improvement had been passed.  A statute 
of 1552 (5 and 6 Edward VI) required that in cases of  treason 
there should  be  two  witnesses, who  are to testify  before  the 
accused-our  law had no such provision for the case of  other 
crimes and has not at the present day. 
Another statute of  some importance was passed  in  1494 
(I  I  Hen. VII, c. I)  : this provides in substance that obedience 
to a king a2 facto who is not also king dejzcre shall not after a 
restoration expose his adherents to the punishment of treason. 
This act  carries  on  its  face  the stamp of  the  Wars of  the 
Roses.  It became  of  some importance  in  after  times: it is 
said that Oliver  Cromwell's  supporters pressed him to accept 
the crown  in  order that they, in  case of  a restoration, might 
have that  protection  which  this  statute gives to  those  who 
obey a de  facto  king-obedience  to a lord protector was  not 
within the statute1. 
Next  below  treason  stand  the  felonies.  These  consist 
(I) of  the common law felonies, which consist of  those crimes 
which  had  been  considered  as  peculiarly  grave  at the time 
when our common law first took  shape in the thirteenth cen- 
tury: homicide,  arson,  burglary,  robbery, rape  and  larceny. 
Broadly speaking we  may say that  they were capital  crimes, 
save  petty  larceny,  stealing  to  less  value  than  12d.  And 
(2)  of  certain  crimes  which  have  been  made  felony  by 
statute-and  which  also  are  punishable  by  death.  But  in 
the  course  of  the  sixteenth  century  a  new  line  is  drawn 
through  the  felonies-some  are  clergyable,  others  are  un- 
clergyable.  To go  back  for  a  moment  to  remote  times: 
Henry I1 had failed in his attempt to bring  the clergy  under 
the ordinary  criminal  law  of  the  realm.  The clerk  found 
guilty of  crime could only be handed over to the bishop, who 
would do no more than degrade him from his  orders.  Owing 
perhaps to the excessive severity of  the law, the doctrine got 
established that anyone who could read was a clerk: and thus 
any man who could read could commit felony with  impunity 
Reference  may also  be made to  Hallam,  Constitutional Htstory, vol.  rrr, 
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-women  had  no such  immunity.  As the Reformation  ap- 
proaches, statutes begin to interfere  with  this state of  things. 
In 1496 a statute (12 Hen. VII, c. 7) deprived all but ordained 
clerks of  benefit of  clergy, in  case of  wilful  murder.  Other 
statutes  follow  which  take  away  clergy  from  all  men  in 
particular  cases-thus  in  I 536  certain  piratical  offences,  in 
I 547 highway robbery, horse-stealing, stealing from  churches, 
in 1576 rape-and  so forth, and thus felonies are divided into 
two  classes  known  as  clergyable  and  unclergyable.  Then 
again  under  an  act of  1487  it .was  provided  that a  person 
not  really  in  orders  should  have  his  clergy but  once,  and 
should  be  branded  in  the  thumb,  so that  the  fact  of  his 
conviction  might  be  apparent.  In  1622, just  at the end of 
our  period,  women  for  the  first  time  obtained  a  privilege 
equivalent to the benefit of  clergy. 
Below the felonies again stand the misdemeanours-minor 
crimes not  punished  with  death, but  punished  in  general by 
fine and imprisonment.  Some are misdemeanours by common 
law; many  are the  outcome  of  statute.  The term  misde- 
meanour  is  gradually  appropriated  to describe these  minor 
crimes.  In the older books we find  them  called  trespasses- 
but, as time goes  on, trespass  is  the  term  appropriated  to 
civil  wrongs, while  misdemeanour  is  appropriated to crimes 
not  amounting  to  felony.  The  same  act  may  be  both 
trespass  and  misdemeanour; thus if  A  assaults  B,  this  is a 
trespass  against B,  he can  sue A  for  it in  a civil  court and 
recover damages, but  also  it  is a  misdemeanour;  A  can  be 
indicted for it before a criminal  court, and can be punished 
for  it  by  fine  or  imprisonment,  or  both; the same act  has 
civil consequences  and penal  consequences, it  is a  cause  for 
civil  action  and  also  a  punishable  offence. 
Treason,  felonies, and  misdemeanours are all  indictable 
offences-every  indictable offence falls under one of these three 
heads.  Of  criminal  procedure  we  have  already  said  some- 
thing-the  accused  person  is  indicted  by  a grand jury  and 
tried  by a petty jury.  The old procedure by way  of  appeal 
is fast dying out.  In case of  misdemeanour, but not of  felony 
or treason, a person might be put upon his trial before a petty 
jury  without  any  indictment  by  a  grand  jury,  in  case  the 
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king's  attorney-general  took  up  the  case  and  filed  what  is 
called  a  criminal  information.  The origin  of  the  criminal 
information  is  still  obscure-it  was  occasionally  employed 
under  the  Stuarts  for  the  prosecution  of  political  misde- 
meanours.  The king's attorney-general informed the Court of 
King's Bench that the accused person had committed a crime, 
and  then  that  person  was  subjected  to trial  before  a  petty 
jury.  This was  the procedure  used  in  the famous  case  of 
Sir John Eliot, which will come before us hereafter. 
An indicted person was  not allowed  to make his defence 
by  counsel,  and only  by  degrees was he gaining the power 
of calling witnesses to give evidence in his favour.  In criminal 
cases the theory that the jury were witnesses had  not entirely 
given way before the theory that they were judges  of  fact- 
the  prisoner  seems  at  all  events  to  have  had  no  power 
to  compel  unwilling  witnesses  to  come  and  testify  in  his 
favour. 
Then  again  below  these  indictable  offences  there  was 
springing up a class of  pettier  offences, for which  no  general 
name had yet been  found, offences which  could  be  punished 
without trial  by jury  by justices  of  the peace.  As yet they 
did not attract the attention  of  lawyers, and it is only in the 
eighteenth  century that  their  number  becomes  considerable. 
However, from time to time a statute created such an offence 
-they  were all of  statutory origin: the justices  of  the peace 
themselves  were  of  statutory  origin.  Thus  taking up  the 
statute book  of James I, the following cases meet our eye- 
he who is guilty of tippling in an ale-house is to be fined  ten 
shillings,  the  offence  being  proved  by  the  oath  of  two 
witnesses  beforc  any one or  more justice  or justices  of  the 
peace ; then, again, in  1604 we  have a severe game law : it  is 
made  penal  for  persons  who  have  not  a  certain  amount of 
wealth  to keep a greyhound  or  a setter-he  who offends can 
be sent to gaol for three months on  the offence being proved 
by two witnesses  before two or more justices  of  the peace- 
and  so forth.  Parliament  has  undertaken  to regulate divers 
trades and industries in  a very elaborate way, and a  breach 
of these  regulations  is often  made  an offence  for  which  the 
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of  imprisonment  by justices  of  the peace  without  any trial 
by jury.  In  short,  what  we  in  our  day  know  as offences 
punishable  upon  summary conviction, as contrasted with  in- 
dictable offences, are becoming not uncommon. 
The  justices of  the peace  have by this time become very 
important persons.  They are attracting attention, and books 
are  written  about their  duties, in  particular  that  excellent 
book,  Lambard's  Eirenarciza.  For every shire a  number  of 
country gentlemen are appointed justices of the peace by the 
king.  The boroughs are often pfivileged by their charters to 
elect their own justices-sometimes  the county justices  have 
no jurisdiction  over  the borough, sometimes the county and 
borough justices have a concurrent jurisdiction : this depends 
on the wording of  the borough charters.  The duties of  the 
justices have by this time become very miscellaneous.  In the 
first  place, four  times  a  year they hold sessions of  the peace 
for  the county-quarter  sessions-and  there they exercise a 
high  criminal jurisdiction : they can try almost all offenders: 
they try with a petty jury those who are indicted  by a grand 
jury.  In  the  second  place,  out  of  quarter  sessions  they 
exercise those  statutory  powers  of  summary  trial  of  small 
offences of  which I have just  spoken.  In the third place, we 
find already the germs of  another function which has become 
very  important  in  our  own  day,  namely,  the  preliminary 
examination of  prisoners accused of  indictable offences.  We 
now are accustomed to see a  person  accused of  crime  taken 
before a  magistrate, who either  commits him to prison  until 
trial, or lets him out on  bail  until trial, or, holding that there 
is no case against him, dismisses the charge.  The  preliminary 
trial, for such we  may call it, before  the justice  of  the peace 
has grown up slowly-but  we can see the germs of it in the six- 
teenth century.  Ever since their institution in Edward 111's 
reign  the duty of  seeing  to the  arrest of  suspected  persons 
has been passing out of  the sheriff's  hands into the hands of 
the justices-it  is for the justices  to bail the prisoner if  by law 
he be entitled to bail, or to commit him to prison.  Then acts 
of 1554 and I 555 directed the justices to examine the prisoner 
and  his  accusers, to  put the examination  into  writing,  and 
send  it to the court  before which the prisoner  was  to stand 
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his trial.  However, we must not suppose that this examination 
was  very  like that to which  we are now accustomed.  The 
object of  it is not to hold an impartial inquiry into the guilt 
or innocence  of  the prisoner, and to set him  free if  there is 
no case against him, but rather to question him and to get up 
the case against him ; the justice of  the peace here plays the 
part rather of  a public prosecutor than of  a judge.  Fourthly, 
the justices  of  the  peace  have  acquired  a  control  over  the 
constabulary of  the county.  Arrests are now generally made 
not  by the hue and cry as in  old  times, but by constables 
who  are often  empowered to make  the arrest  by  warrants 
issued  by the justices.  The validity  of  such warrants  is  in 
Coke's day still a matter of  some doubt, but in course of time 
their  scope is  widened.  Often  the first step in a prosecution 
is now an application to a justice for a warrant for  the arrest 
of  a  suspected  person.  Fifthly, the justices  have acquired 
powers which  we  may,  I  think, call governmental.  In par- 
ticular,  the new  Poor  Law system  instituted  by the act  of 
1601 is  placed  under  their  control:  so is  the new  highway 
system.  Quarter sessions thus become not merely a  criminal 
court  for  the county,  but also a  governmental assembly,  a 
board with governmental and administrative powers.  It thus 
takes the place of the old county court, which has sunk into 
being a  court held  by the sheriff or his under-sheriff for the 
decision  of  petty civil  causes-chiefly  cases  of  small debts. 
Parliamentary elections are still said  to be  held, as of  old, in 
the county court; but  probably  a  parliamentary election  is 
the  one  occasion  on  which  freeholders  attend;  the  small 
judicial  business  of  the court  is  transacted  by the sheriff  or 
his  deputy. 
A very noticeable feature in  English history is the decline 
and  fall  of  the sheriff, a decline and fall which  goes on  con- 
tinuously  for  centuries.  In the  twelfth  century he  is  little 
less than a provincial  viceroy.  All the affairs of the county: 
justice,  police,  fiscal  matters,  military matters, are under his 
control.  Gradually  he loses  power : new  institutions  grow 
up  around  him  and  overshadow  him.  As to  justice:  first 
the  king's  itinerant  judges,  then  the  justices  of  the peace 
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court  for  petty debts :  the  functions of  his  tourn  are  now 
performed  by justices  of  the peace with  statutory power for 
punishing small  offences: he  may  never  be  a justice  in  his 
own  county.  The control  over the constabnlary has slowly 
slipped  from  his  fingers  and  is  grasped  by  the justices  of 
the peace.  He is even  losing his  powers as a tax collector; 
parliament makes  other provisions for  this matter, and what 
he has still to do is very subordinate  work.  Lastly, he  is no 
longer head  of  the county forte, the posse comitatzls.  Under 
the Tudors the  practice  begins  of  appointing  a  permanent 
Lord-Lieutenant  to  command  the military  force, the militia 
it is coming to be called, of the shire. 
One of  the immediate  causes  of  this  decline and  fall  is 
that  the sheriff has become  an  annual  officer.  In the four- 
teenth century the sheriff was well  hated  as the oppressor of 
the county: he  had  taken  the county at a rent and tried  to 
make the most  out of  it.  Having failed, as we  have before 
noted,  in  obtaining elected  sheriffs,  parliament  set itself  to 
obtain  annual  sheriffs, and  ultimately succeeded.  This took 
a series of  statutes extending over near a century, from  1354 
(28 Edw. 111, c.  7) to  1444 (23  Hen. VI, c.  7).  No  matter 
what  statute may  say, the sheriffs  remain  in  office  ten  and 
twelve  years: however, in  the fifteenth  century this  point  is 
won.  This seals the sheriffs fate : an officer who is  to be the 
head of the police and of the military force cannot be an annual 
officer.  He falls  lower and lower  until  at last he has  little 
more  to  do than  to  carry out  the judgments  of  courts  of 
justice-to  seize the property of  debtors, to seize their persons, 
to keep the county gaol, to hang felons.  His office, once so 
profitable,  becomes  merely  a  burdensome,  expensive  task. 
The real  work  is done by an under-sheriff, but  the sheriff is 
responsible  for  his  conduct  and  must  pay  for  his  mistakes. 
Already in  the seventeenth century it is difficult to get sheriKs 
-men  avoid the office if  they can ; but they can be, and are, 
compelled  to serve.  The sheriff,  I say, falls lower and lower 
in  real  power: his  ceremonial  dignity  he  retains-he  is  the 
greatest  man  in  the county and  should  go to dinner before 
the Lord-Lieutenant. 
The Lord-Lieutenant is originally a military  officer; but 
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he  becomes  also  the  honorary  head  of  the justices  of  the 
peace.  From the first, one of  the justices  has been specially 
charged  to keep the rolls, the records  of  the justices-he  is 
the czdstos rotz~lorz~~~.  Generally the same person is appointed 
Lord-Lieutenant  and custos rotulorz~wz-and  it is in  the latter 
character rather than the former that he comes to be regarded 
as the first among the justices.  Under Tudors and Stuarts 
the justices are kept well in  hand  by  the king's  council, and 
the Lord-Lieutenant  is  the person  with  whom  the  council 
carries on its correspondence.  At least in  later days justices 
of the peace are usually appointed on the recommendation of 
the Lord-Lieutenant,  but  he  has  no  rule  over  them, he  is 
merely  the  first  among  equals.  The justices  we  remember 
are appointed by the king and hold their offices merely during 
his good pleasure.  Still the office  is regarded more and more 
as a permanent office from which a man should not lightly be 
dismissed. 
Our  last word  shall  be  as to  the  constables.  A  con- 
stabulary in our modern sense, a force of  men trained, drilled, 
uniformed, and paid there is not-our  modern  police force is 
very modern indeed.  But it  has  become the law  that every 
parish-or  more strictly speaking every  township-is  bound 
to  have  its  constable.  The constable  as  we  have  said  is 
originally  a  military  officer-a  petty  officer  in  the  county 
force;  but  then  the county force,  the posse  conzitat?ds, is  as 
much  concerned  with  making hue and cry after malefactors 
as with defensive warfare ; this work falls more and more into 
the constable's hands, and as the militia becomes more military 
the constable becomes less military, more purely, in  our terms, 
a police officer.  In the seventeenth century he is still elected 
by his neighbours in the old local  courts, in  those  districts in 
which  such  courts still  exist:  elsewhere  and  perhaps  more 
generally he is appointed  by the justices.  Every capable in- 
habitant  of  the township can  be appointed constable, unless 
there is some special cause for exemption.  Remember that all, 
or almost all, of  our old common  law offices  are compulsory 
offices-a  person appointed cannot refuse them.  To this day 
a man  may be  made sheriff or mayor  of a  borough  against 
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allowed to find a respectable substitute-and  this he could do 
for £5  or £10:  the office was annual.  The constable had no 
salary, but he was entitled to demand certain  fees for some 
part of his business.  His chief business was the apprehension 
of malefactors, and for this purpose he was armed with certain 
powers additional to those which the ordinary man has : thus 
it was sometimes safe for a constable to make  an  arrest on 
suspicion, when  it would not have been  lawful for a private 
man.  It is well to remember that the constable  is  an officer 
long known to our common law : a great part of  the peculiar 
powers of the modern policeman  are due to this-that  he  is 
a constable, and as such has all those  powers with  which  for 
centuries past a constable has been entrusted by law. Gradually 
the constables come more and more under the control of  the 
justices  of  the peace-in  particular, it becomes  less and less 
usual for arrests to be made without  the warrant of  justices, 
and  in  executing  such  warrants  the  constable  has  special 
protection. 
Let me remind you in  conclusion  that there is one  book 
for  the  vacation  in  which  some  profitable  things  may  be 
found about Elizabethan justices  and Elizabethan constables 
-if  you cannot yet enjoy Lambard's  Eirennrcha, you can  at 
least enjoy Shallow and Silence, Dogberry and Verges. 
PERIOD  111. 
SKETCH  OF PUBLIC  LAW  AT  THE DEATH 
OF  JAMES  I. 
THE next point  at which  we  will  take our  stand  is  the 
death of  James I  and the quiet accession of  Charles I.  Let 
us once more remember that we are neglecting what certainly 
are the most  obvious  divisions  of  our  history.  The Tudor 
period is a distinct, well-marked period, and anyone who was 
writing the history of England would have to mark it as such. 
But  we  are  not  attempting  any such  task; rather  we  are 
purposely  choosing  unusual  points of  view  in  order that we 
may  see  familiar  facts  in  new  lights-our  attempt  is  to 
supplement our books  of history.  And  I  want  very  much 
to  bring  out  the  fact  that  the  history  of  our  public  law 
regarded  as  a whole  is  very  continuous : the very  greatest 
events  that occur  in  it  do not constitute what  can  fairly be 
termed  revolutions.  The Tudor monarchy  is  indeed  some- 
thing very different  from  the Lancastrian-the  latter was  a 
very  limited  monarchy, the former, if  we  regard its practical 
operation, seems almost unlimited.  Still the difference, when 
we  look  into it,  is  found  not  so much  in  the nature  of  the 
institutions which  exist as in  the spirit  in  which they work : 
the  same  machinery  of  king, lords,  commons,  council,  law 
courts, seems to bring out very different results.  Again there 
is  no  one minute at which  the change takes place-it  is not 
like a change in law which must take place at some assignable 
date.  The Tudor kingship differs from the Lancastrian king- 
ship-but  what are we  to say of  the two Yorkist  kings?  A 
distinguished modern historian prefers to make what  he calls 
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Edward IV-we  have indeed an intermediate time  So again 
at the end of  the period,  before  the death of  James  I, the 
relation  of  the  parliameot  to  the  king  is  practically  very 
different  from  what  it was  under  Elizabeth:  but  the change 
has  not  been  sudden ; gradually  for  some time  past  parlia- 
ments have been becoming more independent : there has been 
no great change in the law, but there has been a slow change 
in the working of the law. 
A.  Parliament. 
I.  Constitution of  Parliament. 
There have been no very great changes in the constitution 
of  parliament.  We look  first  at the House  of  Lords.  The 
parliaments  of  Henry VII had  contained  two  archbishops, 
nineteen  bishops, and twenty-eight  abbots, in  all  forty-nine 
spiritual peers.  After  the dissolution  of  the monasteries  in 
1540  the  abbots  disappear,  but  six  new  bishoprics  are 
founded,  Oxford, Peterborough,  Gloucester,  Bristol,  Chester 
and Westminster, and their occupants as a  matter of  course 
are summoned  to the  House of  Lords  though  they hold  no 
baronies.  The bishopric  of  Westminster, however, had  no 
long continuance : it was dissolved in  I 550, so the number  of 
spiritual peers fell to twenty-six.  The number of the temporal 
peers  does not  increase  rapidly  during the Tudor reigns: a 
new  peerage  was seldom created, save when  an old  peerage 
was extinguished ; during the whole  period  it fluctuates (on 
account of  minorities and  so  forth) round  fifty.  Thus after 
the dissolution  of  the monasteries, the spiritual peers  became 
a minority.  A change comes with  James I ; he throws about 
peerages with  a lavish  hand: eighty-two lay peers  sat in his 
first parliament, ninety-six in his last.  Peers are now invariably 
created by letters patent definitely granting the dignity.  The 
bishops  have  become  distinctly royal  nominees.  Practically 
for a long time past the king had  usually had his way about 
the  appointment  of  bishops;  his  only  competitor  was  the 
Pope-but  the form of election by the cathedral chapters was 
maintained.  In I 53 I a statute,  one of the first statutes directed 
against  Rorne,  dealt  with  this  matter:  the  king  gives  the 
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chapter  his  licence  to  elect  a  bishop,  but  along with  this 
congd d'kliye, he  sends letters recommending a candidate, and 
if  he  is  not  elected  within  twelve  days  then  the king may 
appoint  a  bishop  by  letters  patent.  Capitular  election  is 
therefore but a solemn formality.  In Edward VI's reign even 
the co~zgd  d'dliye was abolished by statute; the bishops were to 
be  appointed  simply  by  the king's  letters  patent.  The act 
which did this was of  course repealed  under  Mary, and was 
not re-enacted by Elizabeth, who re-enacted the statute of her 
father's reign, which  still  is law.  We observe therefore  that 
over the constitution of the House of Lords the king has great 
powers : he practically appoints all the spiritual peers ; he can 
make as many new lay peerages as he pleases. 
The House of  Commons has considerably increased.  Hy 
an act of  1535 (27 Hen. VIII, c. 26) Wales was brought fully 
within  the  system  of  English  public  law.  Monmouthshire 
became  an  English  county with  two  members,  and  two for 
the borough of  Monmouth.  Each of  the twelve counties into 
which Wales was divided sent one member, and eleven Welsh 
boroughs  sent each  one  member.  By  another  act  of  1543 
(34 Hen VIII, c.  13) two members were given to the county, 
two to the city of  Chester; thus this ancient palatinate was 
incorporated  in  the  general  body  of  the  realm;  Durham 
remained  unrepresented  until  after  the  Restoration.  Thus 
thirty-one members were added.  For a short time Calais was 
represented, but that last relic of the king's French possessions 
disappeared  in  Mary's  reign.  But this was by no means all : 
the king, we remember, had exercised the power of  conferring 
on boroughs the right to send members.  Hitherto this power 
had  not  been  extensively  used  for  the purpose  of  packing 
parliament, and  Henry VI I I used  it  but very  sparingly : he 
gave the right to but  five boroughs.  Under Edward VI the 
power was lavishly used for political purposes : he thus added 
forty-eight members, Mary twenty-one, Elizabeth sixty, James 
twenty-seven.  The number of  burgesses  in  the lower house 
was thus vastly increased, and with it the power of  the crown. 
When a new  borough  was created, and when  a  new  charter 
was granted to an old  borough, care was  generally taken  to 
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in  a  small  select  governing  body-a  mayor  and council- 
nominated  in the first instance by the crown, and afterwards 
self-elected.  Meanwhile the qualification for the county fran- 
chise was not altered ; it was still, under the act of Henry VI, 
the forty-shilling franchise, a qualification which, as the value 
of money fell, was becoming somewhat low and very capricious. 
The copyholder  now often had  just  as valuable  an estate as 
the freeholder ;  it was fully protected by the king's courts, and 
his  ancient  services  had  been  commuted  for  money  rents, 
which, as the value of money fell, became less and less burden- 
some-still  he had  no vote.  Towards the end  of  our  period 
we begin to see many signs that to be a member of parliament 
is coming to be an object of  desire:  contested  elections are 
keenly fought.  James  I gave the right to be represented by 
two members to each of the two Universities. 
The time has come when we  can no  longer  speak of  the 
clergy as forming for  any practical  purpose an estate of  the 
realm.  We have  seen  that they had  neglected  to obey the 
prae~lzunientes  clause, but had voted  their taxes in their con- 
vocations.  They still vote  their  taxes  in  convocation, but 
since  1540  the practice has grown  up of  passing an act  of 
parliament  to  confirm  the vote, as  if  it  might  be  doubted 
whether the convocations could bind the clergy.  We have to 
remember  that  the  church  can  now  no  longer  claim  to be 
independent  of  the state.  The clergy have  been  compelled 
to admit  the  royal  supremacy.  In  1534  the convocations 
were  compelled  to  promise  that  they  would  make no  new 
ecclesiastical canons without the king's  licence and approval, 
and this principle was confirmed by act of parliament.  Even 
then within  the purely ecclesiastical  sphere the convocations 
can do nothing without the royal assent, and the doctrine has 
grown up that such canons, even though they have the royal 
assent, are not binding on the laity'. 
2.  Privileges  of  Parliament. 
We have  as yet said  nothing of  what are known as the 
privileges of  parliament, but  this  subject can  no  longer  be 
postponed, for it is becoming of  first-rate importance.  Under 
this head-privileges  of parliament-it  is, or was, usual to mix 
See pp. 51  1-3. 
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together several distinct  matters.  Let us  notice  first; two of 
the usual sub-heads, (a)  freedom  of  speech, and (b)  freedom 
from arrest. 
(a)  During the Middle Ages the right of  each  house  to 
debate freely and without interference  from the king or from 
the other house  seems to have been  admitted and observed. 
It is common in this context to mention  the case of  Thomas 
Haxey ; in  1397  a  bill  was  laid  before  the commons  and 
accepted by them, which contained a bold attack on Richard I1 
and his courtiers.  The king took offence, demanded the name 
of  the person  who  introduced  the bill ; Haxey's  name was 
given  up ;  the  lords  declared  that  anyone  who  stirred  up 
the  commons  to  make  such  demands  was  a  traitor;  they 
condemned Haxey to die, but the Archbishop claimed him as 
a  clerk,  so  he  was  not  executed, and  was  soon  afterwards 
pardoned: in  1399, shortly after the accession of  Henry IV, 
the judgment  was annulled on  the petition of  the commons 
as contrary to their liberties.  One of  the curious points about 
this case is  that  Haxey, to all seeming, was not a member of 
the House of  Commons; it is thought that he may have been a 
clerical proctor attending parliament under the prael~zunientes 
clause.  Such an interference with the freedom of  debate seems 
to stand  almost  alone in  our  medieval history; but  in  1376 
Peter de la Mare, the Speaker, was thrown into prison for his 
conduct in the Good Parliament, and remained in  prison until 
after  the death of  Edward  I1  I, when Kichard  released  him ; 
again in  1453 the Speaker, Thomas Thorpe,  was imprisoned- 
the cause seems to have been  his opposition  to the Duke of 
York ; he was however prosecuted  on  a private pretext and 
imprisoned.  This occurred during a prorogation.  When the 
commons  again  met  they  demanded  their  Speaker-they 
demanded  of  the king and lords  that they might have their 
ancient  privilege ; the lords  however  refused  their  petition 
and  determined  that Thorpe should remain in prison.  Here, 
though  the real  cause  of  arrest  may  have  been  conduct  in 
parliament, the arrest was  made in  a  civil  action  under  the 
judgment  of  3.  court of  law, and it bears therefore rather on 
freedom  from  arrest  than  on  freedom  of  speech.  A  much 
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1512.  Strode, a  member  of  the commons  house,  was  im- 
prisoned  by the Stannary Court for having proposed certain 
bills in  parliament to regulate the privilege of  the tin miners. 
A  statute was  therefore  passed  declaring  void  the proceed- 
ings against  him, and declaring  in  a  general  way  that  any 
proceedings against any member of  the present parliament or 
of any future parliament for any speaking in parliament should 
be  utterly void  and  of  none  effect.  This was  a  statutory 
recognition of  the freedom of  debate.  In Charles 1's day the 
king's  party had  to contend  that this was no general statute, 
but  had  reference  only  to  the  particular  case  of  Strode; 
the judges  in  the famous case of  Sir John Eliot upheld this 
contention ; then  in  the  Long  Parliament  the  commons 
resolved  that Strode's Act was  a general act, and the lords 
concurred  in  this  resolution :  but  all  this  still  lies  in  the 
future.  In  1541 for  the  first  time  the Speaker  at the be- 
ginning of  the session  included freedom of  speech as among 
the  ancient  and  undoubted  rights  and privileges  which  the 
commons  claimed  of  the king, and thenceforward  it became 
the  regular  practice  that  the  Speaker  should  demand  this 
privilege.  It  is  during  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  that  this 
privilege  becomes a matter  of  contention, though the queen 
cleverly  manages  that  disputes  shall  be  compromised.  In 
1566 she prohibits  the commons from discussing  the succes- 
sion to the crown, but then gives way, revokes the prohib~tion, 
and the commons  are grateful.  In I571 Strickland, who has 
introduced some ecclesiastical bills, is called before the council 
and ordered  not  to appear  again  in  parliament; the  queen 
again gives way.  In 1576 Peter Wentworth makes trenchant 
speeches about freedom of  debate ; the commons are against 
him, and themselves  commit him  to the Tower.  The same 
fate  befalls  him  in  1588.  The commons  acquiesce  in  the 
queen's  command  that they shall avoid  religious  topics.  In 
I 593 she is very positive-members  are only to vote 'Aye' or 
'  No,'  and ecclesiastical  matters are not to be discussed ; one 
Morice is committed to prison for introducing an ecclesiastical 
bill.  The commons seem during these years very submissive, 
especially about ecclesiastical matters : they seem to feel that 
the time is  full of  dangers, and  that  the queen  understands 
religious  matters  better  than  they  do  themselves.  With 
James  on  the throne  circumstances  have  changed:  in  1614, 
when  he  dissolves  his  second  parliament,  he commits  four 
members  to the Tower; in  1621 Sandys is committed, and 
James tells the commons pretty distinctly that their privileges 
exist by his sufferance.  The result of  this is the Protestation 
of  18 December, 162  I :  the commons declare that the privileges 
of parliament are the ancient and undoubted birthright of the 
subjects  of  England-that  the  commons  may  handle  any 
subject, and  enjoy  a  complete  freedom  of  speech1.  James 
sends for the journals  of  the commons, tears out the protest 
with his own  hand, and dissolves parliament.  On the whole, 
we see that when Charles comes to the throne there are plenty 
of materials for a conflagration. 
(6)  The topic of  freedom from arrest is connected, as we 
have seen,  with  that of  freedom  of  speech, but  it is  wider. 
Not only do members of  parliament claim  that they are not 
to be arrested for words  spoken  in  the house, but they claim 
a general  immunity from the ordinary law.  We have here 
therefore to note that until  very  lately our  law  made a free 
use of imprisonment, not merely in crim~nal  cases, but in civil 
cases  also; a  debtor  against  whom  a  judgment  had  been 
obtained  could  be  imprisoned  until  he  paid  the  debt-he 
could  be  taken  in  execution ; but  also a defendant in a civil 
action  could  very  generally  be  imprisoned  as  soon  as  the 
action was begun, unless he  found  bail  for his appearance  in 
court.  Now  the  lords  from  an  early  time seem  to  have 
enjoyed  a  considerable  immunity  from  arrest  except  on 
criminal  charges,  and  the  representatives  of  the  commons 
seem to have claimed  a similar liberty during the session of 
parliament  and for a certain time before and after the session 
reasonably necessary for their coming and going-exemption 
from arrest upon criminal charges, at least in  case of  treason, 
felony or breach of the peace, was not claimed.  A statute of 
I I  Hen. VI, c.  I I (1433) gave some sanction to this privilege- 
he who assaulted a  member attending parliament was to pay 
double  damages.  The  privilege  was  invaded  in  Thorpe's 
case, and the invasion was sanctioned by the House of  Lords : 
but the judges who were consulted expressed themselves very 
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positively as to its existence, and further made a declaration 
which was to be of great importance in the future, to the effect 
that the courts  of  law  could  not  measure  the privileges  of 
parliament,  these being  matters  which  could  only be  deter- 
mined  by parliament  itself.  The houses,  in  particular  the 
House of  Commons, by degrees carried  the principle further 
and further.  In 1543,  in  Ferrer's case, they began a practice 
of  sending their  sergeant to deliver  a  member  arrested  for 
debt, and Henry VIII admitted the existence of the privilege. 
In  1575  they  delivered  one  Smalley,  a  member's  servant, 
arrested for debt.  In  1603 they delivered Sir Thomas Shirley, 
who had been arrested for debt; this produced  the passing of 
an act (I Jas. I, c. 13),  which, while it fully admitted and gave 
statutory sanction to the existence of  the privilege, yet made 
certain  provisions  for  the  benefit  of  the  creditor.  In the 
seventeenth century this privilege grew to huge dimensions; it 
became almost impossible to get any justice out of  a member 
of  parliament, and limits had  to be  set to what  had  become 
an intolerable nuisance. 
(c)  Connected with these matters is the power (or if  we 
please  to call  it  so, the privilege)  of  each house  to punish 
persons (whether they be members of  it or no) for a contempt. 
Already in  I 548 we find the commons committing John Storie, 
one of their members, to the Tower, probably for having spoken 
disrespectfully  of  Somerset  the  Protector.  From  I 58 I  we 
have  Hall's  case.  Arthur  Hall, member  for  Grantham, has 
published  a book  derogatory to the authority and power  of 
the house ; his  punishment  is severe; by an unanimous vote 
the commons  expelled  him,  fined  him  500  marks,  and sent 
him  to  the  Tower.  In  1585  they  expelled  Dr Parry for 
having spoken too warmly.  But they also took on themselves 
to punish  those  who  were  not  members of  the house.  Not 
only  did  they  commit  to prison  those  who  interfered  with 
their  immunity from arrest, but they also punished  some who 
spoke against the house: thus in  1586 one Bland  was  fined 
for having used  contumelious expressions against the House. 
But they have not been  content with  punishing persons who 
have insulted the house : in  162  I  they condemned one Floyd, 
who  had  expressed  his  satisfaction  in  the  success  of  the 
Catholic  cause  in  Germany, to pay a  fine of  £1000  and to 
stand in  the pillory.  The lords resented  this assumption  of 
judicial  power, and the commons admitted that they were in 
the wrong-that  they  had  no  jurisdiction  except  when  the 
privileges of their own house were infringed.  Floyd however 
did  not profit by this: the lords condemned him to a fine of 
£f;5ooo and whipping and branding, besides the pillory.  The 
story is disgraceful to both houses.  Here again  it is evident 
enough that the constitution is not working peacefully ; both 
the  king  and  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament  are  ready  to 
commit  acts of  very  questionable  legality. 
3.  Jurisdiction  of  Parliament. 
This  leads  us  to speak  of  the judicial  functions  of  par- 
liament-for  it is sometimes reckoned among the '  privileges ' 
of  the House of  Lords that the judicial  power  of  parliament 
belongs  to it.  Such a use  of  the word  privilege  is not very 
accurate or convenient-but  nevertheless should  be observed. 
This matter has already come before us in the past1; we have 
seen that the representatives of  the commons never gained  a 
share in  the judicial work  of  the parliament-in  I  Hen. IV 
(1399) they had  protested  that  they  were  not  judges,  and 
shortly before  the occurrence  of  Floyd's  case, after a search 
for precedents, they had come to the conclusion that they had 
no power  to punish  save  for  a contempt of  their  house; in 
Floyd's  case  they were  reminded  of  these  declarations  and 
for  a while  attempted to evade them,  but  in  the end  gave 
way.  The judicial  work  of  parliament, done by the  House 
of  Lords, we have on a former occasion  brought under three 
heads. 
(a)  As  a  court  for  correcting  the errors in  law  of  the 
ordinary law courts, the House of  Lords did very little during 
the  greater  part  of  the  period  that  is  under  our  review: 
hardly a case of  error is to be found between Henry IV and 
Elizabeth  The infrequent  sessions  of  parliament,  the  fact 
that the council had assumed a very wide power of judicature, 
may be the causes of  this.  About  1580 however this, among 
other powers of  the parliament, was revived;  the lords began 
once more to  hear cases of error, and a statute of  I 585 distinctly 
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recognized  their  power  to do so.  A  little later  they began 
also to hear  both  civil  and criminal  cases as a court of  first 
instance.  For  this  they had  but  few  precedents-it  is  said 
that they could find but one between  1403 and  1602.  They 
did  not,  as we  shall  afterwards  see, ultimately  succeed  in 
establishing their right to act as a court of  first instance, but 
from about 162  I onwards until the civil war they did so act ;  and 
in the year 1625,  at  which we have placed ourselves, perhaps we 
ought to say that it  is  somewhat doubtful whether  they may 
do so  or no-here  again  is  an  open  question  raised  by the 
renewed activity of parliament. 
(6)  That a  peer  charged  with  felony  or treason  ought 
to be  tried  by the House of  Lords if  that house be sitting, 
and  if  not  then  by the Court of  the Lord  High Steward  is 
now an admitted principle; but such trials have been far from 
common. 
(c)  The procedure by way of impeachment has just  been 
revived.  It seems  true to say that  there  is  no  case  of  an 
impeachment  between  that of the Duke of  Suffolk  in  1449 
and that of  Sir Giles Mompesson in  1621, which was at once 
followed by those of  Mitchell, Bacon and others : Mompesson 
and  Mitchell were  commoners, impeached  of  fraud, violence 
and oppression.  The impeachment  of  Bacon  for bribery is 
still  more important, for he, of  course, was  a  minister of  the 
king-he  was chancellor.  In 1624 the Earl of Middlesex, the 
Lord  Treasurer, was  impeached  for bribery  and  other  mis- 
demeanours.  It is evident that parliament  has unearthed  a 
weapon of  enormous importance.  During the Tudor reigns, 
matters had stood differently ; there was no talk of impeaching 
the ministers of  Henry VIII, and when he had  made up his 
mind to destroy an enemy or a too powerful servant he made 
use  of  an  act  of  attainder.  Cromwell  had  by  the  king's 
command obtained  an  opinion  from  the judges  to the effect 
that by  an  act  of  attainder  a  man  might  lawfully  be  con- 
demned  without  a trial, though, they said, this  would form  a 
dangerous precedent.  Under such an act it was that Cromwell 
himself perished.  An act of  attainder, you  will remember, is 
in  form not a judicial  but a legislative act, a statute made by 
the king with the consent of lords and commons. 
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4.  Fzozctwtzs  of  the  Commo~zs  itz  grantifzg money. 
The function  of  originating  money-bills  is  sometimes 
reckoned among the privileges  of  the House of  Commons- 
at any rate it is the function of that house.  We have seen 
it growing  in  the  past-in  particular  we  have  noticed  the 
state of things under Henry IV1.  The  matter becomes clearer 
during the period  which  we  are now  surveying.  To grant 
subsidies is the function of the commons, but the grant requires 
the authority of a statute enacted by king, lords and commons. 
In  1593  the  commons  resent  a  message  from  the  lords 
reminding them of  the queen's want  of  money-the  custom 
is that the offer  of  subsidies  shall proceed  from  this house. 
But  it is  not until just  after  the end of  our  period  that a 
definite formula is adopted which expresses the share of  the 
two  houses  in  the work.  Under  Elizabeth and James  the 
lords and commons are sometimes said to grant the money- 
more  frequently the  commons  are said  to grant  with  the 
consent of the lords.  In the first parliament of  Charles I we 
get the formula that is  still in use.  An act is passed which 
recites that the commons have granted  a tax, and then it is 
enacted  by the king, by and with the advice and consent of 
the lords spiritual and temporal in parliament assembled and 
by the authority of  the same, that the tax be imposed.  It is 
not  until  after the Restoration  that  the commons  begin  to 
contend  that the lords can  make  no  alteration in a money 
bill, but must simply accept it, or simply reject it 
5.  R&At  to determine disputed  Electtons. 
The commons claim  a  right  to determine all questions 
relating  to the  election  of  members of  their  house.  Such 
questions in  the past seem to have been  determined  by the 
king in council.  Under Mary, however, we find the commons 
appointing  a  committee  to inquire whether  Mr  Alexander 
Nowell,  prebendary  of  Westminster,  may  be  a  member  of 
this  house;  and  it  is  declared  next  day  that  as he  is  a 
prebendary  of  Westminster  and  as  such  has  a  voice  in 
convocation, he cannot be a  member of  this  house, and that 
the queen's writ ought to issue for a new election  In 1586 
the commons, in opposition to the queen, definitely insist that 
1 p.  181 248  Constitutionn  .l  History  PERIOD 
it is for them to inquire into the circumstances of  a disputed 
election-and  from this time forward they frequently exercise 
this function and it seems admitted to be properly theirs1. 
6.  Parliamentary  Procedure. 
It is  during the period  with  which  we  are now  dealing 
that the great outlines of parliamentary procedure, as we  now 
know  them, are drawn-the  practice  of  reading  bills  three 
times, and so forth.  Each house may manage its own affairs; 
there  is  no  legislation  as  to its  procedure,  but  gradually 
precedents are formed and respected and a mass of traditional 
rules  is  the outcome.  In the House  of  Lords  proxies  are 
admitted;  from  an  early  time  we  find  the  king  licensing 
bishops  and  barons  to be  present  in  parliament  by proxy. 
In the sixteenth century it becomes the rule that the proxy 
must  himself  be a  member of  the house.  This privilege of 
appointing a  proxy seems  never  to have  been  extended to 
members  of  the lower house.  Lords also who dissent from 
the action  of  the house exercise the right of  entering formal 
protests  upon  its  journals;  this  practice  grows  up  in  the 
sixteenth century;  there  is  no similar  practice  among  the 
commons.  Each house conducts its business in privacy ; the 
king, however,  occasionally  visits  the  House of  Lords,  and 
makes speeches there ; a throne is set for him there ; but his 
presence  is  not  necessary,  and  in  practice  has become  a 
somewhat rare  event. 
7.  Frequency  and Duration  of  Parliaments. 
We can  have  little  idea  as  to  what  a  parliamentary 
constitution  has really meant  until we  have  considered  how 
often  parliament  has  met.  We  remember  that  under 
Edward IV and Henry VII parliaments have been becoming 
far  less  frequent  than  they were  in  the fourteenth and the 
first  half  of  the fifteenth century.  We remember  also that 
there are statutes of  Edward I11 yet unrepealed which  seem 
plainly to mean that a  parliament ought to be summoned  at 
least once in every year. 
Henry VIII in his thirty-eight years held nine parliaments. 
One of these, however, endured for nearly seven years-this 
1 The question was again raised  in  the  Bucks.  Election  case  (Goodwi~  v. 
Fovtcscuc  1604).  Gardiner,  History of  England,  vol.  I,  pp.  167-70. 
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was the great Reformation parliament, which was  summoned 
for 4  Nov.  I 529 and was not dissolved until 4 April, I 536 ; it 
sat in  1529, 1530, 1531, 1532, 1533, twice in  1534 and once in 
I 536 ; a parliament with so long a  life was  a very new thing. 
There is only one long interval without a parliament, namely, 
from 22 Dec.  I 5 I 5 to I 5  April, I 523, an interval of more than 
seven years. 
Edward VI reigned  from  28 Jan. 1547 to 6 July, 1553- 
six and a half years.  There were but two parliaments.  The 
first was  summoned for 4 Nov.  I 547 : it sat a second time in 
Nov. I 548, again in  Jan.  I 549, again  in  Nov.  1549, again  in 
Jan. I 5 52, and it was dissolved  I 5 April, I 552-having  lasted 
four and a  half years.  Another parliament was summoned for 
I March, I 553, and was dissolved at  the end of the same month. 
Mary reigned from 6 July, 1553 to 17 Nov.  I 558-a  little 
more than five years, and in those five years five parliaments 
were held. 
Elizabeth reigned from 17 Nov. 1558 to 24 March, 1603- 
444  years; ten  parliaments  were  held.  There  is  one  long 
parliament  and  some  long  intervals.  Parliament  I  lasted 
from 23 Jan. 1559 to 8 May, I 559.  After an interval of three 
years  and  more  Parliament  I1  met  on  11 Jan.  1563  and 
endured  to 2  Jan. 1567, having lasted  four years.  After an 
interval of four years Parliament I11 met on 2 April, 1571, and 
lasted  until  May.  Parliament  IV lasted  from  8  May, I572 
to 17 April, 1583-hard  on eleven years.  This is the longest 
parliament  we  have  yet  met  with.  But it  held  only three 
sessions-in  I 572,  I 576,  I 581 ; it was prorogued on 24 April, 
1581, and, never  met  again  for  business, though by repeated 
prorogations  its  nominal  life was  prolonged  for  another two 
' 
years.  Parliament V was  summoned  for  23  Nov.  I 584  and 
lasted  with  two sessions  to  14 Sept.  1585.  Parliament VI 
met  on  I 5  Oct. 1586 and was  dissolved  on  23  March, I 588. 
Parliament VII  met on  12 Nov. 1588 and was  dissolved on 
29 March, 1589.  Then there is an interval of near four years. 
Par!iament  VIII met on  19 Feb. 1593 and was  dissolved  on 
10 April,  1593.  Another  interval  of  four  and  a  half  years 
occurs.  Parliament  IX met on 24  Oct.  1597 and was  dis- 
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years.  Parliament X met on 27  Oct. 1601 and was dissolved 
on  19 Dec. 1601.  In March, 1603 the queen died. 
James  I reigned from  I  March, 1603 to 27  March, 1625- 
twenty-two years.  Four parliaments were held.  There is one 
long parliament of  nearly seven years, and two considerable 
intervals.  Parliament  I  met on  19 March, 1604 and was not 
dissolved  until  g  February,  1611 ; it  held  five  sessions, 
rg March-7  July, 1604,~  I Jan.--27  May, 1606, I 8 Nov. 1606- 
4 July, 1607, g February--23  July, 1610 and  16 Oct. 1610- 
g February, 161  I.  After an interval of more than three years 
Parliament  11, '  the addled Parliament,' met on 5 April, 1614 
and was dissolved  on  7 June of  the same year.  Six and a 
half  years intervened.  Then  Parliament  I I1 met on 30 Jan. 
1621 and was  dissolved  after two  sessions on  8  Feb.  1622. 
Parliament  IV met on  12 February, 1624 and was d~ssolved 
by the king's death on 27 March, 1625. 
Looking back then we may say that although the statutes 
of  Edward 111's  reign  have not been  observed  and are very 
probably  regarded  as obsolete, parliaments  have  still  been 
frequently  holden.  The king  has not  been  able to get  on 
for more than three or four years without calling a parliament. 
James  managed  to do without  a  parliament  for  near  seven 
years, and he kept the same parliament alive for near  seven 
years: for so long a life there was a precedent in Henry VIII's 
reign, and one of  Elizabeth's  parliaments  lived  eleven years. 
We find  from  what happens under Charles I  that the nation 
would  be  content if  a  parliament  met  once in  three  years, 
and  was  never  kept  in  existence  for  longer  than  three 
years.  The long parliaments  of  Henry VIII, Elizabeth and 
James, no doubt had  very  important  results-not  only  did 
they educate the commons to act together, but they familiarized 
the nation  with  the notion  of  parliament  as of  a  permanent 
entity, in which the sovereignty of the realm might be vested: 
it is difficult to think of  sovereignty being vested in so fleeting 
an affair as a medieval  parliament, which exists for  a  month 
or two and disappears. 
The principles  which  at the present  day make it indis- 
pensably necessary that parliament should  sit in  every year 
were  not  yet  in  fr~rce;  there  was  no standing army to be 
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legalized, and the king did not by any means always require a 
grant of money in  every year.  Each of the kings and queens 
of  our  period  has  tonnage and  poundage  granted  for  life; 
parliament  also  often  grants  additional  taxes  which  will 
carry the king on  for  several  years.  The king is  now  rich 
as compared with his predecessors-the  spoils of  the monas- 
teries have enriched  him-the  feudal  sources of  revenue  are 
very profitable-wardships,  marriages  and the like bring  in 
large  sums.  Under  James  I  there  has been  much  talk  of 
buying up the king's feudal rights : the parties have not been 
able to come to terms however-the  king wanted in exchange 
an income of Azoo,ooo. 
B.  Relation  of  the King  to  Parliament. 
If now we look at the relation  of  the king to the parlia- 
ment and ask whether parliament has lost or gained in power 
we  have  a  rather  complicated  answer  to give.  On  the one 
hand  there  is  no  doubt  that  the parliaments  of  the Tudor 
reigns,  more  especially  those  of  Henry VIII's  reign,  were 
extremely  submissive, practically  Henry could  get  them  to 
do what he wanted.  I need not instance his matrimonial affairs, 
or the great religious revolution, the measures whereby he was 
made head  of  the church ; the best instance is, I think, given 
by the remission of  his debts.  In the years between I 522-8 he 
exacted  heavy  loans  by  a  regular  process  not  far  removed 
from compulsion;  in  1529 parliament wiped out all the debts; 
he  had  recourse  to  the  same  expedient  in  1542, and  the 
parliament  of  1543  whitewashed  him  once  more.  It  is 
only towards  the  end  of  our  period  that parliament  again 
begins  to  act  as  an  independent  check  upon  the  king, to 
assert a will of  its own; the parliaments of Elizabeth grumble, 
the parliaments  of  James  I  more  than  once resist  him  and 
defeat him.  How it came about that the earlier  parliaments 
had  been  so very tractable, it  is hardly for us  to inquire, for 
this question lies beyond the legal domain ; the remembrance 
of  past  anarchy had  to do with  it, the religious  difficulties 
had to do with it, foreign affairs had to do with  it, the nation 
desired a time of peace and of  strong government.  We must, Constitutional History 
I  think,  add  that the nation  was  thoroughly  frightened  by 
Henry.  But what does demand our  notice  is that this very 
tractability of  parliaments serves in  the end  to save and to 
strengthen the parliamentary  constitution ; parliament  is  so 
tractable that the king is very willing that king in parliament 
should  be  recognized  as supreme-it  strengthens his  hands 
that what he does should be the act of the whole nation.  Let 
us then look at some of  the more extraordinary exercises of 
this sovereign power of  king in parliament.  We have already 
referred to the acts which blotted  out King Henry's  debts- 
that surely is an extraordinary exercise of  power.  We have 
also spoken of acts of  attainder-these  also are extraordinary; 
without  any pretence of  legal  trial  a  statute may be  passed 
condemning a man to death, and no court of  law will  call its 
validity in  question.  But  now look  at the royal  succession. 
Thrice over during Henry's reign was the succession arranged 
by act of  parliament; the king's  marriage with Katherine of 
Aragon  was  declared  void,  and  his  marriage  with  Anne 
Boleyn  was  declared  valid;  then  the  marriage  with  Anne 
Boleyn was declared void ; then again both Mary the daughter 
of Katherine, and Elizabeth the daughter of Anne were treated 
as legitimate  and placed  in  the succession ; then  in  default 
of the heirs  of  his body, Henry was to have power to leave 
the crown  by  will  to  anyone  he  pleased-to  anyone,  not 
necessarily a member of  the royal house.  It is fairly certain 
that  Henry did  exercise  this  power  given  him  by  act  of 
parliament, and devised the crown on the failure of  the issue 
of  his three children to the heirs  of  the body of  his younger 
sister  Mary,  Duchess  of  Suffolk,  postponing  to  them  the 
descendants  of  his  elder  sister  Margaret,  Queen  of  Scots. 
In the first  year  of  Elizabeth  it was  enacted  by parliament 
that if  any person  should  affirm  that the  queen  could  not 
with the assent of  parliament make laws to settle the descent 
of the crown, he should  be deemed a traitor.  There can  be 
no doubt that there was a very strong sentiment in  favour of 
strict hereditary descent-that  seems the explanation of  the 
undisputed  succession  of  James  I.  In  all  probability  he 
succeeded  to the throne  in  defiance  of  a will  duly executed 
by  Henry VIII  under  the  power  given  to  him  by  act  of 
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parliament ; nothing however seems to have been  said  of  the 
will, and the house  of  Suffolk  made no  claim.  James, as it 
seems to me, had good  reason  for supposing that he reigned 
by virtue of strict hereditary right ; he and his successors had 
at least an excuse for believing  that such right could  not be 
overridden by act of parliament.  Still, as we have just  seen, 
there were  important  precedents  the other way-parliament 
had  repeatedly and  successfully regulated  the succession to 
the throne. 
A  still better  illustration, however, at once  of  the actual 
tractability of  parliaments and of the theoretic supremacy of 
king in parliament is afforded by an act of  I 539, which has been 
called the Lex Regia of England, and the most extraordinary 
act in  the Statute Book-power  was  given  to  the  king  to 
make  proclamations  with  the  advice  of  his  council,  or  a 
majority of  his  council, to make proclamations which  should 
have the force of  statutes ; the punishment  for disobedience 
might  be  fine  or  unlimited  imprisonment;  it was  not  to 
extend  to life, limb, or forfeiture.  This act was  repealed  in 
the  first  year  of  Edward  VI-you  will  at  once  see  the 
importance  of  its  enactment  and  its  repeal;  they  seem 
distinctly  to  confirm  the  doctrine  that  the  king  is  not 
supreme,  king  and  parliament  are  supreme;  statute  is 
distinctly above ordinance or proclamation ; statute may give 
to  the  king  a  subordinate legislative power, and what  one 
statute has given another statute may take away. 
There is a yet stronger illustration  and this, though  it  is 
a rather elaborate story, is worth giving, for it is not generally 
known.  The accession of an infant in the person of Edward VI 
had  been  foreseen.  His father was  given  power  by  statute 
to appoint governors.  He appointed his sixteen executors to 
form  a  governing  council.  They,  when  Henry  was  dead, 
elected Somerset to be Lord Protector, and very soon allowed 
him  to take the whole  power  into his  own  hands.  Now in 
I 536 Henryhad procured the passing of a statute (28 Hen.VII1, 
c. 17) which was to enable future kings to rescind any acts of 
parliament that should be passed while they should be  under 
the age of twenty-four.  This act however was at once repealed 
on the accession of  Edward VI,  by a statute of  1547  (I  Edw. VI, Constitutioaad History 
c.  I I), the requisite royal assent being given  by the Protector 
and the governing council.  The reason for revoking the act 
of  1536 was this, that it was  drawn  in  such very wide terms 
that had Edward attained the age of twenty-four and revoked 
the statutes made while he was under  that age, it  might well 
have been contended that these statutes were not merely null 
and void for the future, but that they had all along been  null 
and void, so that  everything done under them which  could 
not be justified by the common law would have been rendered 
illegal expost  facto.  The act of  I 547 repealed this act ; it gave 
the king power when he should attain twenty-four  to rescind 
the statutes passed  while he was under that age, but declared 
that such  a  repeal was  not  to have retrospective  force.  On 
the whole, I  know  of  no  acts  of  parliament  which  better 
illustrate our notion  of  the absolute supremacy of  a statute. 
A  statute gives  a  king power  to revoke statutes and even 
render  them  void  ab  initio;  this  cannot  prevent  another 
statute being  passed  during that king's  minority (his assent 
being  given  by  a  council  of  regency  which  itself  is  the 
creature  of  a  statute), which  statute may  repeal  or  modify 
the previous  statute that gave a power of  revoking statutes. 
The  power  of  statute-making  cannot  be  curtailed;  no 
parliament  can  bind  the  hands  of  its  successors  with  any 
legal  bonds. 
We might  multiply illustrations.  Probably it was in  the 
domain of  religion that the men of the time saw what seemed 
to them the most conclusive proofs of the sovereignty of king 
in  parliament.  Throughout the Middle  Ages there  was  at 
least  one limitation  set to temporal  sovereignty; it had  no 
power  in  spiritual  matters;  the  church  was  an  organism 
distinct  from the state.  But now statutes have gone to the 
very  root  of  religion;  the  orthodox  creed  is  a  statutory 
creed  and  that  creed  has  been  changed  more  than  once. 
Thus  statute  has  given  the  most  conclusive  proof  of  its 
power. 
Not  only however  do we  find  the supremacy of  king in 
parliament admitted in fact, we find  it proclaimed  in  theory. 
The Tudor kings  are well  content  that  this  should  be  so. 
The following emphatic  and  remarkable  passage  occurs  in 
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'  The Commonwealth of England and the manner of  govern- 
ment  thereof'-a  book  published  in  1589 by  Sir  Thomas 
Smith who was Secretary of  State to Queen Elizabeth : '  The 
most  high  and  absolute  power  of  the  realm  of  England 
consisteth  in  the  parliament.. ..That  which  is  done  by  this 
consent  is  called  firm, stable and sa?zctu?tz,  and is taken for 
law.  The  parliament  abrogateth  old  laws,  maketh  new, 
giveth orders for things  past  and for  things hereafter to be 
followed, changeth  rights  and  possessions  of  private  men, 
legitimateth bastards, establisheth  forms  of  religion, altereth 
weights and measures, giveth forms of succession to the crown, 
defineth of  doubtful rights, whereof  is  no  law already made, 
appointeth subsidies, tailes, taxes, and impositions, giveth most 
free pardons and absolutions, restoreth  in  blood  and  name 
as the highest  court, condemneth  or  absolveth them  whom 
the prince will  put  to that  trial.  And  to be  short, all  that 
ever  the  people  of  Rome  might  do  either  in  centuriatis 
co)~zitiis  or tributis, the same may be done by the parliament 
of  England  which  representeth  and  hath the power  of  the 
whole  realm, both  the head  and body.  For  every English- 
man  is intended  to be  there present, either in  person  or by 
procuration and attorneys, of what preeminence, state, dignity 
or quality soever he be, from the prince, be he king or queen, 
to the lowest  person  of  England.  And  the consent of  the 
parliament  is  taken  to be  every man's  consent1.'  That is  a 
very memorable passage ; the following century, we  may say, 
was  one  long  struggle  as  to where  sovereignty should  be, 
should it be in king and parliament  or in king alone.  There 
can be  little doubt, I  think, which  party had  history  on  its 
side, not merely remote history, but the history of  the recent 
' 
Tudor reigns ;  the absolute supremacy of  the statute-making 
body, of king and parliament, had been both admitted in fact 
and acknowledged in theory. 
Still it must candidly be admitted  that the extent of  the 
royal  power was in  many directions very ill defined.  Before 
speaking of  this  it is necessary to refer to the council.  The 
Tudor reigns are, we  may say, the golden age of  the council : 
1 Sm~th,  De  Repudbca  A~zglo~t~nz,  ed.  L.  Alston  (with a  preface  by  F. W. 
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the council exercises enormous  powers of  the most various 
kinds; but it is not an independent body-as  against the king 
it  has  little power  or  none  at all, and when  in  the case  of 
Edward  VI  the king  is  a  boy, then  the  council  raises  up 
above itself a Lord Protector, who acts pretty much as a king 
de facto.  In 1553 the council consists of  forty members ; there 
are but four bishops and fourteen temporal peers;  the rest are 
commoners, among whom  are the two king's secretaries, who 
before the end of  our per~od  have gained the title '  the king's 
secretaries of  state.'  The large  number  of  the commoners 
marks  a  great  change;  the  government  of  the  realm  has 
slipped out of  the hands of  the nobles  In 1536 it is matter 
of  complaint that the councillors are of  humble birth.  The 
king  chooses  capable  commoners  who  will  serve  him  well 
and who will  not  be  independent.  Again, the ecclesiastical 
members of the council have lost their independence ; if  they 
represent the church, still it is a church  of  which  the king is 
head.  On the whole, the council seems to be just what  the 
king would wish it to be, and he consults it or not, as pleases 
him best; many important negotiations Henry does not bring 
before his council at all.  But to the king a council of  able 
servants is a source of strength. 
We must  now  look  at the powers  wielded  by  the king 
with the assistance of  his council.  We will bring the subject 
under four heads-(I)  legislation, (2) taxation, (3) judicature, 
(4) administration. 
(I)  It certainly seems to have been the common opinion 
that the king had  a certain ordaining power.  Regard being 
had  to the past  it  was  difficult  to deny this; but what were 
its limits?  Henry VIII, we have seen, obtained from  parlia- 
ment  a  statute giving to his  proclamat'ions issued with  the 
consent  of  the majority  of  his  council  the force  of  statute 
law1.  But  then  thls  act  was  repealed.  Elizabeth,  we  find, 
freely  issues  proclamations : thus  anabaptists  are  banished 
from  the  realm,  Irishmen  are  commanded  to  depart  into 
Ireland, the  exportation  of  corn,  money, and  various com- 
modities  is  prohibited.  A proclamation  in  1580 forbids the 
erection  of  houses within  three  miles of  London  under pain 
of  imprisonment.  The council frequently issued  proclama- 
1 See p.  253. 
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tions  to restrain  the importation  of  books, and to regulate 
their  sale-thus  a  censorship  of  the press  was  established. 
James I followed the example of his predecessor-in  particular 
he  issued  frequent  proclamations  to forbid  the increase  of 
London.  In 1610 the commons protested-  it is the indubit- 
able  right  of  the  people  of  this  kingdom  not  to be  made 
subject to any punishment  that shall extend  to their  lives, 
lands, bodies or goods, other than such as are ordained  by 
the common laws of  this land, or the statutes made by their 
common consent in  parliament.  Nevertheless  it is apparent 
both that proclamations have been  of  late years  much  more 
frequent than heretofore, and that they are extended not only 
to the liberty, but  also to the goods, inheritances and liveli- 
hood of men, some of  them  tending to alter some parts of 
the law and to make a new; other appointing punishments to 
be inflicted before lawful trial and conviction,'  and so forth. 
'By reason  whereof  there  is  a  general  fear  conceived and 
spread among your majesty's  people, that proclamations will, 
by degrees, grow up and increase  to the strength and nature 
of laws1.'  To all this, and there is more of it, the only answer 
is that the proclamations shall go no further than is warranted 
by law. 
Before this answer was given the great oracle of  the law 
had been consulted.  Coke, then Chief Justice of the Common 
Pleas, was summoned to the council, and the question was put 
to him, whether the king by proclamation  might prohibit the 
erection of new buildings in London and the making of starch 
from  wheat.  He was  pressed  to answer in  the affirmative. 
He refused  to answer without  consulting his brethren.  He 
consulted with three judges, and they answered that the king 
cannot  by his  prerogative  create any offence which  was not 
one before, but  the king may by proclamation  admonish all 
his subjects that they keep the laws and do not offend them 
upon  punishment  to be  inflicted  by  the law-neglect  of  a 
proclamation  aggravates the offence ;  lastly, if  an offence be 
not punishable in the Star Chamber, the prohibition of  it by 
proclamation  cannot make it so.  This probably was sound 
law-that  is  to say, there  was  a  distinct  precedent  for  it 
Son~e~s'  Tracts,  vol.  11,  p.  162  The  protest  1s  also  ~rlnted  by  Hallan], 
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coming from  the  middle  of  the  Tudor  period.  In  Mary's 
reign  the judges  had  delivered this opinion: 'The king, it is 
said, may make a proclamation  quoad terrorem populi, to put 
them  in fear of  his displeasure, but  not to impose  any fine, 
forfeiture, or imprisonment : for no proclamation  can  make a 
new  law, but  only confirm and ratify an ancient one.'  But 
though James  I had  the opinion  of  his judges  against him, 
still he went on issuing proclamations.  It is difficult for us to 
realize the state of  things-that  of  the government constantly 
doing what  the judges  consider  unlawful.  The key  is  the 
Court of  Star Chamber-the  very council which  has issued 
these proclamations  enforces them as a legal tribunal, and as 
yet no one dares resist its judicial power. 
(2)  But of  course it is one thing to say that the king has 
no general  legislative  power  and  another thing  to say that 
there are no matters about which he can make valid ordinances: 
thus it may be in  his power to regulate the importation and 
exportation  of  goods.  We  are  thus  led  to speak  of  the 
taxing  power.  The highroad  of  direct  taxation  had  long 
been  barred to the king by very distinct statutes ;  the case of 
customs duties was  almost  equally clear.  It is  said, and I 
believe with  truth, that between the accession of  the House 
of  Lancaster and the reign of  Mary there is no precedent for 
any duty imposed by the king.  Edward IV had  recourse to 
benevolences, Henry VII and  Henry VIII to forced loans- 
but  they did  not  attempt to  impose taxes on  merchandise'. 
However in  1557 Mary set a duty on cloths exported beyond 
seas, and  afterwards a  duty on  the  importation  of  French 
wines.  It seems probable that at the beginning of Elizabeth's 
reign  the opinion  of  the judges was taken  by the council as 
to the legality of  these  impositions, and  that their opinion 
was  not  favourable.  The queen  however  did  not  abandon 
the impost, and  she herself  set an impost  on  sweet wines. 
James  imposed  a  duty on  currants over and above the tax 
which was set on them by the statute of tonnage and poundage. 
Bate  refused  to  pay.  The Court  of  Exchequer decided  in 
the king's favour.  It is difficult to understand the judgment 
as an exposition of law ; rather, I think, we must say that the 
Henry VIII  was given power in 1534  (26 Hen.VlI1, c. x) during his 'lifenatural' 
to repeal or revive acts relating to the ~n~portation  and exportation of merchandise 
king succeeded in obtaining from the barons of the Exchequer 
a declaration  that there is a large sphere within which there 
is no law except the king's will.  'The matter  in  question  is 
material matter of state, and ought to be ruled by the rules of 
policy; and if so, the king has done well to execute his extra- 
ordinary  power.  All  customs,  old  or  new,  are  effects  of 
commerce  with  foreign  nations;  but  commerce  and  affairs 
with foreigners, war and peace, the admitting of  foreign coin, 
all treaties whatsoever, are made by the absolute power of the 
king.  The king may shut the ports altogether; therefore he 
may take toll at the ports.'  This seems the main thought of 
the judgment.  It seems that the opinion  of  the two Chief 
Justices, Popham  and  Coke, was taken, though the case did 
not come before them judicially.  They would not go nearly so 
far as the barons of the Exchequer.  They said that the king 
cannot set impositions upon  imported goods at his pleasure, 
but  that  he  may do so for the good  of  the people-thus  if 
foreign  princes  set  taxes  on  English  goods  the  king  may 
retaliate.  Their doctrine seems to have been  that the king 
may not  set impositions  merely for the sake of  revenue, but 
that he  may  do so for  other  ends, as for  the  protection  of 
English merchants :  obviously this is an unstable doctrine. 
The House of Commons in 1610  took up the matter.  The 
lawyers  in  that house, in particular  Hakewill, very learnedly 
disputed  the  judgment  of  the  Exchequer, relying  on  the 
statutes of the fourteenth century, and on the cessation of  any 
attempts to tax merchandise without parliamentary authority 
from  the reign  of  Richard  I1 to the reign  of  Mary.  They 
carried  a  bill  enacting  that  no  imposition  should  be  set 
without the consent of parliament, but the lords  rejected  it. 
The immediate consequence had  been  that in  1608 the king, 
having the judgment in Bates's case at his back, issued a book 
of  rates imposing heavy duties  upon  almost  every  article of 
merchandise.  The subject was  resumed  in  the short parlia- 
ment of  1614;  the commons passed a unanimous vote denying 
the king's  right  of  imposition.  They refused  to grant  any 
subsidy  until  this  grievance  should  be  redressed.  James 
dissolved  the parliament1. 
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A  more serious step was  now  necessary if  money was to 
be obtained.  The  king had recourse to benevolences.  Letters 
were  written  to  the  sheriffs  directing  them  to  call  upon 
persons of  ability for contributions.  The unrepealed  statute 
of Richard  111 against 'exactions called benevolences'  stood 
in the way.  Still it was difficult to argue that the king may 
not accept a perfectly voluntary gift  of  money.  To the end 
of the reign the impositions are exacted, though the commons 
from time to time protest against them. 
The legal ground that they occupied was certainly strong, 
but we must not exaggerate its strength.  They were obliged 
to concede the existence of prerogatives which, at least in our 
eyes,  amount  to  a  prerogative  of  extorting  money.  For 
instance, Hakewill  in  his  famous argument over Bates's case 
admits that the king can debase the coinage, and as a matter 
of fact  the kings have done this over  and over  again.  The 
king's  power  over  the  coinage  was  certainly  very  great. 
Sir Matthew  Hale, writing  after the  Restoration, is  still of 
opinion that the king  may debase the coinage.  It is  legal, 
though  dishonourable.  Even  Blackstone is not certain  that 
it is illegal1.  This is one instance of the admitted powers of 
the  king,  powers  whereby  he  could  increase  his  revenue. 
Another instance, and one which  becomes  of  importance  in 
James's reign, is afforded by monopolies. 
From the Conquest  onwards the kings had  exercised the 
right  of  granting and  selling  many  valuable  privileges-to 
name but one, though an important matter,-it  was to charters 
purchased from the kings that the towns owed their privileges. 
Not unfrequently such privileges included privileges of trading 
-the  right to hold  a  fair or a market  could  be  granted  by 
the king.  So could  the right  to take  toll  for  merchandise 
passing through  the town.  Such grants were  common, and 
do not seem to have been  in  the least unpopular ; it was  the 
object of every town  to obtain as comprehensive a grant as 
possible.  Under  the Tudors the practice  of  granting  rights 
of  exclusive trading assumed  enormous  proportions : letters 
patent giving the patentee the exclusive right of selling became 
common, and some very necessary articles such as salt, leather, 
Hale, Pleas of the Crown,  vol. I, p.  194.  Blackstone, Comvzentaries, vol. I, c. 7. 
and coal had  been  made the subject of monopolies.  In 1597 
the commons begin to protest ;  these monopolies have become 
a grievous  burden.  In  1601  a  bolder  attack  is  made,  and 
Elizabeth was induced  to promise  that the existing patents 
should be repealed and no more issued.  The commons how- 
ever do not  seem  to have  been  prepared  to assert  that  all 
monopolies  were  illegal,  or  to  separate  those  which  were 
illegal  from  those  which  were  not.  James,  disregarding 
Elizabeth's  promise,  made a  copious  use  of  monopolies  for 
the  purpose  of  obtaining  a  revenue.  The commons  grew 
bolder, asserted the illegality of all monopolies, and in the last 
parliament of  the reign  a declaratory act was passed-an  act 
declaring not merely that grants of monopoly were to be illegal 
in the future, but also that they had  been illegal in the past1. 
This is the greatest victory of  the commons during the reign 
of James.  An exception was made in favour of  letters patent 
granting the exclusive right of  using  for a term  of  fourteen 
years any new manufacture to  the first and true inventor thereof. 
Our modern patent law is the outcome of  this exception. 
(3)  It is by means of  the judicial  power  of  the Court of 
Star Chamber that the king enforces his proclamations.  We 
have already said something of  this court  2.  Let us remember 
that a statute of  1487 (3  Hen.  VII, c.  I) gave authority to 
certain  persons  to punish  certain crimes.  These persons are 
the chancellor and treasurer of England and the keeper of the 
privy seal, or two of  them, calling to them  a  bishop  and a 
temporal lord of  the king's council and the two chief justices, 
or in their absence two other justices.  The offences that they 
are to punish are riots, unlawful assemblies, bribery of  jurors, 
misdoing of  sheriffs, and some others which we may describe 
as interferences with the due course of  justice.  It is evidently 
contemplated by the statute that the accused persons will not 
be  tried  by  jury.  The statute  does  not  mention  the Star 
Chamber, but that is a room which the council has long used. 
Now  a  difficulty meets  us : long  before  the  end of  our 
period  there  exists  what  is  known  as  the  Court  of  Star 
Chamber.  This however  does not exactly correspond to the 
ar James I, c. 3.  The Act did not apply to monopolies.  Gardiner, Hssbry 
of  England, vol. v, p. 233, vol. VUI, PP.  71-5. 
See pp. 2x8-ar. 262  Constitutionn  Z History  PERIOD 
court  described  by  the  statute  of  1487-and  that  in  two 
respects.  (a)  All the members  of  the council seem  to have 
been  members  of  it.  James  himself,  at least  upon  some 
occasions, sat there  in  person  and  himself  passed  sentence. 
As many as twenty-five councillors are sometimes found sitting 
fhere.  It had  a great deal of  work  to do, and in term time 
sat three days a week.  This brings us  to the second point. 
(b)  It did  not  confine  itself  to  dealing  with  the  crimes 
specified in the statute of  1487.  Its jurisdiction  over  crime 
was practically unlimited, or limited only by this-that  it did 
not pass sentence of death.  We know it best as dealing with 
what  may be  called  political  crimes-sedition  and the like; 
but it dealt also with commoner offences-robbery,  theft, and 
so forth.  It dealt with some misdoings for which the common 
law had as yet no punishment, in particular with libels. 
Now was this the court created by the statute of Henry VII? 
Under Charles I (for we must anticipate this much) the opinion 
had  gained ground  that it zuas, that consequently whatever it 
did  beyond  the sphere  marked  out by  that  statute was  an 
unlawful  usurpation  of  jurisdiction.  When  the  time  for 
abolishing  it had  come, it was  abolished  on  this score.  But 
the general opinion  seems now to be that the jurisdiction  of 
this Court of Star Chamber was in truth the jurisdiction which 
the king's council had  exercised  from  a remote. time, despite 
all protests and all statutes made against it.  The act of  1487 
constituted  a  committee  of  the council  to deal with  certain 
crimes ;  this however did not deprive the council itself  of  any 
jurisdiction  that it had.  This committee seems to have been 
in  existence  as  late  as  1529,  for  a  statute  of  that  year 
(21 Hen. VIII, c.  20)  adds to the committee the lord president 
of the council, an officer recently created ; but before the end 
of  Henry VIII's reign this statutory committee seems to dis- 
appear, it is merged in the general body of  the council. 
There can, I, think, be  no doubt that under Elizabeth and 
James  this  court  was  regarded  as  perfectly  legal-though 
there may have been  doubts as to how it came  to be  legal, 
and  it is said that Plowden, the great lawyer, asserted that it 
derived all its lawful authority from the statute of  Henry VII. 
Coke speaks of it with great respect, and does  not  seem  to 
The Star Chamber 
&are  Plowden's  doubts : '  It is  the  most  honourable  court 
(our  parliament  excepted)  that  is  in  the Christian  world1.' 
A statute of  1562 (5  Elizabeth c.  g) enumerates  the King's 
Court of Star Chamber along with the Chancery as one of the 
known courts of  the realm.  The Chancery had by this time 
become a  fully  recognized  court of  justice,  administering  a 
mass  of  rules  known  as  equity,  and  yet  the origin  of  its 
jurisdiction  was as obscure as that of  the jurisdiction  of  the 
council in  the Star Chamber: if  there were ancient  statutes 
against the one there were ancient statutes against the other 
also.  There can, I think, be little doubt that the Star Chamber 
was useful and was felt to be useful.  The criminal  procedure 
of the ordinary courts was extremely rude ;  the Star Chamber 
examining  the  accused,  and  making  no  use  of  the  jury, 
prubably succeeded  in  punishing many crimes  which would 
otherwise have gone unpunished.  But that it was a tyrannical 
court, that it became  more  and more  tyrannical, and under 
Charles I was guilty of great infamies is still more indubitable. 
It was a court of  politicians enforcing a policy, not a court of 
judges administering the law.  It  was cruel in its punishments, 
and often had recourse to torture.  It punished jurors for what 
it  considered  perverse  verdicts;  thus  it  controlled  all  the 
justice  of  the kingdom.  The old process of  attaint, of which 
we  have before spoken, had  long gone o;t  of  use, but in the 
Star Chamber the jurors  had to fear a terrible tribunal which 
would resent a verdict against the king. 
Other courts of  a similar kind closely connected with the 
council had  come into existence  in  divers parts of  England. 
The Council of  the North  was erected by Henry VIII after 
the Catholic revolt of  I 536 without any act of parliamenta.  It 
had  a  criminal  jurisdiction  in  Yorkshire and  the four  more 
northern counties as to riots, conspiracies and acts of violence. 
It was also given a civil jurisdiction  of  an equitable kind, but 
in  Elizabeth's  reign  the judges  of  the common  law  courts 
pronounced  this illegal.  Their doctrine seems to have been 
that without act of  parliament  the king might create a new 
Insfi/ufes,  Part  IV, cap.  5.  See  Prothero,  Statutes  and  Consti&tional 
Documents  (155-1625)~  pp.  +"I-3. 
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court to deal with  matters known  to  the common  law, but 
that  he  could  not  create  a  new  court  of  equity.  But  its 
criminal  jurisdiction  the Council of  the North  maintained, 
and this it seems to have exercised according to the course of 
the Star Chamber. 
The Court of  the Council of  Wales seems to have arisen 
under  Edward  IV, but  its authority was  acknowledged  and 
confirmed  by a  statute of  I542 (34  Hen. VIII, c.  26).  It 
was  to have  authority  in  Wales  and  the  Welsh  marches1. 
Under this latter denomination  it seems to have considered 
that the four counties of Gloucester, Worcester, Hereford, and 
Salop, were included.  We hear of protests against this exten- 
sion under James I, and according to Coke the twelve judges 
held that these four counties were not within the scope of the 
council's power.  However, the opinions of the judges were in 
vain : the question what was meant by the marches  of  Wales 
was a difficult question.  In considering the position  of  these 
courts it is desirable to remember  that the old  local  courts 
had become very useless as judicial tribunals; they could only 
entertain personal actions in which no more than forty shillings 
was claimed, and forty shillings had become a small sum.  That 
concentration  of justice  in  the Westminster  courts of  which 
we have so often spoken was producing evil effects-it  made 
litigation  about small matters very slow and very  costly ;  in 
many instances it must have amounted  to a denial of  justice. 
So there  was  room  enough  for  new  local  courts.  Men  in 
general  seem to have been  very willing that these new  local 
courts  should  exist,  and  the  opposition  of  the  common 
lawyers was to a large extent a selfish professional opposition, 
though it served in course of  time to maintain the authority 
of parliament against stretches of the prerogative. 
There was, however, one  new court of  great  importance, 
whose powers  they were  inclined  rather to magnify  than to 
minimize-this  was the Court of High  Commission1.  Time 
does not permit us to investigate the great religious changes of 
our period ; but, of course, the Reformation has an important 
For further information see Miss C. A. S. Skeel, The Council ilz the Marches 
of  Wales (London, 1904). 
For the High  Commission Court see Frathero, Statutes and  Corzstitzttional 
Documents,  Intr. 
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legal side, it is effected by acts of parliament.  The measures 
of  Henry VIII and those of  Edward  VI placed the church 
under  the  headship  of the king, he  was recognized  as head 
of the church.  These measures were repealed by Mary.  Most, 
but not all of  them, were revived  by the Act of  Supremacy 
(I Eliz.  I); she  did  not  revive  the  act which  asserted  the 
king's  heads,hip  of  the  church1.  The  ecclesiastical  courts 
continued  to exercise their jurisdiction,  but above them was 
raised a court of royal commissioners.  The Act of Supremacy 
empowers the queen to appoint any number of  persons, being 
natural  born  subjects,  to  exercise  under  Her  Majesty  all 
manner  of  jurisdiction  in  anywise  touching  ecclesiastical 
matters.  The words of  the act (sec. 18) are extremely large, 
and the commissions issued under it became wider and wider. 
In  1583 the power  of  the commissioners  has  become  very 
ample-there  were  forty-four commissioners,  most  of  them 
laymen.  In many matters affecting religion they had a dis- 
cretionary  power  of  fine  and  imprisonment ; these  powers 
could be exercised by any three members of  the body, one of 
them being a bishop.  Now this court had a distinctly statutory 
origin ; there could be no ground whatever for questioning its 
legality.  But in  this instance the common lawyers were  3n 
the side of  the crown ; if  they disliked the perogative when 
it interfered with the course of thecommon law, they magnified 
it when exercised about ecclesiastical matters ;  they were glad 
enough  to  see  their  old  rival, the spiritual jurisdiction,  the 
humbled  servant  of  the temporal  power;  they held  that so 
absolute was  the royal  supremacy over  all  religious  affairs, 
that even  the ample words of the Act of Supremacy did not  , 
express  its  full extent ; the  high  commissioners  might  do 
things that were not expressly authorized by the statute book. 
A  little later, the lawyers, or  at least some of  them, turned 
round.  Coke held that the act of  Elizabeth did not give the 
commissioners power  to fine or imprison  the laity-the  sole 
weapons  that it could use were the old ecclesiastical weapons 
of censure, penance, excommunication.  However, this power 
was  de fncto  maintained,  and  was  largely  and oppressively 
'  For  Elizabeth's  title  see  Maitland,  Defnder  of  the  Faitlr,  ad  so forth, 
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used  under  Charles I.  To whatever quarter we  look we  see 
that  he  inherited  a  great  number  of  difficulties  in  church 
and state-lawyers  and parliaments were  beginning to call in 
question the legality of  the institutions whereby the Tudors 
had  governed  the country. 
Again  commissions  had  been  exercised  for  the  trial  of 
offenders by martial law.  In tracing their history we have to 
notice a verbal confusion.  From a very early time the king's 
constable and marshal1 were the leaders of the king's  army. 
These offices became  hereditary and of no very great impor- 
tance.  However, as late as Edward I, it is the fact that Bohun 
and Bigod are the constable and marshall, which enables them 
to paralyze the king, by refusing to lead the army to France. 
The marshall's office is still in existence ; the Duke of Norfolk 
is Earl Marshall of  England.  The constable's  office fell  into 
the royal  family on the accession  of  the House of  Lancaster 
-occasional  grants  of  the  office  were  made ; but  after 
Henry VII's time, the office seems only to have been granted 
for special occasions.  Now as leaders of the army the constable 
and  marshal1  seem  to have  had  jurisdiction  over  offences 
committed  in  the  army, especially  when  the  army  was  in 
foreign parts, and in the fourteenth century we hear complaints 
of  their attempting to enlarge their jurisdiction.  Now  as a 
matter of etymology, ~narshall  has nothing whatever to do  with 
martial-the  marshal1  is  the  master  of  the  horse-he  is 
~izat8escnllz~s,  mavesckalk,  a  stable  servant-while  of  course 
martial has  to do with  Mars,  the god of  war.  Still, when 
first we hear of martial law in  England, it is spelt indifferently 
marshall and ~rzartial,  and it is quite clear that the two words 
were confused  in the popular mind-the  law administered by 
the constable and marshall was martial law.  Towards the end 
of  the Wars  of  the  Roses  we  find  very  terrible  powers  of 
summary justice granted to the constable.  In 1462 Edward IV 
empowers him  to proceed  in  all cases of treason, '  summarily 
and plainly,  without  noise and show of judgment  on simple 
inspection  of  fact.'  A  similar  patent was  granted  to Lord 
Rivers in  1467.  They show something very like a contempt 
for  law-the  constable is  to exercise powers  of  almost un- 
limited extent, all statutes, ordinances, acts and restrictions to 
Martial Law 
the contrary notwithstanding.  This illegal tribunal, for  such 
we may well call it, came to an end after the accession of  the 
House of  Tudor-the  king had  no need  of  it ; but  an evil 
precedent  had been set.  Mary seems to have executed some 
of  those  taken  in Wyatt's insurrection without regular trial. 
In I 588, when the Armada was approaching, Elizabeth issued 
a  proclamation  declaring that those who  bring in  traitorous 
libels  or papal bulls against  the queen, are to be  proceeded 
against  by  martial  law.  In  1595  there  had  been  riots  in 
London; the  queen  granted  a  commission  for  trying  and 
executing the rebels according to the justice  of  martial  law. 
There seems to be another precedent  for  such a commission 
in  1569, after the insurrection of  the northern earls, when six 
hundred persons were, it is said,executed by the Earl of Sussex. 
James on several occasions issued such commissions : in  1617, 
1620,1624; they empower the commissioners to try men by the 
law called the law martial-even  those who have been  guilty 
of  ordinary felonies.  There can, I  think, be no doubt that, 
according  to the  opinion  of  the  lawyers  of  the time, such 
commissions  were  illegal.  The government may put  down 
force by force-but  when  there is no open rebellion, or when 
the rebellion  is  suppressed, it has no  authority to direct the 
trial of prisoners, except in the ordinary courts and according 
to the known law of the land.  As to what was this 'law called 
martial law' we  know little, and probably there is little to be 
known ; it meant an improvised justice executed by soldiers. 
It may seem  to us  very  strange that there should  have 
been  in  full  play  tribunals, the  legality  of  which  was  very 
questionable, and other tribunals, the illegality of which could 
hardly be questioned.  Why, we may ask, was not the question 
raised  in  some court of  common law?  The answer seems to 
lie, at least partly, in the fact that the judges of  the courts of 
common law  were  very distinctly the king's  servants.  It is 
needless  to accuse  them  as a  class of  any disgraceful sub- 
serviency, though some of them were disgracefully subservient 
-but  past history had made their position  difficult.  The king 
was the fountain of  all justice;  they were but his deputies- 
this was the old theory, and to break  with it was impossible. 
To hold, not that some isolated  act of  royal  authority was 268  Constitationad History  PERIOD 
illegal-but  that the government  of  the country  was  being 
regularly conducted in  illegal  ways-this  would  have been  a 
hard  feat for the king's servants and deputies.  The position 
of affairs may be best illustrated by some episodes in the career 
of one who has left his mark deep in the history of our law. 
Edward  Coke was  born  in  1552, and died  in  1634.  His 
books,  which  were  soon  treated  as  venerable  authorities, 
consist of the Institutes in four parts-the  first the celebrated 
commentary  on  Littleton's  Tenures  (1628),  the  second  a 
commentary on various  statutes ranging from  Magna  Carta 
to James I, the third  an account  of  the  criminal  law,  the 
fourth  a  treatise  on  the  various  courts  (all  published  in 
1641 and  therefore  posthumous)-and  thirteen  volumes  of 
Reports  (the first  eleven,  1600-1615,  the  last  two  posthu- 
mous)-and  there are some minor  works.  Certainly he was 
a  very  learned  man:  he  knew  his  Year Books  at a  time 
when  such  knowledge  was  becoming  uncommon-and  by 
giving the results of  his learning in English instead of debased 
French, he made himself for ages an ultimate authority about 
all  matters  of  medieval  common  law:  we  are but  slowly 
beginning to find out that he did  not  know everything.  In 
I 593 he became Solicitor-General, in  I 594 Attorney-General, 
in  1606 Chief Justice of  the Common Pleas.  We soon  find 
him in opposition to the king.  In 1605 Archbishop Bancroft 
had complained of  the interference of the common law courts 
with  the ecclesiastical  tribunals ; the former were constantly 
issuing in  the king's  name prohibitions forbidding the courts 
Christian from entertaining cases which,as the common lawyers 
maintained,  belonged  to  the  lay  courts.  The  king  was 
inclined to take the archbishop's side : he sent for the judges, 
told  them  that  they  were  his  delegates, and that it  was for 
him  to decide to which  court cases should go.  '  Then ' (this 
is Coke's account) 'the king said that he thought the law was 
founded  upon  reason, and that he  and others had  reason as 
well  as the judges.  To which it was  answered  by  me  that 
true  it  was  that  God  had  allowed  His  Majesty  excellent 
science and great endowments  of  nature ; but  His  Majesty 
was  not  learned  in  the laws of  his  realm  of  England and 
causes  which  concern  the  life  or  inheritance  or  goods  or 
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fortunes of his subjects ;  they are not to be decided by natural 
reason,  but  by the  artificial  reason  and  judgment  of  law, 
which law is an act which requires long study and experience 
before that a man can attain to the cognizance of  it; and that 
the law  was  the golden  met-wand  and  measure  to  try the 
causes  of  the subjects, and which  protected  His Majesty  in 
safety and peace.  With which the king was greatly offended, 
and  said  that then  he  should  be  under  the law,  which  was 
treason  to affirm,  as he said.  To which I said that Bracton 
saith pod Rex non  debet esse  sub Lomine set  sub  deo  et  Zege1. 
We  see  these  old  words  of  Bracton  doing  service  again 
and again.  The judges seem even to have told the king that 
no king after the Conquest had ever taken on himself to give 
judgment:  if they said so, they said what was certainly untrue; 
but we see that it was difficult to assure James I that he was 
not in  fact, what  he  was  according  to admitted  theory, the 
highest  judge  in  his  realm. 
Coke's next exploit is in 161  I, when he and his brethren in 
the Common Pleas held  that the Court of  High Con~mission 
had  no  power to fine and imprison.  The question turned on 
the meaning of the section in the Act of  Supremacy, to which 
reference  has already been  made.  The Common  Pleas held 
that the Commission  which  authorized  the infliction  of  fine 
and  imprisonment  was  not  itself  authorized  by  the statute. 
The judges  of  that court, and those of  the other two courts, 
were  summoned  before  the council  and examined  seriatim. 
Coke  refused  to give  way;  but  the  other judges  were  not 
unanimous.  The king promised that a less objectionable form 
of  commission  should  be issued ; and a new commission was 
issued with  Coke's  name  in  it-but  he  refused  to sit, as he 
was not allowed to see the commission. 
As regards the impositions of customs dues.  The Court of 
Exchequer held this to be legal, and Coke agreed that it was 
legal if the imposition was intended for the good of the public, 
and not  merely for the increase of  the revenue.  As regards 
the validity of proclamations in general, he and the rest of the 
judges were bolder ; they declared  that a proclamation could 
not create a new offence-but  of this we have already spoken. 
Coke, Reporfs, MI,  65.  Cf.  Gardlner, Ntstory ofB?zgZa~td,  VO~.  11,  pp. 36-9. 270  Constitutional History  PERIOD 
In 1613 Coke was made Chief Justice of the King's Bench, 
seemingly in the hope that in a more exalted position he would 
prove more pliant.  But the hope was vain.  In Peacham's case 
he objected to the judges  being  asked  singly and apart for 
their opinions as to a matter which was to come before them 
judicially.  At a later day, when he was no longer a judge, he 
objected to the whole practice of  consulting the judges  about 
such  matters-but  at this time he  merely objected  to their 
being consulted one by one : as solicitor and attorney-general 
he  had  often  himself  asked  the judges  for  their  opinions. 
The practice, however  evil  it may seem  in our eyes, was  an 
old, well-established  practice, and  it  was  even  possible  to 
contend that the judges were bound by their oaths to give the 
king legal advice whenever he asked for it. 
Then in  1615 Coke plunged  into a  controversy with  the 
Court of  Chancery, in which he was  decisively worsted.  For 
some time  past  the Chancery had  claimed  and exercised  a 
power of ordering a person who had been successful in a court 
of  law, to refrain  from  putting  in  force the judgment  that he 
had  obtained, on the ground that he had obtained it by fraud 
or  other  inequitable  means.  You  will  understand  that  the 
Chancery did not attempt to prohibit  the courts of law from 
entertaining  or  deciding  causes-it  claimed  no  supervisory 
jurisdiction  over  them, such  as the Court of  King's  Bench 
exercised over the local courts; but it did claim that if  a person 
had  obtained  a judgment  by  inequitable  means, by fraud  or 
breach of trust, he might be enjoined from putting in force, from 
obtaining execution.  Coke rebelled  against this-and  seems 
to have  thought  that anyone who  went  to the Chancery  in 
such a case was  guilty of  the offence created  by the Acts of 
Praemunire, that of  going from the king's  courts to another 
tribunal-acts  which  had  been  directed  against  the judicial 
power of the bishop of  Rome.  The matter was referred to the 
king,  and  he had  the pleasure of  deciding  in  favour of  the 
Chancery, and thus maintaining his theory  that he was  the 
supreme arbiter when his judges differed.  The victory of  the 
Chancery was final and complete-and  if  we were to have a 
court of equity at all, it was a necessary victory. 
Then in  1616  came the case of  the conzmendnms-Bishop 
III  Coke's Dis~nissal  27  I 
Neile of  Lincoln had received two benefices from the king to 
be  held  in  commendam,  that  is  to  say, together  with  his 
bishopric.  An action was  brought against him  by two men, 
Colt and Glover, who contested the legality of the royal grant, 
and in the course of the proceedings it was reported to James 
that the counsel for the plaintiffs  disputed  the royal right to 
grant a  commendam.  Coke  and his  fellows received  orders 
not  to  proceed  with  the hearing of  an action  in  which  the 
king's  prerogative was  questioned ; they answered that they 
were  bound  by  their  oaths  not  to regard  such  commands. 
The king sent for them, and they humbled  themselves, with 
the exception  of  Coke-from  whom  no  more  could  be got 
than  that  if  such  a  command  came  he would  do what  an 
honest  and just  judge  ought to do. 
The intractable chief justice was forthwith dismissed.  '  It 
is the common speech (says a contemporary) that four p's have 
overthrown him-that  is pride, prohibitions, praemunire  and 
prerogative1.'  In 1620  he appears in parliament as a leader on 
the popular side, and from that time until his death in 1634,  did 
not a little to give the great struggle its peculiar character- 
a struggle of the common law against the king. 
On  several  occasions during that  struggle an important 
part is played  by the writ of  habeas  corpus.  We had better 
therefore see what  that writ was, and we  shall have to notice 
that even during the Tudor time there was considerable doubt 
as to its scope.  From a very early time our kings had claimed 
to supervise  all  the justice  of  their  realm.  If  anyone was 
imprisoned it was in the king's power  to inquire the cause of 
the imprisonment.  We ought to carry our thoughts back to 
a time when England was full of  private ~risons-the  prisons 
of  lords  who  claimed  jurisdiction  by  royal  grant  or  by 
prescription.  At the suit of  an  imprisoned  subject the king 
would  send  his writ  to the keeper of  the gaol, bidding him 
have  the  body  of  that  subject  before  the  king's  court,  to 
undergo  and  receive  what  that  court  should  award.  As 
happened  in  many other  cases, this  prerogative  of the king 
came to be regarded as the right of  the subject.  During the 
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later Middle Ages a writ of habeas corpus seems to have been 
granted  in  the royal  chancery almost  or quite as a  matter 
of  course;  there  were  clerks  very  willing  to increase  their 
business, and  there were  judges  very desirous of  amplifying 
their  jurisdiction.  When  the three  courts  of  common  law 
had  become  separate, this  work  of  investigating  the cause 
of  an  imprisonment  belonged  most  properly  to the  King's 
Bench;  but  by  means  of  fictions  the  other  two  courts 
followed its example, and issued  and adjudicated upon writs 
of habeas corpus. 
We ought further to know some little as to the imprison- 
ment of persons accused, but not yet convicted of crime.  Our 
early law seldom kept a man in prison before trial if  he could 
find  pledges,  if  he could  find  persons who  would  undertake 
for his  production  in  court.  According to Glanvill it is only 
in  cases  of homicide that it  is usual to keep a man in prison 
instead  of  allowing him to find pledges.  The law during the 
next century grew somewhat stricter.  The Statute of  West- 
minster I (1275, c. 12) defined the cases in which pledges are 
not to be allowed-persons  taken for the death of  a  man, or 
by commandment of  the king or of  his justices, or for  forest 
offences, or for certain other causes, are not to be replevied. 
This statute  determined  what  offences  are replevisable and 
what not until  1826, though a  considerable mass of  interpre- 
tation grew up around it, and certain  particular  offences were 
from  time to time specially dealt with by statute.  In I275 
the work  of  bailing  or replevying prisoners was still done by 
the sheriff;  gradually his  powers  in  this respect  were trans- 
ferred to the justices  of the peace.  A person who felt himself 
aggrieved by the refusal  of  the sheriff  or the justices  of  the 
peace to let him  find  pledges could  by means of  the writ  of 
habeas corpus bring his case before one of  the common law 
courts.  These courts had  also exercised  a  power  of  bailing 
prisoners  whom  the sheriff or the justices  of  the peace could 
not set free: for instance, the sheriff  and justices  of  the peace 
could not set a man at liberty if  he was accused of  treason or 
of  murder-they  were  distinctly  forbidden  to do so  by  the 
Statute  of  Westminster-but  the  King's  Bench  did  not 
consider  that the Statute limited its power  of  allowing bail, 
and it exercised a discretionary power of bailing even accused 
traitors and murderers. 
We ought  to  notice,  even  though  we  cannot  afford  to 
explore the matter to the bottom, that there was a somewhat 
subtle distinction  between  replevying a  prisoner and bailing 
a  prisoner:  both  processes  had  much  the  same  practical 
result-but  the distinction  gave  ground  for  the  contention 
that  the  power  of bailing  exercised  by  the  King's  Bench 
was not limited by the Statute of  Westminster, which merely 
forbad  sheriffs  and  others  to  replevy  persorls  in  certain 
particular  cases.  Now  this  small  point  became  of  great 
importance: one of  the cases in which  a  man  was  not to be 
replevied was that of  a  person imprisoned by the command- 
ment of  the king:  could then the courts of  common law bail 
a prisoner who was imprisoned by the king's commandment? 
In the reign  of  Charles I, when  the power of the council  to 
commit  to prison was  the subject of  hot controversy, it was 
asserted  by the king's  advocates, denied  by the parliamen- 
tarians, that the power of  the King's Bench was restricted by 
the  Statute of  Westminster.  The argument  of  the  king's 
opponents  took  this  form-the  court's  power  of  bailing 
prisoners cannot be touched  by the Statute of  Westminster, 
for  in  that case it would  never  be able to bail  an accused 
murderer : but indubitably it does bail  accused  murderers- 
therefore  this statute refers  merely  to the action  of  sheriffs 
and  similar  officers.  But  further, and this  matter concerns 
us  more directly, a number of  cases were produced  in which 
the  Court  of  King's  Bench had  bailed  prisoners,  when  the 
cause  of  their  commitment  was  stated  to  be  the  king's 
command.  In answer to the writ of habeas corpus, the gaoler 
, 
had returned that the prisoner was committed by the command 
of the king, or by the command of the king's council, and yet 
the court had  liberated  him upon bail.  There was one clear 
case  of  this  from  1344-the  lieutenant  of  the  Tower  had 
returned that one J. B. was in prison by the king's  command 
under  his  great  seal: the  court  let  him  out  on  bail  puia 
videtzcr curiae  breve praedictuvz  sz~scientem  not2  esse  causa  wz 
praedicti  J. B.  in pyiso~za yetkendi.  The other cases come 
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eleven of  them-the  prisoners were liberated on  bail, though 
the gaoler returned that they were imprisoned (in some cases) 
by command  of  the king, or (in  others) by command  of  the 
king's  council1. 
It seems that in  Elizabeth's reign, in  15gr or thereabouts, 
the judges  were consulted by the council as to the power of 
the queen, and of  the council, to commit to prison.  We have 
two  versions  of  the  answer  that  they  gave,  the  one  is  in 
Anderson, Reports, vol. I, p. 297, the other in Hallam, chap. 5. 
Both are singularly obscure-perhaps  they are intentionally 
obscure-and  there is a considerable difference between them. 
The judges  manage to evade saying distinctly whether they 
will or whether they will not bail prisoners when the return to 
the writ  of  habeas corpus simply says that the prisoner was 
committed  by the command  of  the king or the command of 
the council.  They evidently  think  (as it  seems to me)  that 
the cause of  the commitment ought to  be  assigned, but  what 
they will  do, if it is  not  assigned, they do not  say.  In the 
struggle  of  Charles's  reign  both  parties  claimed  that  'the 
resolution  in  Anderson'  was  favourable  to them:  to  me  it 
seems to show that the judges  of  Elizabeth's day felt them- 
selves  in a great difficulty-and  the difficulty grew greater; 
Coke himself, when  Chief Justice, held  that one committed 
by the council was not bailable by any court  in England ; he 
afterwards recanted his opinion in parliament, saying that he 
had been misled by an inapposite precedent. 
It should be clearly understood that the judges of this time 
did not question the power of  the council to act judicially  and 
to sentence to imprisonment,-the  jurisdiction  of the Court of 
Star Chamber was not in  debate-nor  did they  question  the 
power  of  the council to commit  to prison  persons  suspected 
of  crime.  The doubt was merely this-whether  if the council 
committed  to prison,  the courts  of  common  law  would  be 
prevented  from  considering  whether  the  suspected  person 
ought to be bailed-was  the king's command or the command 
Proceedings  on the Habeas Corpus brought  by  Sir T. Darnel  and  others, 
3  Charles  I,  1627,  State  Trials, vol.  111,  pp.  1-59.  John  Bilston's  case 
(18 Edw.  111,  Rot.  33) was quoted by Coke,  zq March  1617, in  the Commons 
but  does not  appear  to have been  cited  in court, ib.  p.  69. 
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of  the  council  a  sufficient answer  to the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus?  If  the return  was  that the prisoner  was  sentenced 
to imprisonment by the Star Chamber there would  have been 
no talk of setting him free ; the doubt was as to persons  who 
had not been tried: could the king prevent an investigation  of 
their cases in  a court  of  law, by telling the gaoler  to return 
that  they  were  imprisoned  by  the king's  command? 
Taking a  general  survey,  everywhere  we  see  difficulties 
before King Charles  I.  The system  by  which  England has 
of  late been  governed  is  a  questionable  system, it  is  being 
questioned  in  parliament,  it  is  being  questioned  in  the law 
courts.  The more  men  look  back  at  history  (and  history 
is  now  being  minutely examined for  controversial  purposes) 
the more  they  see that  the constitution  is  not  what  it  was 
under  the Lancastrian kings-that  the mode of  government 
conflicts  with  unrepealed  statutes,  that  there  is  at  least 
plausible  excuse  for  pronouncing  a  great  deal  of  it  illegal. 
Whether  a  wiser  man  than  Charles  could  have  averted  or 
guided  the coming storm, is a question  over which  we  may 
well think ; but everywhere we see that the storm is coming. 
C.  History  of  the  A rmy. 
The last topic with which we can deal before passing to a 
new period is the history of the army-a  matter of  which we 
have  hitherto said  too little.  After  the Conquest the feudal 
tenures  had  supplied  the  king  with  troops; but  the feudal 
array was  an  extremely  clumsy  weapon.  The  tenant  by 
knight service was only bound  to serve for forty days in  the 
year-and  there was  constant friction between  the king and 
his  barons  as to  the  conditions  of  the  service-were  they 
bound  to serve in  Normandy? were  they  bound  to serve in 
Germany?-on  more than one famous occasion these questions 
were  raised,  and the embarrassed  king  had  to  make  con- 
cessions.  Already  in  1159 Henry I1 took  the first  scutage, 
by way of  composition  for personal  service1.  It is explained 
that his object was to spare the lives  of  his subjects and get 
Traces of scutage have been found as early as the reign of  Henry I.  Round, 
Feudal Englatzd, p.  268.  See MCKechnie, Maggra  Carfa,  pp. 86-90. Constitutional  History 
his  foreign  wars  fought  for  him  by  mercenaries.  Towards 
the end of  his  reign, in  1181, he revived and reorganized  the 
ancient  national  force  by  his  Assize  of  Arms.  Apparently 
the idea  of  such  a  force had  never  ceased  to exist; it  had 
never become law that military service, at all events defensive 
military service, was limited by the system of  military tenure. 
Every  man,  according  to  his  degree,  is  to  have  suitable 
weapons-even  the poorest free man is to have his spear and 
helmet.  A  national  force, organized  by  counties,  was  thus 
created. 
Henry  I11 reissued  the assize in  an  amplified  form,  and 
it forms the base of  one of his son's great statutes, the Statute 
of  Winchester.  Its date is  1285, so there  is just  a  century 
between it and the Assize of Arms1.  Every free man between 
the ages of fifteen and sixty is to have armour according to 
his wealth.  There are five classes, ranging from him who has 
.415  of  lands  and  40  marks  of  goods,  a  habergeon,  iron 
helmet, sword, knife and horse, down  to him  who  is  merely 
to have his bow  and arrows.  Twice a year the arms are to 
be  viewed  in  each  hundred  by two  elected  officers  called 
constables.  These provisions occur in  close connection  with 
others  enforcing  tlie  ancient  duties of  watch  and  ward,  of 
hue  and  cry.  If  this national  force  is  to be  useful against 
the public  enemy, it is  to be useful also for police purposes, 
for  apprehending malefactors and the like.  Its officers you 
will observe are 'constables'-the  title is originally a  military 
title,  which  spreads  downwards  from  the  king's  constable, 
who along with the king's marshal1 arrays and leads the royal 
forces.  Even the lowest officers in the national force become 
constables;  the constable  of  the  township  looks  after  the 
armour of  the township, above him are the constables of  the 
hundred; they again  are below  the constable, the high  con- 
stable  (as  he  comes  to  be  called)  of  the  county.  The 
military  duties  of  the  constable  of  the  township  are  from 
the  first  allied  with  the  duty  of  keeping  the  peace  and 
apprehending  malefactors-the  ancient  village  officers,  the 
reeves, the headboroughs (chiefs of  the frankpledge), become 
also the constables, and lose their older names. 
Select  Charters, pp.  1.5~4,  469-74. 
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To return.  The obligation  of  this armed  force, defined 
by  the Statute of  Winchester,  to take part in  war offensive 
or defensive, is for a long while very  indefinite.  Of  course it 
could not be contended that the king might send  every able- 
bodied  man  out  of  the realm  to serve in  France.  We find 
that Edward I commissions certain  of  his servants to choose 
out a  fixed number of  able-bodied men from their respective 
counties.  In  other  words, he  issues  commissions  of  array. 
The forces thus levied  he  pays at his own cost.  The troops 
from a county are under  the command  of  a royal  cnpitanez~s 
or captain, in  whom  we  may see the forerunner of  the lord- 
lieutenant of  later  times.  The sheriff  would  naturally  be 
the head  of  the county force, and so in  theory  he  remains; 
it  is  he  who  can  raise  the  power  of  the county, the posse 
cornitatus,  for  the  pursuit  of  malefactors;  but  for  actual 
warfare  an  annual officer (and permanent sheriffs the country 
will  not  stand)  is  not  a  good  commander.  So the  sheriff 
loses his  military  functions  at a  time  when  the  institution 
of  permanent justices of  the peace  is sapping many other of 
his  powers.  Commissions  of  array become  common  under 
Edward  I1 and Edward  111,  and  the king does not always 
pay the soldiers whom  he  levies-he  expects the counties  to 
pay  them ; the counties  were  required  to provide  arms not 
prescribed  by  the Statute of  Winchester,  to  pay  the wages 
of  men  outside  of  their  own  area  and even  outside  of  the 
kingdom.  Complaints of  this  become  loud.  In  1327 the 
commons petition  that they be not  compelled  to arm them- 
selves at their own cost contrary to the Statute of Winchester, 
or to serve beyond  the limits of  their counties, except at the 
king's cost.  The petition was granted by statute (I Edw. 111, 
stat. 2,  c.  5)  in  this  modified  form.  'The king  wills  that 
no man  be  charged  to arm  himself  otherwise  than  he was 
wont in  the time of  his (the king's) progenitors, and that no 
man be compelled to go out of  his shire, but where necessity 
requireth  and  sudden  coming  of  strange enemies  into  the 
realm;  and  then  it  shall  be  done  as  hath  been  used  in 
times past  for  the defence  of  the realm.'  But Edward  had 
to  make  a  further  concession.  By  statute  (25  Edw.  111, 
stat. 5, c. 8) it is accorded and assented that no man  shall be constrained  to find  men-at-arms, hobblers  nor  archers, other 
than  those  which  hold  by  such services, if  not  by  common 
assent  and  grant  made  by  parliament.  Apparently  those 
statutes  were  habitually  broken  or  evaded.  In  I402  they 
were confirmed by statute (4 Hen. IV, c.  13), and they  seem 
to have been  observed  during the Lancastrian  reigns.  The 
Welsh  and  Scottish  wars  of  Henry  VI  were  regarded  as 
defensive, resistances of invasion, and  the county forces could 
lawfully be called to meet them.  The army whereby Henry V 
won  his  victories  in  France  consisted  partly  of  soldiers 
voluntarily enlisted who had the king's wages, partly of  forces 
raised by lords who served the king by indenture, by  special 
bargain.  During the Wars of  the Roses both  sides  used  the 
king's  name for  commissions  of  array, and  the country  got 
thoroughly accustomed to intestine war,compulsory service, and 
extorted loans and benevolences.  The statutes of Edward I11 
remained  on  the statute book; so did  the  Statute of  Win- 
chester. 
The Tudor despotism  was  not enforced by  any standing 
army ; that  is  one  of  the  most  noticeable  things  in  the 
history  of  the time.  One or  two  hundred  yeomen  of  the 
guard  and  a  few  guards  in  the  fortresses  were  the  only 
soldiers  that the king  kept permanently in  his  pay.  Com- 
missions  of  array, however, were  issued  from  time to time ; 
the  counties  were  compelled  to  provide  soldiers  even  for 
foreign  service, and  the statutes of  an  earlier  time seem  to 
have been disregarded and perhaps forgotten.  An  important 
act of  1557 (4 and 5  Philip and Mary, c. 3) takes no notice of 
the old acts, but speaks of  mustering and levying men to serve 
in the wars as a recognized legal  practice, and, as it seems  to 
me, implicitly sanctions impressment by means of commissions 
of array, even impressment for foreign service.  Certain offences 
when  committed  by  the soldiers  when  mustered  and  levied 
are to be tried by the king's lieutenant, 'the lord-lieutenant'  as 
he is here called.  The usage of appointing a permanent lord- 
lieutenant for each county is said to date from this reign. 
Another statute of  this same year 1557 (4 and 5 Philip and 
Mary, c.  2) expressly  repealed  so much  of  every statute of 
earlier date as concerned  the finding or keeping of  horse or 
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armour; and it enacted a new scale of armour, which replaced 
that ordained by the Statute of Winchester.  But this statute 
was  itself  repealed  in  1603 by I  James I, c. 25, an act which 
repealed in a wholesale  fashion a large number of  the Tudor 
statutes.  No reason is given for the repeal;  Hallam suggests 
that the accession to the English throne of  the king of Scotland 
had removed the chief necessity for a defensive force.  But the 
repeal had  a perhaps  unexpected  effect.  Until  1850 it was 
our law that if  statute A  be repealed by statute B,  and then 
statute B be simply repealed  by  statute C, statute A is thus 
revived-so  the Statute of Winchester came to life once more1. 
Then in the days of  Charles I it became rnatter of  hot debate 
whether  the armed  force which  the old  statutes created was 
at the king's disposal.  This force was just  acquiring the new 
name of militia, and the control over the militia became one of 
the chief points of controversy between crown and parliament. 
Meanwhile  no  standing  army  is  kept  up;  for  foreign 
warfare  a  temporary  army  is  got  together  partly  by virtue 
of  feudal  obligation,  partly  by  voluntary  enlistment,  partly 
by impressment.  However, in James's reign we find  that the 
troops are not always disbanded  immediately  on  their  return 
to England, and we find that commissions of  martial  law are 
issued  for  their  governance.  Thus at the end of  the reign, 
December, 1624, there are troops at Dover.  A commission is 
issued to the Mayor and others empowering them  'to proceed 
according to the justice of  martial law against such soldiers. .. 
and  other  dissolute  persons  joining  with  them.. .as  commit 
any robberies,  felonies, mutinies  or  other  outrages  or  mis- 
demeanours ...  and  then  to  execute and  cause  to be  put  to 
death according to the law martialz.'  Of the very questionable 
legality  of  such  commissions  we  have  before  spoken : here 
let us notice that only by such means could a  standing army 
be held together.  This, I think, has been  the verdict  of  long 
experience,  that  an  army  cannot  be  kept  together  if  its 
discipline  is  left  to the ordinary common  law.  These com- 
missions, you will observe, went far beyond matters of military 
1  13 and 14 Victoria,  c.  21. 5. 
Pat.  Roll,  22 Jac. I, part 4, printed in Prothero, Statutes atad  Constit~ltionnl 
Docunzents (1559-1625),  pp. 398-9. discipline-they  empowered the commissioners to try soldiers 
'  and other dissolute '  persons for robberies  and other felonies, 
as well as for mutinies.  The difficulty of  keeping a standing 
army was,  as James's successors found, a  double difficulty- 
(I) that of maintaining any discipline without having recourse 
to illegal commissions, (2) that of  paying troops without having 
recourse to illegal modes of  raising money. 
As regards the legality of pressing  soldiers,  we  have this 
to remember in the king's favour, and it is too often forgotten, 
that the legality of pressing  sailors  seems to have been  fully 
admitted.  From an early time, certainly through the fourteenth 
century, we  find  that  the  king  presses  sailors  and  presses 
ships for transport  and for  naval  warfare.  This  is  done by 
means of  commissions closely similar  to  the commissions of 
array.  But while the commissions of arraying soldiers excited 
much  opposition,  and parliament  was  constantly petitioning 
about  them  and  sometimes  succeeded  in  getting  statutes 
passed  limiting the king's  power,  the pressing  of  sailors and 
ships  seems  not  to  have  been  a  great  grievance.  All  one 
hears by way of  protest is that the sailors ought to be at the 
king's wages from the time when they are on  board  ship.  A 
statute  of  1378  (2  Ric.  11,  c.  4)  distinctly  recognizes  the 
lawfulness of  the practice-it  speaks of  sailors  arrestled and 
retained for the king's service, and provides  a punishment  for 
them if they run away.  Many later statutes speak of pressing 
as a lawful process.  There are several  from the last century 
which  do  so  by  making  exceptions;  in  these  and  those 
circumstances sailors are not to be impressed.  No word in the 
Petition of Right or the Bill of  Rights is directed against this 
prerogative ; the class affected by it was, I suppose, too small 
to  make its voice  heard, or  else  the necessity  of  manning a 
navy was considered so great that the king's power was never 
called in question. 
PERIOD  IV. 
SICETCH  OF PUBLIC  LAW  AT  THE  DEATH  OF 
WILLIAM  111. 
WE pass  over an  exciting  time, and placing ourselves at 
the quiet accession of  Queen  Anne, we ask  what have been 
the legal and permanent results of the great events-Rebellion, 
Restoration,  Revolution.  The  chronological  sequence  of 
these events we  certainly ought to know ; but  we  have  not 
time for everything, and I think that we had  better adopt an 
analytical  rather  than a historical treatment.  What, then, is 
the constitution in  1702 ? 
We can  now  say  with  some  certainty  that  we  have  a 
composite sovereign body-the  king, lords spiritual and tem- 
poral, and commons  in  parlifment  assembled.  Let us  first 
look at the constitution of each of  these factors-how  and by 
what right do they come to be what they are? 
A.  Constitution of  the King&$. 
And first of  the king.  His title is now a statutory title  if 
it be a title at all.  Of course it is the opinion of a considerable 
number of  persons  that his  title  is  bad ; let  us  attempt to 
understand  their  opinion.  Not  to  go back  to the  Middle 
Ages, to the parliamentary right of  the House of  Lancaster, 
the hereditary right of the House of York, we  remember  that 
Henry VIII came  more  than once to parliament for an act 
regulating the succession to the throne, even  obtained  an act 
enabling him in default of  issue to leave  the crown to whom 
he would.  In Elizabeth's  reign it was  treason  to affirm  that 
the succession  could  not  be  settled  by  act  of  parliament. 
We have seen, however, that James, by the quiet  consent of 
the nation,  succeeded  to  the crown,  though,  if  statutes on Constitwtiolzn  Z  History 
such a matter had  any validity, the succession was probably 
illegal;  probably  Henry  VIII,  in  exercise  of  a  statutory 
power, had preferred the issue of  his younger  to those  of  his 
elder  sister.  There was  much  therefore  in  his  own  case  to 
set James on thinking that the inheritance of  the crown was 
divinely appointed and was  not to be meddled  with by act of 
parliament.  He was  succeeded  by  his  son  Charles  I, and 
when Charles I was murdered he was  immediately succeeded 
by his son Charles 11.  I put the matter in  that way because 
that  was  in  1702, and  is  even  now  the  legal  view  of  the 
matter, and we must not allow any sympathies or antipathies 
to interfere with  our  statement of  the law.  In  I702 it was 
not questioned that the first Charles had  been  murdered, and 
that the  second  began  to reign  on  30 January,  1649.  On 
29 May, 1660, the king began  to enjoy his  own  again, but it 
already was his own and he had been reigning for eleven years 
and  more.  All the acts of  the Long Parliament which  had 
not  obtained  the king's  assent  were  simply void.  At the 
Restoration  no  statute was  passed  to  declare  them  void ; 
they were  obviously void  as having  been  made without  the 
royal assent, and no repeal was necessary.  In 1702 no lawyer 
would have appealed to them as law, and no lawyer would do 
so at  the present  day: they  have  no  place  in  our  statute 
book.  This theory  had  been  pressed  far.  On  16 March, 
1660, the remains of  the Long Parliament had declared itself 
dissolved.  Elections  were  held without the king's  writ-no 
decisive measure  had  yet  been  taken for inviting Charles to 
England-and  a parliament,  afterwards  known  as '  the Con- 
vention Parliament,' consisting of  a few lords and the newly- 
elected  commons,  assembled  on  25  April.  It at once  pro- 
ceeded to enter into negotiations with Charles ; on 7 May the 
houses resolved that the king  should be  proclaimed;  on the 
24th he set sail ; on the 26th he landed ; on  the 29th  he met 
the parliament.  An act was at once passed declaring that the 
Long Parliament was dissolved (it had never been dissolved by 
the king, and so there might be question as to its dissolution) 
and that the lords and commons now sitting at Westminster 
in this present  parliament are the two  houses  of  parliament 
notwithstanding the fact that  they had  not  been  summoned 
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by the king's writ.  Of  course, however, if  the king's  writ of 
summons was necessary to the legal  being  of  a parliament, 
this defect could not be remedied  by a parliament which  had 
come together without such writ-if  it was  not a true parlia- 
ment, its  own  declaration  could not  make it  so.  This Con- 
vention Parliament sat on  until  December, 1660, and passed 
a number  of  acts.  Another  parliament  met  in  May,  1661, 
and this of  course was  summoned  by the king's writ  in due 
form.  It proceeded to pass an act confirming the acts of  the 
Convention  Parliament  as  though  their  validity  might  be 
questionable owing to the want of the king's writ.  All there- 
fore that was done at the Restoration was done on the theory 
that Charles I1 had reigned from  the moment  of  his father's 
death. 
Passing to the events of  1688 we see that it was extremely 
difficult for any lawyer to make out that what had then been 
done was  lawful.  What had  happened  was briefly this.  In 
July,  1688, James had  dissolved  parliament,  so  that  at the 
critical  moment  there  was  no  parliament  in  existence.  On 
5  November  William  landed; on  I I  December  James  fled 
from  London  and  dropped the great seal  into the Thames; 
on the zznd he left the kingdom.  William, Prince of Orange, 
invited  an  assembly.  It was rapidly got together.  He sum- 
moned the peers and such of the members of  the parliaments 
of  Charles 11's  reign (not James '11) as were in  London; the 
aldermen  of  London also were  summoned.  This, of  course, 
the lawyer  cannot but  regard  as a quite irregular assembly, 
called  by one who  is  not, who  does not  profess to be  king. 
The assembly met  on  26 December, 1688, and  it advised the 
Prince to summon a 'convention'  of  the estates of  the realm. 
In accordance with  this advice he  invited  the lords to come, 
and the counties  and boroughs  to send representatives to a 
convention  on  22 January, 1689.  The convention  met.  On 
25 January the commons resolved that King James I1 having 
endeavoured  to subvert the constitution  of  the kingdom  by 
breaking  the original  contract between  king and people, and 
by  the  advice  of  Jesuits  and other wicked  persons  having 
violated  the fundamental laws and having withdrawn himself 
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the throne has thereby become vacant.  After some hesitation, 
on  12 February the lords agreed to this resolution, and it was 
resolved  that William and Mary should  be  proclaimed  king 
and queen.  On I 3 February the Houses waited  on  William 
and Mary and tendered them the crown, accompanied  by the 
Declaration  of  Rights.  The crown was accepted.  The con- 
vention, thereupon  following the precedent  of  1660,  passed 
an act declaring itself  to be the parliament  of  England, not- 
withstanding  the want  of  proper  writs  of  summons.  This 
Convention Parliament was  not  dissolved until early in  1690, 
and passed many important acts, including the Bill of  Rights, 
which incorporated the Declaration of Rights.  A new parlia- 
ment  met  on  22 March,  1690,  and  this of  course  was  duly 
summoned by writs  of  the king and queen.  It proceeded to 
declare  by  statute that the king and queen  were  king and 
queen, and that the statutes made by the convention were and 
are laws and statutes of  the kingdom. 
Now certainly it was very difficult for any lawyer to argue 
that there  had  not  been a revolution.  Those who conducted 
the revolution  sought,  and  we  may  well  say were  wise  in 
seeking, to make the revolution  look  as small as possible, to 
make  it  as  like  a  legal  proceeding,  as  by  any stretch  of 
ingenuity  it  could  be  made.  But  to make  it  out  to  be  a 
perfectly legal act seems impossible.  Had it failed, those who 
attempted it  would  have  suffered  as traitors,  and  I  do not 
think  that  any  lawyer  can  maintain  that  their  execution 
would  have  been  unlawful.  The convention  hit  upon  the 
word  '  abdicated ' as expressing James's  action,  and, accord- 
ing  to  the  established  legal  reckoning,  he  abdicated  on 
the  I I  December,  1688, the day on which  he  dropped  the 
great seal  into the Thames.  From  that  day until  the day 
when  WiIliam  and  Mary  accepted  the crown,  13 February, 
1689, there was no king of England.  Possibly the convention 
would better have expressed  the truth if, like the parliament 
of  Scotland, it had  boldly  said  that James had  forfeited the 
crown.  But  put  it  either way, it is difficult for a lawyer  to 
regard  the  Convention  Parliament as a lawfully  constituted 
assembly.  By whom  was  it summoned?  Not  by a king of 
England, but  by a  Prince of  Orange.  Even  if  we  go back 
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three  centuries  we  find  no  precedent.  The parliaments  of 
1327 and of  1399 were summoned by writs in  the king's name 
under  the great seal.  Grant that parliament  may depose  a 
king,  James  was  not  deposed  by  parliament;  grant  that 
parliament  may  elect  a  king, William  and  Mary  were  not 
elected by parliament.  If when the convention met it was no 
parliament, its  own  act  could  not  turn  it  into a parliament. 
The act which declares it to be  a parliament  depends for its 
validity on the assent of  William and Mary.  The validity of 
that assent depends on  their being king and queen ; but how 
do they come  to be  king  and queen?  Indeed  this  statute 
very  forcibly  brings  out  the difficulty-an  incurable  defect. 
So again  as to the confirming statute of  1690. 
Do  not  think  that I  am  arguing  for  the Jacobite  cause. 
I am  only endeavouring to show you  how much  purely legal 
strength that cause  had.  It seems to me that we must treat 
the Revolution  as a revolution,  a  very necessary  and wisely 
conducted revolution, but still a revolution.  We cannot work 
it into our constitutional law. 
Passing from this point, we  notice that the tender  of  the 
crown was  made to William  and Mary jointly ; but William 
had refused to reign merely in his wife's right-such  as it was 
-and  the declaration of the convention was that William and 
Mary were to hold the crown during their joint  lives and the 
life  of  the survivor of  them, that, however, the sole  and  full 
exercise of  the regal power was to be in William during their 
joint  lives, but was  to be exercised  in  the names of  William 
and Mary, and that after their deceases  the crown should go 
to  the issue  of  Mary,  and  in  default  of  her  issue  to  the 
Princess Anne and the heirs of  her  body, and for default  of  . 
such issue to the heirs of  the body of William.  The Bill of 
Rights,  passed  in  1689, confirmed  this settlement, adding  a 
clause  to the effect  that  any person  who  should  hold  com- 
 nuni ion with the See or Church of Rome or profess the Popish 
religion  or  marry a  Papist  should  be  incapable  to inherit, 
possess or enjoy the crown and government of  the realm, and 
that the crown should pass to the person  next entitled.  In 
1700, after  the death of  Mary, William  being  childless, and 
Anne's  son  the  Duke of  Gloucester  being  dead, it  became ConstitutionaZ History  The Coronatiofz Oath 
necessary  to make a  further settlement, and  by  the Act  of 
Settlement (12 and  13 Will.  111, c.  2) it was  ordained  that 
in  default  of  issue  of  Mary,  Anne,  and William  the crown 
should go to the Princess Sophia of  Hanover and the heirs of 
her  body  being  Protestants.  She, a  daughter of  Elizabeth 
Queen  of  Bohemia,  a  daughter of James I, was  the nearest 
heir according to the ordinary rules of  inheritance, if  Roman 
Catholics were excluded. 
A new form of coronation oath has been provided.  About 
the coronation oath there has been controversy.  In the reign 
of Charles I it became known that the king had taken an oath 
which differed in some respects from the ancient form.  That 
ancient  form  has  come  before  us  already.  In  it  the  king 
promised  to hold  and keep the laws and righteous customs 
which the community of  the realm  shall have  chosen-qzras 
vulgus elegerit, lees  qzdels la communaz~te  de vostre roiaume aura 
esleu.  Now  at Charles's  coronation  the last  question  put  to 
him  had  been  this:  'Will you  grant  to  hold  and  keep  the 
laws and rightful customs which the communalty of  this your 
kingdom  have, and will  you  defend  and uphold  them  to the 
honour of  God as much as in you lieth ?'  This form, you will 
observe, does not assert the right of the people, the community 
of  the realm, to choose its own laws : the king is to hold and 
keep the laws which the communalty has.  Archbishop Laud 
was accused  of  having tampered with the oath.  His defence 
seems  on  this  point  to  have  been  quite  sound.  He had 
administered  the  oath  in  the  terms  in  which  it  had  come 
to him, the terms  to which  James  I  had  sworn, the terms 
to which  Elizabeth  had  sworn.  As to Mary's  oath I know 
nothing; but  a  change  had  been  made  on  the occasion  of 
Edward VI's accession.  He had sworn to make no new laws 
but such as should be to the honour and glory of  God and to 
the good of  the commonwealth, and that the same should  be 
made by consent of his people as hath been accustomed. 
But a change seems to have been made yet earlier.  There 
is extant a copy of the coronation oath in  which  alterations 
have been made in the handwriting of  Henry VIII1.  The last 
A facsimile of  the oath with Henry's corrections is given in ZttgZisA Corona- 
lion Records, ed. L. G. Wickham-Legg, pp. 240-1. 
clause reads thus-I  will note the changes made by the king's 
own hand-'  And that he shall graunte to hold  the laws and 
[approvyd] customes of the realm [lawfull and nott prejudicial 
to his Crowne or Imperial1 duty], and to his power kepe them 
and affirm  them  which  the [nobles  and]  people  have  made 
and chosen [with  his consent].'  The interpolations are very 
remarkable: they seem to point to the notion of an indefeasible 
royal  power  which  laws  cannot  restrain;  the  king will  not 
bind himself to maintain laws prejudicial to his crown.  Thus 
since the accession of Edward VI the terms of  the oath seem 
to have varied-and  Laud, I believe, successfully showed that 
he  could  not  be  charged  with  any  insidious  alterations1. 
But  the  meaning  of  the  more  ancient  form,  the  form  of 
Edward 11's oath, now became a subject of  bitter controversy; 
it was  maintained  that the elegerit-'  qzras vukz~s  elegerit '- 
could  not  refer  to the future:  the kings  are to uphold  the 
old  law, the law which  the people  had chosen, not  the laws 
which the people should  choose.  On  the other hand, it was 
even urged that the terms of the oath excluded the king from 
all share in  legislation-that  without perjury he  could  reject 
no  bill  passed  by  two  Houses.  Neither  contention  would 
harmonize with  past  history; on  the one hand the old  oath 
was a not indistinct declaration that there were to be no laws 
save those  chosen  by  the community of  the realm; on  the 
other hand  the contention  that the king was  no  part of  the 
community was  wild.  However,  when  such  opposite views 
were  taken  of  the  king's  obligation, the  time  for war  had 
come. 
The oaths of  Charles I1 and James I1 seem to have been 
just those which Charles I had taken.  Immediately after the 
Revolution a new oath was provided  by a statute (I William 
and Mary, c. 6) which recites that the old oath was framed in 
doubtful words and expressions with  relation  to ancient laws 
and constitutions at this time unknown.  The most important 
phrase  is  this-the  king  promises  to govern  the people  of 
England and the dominions thereto  belonging  according  to 
the statutes in parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs 
1 The question is  discussed  by J. Wickham-Legg, The Coro~tation  Order of 
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of the same ;  thus '  the statutes in parliament agreed on ' take 
the place of leges quas vu&z~s  elegerit. 
By another clause in  the oath the king has to swear that 
he will maintain to the utmost of his power the true profession 
of the gospel and the protestant reformed religion established 
by law, and preserve unto the bishops and clergy of the realm 
and  the churches committed  to their charge, all such rights 
and privileges  as by law  do or shall  appertain  unto  them. 
Another obligation is laid upon the king by the Bill of Rights 
and  by the Act of Settlement: on  the first  day of his first 
parliament he must make the declaration against transubstan- 
tiation, the invocation  of  the saints and the sacrifice  of  the 
mass.  The clauses which deprive him of his crown in case he 
holds communion with the Church of Rome or marries a Papist, 
have already come before us. 
B.  Constitzbtion of  Parliament, 
We turn to speak of the composition of  parliament.  The 
number of  the lords spiritual, the mode of their appointment, 
has not been  changed : they are now a small minority in  the 
Upper  House.  But though we  have here to chronicle  that 
things  are as they were, still we  must remember that there 
has been a period during which the bishops have had no place 
in parliament.  The royal assent to an act excluding them was 
given on 13 Feb. 1642-this  was one of  the last concessions 
extorted  from  Charles.  They  were  not  restored  by  the 
Convention  Parliament,  but  were  restored  by  the  second 
parliament  of Charles I1 in  1661.  They took  their seats on 
20 Nov., after an interval of nineteen years. 
The number of temporal peers has greatly increased.  To 
Elizabeth's  last  parliament,  1597,  56  were  summoned.  To 
James's first parliament, 1604, 78.  To the first parliament of 
Charles 1, 97.  To the parliament  of  1661, 142.  To that of 
1685, 145.  The grant of a peerage has been used as a political 
reward.  As to the mode of creating peers there is little to be 
added to what has already been  said.  It has, however, been 
decided that a peerage cannot be bound up with the possession 
of  a tract of land ; peerage by tenure is  regarded as extinct. 
Also it has now become the quite definite rule that a summons 
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by name to parliament, followed by an actual sitting, confers 
a hereditary peerage.  However, for a long time past all peers 
have been created by letters patent. 
Here again we  have to remember  that there has been  a 
short  breach  of  continuity, not  indeed  in  law, but  in  fact. 
During  the  Civil  War  the  number  of  lords  who  attend 
parliament is small-it  becomes thirteen or thereabouts.  On 
the eve of the king's trial on 4 Jan. 1649, the commons voted 
that 'the commons of  England in  Parliament  assembled do 
declare  that the People are under God the original of all just 
power, and that whatsoever is  enacted  or declared for law by 
the commons in  Parliament assembled, hath the force  of law 
...  although the consent and concurrence of the King or House 
of Peers be  not had thereunto.'  On 6  Feb. the lords sat for 
the last time.  On 19  March the commons passed  an act for 
abolishing the House of Peers.  On 25 April, 1660, the lords 
reappear  once  more  in  the Convention  Parliament, after an 
interval of  eleven  years.  Their case  must  be  distinguished 
from that of the bishops.  The bishops were deprived of their 
seats by a  statute passed  by king, lords  and  commons;  it 
required  a  statute to recall  them:  the temporal  lords were 
excluded simply by the act of the commons, an act which so 
soon as the Restoration  was agreed on, was regarded simply 
as null and void. 
The numbers of  the House of Commons have grown.  In 
the first parliament of James there were 467 members.  In the 
Long Parliament (1640), 504.  In the parliament of 1661, 507; 
in 1679, 5  13.  The causes of  the increase have been various. 
In 1672 a statute admitted two knights for the County Palatine 
of  Durham, and two  citizens  for  the city.  Except in  this 
respect  the representation of  the counties  remains unaltered. 
We have seen  that under  Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, and 
James,  the  number of  borough  members was  increased  by 
royal charter-thus  it was  hoped  that a House favourable to 
the crown might be returned.  Charles I  added, or restored, 
I think,  eighteen  borough  members'.  Charles  I1 exercised 
'Restoration'  is the right word.  The  nine boroughs restored to parliamentary 
rights under Charles I were however  restored  by resolution of  the commons not 
by royal charter.  Porritt,  The Unreforf~zed  Parlia?>ze?rt,  vol.  r,  p. 382. Co~zstitz.ttio~zaZ  History 
this  prerogative  but  once,  he  gave  Newark  two  members. 
This  is  the last  exercise  of  this  prerogative, and it  did  not 
pass quite unquestioned.  For a long time past the commons 
had  looked jealously  on  this  power.  They had  claimed  to 
themselves the right  of  deciding whether  a borough had  the 
right to send  members-and  most  of the additions made by 
Charles  I  to the I-Iouse were  by  way  of  reviving  boroughs 
which,  according  to  the  decision  of  the  House,  had  once 
returned members, but had discontinued the practice of sending 
them.  The right  to send  members  was  now  becoming  a 
coveted  right,  and  boroughs  sought  to show  that they  had 
exercised this right in  remote times.  The representation  of 
the two  Universities is due to James I.  The prerogative of 
increasing the number of  borough  members was never taken 
away-but  it was  last exercised  in favour of Newark in  1677 
-and  after  the Restoration  the  House  of  Commons  would 
have resented its exercise: though it is clirious to observe that 
the excellent whig, John Locke, agreed that if the House would 
not reform itself, the king might reform it1.  Thus the number 
of mdmbers became finally fixed at 5 13  ; 24 for Wales, 80 for the 
English counties, 4 for the Universities, the rest for the English 
boroughs ; these, with  the 45  Scottish members added under 
Anne, and the  IOO  Irish members added under  George 111, 
brought up the total to 658.  This was the number in  1832. 
Though from the legal point of view this is no precedent, 
still we do well to observe that in  the parliament of  1656, the 
third  of  Cromwell's  parliaments,  Scotland  and  Ireland  are 
represented2.  It consists  of  459  members:  375  English, 24 
Welsh,  29  Scottish, 31  Irish. 
The  electoral qualifications remain what they have been.  In 
the counties the electors are still the forty-shilling freeholders. 
In the boroughs there is the utmost  variety.  On the whole, 
the tendency has been towards vesting the right to elect repre- 
sentatives in  an oligarchic  governing  body.  In  many cases 
the crown procured a surrender of an old charter and granted 
1 Civil Gover?zt~ze?zt,  c. XIII. 
Irish  and Scottish members  sat  in  the  Barebones  Parliament  (1653) and 
again, in accordance with the provisions of  the Instrument of  Government,  in the 
Parliament of  165~. 
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a new.  Under Charles I1 a plan was conceived for hastening 
this process.  An attack was made on the charters of the city 
of London, and they were declared  to be  forfeited.  It was 
a principle of law that if a charter was abused it was forfeited, 
and  it was  alleged  that the citizens of  London  had in some 
not  very  important  respects  abused  their  corporate  powers. 
Their charter was  declared  to be forfeited.  In terror at this 
judgment many of  the boroughs of  England surrendered their 
charters, and received new charters vesting the right of election 
in governing bodies nominated by the king1.  By these means 
James I1 obtained a very subservient  parliament.  After the 
Revolution-in  1690-the  judgment  against  the  city  of 
London was declared void  by statute.  Some of the boroughs 
which had surrendered their charters and taken new ones, got 
back  their old charters on the ground that the surrender was 
unlawful, but this was not always the case-in  some instances 
the surrenders were adjudged  lawful.  Altogether, therefore, 
the constitution of very many boroughs had become oligarchic. 
After the Revolution many of them fall under the influence of 
great land-owners and become  pocket boroughs.  Already in 
William's day the distribution of seats presents many of those 
anomalies  which  are  abolished  in  1832.  Shortly after  the 
Revolution  Locke  wrote  thus-'We  see  the bare  name  of 
a  town,  of  which  there  remains  not  so much  as the ruins, 
where  scarce  so  much  housing  as  a  sheep-cote, or  more 
inhabitants than a shepherd is  to be found,  sends as many 
representatives to the grand assembly of law makers as a whole 
county, numerous  in  people  and  powerful  in  riches.  This 
strangers stand amazed  at2.' 
The power  of  determining all  questions  as to contested 
elections, the  House of  Commons has now  got into its own 
hand-and  it jealously  resents any interference by the king, 
the  House  of  Lords,  or the  courts  of  law.  Too  often  its 
decision is simply the result of a party division. 
As  to  the qualification  of  those  elected.  The  act  of 
Henry V is still on  the statute book, and it requires that the 
knights and burgesses shall be resident in the shires and towns 
Porritt, vol.  I, pp.  393-6,  399-405. 
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which  they represent;  it will  not be repealed  until 1774, but 
since the days of Elizabeth it has been habitually disregarded. 
There is no property qualification-though  we are on the eve 
of  getting one-for  in  1710 (9  Anne, c. 5) a statute is passed 
providing  that a  knight of  the shire must have an estate of 
land worth A600 per annum, a burgess one worth £300, 
Of late there has been a great noise against the number of 
place-men in parliament-at  present  there is no law against 
them-but  the Act of  Settlement (1700,  12 and 13 Will. 111, 
c. 2) has lately provided 'that so soon as the House of Hanover 
shall come to the throne, no person who has an office or place 
of profit under the king, or receives a pension from the crown, 
shall  be  capable  of  serving as  a  member  of  the House of 
Commons.'  This momentous clause  never came into force: 
it was repealed in I705 before the House of  Hanover came to 
the throne.  Had it ever come into play it must have altered 
the whole history of the House of  Commons ;  no minister of 
the king would ever have been  able to sit there.  Macaulay 
says that the result would  have been  to make the House of 
Lords the most august of senates, while the House of  Commons 
would  have become little better than a vestry1.  The plan in 
1707, by a statute which still is the fundamental  law on this 
subject, was  that the acceptance  of  an  old  office,  i.e.,  one 
created before  25 October,  1705, should vacate the seat, but 
that the office holder should be capable of reelection, while on 
the other hand  no  holder  of  a  new  office,  an office created 
since that date, should be capable of sitting at all'.  The clause 
in the Act of  Settlement, to which we  have just  referred, is a 
good reminder that our modern system of  ministerial govern- 
ment is modern ; in  1700, let us  repeat it, parliament ordains 
that there shall be no ministers in the House of Commons. 
C.  Frequency  and  Duration  of Parlinnzents. 
And  now  as  to  the  frequency  of  parliaments.  It  is 
impossible to speak in general terms ; each parliament of  the 
time that we are surveying has its own very peculiar history. 
The first parliament  of  Charles I  met on 17 May, 1625, and 
History of En~Zand,  c. XIX. 
New offices have however been created by subsequent statutes to which this 
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was dissolved on  12 August, the commons protesting, and no 
grant of tonnage and poundage having been made.  The  second 
parliament  met  on  6  February,  1626, and was  dissolved  on 
15 June without passing a statute; the king was at issue with 
both  Houses  as  to their  privileges.  The third  parliament 
met  bn  17 March,  1628, and sat until  26 June, when  it was 
prorogued.  It sat a second  time on  20 January, 1629, and 
was  dissolved  on  10  March.  To its first session we owe the 
Petition of  Right.  Then for hard on eleven years there is no 
parliament.  The fourth (a short) parliament met on  13 April, 
1640, and was dissolved on  5  May-after  less than  a month ; 
the king had  got no supply.  On 24  September Charles had 
recourse  to  a  nzagnuvn  concilium  of  peers  held  at  York- 
the last  occasion  on  which  such  a  body  has  met-but  got 
nothing from  it, save advice to summon a parliament.  One 
was  summoned;  it met  on  3  November,  1640, and became 
the Long Parliament.  We may say that it remained in legal 
being for twenty years, that it was never lawfully dissolved until 
in  1660 a statute of  the Convention  Parliament  declared its 
dissolution.  But we may rapidly trace its history.  It met on 
3 November, 1640, and sat on steadily until 22 August, 1642, 
when the king's standard was raised at Nottingham, and long 
afterwards.  In the meantime, however, before the war broke 
out, not only had it procured the attainder of Strafford, the ex- 
clusion of  the bishops from the House of  Lords, the abolition 
of the Star Chamber; but further two acts were passed which 
particularly concern us here.  In the first place on I 5 February, 
1641, the  royal  assent  was  obtained  to the  Triennial  Act 
6  Car I  c.  I).  This enacts that a parliament shall be held 
in  every third year; if  the Chancellor does not issue writs, then 
the peers  are to meet  and issue writs  for the election  of  the 
representatives of the commons, and if the peers ~nake  default, 
then  the sheriffs and mayors  are to see to the election.  No 
parliament,  again, was  to be dissolved  or prorogued  within 
fifty days after its meeting.  The old statutes of  Edward 111 
which directed that a parliament should be held in every year 
or more  often  if  need  be  were  not  repealed1.  But a  more 
'  Gardiner,  Constittrtional  Documents  of  the  Ptdrifa,r  Revolution,  2nd  ed., 
PP.  '44-55. 
disability does not attach. Tyienlzind Act 
momentous  concession  was  extorted on  17 May,  1641 ; the 
king gave his assent to a bill which declared that the present 
parliament  shall  not  be  dissolved  unless  it  be  by  act  of 
parliament  to  be  passed  for  that  purpose;  nor  shall  it  be 
prorogued  or adjourned  unless  by act of  parliament, and the 
houses shall not  be adjourned  unless  by themselves or their 
own  order.  Thus the parliament  provided  that  it  should 
continue to exist during; its own  good pleasure.  It continued 
sitting during the Civil War, after 1649  as a parliament without 
lords.  On  7  December,  1648, the army which  had  become 
masters of  England, violently  expelled  (Pride's  purge), or as 
the phrase  went,  'secluded'  the  majority  of  the  house,  a 
hundred and forty-three members of  the  Presbyterian  party. 
The Rump that was left at once proceeded to erect a court of 
justice for the king's trial.  This Rump of the Long Parliament 
went on  sitting until  20  April,  1653-in  1651 it had  voted 
that  it  would  continue  sitting  until  November,  1654-but 
meanwhile  Cromwell  put  an end  to its  prating. 
On 4 July, 1654, there  appears the collection  of  persons 
known  as the Little Parliament  or  Barebone's  parliament- 
140 persons, not elected by the country, but nominated  by the 
council of officers ; it sat until I 2 December, and then dissolved 
itself  On 3  September, 1654, met  the second of  Cromwell's 
parliaments,  if  we  reckon  the  Rarebone's  assembly  as  the 
first ; it was a body of 400 elected members, elected according 
to a scheme settled by the Long Parliament in  1650; there 
was some redistribution of seats, and the county franchise was 
extended  to any persons having real  or personal property to 
the value of £200.  On 22 January, 1655, Cromwell dissolved 
this body.  His third parliament met on 17 September, 1656 ; 
it offered  him  the kingly title which he refused ; it instituted 
an  upper  house  consisting  of  his  nominees,  and  then  fell 
quarrelling as to whether  this  was  a  House of  Lords.  On 
4 February,  1658, he dissolved it; on  3  September he died. 
Power had been given him to appoint a successor to the office 
of Lord Protector, and it seems that he had appointed his son 
Richard, though by no  formal  instrument.  On  27  January, 
1659, a parliament met ; the military council of  officers could 
not get on with it, and on 22 April Richard dissolved it.  On 
7 May  the officers  restored  the Rump, the members of  the 
Long  Parliament  not  excluded  in  1653 ; again  they  were 
expelled, and again they were restored-the  secluded members 
returned.  On 16 March, 1660, this Long Parliament  passed 
a  bill  declaring  itself  dissolved, and  taking  order  for  the 
holding of  a  new  parliament  on  25 April. 
That parliament was the Convention  Parliament, and of 
some of its doings we have already spoken.  With the king's 
assent,  for  Charles  was  restored  in  May, it  passed  an  act 
declaring  the  dissolution  of  the  Long  Parliament ; it  was 
dissolved on 29 December, 1660.  Charles's second parliament 
met on 8 May, 1661,  and was not dissolved until 31 December, 
1678, having thus sat between seventeen and eighteen years. 
During this time it held sixteen sessions.  Really it was a 
much  longer  parliament  than  what is called  the Long Par- 
liament-which  had  not sat thirteen  years before  Cromwell 
packed  it off, though  it maintained  a notional  existence for 
seven  years  longer.  On  6  March,  1679,  Charles's  third 
parliament met; it was prorogued  in May, dissolved in July. 
His fourth parliament  met on  October  17 in  the same year, 
but  did  not sit for  business until October, 1680; it sat until 
January, 1G81, when  it was dissolved.  The fifth and last  is 
the  Oxford  Parliament, which  met on  21  March,  168r : sat 
but for a week  and was then  dissolved.  From  March, 1681, 
until  his death in  February, 1685, Charles reigned  without a 
parliament.  But we must go back  for a moment.  We have 
seen that the first act of the Long Parliament (16 Car. I, c. I) 
was a Triennial Act (1641), which provided machinery for the 
assembling of a parliament once in  every three years : if the  , 
king  neglected  to  summon  it, it  would  meet  without  his 
summons.  In 1664 this act was repealed as being in deroga- 
tion of  the king's  just rights.  Instead thereof  it was enacted 
(16 Car. 11, c.  I)  that the sitting and holding of  parliament 
shall not  be intermitted  or discontinued above three years at 
the most-but  no machinery was provided for the assembling 
of a parliament in case the king should  neglect  his statutory 
duty of  calling one.  It supersedes, we  may say, though  it 
does not repeal the acts of Edward I11 as to parliament being 
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king's  statutory duty to call  a  parliament  together  once  at 
least  in  every  three  years,  but  if  he  neglects  to  do this 
there is no  lawful  manner  in  which  a  parliament  can  come 
together.  Twenty years  afterwards  Charles  11, as we  have 
just  seen, violated the act.  He dissolved the Oxford  Parlia- 
ment  in  March, 1681, and had  not  summoned  another when 
he died in  February, 1685. 
James  held  but  one  parliament;  it  met  19 May,  1685, 
held two sessions in that year, was prorogued on 20  November, 
1685, and  never  sat again  for  business,  though  it  was  not 
dissolved until July, 1687. 
We have already spoken of the Convention of  22 January, 
1689,  which became the first parliament of  William and Mary. 
One of  the clauses of  the Declaration of  Rights incorporated 
in  the Bill  of  Rights declared  that for redress of  grievances, 
and  for  the  amending, strengthening and  preserving  of  the 
laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently.  The Triennial 
Act of  1664, however, was left standing.  The second  parlia- 
ment  met  on  20  May,  1690 ; it  held  six sessions and was 
dissolved in  the autumn of  1695.  Meanwhile it had  passed 
another  Triennial  Act-carefully  to  be  distinguished  from 
the acts of  1641 and  1664.  It was  passed  in  1694 (6 and 7 
William and Mary, c.  2).  This act was directed not so much 
against intermissions of  parliament, though  it repeated  what 
was already law, namely, that a parliament shall be holden once 
in three years at least, but against long parliaments : no parlia- 
ment is to endure for more than three years-it  is then to die 
a natural death.  As to this present parliament, it is  to cease 
on I  November, 1696.  William dissolved it when  it was just 
about to expire.  William had  rejected  this Triennial Act in 
1693 ; this  is  one  of  the  last  instances  of  the royal  assent 
being withholden.  It remained in  force until the Septennial 
Act was  passed in  1715 (I Geo. I, st. 2, c. 38).  William  met 
his third parliament  in November, 1695 ; it sat again in  1696 
and 1697.  Another  met  in  1698, and  sat again  in  1699 and 
1700.  A fourth met in  1701,  and was in existence on 3 March, 
1702,  when the king died.  I think that in  the whole course of 
English  history it had  only once  happened  that  a  reigning 
king had died  during the existence of  a parliament-he  was 
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Henry IV1. It had, however, been accounted well-settled law 
that the king's death, the demise of  the crown, would dissolve 
parliament ;  just  as it would deprive the judges and all officers 
of state who  held  their  comtnissions from the king of  their 
powers.  But  shortly  before  William's  death,  in  1696,  an 
act had been passed to obviate this evil result-if  the present 
king  dies when  there  is  a  parliament, it  is  to continue  in 
existence  for  six  months,  unless  sooner  dissolved  by  his 
successor ;  if  there  is  no  parliament when  he  dies, the last 
parliament  is  to come together  and  be  again  a  parliament. 
The grave possibility of a disputed succession led to this act. 
It applied only to the case of  King William; in  I707 (6 Anne, 
c.  41, sec. 4) the rule  was generalized.  In  1867 (30 and  31 
Vic. c.  102, sec. 5 I)  it was enacted that the demise of the crown 
should have no effect on the duration of parliament, and thus 
the rule as to six months was abolished. 
It will be needless hereafter to speak of the actual duration 
of  parliaments.  Since  the  Revolution  the  principle  that 
parliament  shall sit in  every year, has been secured by very 
efficient means which will soon come before us.  This is one 
of  the great  results  of  the period  which  is  now  under  our 
consideration.  Of the other results let us take a brief review 
under six heads. 
D.  The  Question of  Sovere&nv. 
The first question which a student of  modern jurisprudence 
is  likely to ask  on turning to consider a political constitution 
is,  Where  is  sovereignty?  I  have  before  now  given  my 
reasons why we  should  not ask  this question  when  studying 
the Middle Ages-why  we  should understand that no answer 
can be given. 
Gradually, and as a result of long continued struggles, the 
question emerges, and it is not settled without bloodshed. 
In  the  middle  of  the  century  Hobbes,  in  his  vigorous 
writings, had sharply stated the theory that a sovereign there 
must be-some  man or body of  men whose commands are laws 
-and  though Hobbes had no great following, still this theory 
told  on the world.  Now  I think  that at the outset  of  our 
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period there were three claimants for sovereignty, (I) the king, 
(2) the king in  parliament, (3) the law.  As a matter of history 
the claims  of king and parliament  certainly seem to us the 
best  founded.  We have seen that the practical despotism of 
the Tudors had  laid  a terrible  emphasis upon  the enormous 
powers  of  parliament-there  was  nothing  that  parliament 
could  not  do-it  could  dissolve the ancient dual constitution 
of church and state, it could place the church under  the king, 
it could alter the religion of  the land, it could settle the royal 
succession, it  could  delegate legislative powers to the king, it 
could take them  away again.  I think  that the statesmen of 
Elizabeth's  reign, witness  Sir Thomas Smith, had  distinctly 
held that king in parliament was absolutely supreme, above the 
king and above the law.  Still for the king there was a great 
deal  to be  said-more,  as I  think, than  modern writers  are 
inclined  to allow, and this even  apart from those theories  of 
divine  right  which  were  generally held  by  the monarchical 
party.  Those theories, which became current under James I, 
we must leave on one side ; they belong rather to the domain 
of political philosophy, than to that of  constitutional  law.  It 
is  more within  our scope to observe that it must  have  been 
a hard feat to conceive of sovereignty as vested in  the parlia- 
mentary assembly.  Consider how  very  much  that assembly 
depends for its constitution, for its very existence, on the king's 
will.  It comes when he calls it, it disappears when  he bids it 
go; he makes temporal lords as he pleases,  he  makes what 
bishops  he pleases, he charters new  boroughs to send  repre- 
sentatives.  After all, is not this body but an emanation of the 
kingly power?  The king does well to consult a parliament- 
but  is this more than a moral obligation, a dictate of  sound 
policy?  As to old acts of  the fourteenth century, a question 
of  sovereignty cannot  possibly  be  decided  by an  appeal  to 
ancient  documents. 
The high-water mark of this theory is to be found in some 
of  the judgments  delivered  in  the Ship Money case.  I will 
read a few sentences. 
Crawley, J.  '  This imposition  without  parliament  apper- 
tains to the king originally, and to his successor @so fncto  if 
he be a sovereign  in  right of  his sovereignty from the crown. 
You cannot have a king without these royal rights, no not by 
act of  parliament. 
Berkley, J.  Where Mr Holborne supposed a fundamental 
policy in  the creation of  the frame of  this  kingdom, that in 
case the monarch of England should be inclined to exact from 
his subjects at his pleasure, he should  be  restrained  for  that 
he could have nothing from them, but upon a common consent 
in  parliament : he is utterly mistaken herein.  The law knows 
no  such  king-yoking  policy.  The  law  itself  is  an  old  and 
trusty  servant of  the king's;  it  is  his  instrument or means 
that he  useth  to  govern  his  people  by.  I  never  read  nor 
heard  that Zex  was rex; but it is common and most true that 
rex is lex. 
Vernon,  J.  The king pro  bono p2rbZico  may  charge  his 
subjects for the safety and defence of  the kingdom, notwith- 
standing any act of parliament, and a statute derogatory from 
the prerogative  doth not  bind  the king and  the  king  may 
dispense with any law in cases of  necessity. 
Finch, C. J.  No  act of  parliament can  bar a king of  his 
regality, as that no land should hold of him ; or bar him of  his 
allegiance of  his subjects; or the relative on  his,part as trust 
and power to defend his people ; therefore acts of  parliament 
to take away his royal power in the defence of the kingdom are 
void ; they are void acts of parliament to bind the king not to 
command the subjects, their persons and goods, and I say their 
money too ; for no acts of  parliament make any difference1.' 
Now  this goes  far  indeed, but  as it  seems  to  me, from 
a lawyer's point of view, the fatal flaw in  it is that it does not 
go far enough.  If the judges had grasped the modern notion 
of sovereignty, the notion which Hobbes was just giving to the 
world-had  said  the  question  really is, Who  is  sovereign? 
had answered boldly, ' The king is sovereign, it is to him (not 
to him and parliament) that this nation renders that habitual 
obedience which  is the fact which constitiites the relation  of 
subject and sovereign ;  this is clear from the nation's prolonged 
acquiescence in  breaches  by the king  of  the plain  words  of 
statutes ; no  act of parliament binds or can bind him, no, not 
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though  he  himself  assented  to it yesterday;  he is, in  short, 
a  perfectly absolute monarch.'  Had they said  this, it would 
have been difficult to find any logical flaw in their judgments. 
The law, it might be said, cannot determine who is sovereign. 
But  the  judges,  bold  though  their  language  was,  shrank 
from  this assertion, an assertion which  must  have hurried on 
the Civil War.  They spoke of cases of necessity-the  necessity 
of  levying money for the defence of the realm-they  admitted 
that the king could not of  his own  will  impose  a tax to be 
spent on his personal pleasures, they spoke of certain, or rather 
some not very certain, royal  rights  as beyond  the power  of 
statute.  '  Acts of parliament,' even Finch admitted, '  may take 
away flowers and ornaments of  the crown, but not the crown 
itself1.'  This makes their position very weak-who  is to decide 
what is an ornament and what a substantial part of the crown 
-the  notion of a constitution above both king and parliament, 
limiting  to royal  acts a  proper  sphere, limiting  to statutes 
a proper sphere, was nowhere to be  found expressed  in  any 
accurate terms,  and  would  satisfy neither  king  nor  nation. 
The contest was to he between the sovereignty of  a king, and 
the sovereignty of  a king in  parliament.  We know how  the 
contest was  decided-by  the Civil War and the Revolution. 
Of  course,  however,  so  long  as  Jacobitism  survived,  and 
certainly it survived in  1745,  there survived the doctrine that 
the title of the king, and some at least of  the powers of  the 
king, are above statute.  The fatal theoretic fault of Jacobitism 
was that it could not  say, dared  not say, the king is  utterly 
above all law, law is but the king's command. 
I have said that there was a third claimant for sovereignty, 
namely the law.  If the lawyers of  James 1's  day had  been 
forced to consider Hobbes's theory, they would, I think, have 
denied the necessity for there being any man  or body of  men 
above the law.  This, so far as one can  discover it, was the 
position  of  the  great  typical  lawyer  Coke.  It is  always 
difficult to pin  Coke to a theory, but he does seem distinctly 
to claim  that  the common  law  is  above  statute, and above 
prerogative-it  assigns a place to both  king and parliament, 
In the Ship Money case, State Trials, vol. III, p.  1235,  Broom, Constitutional 
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and keeps them in it.  Coke distinctly claims that the judges 
may  hold  a  statute void, either because it is against  reason 
and natural  law, or because  it trenches on the royal preroga- 
tivex.  He alleges precedents for this-cases  in which statutes 
have been held void.  1 do not think that they bear him  out. 
I  do not  think  that  the  judges  of  the  Middle  Ages  had 
considered themselves free to question the validity of a statute 
on  the ground  of  its  being  against natural  law.  As to the 
prerogative,  Coke's  case  was  somewhat  stronger;  and,  as 
already said, I  take it to have been  the lawyer's doctrine of 
James's time, that the courts had power to decide that a statute 
was not  law.  If this theory had been generally accepted the 
judges  would  have  become  the  ultimate  lawgivers  of  the 
realm-in  declaring law they would have made law, which they 
would  have  upheld  even  against  statute.  They  did  not 
expressly claim  legislative power, they did  not even conceive 
that this was  their claim : they claimed to declare that law- 
law, common law, natural law (and this was, as we have seen, 
the old theory) had an existence of its own, independent of the 
will  of  man, even perhaps of  the will of  God.  The difficulty 
before this theory was that the judges could not point out the 
limits to the power of  statute with any reasonable  accuracy. 
A statute might take away flowers and ornaments of the crown, 
but not  the crown itself.  Such language is far too vague to 
become a constitutional theory, and looking back at the statute 
book  of  the fourteenth, fifteenth  and sixteenth centuries, it 
was indeed difficult to find any matter with which parliament 
had not  meddled.  The vigorous  legislation  of  our medieval 
parliaments had rendered  any theory of law above king, above 
king and parliament, an unworkable doctrine.  It soon perished;  , 
year  by year  events showed  that  the  struggle  lay between 
sovereignty  of  king, and sovereignty of  king  in  parliament. 
A poor relic of the theory lives on in  Blackstone-the  judges, 
he seems to think, might hold a statute void if  it contravened 
the law of  nature, but by Blackstone's day this had become an 
impracticable speculative tenet, and we  may fairly say that it 
was  destroyed  by Bentham.  However, let  us remember that 
Coke held it. 
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We may  then  regard  the seventeenth century as finally 
settling the sovereignty of  England in  king and parliament. 
But we must watch this process more in detail: and we will start 
with  the ordaining, dispensing and suspending powers which 
the kings have claimed.  We have seen that under James I the 
judges, who were no enemies to the prerogative, had held that 
a royal ordinance or proclamation could have but an extremely 
limited force-it  could create no new offence-it  could simply 
be used  as a public  announcement  of  the law, an intimation 
that the government was going to enforce the law.  Here then 
the common  law as declared  by  the judges  was  against the 
king-but  practically so long as the Court of Star Chamber 
existed, the last  word  on  the matter  did  not  rest  with  the 
judges :  that  court  would,  and  did, enforce  proclamations. 
The proclamations of  Charles I were far more numerous than 
those of his father.  Prices were fixed by proclamation ; houses 
were  demolished, shops  were  shut  in  order  that  the  new 
cathedral of  St Paul  might  appear to better advantage; all 
persons who had houses in the country were directed to leave 
London.  On 5  July, 1641, the act was passed which abolished 
the  Court  of  Star Chamber, and  with  it  fell  the  power  of 
enforcing proclamations.  One finds it said in later law books, 
in  accordance with  the opinion of  the judges of James I, that 
an offence  may  be  aggravated  by  being  committed  against 
a royal proclamation.  This doctrine would seem to hold even 
in our own day : a judge in  passing sentence might take into 
consideration  the  fact  that  the  offence,  riot,  let  us  say, or 
unlawful  assembly, had been  publicly  proclaimed  an  offence 
by the king : but obviously a power of issuing such proclama- 
tions is not of first-rate importance. 
With  regard  to the dispensing  and suspending  powers, 
I can refer you to Sir William Anson'.  The two powers  are 
in theory distinct.  Our law might give to the king power to 
dispense with statutes in favour of individuals specially named 
by him, and yet might well deny him the power of  suspending 
Law and  Ctisto//t  of  the ConstituLimz, Part  I, PnrZiam~lzt,  3rd ed., pp. 31  1-19. 
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a law so that persons in general might treat it as being  non- 
existent.  The claim to the greater power seems to have grown 
out of the claim to the lesser power, and the theory established 
at the Revolution  by the Bill of  Rights is that, while the sus- 
pending power had never had any legal existence, the king had 
lawfully enjoyed a certain, or rather, perhaps we ought to say, 
an uncertain power of  dispensation.  It was extremely difficult 
even  for  the  most  ardent  parliamentarians  to  deny that  a 
dispensing power  had  existed, though  as to the definition of 
its lawful  limits there  was  a very  great  uncertainty.  From 
a very early time the king had taken on  himself to dispense 
with  statutes.  In  theory  this  power  was  closely  connected 
with  that power  of  pardoning,  with  which  our  king is  still 
entrusted.  We may  indeed  readily distinguish  between  the 
two-pardon  relates to something that has already been done, 
dispensation  to something that is to be  done in  the future. 
Also  to  this  day the  queen,  by  her  Attorney-General, has 
power  to  stop a  criminal  prosecution  by  entering  a  nolie 
prosequi.  Every proceeding  by indictment  is  in  legal theory 
a  proceeding  by  the  queen,  and  if  the  queen  refuses  to 
prosecute, then the prosecution  comes to an end.  It should 
be  remembered  also  that  many  of  the  medieval  statutes 
imposed  as punishments for offences not  reaching the degree 
of felony, fines and forfeitures of which the king had the profit. 
It should  be remembered  also that a distinction between the , 
king's  public  capacity and his private  capacity, a distinction 
between the king and the crown is pretty modern and foreign to 
the Middle Ages.  The royal revenue and the national revenue 
are all one ; there is no such thing as national land, the king's 
lands are simply the king's lands, no matter by what title they 
became his.  These things being remembered, it will not seem 
strange  that  the  king  should  have  exercised  a  power  of 
dispensing  with  penal  statutes.  If any one  breaks  such  a 
statute, who is wronged?  The king; it is for him to prosecute, 
and the fines  and  penalties  will  be  his.  May  we  not  say, 
Volendi  non  jit injuria ; if  the king chooses to say in advance 
that he will  not  consider  himself  wronged, that he will  not 
exact  those  penalties  which  the  statutes  have  given  him, 
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with statutes, seems to have provoked but little protest before 
the seventeenth century.  In that century no lawyer, so far as 
I  am  aware, doubted  its  existence, and  the  Bill  of  Rights 
admitted that in  some instances the exercise of  it had  been 
lawful.  Certain lines had been drawn.  It  was, for example, a 
very general doctrine, that while the power extended to what 
were called mnla qz~iaprohibita,  it did not extend to mala ilt 
sel.  The king might permit a man to do  what would not have 
been unlawful but for the statute; he could not permit him to 
do what apart from any prohibition  would  be wicked ; might 
dispense with such a statute as those which forbad the holding 
of land in mortmain, but not with a statute which fixed a pun- 
ishment for larceny or murder.  Again  we  find  in  Coke the 
doctrine that the king can always dispense with a statute which 
trenches on the royal prerogative, yes, even though the statute 
itself  declares  that  a  dispensation  shall  be  invalid.  Coke 
more than once repeats this doctrine, which  obviously points 
to prerogative  above statute.  He says that in  Henry VII's 
day  it  was  decided  that  the  king  might  dispense with  a 
statute, providing that  the same person  shall  not  be  sheriff 
for  more than a year, and which  declared that a dispensation 
to the contrary should be invalid.  The king, by his  preroga- 
tive, was entitled to the service of his subjects as sheriffs  and 
so forth; no statute could deprive him of this.  The  Year Book 
to which  Coke refers does not seem to me to bear him out; 
such, however, was his doctrine2.  It is  only under James  I1 
that we hear  much  against dispensations, though the sale of 
them had  long been a grievance.  James seems to have used 
them  with  a  settled  purpose  of  practically  annulling  the 
statutes which excluded Papists from office.  In this the court 
maintained him, and doubtless his success with dispensations 
set him on the project of suspending laws i11 a direct fashion. 
The line  between  the  two  powers  that he claimed  can  be 
theoretically marked-the  dispensation applies to this or that 
individual, a suspending of  the statute would free all men, and 
yet, of course, the dispensing power might be so lavishly used 
that it would  practically  operate to suspend the laws.  The 
1 Coke, Case of  P~oclat7zations  xrr, Report 76. 
ib.  Case of  Not2  Od~fanfe  XII, Report  18. 
Bill of Rights condemned absolutely the suspending power ; 
its condemnation of the dispensing power was qualified.  'The 
pretended  power of  dispensing with  laws, or the execution of 
laws by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised 
of late, is illegal.'  It  would have been going too far to declare 
that every exercise of the dispensing power had been illegal- 
many private rights and titles must have been acquired on the 
faith of  dispensations.  No attempt, however,  was  made  to 
settle what dispensations had been legal : the words used were 
those which I have just read.  As to the future, it was declared 
that no dispensation by non  obstmzte of  any statute shall  be 
allowed, '  except a dispensation be allowed of  in such statute, 
and except in such cases as shall be specially provided for by 
one or  more  bill  or  bills, to be passed  during this  present 
session  of  parliament.'  There was  some intention,  at least 
among the lords, of  passing  an  act  defining  in  what  cases 
dispensations  should  be  valid;  but  the  project  fell  to  the 
ground-and  so the words about a bill to be passed in the then 
session  of  parliament, never  took  effect.  This is the last of 
the dispensing power. 
As to the suspending power, the case of the seven bishops 
is  the one great case.  The question came but incidentally 
before  the  court.  James  I1 had  issued  the  declaration  of 
indulgence.  By his royal prerogative (as the document runs) 
he  declares  it his  royal  will  and  pleasure  that  all  and  all 
manner of penal laws in matters ecclesiastical be immediately 
suspended.  The clergy were required to read this declaration 
in  church ; the bishops  petitioned, and their petition was the 
'seditious  libel'  for  which  they were  tried.  Now  the one 
precedent which could be produced for such a declaration, was 
a very similar declaration published  by Charles I1 in  1673- 
a declaration  of  indulgence suspending the penal laws.  Rut 
the commons had protested, and Charles had  been compelled 
to  acknowledge  that  the  declaration  was  illegal.  This 
precedent, therefore, so far from  strengthening the  case  for 
the  crown,  could  but  weaken  the case  for  James when  he 
followed  his  brother's  footsteps.  At  the  bishops'  trial  the 
advocates make the best of their very bad case, but very bad 
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the  crown, two  in  favour  of  the bishops.  The two  former 
seem to have had nothing to say for the declaration, save that 
the laws were the king's, and that he might do what he liked 
with them ; the bishops, as we  all know, were acquitted.  The 
only ancient record that was produced was  from  the reign  of 
Richard  11, and, as it seems to me, shows very  plainly that 
even Richard did not believe himself to possess any such vast 
power as James now claimed1.  The commons, expressing great 
confidence in the king, declared that the king, with the assent 
of the lords, might make such sufferance touching the Statute 
of  Provisors lately passed, as should  seem to him reasonable 
until the next parliament ; the commons, however, were to be 
at liberty to disagree to such sufferance in the next parliament, 
protested  that this assent was  a  novelty,  and was not to be 
drawn  into consequence, and prayed  that this protest  might 
be recorded  on the roll of  the parliament.  But in truth one 
can hardly speak of this declaration otherwise than as an open 
and  determined  attempt  to  override  the  law.  The Bill  of 
Rights dealt with  the suspending power  in  a very  summary 
way.  'The pretended  power  of  suspending of  laws, or  the 
execution  of  laws  by  regal  authority, without  consent  of 
parliament, is illegal.'  This also is reckoned one of  the ways 
in which King James did  endeavour to subvert and extirpate 
the  Protestant  religion  and  the  laws  and  liberties  of  this 
kingdom : namely  ' By  assuming and  exercising a power  of 
dispensing  with  and  suspending laws, and the execution of 
laws without the consent of  parliament ; also  by committing 
and prosecuting divers worthy prelates for humbly petitioning 
to be excused from concurring to the said assumed power.' 
F.  Taxation  and Control over  Finance. 
At the beginning of our period the king has lately achieved 
a great victory in the financial sphere. The Court of Exchequer 
has  decided  in  Bate's  case, or the case  of  the Impositions, 
that the king may set a duty on  impor~s. Even Coke thinks 
that he may do this, if  it be  not merely  for the purpose  ~f 
raising  a  revenue, but  for  the good  of  the realm;  he may 
prohibit  importation,  therefore  a  fortiori  he  may  tax  it. 
SIoZc  TriaLs, xrr,  375.  For the precedent, Rot. Purl. 15 Ric.  11.  See also 
Broom, Constitutwnal Law, 2nd ed. pp. 406-506. 
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Parliament protested, and grew bolder the more it explored the 
records of  the Middle Ages.  None the less, imposts were set 
on  all goods, and were collected.  When  Charles I  met  his 
first parliament, the commons refused to make that grant of 
tonnage and poundage for the king's life, which since the days 
of  Henry V had  been usual ; they would  grant it for but one 
year ;  the lords would not pass a bill for so restricted a grant; 
the  king  dissolved  the  parliament,  and  continued  to  levy 
tonnage and poundage and other imposts, without parliamen- 
tary  sanction.  Out  of  his  second  parliament  he could  get 
nothing; it was  set upon  impeaching  Buckingham, and the 
king  was  set  on  saving  him.  Indirect  taxation  would  not 
now  suffice to meet  the  king's  wants.  He had  recourse  to 
a  forced  loan-the  very  sums which  divers  persons were to 
'lend' him were specified.  Five knights who refuse to contribute, 
Darnel, Corbet, Earl, Heveningham and Hampden, were com- 
mitted to prison  by the council.  They applied for a habeas 
corpus,  but  could  not get  delivered;  their  case, famous  as 
Darnel's case, will come before us  under another heading. 
In March, 1628, Charles had  to face his third  parliament, 
and on 7  June he gave his assent to the Petition of  Right which 
turned it into a statute.  The first of its four points concerns us 
here.  It recites  the  Statutzmz  de  Tallagio non  Concedendo, 
the  statute of  1350 against  forced loans, and the  statute of 
Richard I11 against benevolences; it then recites that commis- 
sions have issued, by means whereof people have been required 
to lend money-and  have been imprisoned for not doing so.  It 
prays  that no  man  hereafter be compelled to make or yield 
any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or  such  like charge, without 
common consent by act of parliament.  This request the king 
concedes. 
As against  anything  that we  could  call  direct  taxation, 
these words are clear enough.  That they were meant to strike 
at the customs duties, usually known as the impositions, which 
the king was levying without parliamentary consent, is by no 
means  clearl.  We  have  to  remember  that  the  Court  of 
Exchequer had pronounced them to be lawful.  As a matter 
of fact the king continued to levy them-some,  Chambers for 
Gardiner,  History  of  England, vol.  VI, pp.  326-9.  G. W.  Prothero  in 
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instance, refused to pay and were imprisoned.  But during the 
long interval which now passed without a parliament (1629-40), 
theking had recourse tdyet a new means of extorting money. 
In 1634 he required  the seaports and  maritime  counties to 
furnish  him  with  ships.  Shortly  after  he  demanded  ship- 
money-money  by way of  composition  for an equipment of 
ships-even  from  the inland counties.  Hampden refused to 
pay.  His case was  heard  by all  the twelve judges  in  the 
Exchequer-Chamber1;  seven decided against him, five were in 
his  favour;  but two of these took  a merely technical  point; 
only two, Cooke and Hutton, spoke decidedly against the king. 
Now that there were some ancient precedents which might be 
forced to support his case, could hardly be denied ; but to say 
nothing of  the Confimalio  Cartarum, and  the De  Tallagio, 
which parliament had lately treated as a statute, there was the 
recent  Petition  of  Right.  Whatever  might  be  said  of  the 
customs  duties,  clearly  this  ship-money  was  a  tax.  The 
majority of the judges-would not contest the applicability of 
these statutes-they  fell  back  on  prerogative  above statute. 
I have already quoted some passages from their judgments- 
practically  they  say  that  the  king  is  sovereign,  and  his 
commands  are  laws.  The Long  Parliament  passed  an act 
declaring  the judgment  void ; the  king  gave his  assent  on 
7 August, 1641.  It declared that the writs for collecting ship- 
money  were  unlawful,  and  it  condemned  the  practice  of 
obtaining an extra-judicial opinion from the judges, a practice 
which had been  resorted  to in  Hampden's case.  Meanwhile 
the  parliament  had  at  last  made  grants  of  tonnage  and 
poundage, and the king had, in giving his assent, declared that 
he was  abandoning a  right which  his  predecessors  had  ever 
considered  their  own.  The act  declared  that  it  could  not 
lawfully be levied without parliamentary grant.  At the same 
time measures were passed  to abolish the practice of  forcing 
men  to accept  knighthood, or pay  a fine-a  practice  of  his 
There were two Courts of  Exchequer  Chamber, one created by 31 Ed. 111, 
st.  I, c.  12  to  hear appeals from  the Court  of  Exchequer, the other,  created by 
27  Eliz. c. 8 to hear appeals  from the Court  of  King's  Bench.  The Courts were 
practically  amalgamated  in  1830  by 11 Geo.  IV,  I  Will.  IV,  c.  70, 1  8.  The 
Jurisdict~on  of  the  Exchequer  Chamber was  finally  transferred  to the  Court  of 
Appeal  in  1873.  36, 37 Vict.  c. 66, 1 18.  See W. S. Holdsworth,  Hislory  of 
English Law, vol.  r, pp.  108-10,  413. 
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ancestors which  Charles had  revived-and  which  parliament 
might  well  call  useless  and unreasonable,  but  could  hardly 
call unlawful, and also to prevent  the resuscitation  of  ancient 
forest rights, which had of late been oppressively used. 
On the whole then, the victory in this matter of  taxation 
was  won,  so far  as  such  a  victory  can  be won  by  acts  of 
parliament, before the Civil War broke out.  Charles I1 had no 
need  to raise  revenue without  the consent of  parliament: he 
was liberally supplied.  But the duties which had been granted 
to him died with him, and James continued to levy them with- 
out parliamentary authority during the interval  between  his 
accession and the meeting  of  his  parliament.  That interval 
was but  two months, however, and his parliament  was ready 
to condone what he had done.  However, when the Revolution 
came,  this was reckoned  up as one of  his illegal acts in  the 
Declaration  of  Rights and the Bill of  Rights-he  had levied 
money by pretence of  prerogative for other time and in other 
manner, than  the same  was  granted  by  parliament; and  it 
was  declared that 'the levying of  money for or to the use of 
the  crown  by  pretence  of  prerogative  without  grant  from 
parliament  for longer time or in  other manner than the same 
is or shall be granted, is illegal.'  This we may say is the last 
word on this matter-one  great chapter of English history has 
been closed. 
But  controversy has been  collecting round  another point. 
Parliament  has been claiming a control over the expenditure 
of  the revenue.  We have to remember that throughout  the 
Middle Ages the king's revenue had been in a very true sense 
the king's revenue, and parliament had but seldom attempted 
to give him orders as to what he should do with it.  However, 
sometimes, in particular under Henry IV, it had forced him to 
render accounts.  Under the Tudors, parliament hardly dared 
to meddle with such matters ; but in  1624 a precedent was set 
for  an  appropriation  of  supplies-the  money  granted  by 
parliament was  to be paid  into the hands  of  commissioners 
named  by the parliament, and was to be applied to the relief 
of the Palatinate.  A  similar course was  followed  in  1641- 
but this might perhaps be accounted a revolutionary proceed- 
ing.  During the rebellion men became accustomed to see the Co~zstitz.ttio~za  Z  History  Taxation of the Clergy 
national finances managed by a parliamentary committee.  In 
1665 a very large sum was  to be granted for the Dutch war ; 
a clause was introduced into the bill  which  imposed  the tax 
to  the  effect  that the money was  to be  applied only to the 
purposes of the war.  This ~recedent  was followed in some, but 
not  all, other  cases under  Charles  11-it  was  not  followed 
by  the  parliament  of  James  11.  After  the  Revolution 
it  was  invariably  followed-money  raised  by  taxation  was 
appropriated  to this  purpose  and  to that, and a  clause was 
inserted in the statute forbidding the Lords of  the Treasury to 
use money for any other purpose  than that for which  it  was 
appropriated.  Before  the  end  of  William's  reign,  a certain 
annual sum is assigned to the king for his own use ; we begin 
to have what  is afterwards called  a civil  list; the residue  of 
the money is voted for this purpose and for that-so  much for 
the navy, so much  for the army.  Already under  Charles  I1 
it had become apparent that such appropriation was to be  no 
idle scheme ; the breach of an appropriation clause was one of 
the charges on which  Danby was  impeached.  He was  saved 
from  punishment  by  a  royal  pardon-a  matter  which  will 
come before us by and by.  We shall also see how the appro- 
priation of supplies secured as a matter of  fact that parliament 
should meet every year. 
Meanwhile, the  commons  had  asserbed, not  merely  that 
money bills must  be first  introduced in  their house, but also 
that the lords cannot make amendments in  them.  This claim, 
it seems, cannot be traced beyond the Restoration, but we hear 
of it  in  1661 and 1671.  The lords gradually and reluctantly 
gave way about this  matter-but  a border warfare was  long 
kept  up between  the two houses as to details.  It is difficult 
to find any principle  upon  which  this so-called  privilege of 
the House of  Commons can  be  founded.  Before the end  of 
William's  reign  the commons  saw  that this  put  a powerful 
engine into their hands for coercing the House of Lords.  In 
1701, in  order  to  force the lords  into  passing  a bill  which 
annulled  the  grants  which  William  had  made  out  of  the 
forfeited  Irish  lands, they tacked  to this a money bill, a bill 
granting the Land Tax ; they sent up, that is to say, a single 
bill dealing with these two matters, and insisted that as it was 
a  money  bill,  the  lords  could  not  atnend  it, could  merely 
accept  or  reject  it as a whole.  The lords, thus forced  into 
a  dilemma, had  to  pass  the bill,  for  they could  not  leave 
the  king  without  money1.  Thus the  House  of  Commons 
became  in  practical  power  the superior  of  the two  houses. 
One curious little point remains to be noticed, namely, the 
taxation  of  the clergy.  Ever  since  Henry  VIII's  day the 
clerical subsidies, though voted in the convocations, were con- 
firmed by act of  parliament.  During the commonwealth the 
clergy were taxed along with the laity.  After the Restoration 
the old  plan was for a moment adopted-the  convocations  of 
1661 taxed  themselves ; but  in  1662 they  were  taxed  by 
parliament.  This theoretically great change was the outcome 
of no legislation, there was no fuss about it, merely a private 
arrangement between  Lord  Chancellor Clarendon and Arch- 
bishop Sheldon.  From that moment, we may say, the clerical 
estate disappears finally.  Convocations, however, still met, but 
in  1717  the Bangorian controversy, originated by the writings 
of  Hoadley, Bishop of  Bangor, was in flame ; it was apparent 
that the clergy would censure Hoadley, a friend of  the govern- 
ment.  The convocations  were  prorogued  by royal  writ, and 
were never summoned again for business until  1861. 
The  greatest  event  that  we  have  to  notice  under  this 
heading is  the abolition of the Star Chamber-accomplished 
by  an  act  of  the Long Parliament, to which the king gave 
assent  on  5  July,  164r2.  More  and  more  the theory  had 
grown,  that  it  derived  its  only  authority  from  the  act  of 
Henry VII, that all that it  did beyond the authority of  that 
statute was illegal.  This theory was adopted by the act which 
abolished the court.  It abolished the court commonly called 
the Star Chamber-it  also forbad the council to meddle with 
civil causes-it  abolished the jurisdiction of the Council of the 
Marches, and  the Council of  the North; it declared  that  no 
court should exercise the same or the like jurisdiction  as had 
been  exercised by the Star Chamber.  On the same day, by 
Macaulay, History of  England, c. XXV. 
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another act, the  Court of  High  Commission  was  abolished, 
and  it was  declared that no  similar court  should  be erected 
for  the  future.  This  act  used  very  large  words  as  to  the 
abolition  of  all  ecclesiastical  jurisdiction.  During  the com- 
monwealth  episcopacy  disappeared.  In  1661,  after  the 
Restoration, an act was passed, explaining that the old eccle- 
siastical  courts were  to retain  their  old  powers-the  act  of 
1641 was abolished save as far as related to the Court of  High 
Commission.  Loyal as was the parliament of  1661, it did not 
mean to have either the Star Chamber or the High Commission 
back again.  However, in  1686 James 11, in the teeth of  these 
statutes, entrusted  the whole  government  of  the  church  to 
seven commissioners with large powers of  suspending, depriv- 
ing and  excommunicating the clergy.  His hardly disguised 
object was to force the Rotnan religion on the national church. 
It is  one  of  the  offences  reckoned  up  against  him  in  the 
Declaration  and  the Hill  of  Rights that he has  issued  and 
caused to be executed a commission under the great seal for 
erecting  a  court of  commissioners  for  ecclesiastical  causes : 
this  is  'illegal  and pernicious.' 
The Chancery, though it had never been popular, and had 
at times  been  regarded  as unconstitutional,  escaped.  Bare- 
bones'  Parliament  attempted  to  abolish  it,  but  even 
Cromwell found that the Chancery lawyers were too much for 
him1.  After the Restoration a new period opens in its history. 
Heneage Finch, Lord Nottingham, who became Chancellor in 
1675, has been  called  the father of  English Equity.  Hence- 
forth equity becomes a settled  system of  rapidly developing 
principles,  a  supplementary  system  of  case  law,  giving 
additional remedies  and  enforcing  additional  duties-but  a 
system of case law with precedents reported and respected. 
Next we  notice that the independence of  the judges  has 
been  secured.  Throughout  the  Stuart  reigns  judges  have 
been  dismissed  if  they withstand  the  king-too  often  they 
have  been  his  servile  creatures.  All  along they have held 
their  offices  dura~zte benepZacito-during  the  king's  good 
pleasure.  At once after the Revolution the question is raised, 
For  the  attempts  to  reform  the  Law  during  the  Commonwealth  see 
I?.  A. Illderwick,  The Ztttwregrtunz,  pp.  152-248. 
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and  William's  judges  were  commissioned  qunmdiu  se  bene 
gesse?,i?~t-during  good  behaviour.  He, however, refused his 
assent  to  a  bill  for  making  this a  matter  of  law-but  the 
point  was  secured  by  the  Act  of  Settlement (12 and  13 
11  111, c. 2).  SO  soon  as the House of  Hanover comes to 
the throne judge's  commissions  are to be  made qun~ndiu  se 
benegesssri?zt,  and their salaries are to be  fixed, but  they are 
to be  removable  upon  an  address of  both  houses  of  parlia- 
ment.  This means that a judge  cannot be dismissed except 
either in  consequence of  a conviction for some offence, or on 
the address of both houses. 
Another  important matter  has been  the  power  of  com- 
mitting to prison and  the use  of  the writ of  habeas  corpus. 
The first  question  is,  whether  the  king  or  king in  council 
having committed a man  to prison, it is a sufficient return to 
the writ that he was committed by the king's command.  We 
have seen  that the judges  of  Elizabeth's  day had  returned 
a  very  obscure,  perhaps  designedly  obscure,  answer1.  The 
point  was  raised  by  Charles  I  in  the interval  between  his 
second and his third parliament : five knights, Darnel, Corbet, 
Earl, Heveningham, and Hampden were committed to gaol for 
refusing  to contribute to the so-called ' loan ' that was  being 
exacted.  They obtained  the habeas  corpus, and the gaoler 
returned  that  they were  imprisoned per speciale  mandntu~n 
domini Regis  signified  to him  by  a  warrant  of  the  council. 
Darnel's  counsel  hardly contended that he should be set free 
-but  did contend that he ought to be liberated on bail-and 
produced  a great mass of  precedents  to show that the courts 
had  repeatedly bailed  prisoners  about whom  similar  returns 
had been made.  The judges refused to bail the prisoners, and 
sent them back to gaol.  In doing this they had, I think, the 
weight  of  precedents,  even  of  modern  precedents,  against 
them ; but practice had hardly been uniform, and we are not, I 
think, entitled to say that the judgment was plainly iniquitous. 
This was the second point dealt with by the Petition of Right. 
It recited  the famous  clause  in  Magna  Carta  Nz~lZus  Ziber 
konzo  etc. ; it  recited  what  had  happened  in  Darnel's  case, 
and  it  prayed 'that  no freeman  in  any such  manner  as  is 
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before  mentioned  be imprisoned  or  detained';  and to this 
prayer the king gave his  assent.  On  2  March,  1629, there 
was  a  disorderly  scene  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The 
Speaker  had  the  king's  commands  to  adjourn  the  house. 
Eliot  wished to read  a  remonstrance  against  the taking of 
tonnage and poundage without parliamentary sanction.  The 
Speaker  was  held  down  in  his  chair.  On  10 March  the 
king  dissolved  parliament.  A  few  days  after  he  arrested 
some of those who had been  engaged in the disorder, Eliot, 
Holles,  Selden, Long and  Strode.  They sued out a writ of 
habeas  corpus.  On  this  occasion  the  return  mentioned  a 
cause for the arrest-they  were arrested for notable contempts 
and for stirring up sedition.  This was not a charge of  felony 
or treason, and the judges  seem to have had  no real  doubt 
that they ought to be bailed.  However, they temporized and 
ordered the prisoners  not merely to find  bail  for the present 
charge,  but  also  to find  sureties for  future good  behaviour. 
The  prisoners  refused  to  do this.  The king  afterwards 
liberated  all  but  three.  Against  Eliot an information  was 
filed  in  the  King's  Bench  for  words uttered  in the House: 
against  Holles and Valentine, for tumult  and an assault  on 
the Speaker.  The further  history  of  this  case  must  come 
under  the heading of  parliamentary  privilege. 
The act of  1641 which  abolished  the Star Chamber did 
not deprive the council of the power of committing to prison ; 
it deprived  it of  criminal jurisdiction, of power  to hear and 
determine  causes,  but  the power  of  committing  to prison 
suspected  persons in order that they might stand their trials 
in the ordinary courts was left to it, it was a power possessed 
by every justice of the peace.  The act, however, provided that 
every  person  so committed  should  be  entitled  to a  habeas 
corpus, and  made  some stringent regulations for forcing the 
court to decide at once whether they were bailable or no. 
Thus at the Restoration, we may say, the general principles 
of  the law  were  settled  and  needed  no  amendment;  but 
events  showed  that  they  could  be  evaded.  Between  1670 
and 1679 the House of  Commons attempted to get a new act 
dealing  with  this  matter.  In the  latter  year  the  famous 
Habeas Corpus ac!  was passed (31 Car. 11, c. 2).  I know no 
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subject on which it is more difficult to lecture briefly, because 
it  is altogether  made up of  details, but roughly speaking the 
result  is  this-any  person  who  stands  committed  for  any 
crime  except  for  treason  or felony  plainly  expressed  in  the 
warrant of commitment, is to have the writ.  He is to be able to 
get it in vacation time as well as term time.  The chancellor or 
any judge to whom he applies must grant it, or incur a penalty 
of  £500.  The gaoler  must  make  the return  within  a  very 
brief time, or incur  a penalty.  No  person is to be sent into 
prison out of  the kingdom ; anyone who breaks this rule is to 
incur the penalty of a praemunire and be incapable of pardon. 
Prisoners who are committed for treason or felony are to have 
a right to a speedy trial.  The heavy penalties which judges 
and  gaolers  incur  if  they  break  this  act  are given  to  the 
injured person, may be sued for by him as debts ; this scheme 
makes  it  impossible  for  the king to protect  or pardon them, 
for  the  king  has  no  power  to  forgive  a  debt  due to  his 
subjects.  For further details  I must refer you  to Langmead 
or Hallam, or still better to the act itself1. 
One  of  the  offences  alleged  against  James  I1  in  the 
Declaration of  Rights and Bill of Rights is that excessive bail 
has  been  required  of  persons  committed  in  criminal  cases to 
elude  the benefit  of  the  laws  made  for  the  liberty  of  the 
subjects: and it is declared that excessive  bail ought not  to 
be required.  This is somewhat vague, but there was no more 
distinct provision.  The law as to what offences were bailable, 
what  not, was still in  the main  contained  in  the Statute of 
Westminster  1 (1275).  As a general rule a person committed 
for  a  misdemeanour was entitled to bail ; but  in  the course 
of  the  seventeenth'and  eighteenth  centuries  a  number  of 
exceptions  were  made  to this. 
To this period  also  we  must  assign  the establishment  of 
the principle  that  jurors  cannot  be  fined  or  imprisoned  or 
otherwise punished  for a false verdict, or for a verdict against 
the judge's direction.  The old process of attaint still existed: 
nominally it existed until  1825, when  it was abolished ; but it 
had fallen into disuse, and judges pjesiding at trials had taken 
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on themselves to fine and imprison jurors  in a summary way 
for perverse verdicts.  Apparently this practice began  in  the 
sixteenth century.  In 1670 the  Court of  Common  Pleas in 
Bushell's  case decided  that it was illegal, and set free jurors 
who had  been imprisoned by justices of  oyer and terminer at 
the Old Bailey.  The abolition  of  the Star Chamber was, we 
must  remember, the  abolition  of  a  court  which  habitually 
punished  jurors  for perverse  verdicts.  We may  say that at 
the end of our period the principle is fully established that for 
a perverse  verdict  or  a verdict  against the judge's  direction 
jurors cannot be punished -though  the old process of attainting 
them before a jury  of twenty-four (which seems never to have 
been  applied  in  criminal  cases) still  maintained  a  nominal 
existence.  A corrupt  verdict  would  of  course be a different 
matter-for  this  jurors  might  be  indicted  and tried  in  the 
regular  way. 
Meanwhile some other points of  our judicial  constitution 
were  settled.  The House of  Lords had  succeeded in  estab- 
lishing its right to hear  appeals from the Court of  Chancery 
and had failed in establishing a right to act as a court of  first 
instance in  civil matters.  We have seen how the function of 
the  House  of  Lords  as  a  court  of  error  had  fallen  into 
abeyance  towards  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  been 
revived  under  James  I.  During  the  reign  of  Charles  I  it 
pressed its claims further with little protest from the commons; 
it entertained  appeals  from  the Chancery, and it exercised  a 
jurisdiction  as a court of  first instance both in civil cases and 
in  criminal  cases  which  had  nothing  to  do  with  privilege. 
When at the Restoration the time came for reestablishing the 
ancient  constitution, this  part  of  the  constitution  was  in  a 
somewhat undefined state and gave rise to some bitter quarrels 
between the two Houses ofthe parliament of 1661-Charles  11's 
long parliament.  The result I have described.  In the case of 
Skin~zer  v.  The East India Compaay the lords attempted to act 
as a civil court of  first instance.  Both houses had gone great 
lengths, and when in  1670 the king intervened and persuaded 
the houses to rescind all their proceedings, the fruits of victory 
in this case were obtained by the commons-the  lords tacitly 
abandoned  their  claim  to an original  civil  jurisdiction.  In 
Jz~dicial  Power of  the Lords 
1675 they fell out again  over  the case  of  Shi~Zey  v. Fagg, a 
case in which the House of Lords had taken on itself to hear 
an appeal from the Chancery.  In this case after long disputes 
the commons tacitly gave way, and the lords established their 
point.  The truth seems to be that the commons were getting 
frightened  by  their  own  arguments.  The historical  investi- 
gations into which  they plunged  might  show  them that the 
claim of  the House of Lords to an inherent power of  hearing 
appeals from the Chancery was a new  claim, but such investi- 
gations could  only  bring  out  into clearer  relief  the ancient 
doctrine  that  the only source  of  all jurisdiction  is the king. 
They did  not want  to exalt the king's power, and they gave 
way without however conceding that they were in the wrong. 
Thus it came about that the House of  Lords acquired a new 
domain for its judicial  powers-it  now sat as an appeal court 
from the Chancery; as the depository of the judicial power  of 
parliament  it was a court for correcting the errors in  law of 
the courts of comnlon law, it was a court for the trial of  peers 
indicted  for treason  or felony, and lastly it was  the tribunal 
for  impeachments. 
This  is  the  era  of  impeachments.  Do  not  think  of 
impeachments  as  common  events.  During  the  whole  of 
English.history there have not, I think, been seventy, and a full 
quarter of all of them belong to the years 1640-1-2.  Almost 
every case therefore has raised some new point.  Perhaps the 
most  important  points  are these-(I)  can  a  commoner  be 
impeached  for felony or treason ?  The lords  in  Fitzharris's 
case (1681) decided that he could not-he  was entitled to trial 
by jury in  every capital case.  The commons voted that this 
was a violation of  the constitution  of  parliament.  Fitzharris 
was indicted for treason in the ordinary way before the King's 
Bench and hanged.  In 1689 however the House of  Lords in 
the case of  Sir Adam Blair  and other commoners impeached 
for treason decided to proceed with the impeachment.  Certainly 
in  the  reign  of  Charles  I  they  had  not  objected  to trying 
impeached  commoners  for  treason.  The question  has  not 
been raised since 1689, though it has often been discussed.  I 
believe  that  the  weight  of  legal  authority  is  against  the 
impeachment of  commoners for treason  or felony.  Sir J. F. Constitutio~znd  History 
Stephen lays  down  that a  commoner  cannot  be  impeached 
for treason or felony, but that there may be some doubt as to 
treason1.  (2)  It was at length decided  in the case of  Warren 
Hastings  that  neither  a  prorogation,  nor  a  dissolution  of 
parliament, will  bring  an  impeachment  to  an  end.  About 
this the  House of  Lords  in  Charles  11's reign  had  come  to 
contradictory resolutions ; in Danby's case (1679) it had  held 
that a dissolution did not put  a stop to an impeachment; in 
1685 it reversed and annulled this resolution.  Too often such 
matters have been decided by party votes.  (3)  Danby's  case 
raised  the important question, whether  a royal pardon  could 
stop an impeachment; the question was raised but not decided, 
for the impeachment was  dropped.  The Act of  Settlement 
provides  that  a  pardon  shall  not  be  pleadable  to  an  im- 
peachment,  but  does  not  prevent  the king  from  pardoning 
after  sentence-and  three  of  the  lords  concerned  in  the 
rebellion  of  1715  were  pardoned  after  they  had  been  im- 
peached, found  guilty and sentenced.  As to the point raised 
in Danby's case, whether as the law stood a pardon would stop 
an impeachment, it  was  a  very  new  point,  and  on  general 
principles  I am far from being satisfied that the commons had 
the best  of  the argument.  The question  would  seem to be 
whether  an  impeachment was  more  analogous  to an indict- 
ment, which could  always be  stopped by the king's  pardon, 
or to an  appeal of  felony  which, being  regarded as a private 
suit, was beyond the royal power. 
Another change to be noted is this.  We remember that 
if  a  peer  is  indicted  for  treason  or  felony  he  is  tried  if 
parliament be in  session by his peers in the House of Lords, 
but  if  parliament  be  not  sitting, then  by  the Court  of  the 
Lord High Steward.  The king, since the steward's office had 
ceased  to be  hereditary, made some peer  High Steward for 
the occasion, who summoned a number of  peers, not fixed by 
law, to hold the trial!  This of course enabled the king or his 
steward to pack the court.  An act of 1696 altered this in case 
of treason, but not in case of felony, by ordering that all peers 
History of  Criminal Law, vol.  r, p. 146. 
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sllould  be summoned twenty days before the trial.  I believe, 
however, that  in no case has  this provision taken effect ; the 
last trial  in  the Court of  the High Steward is said to be that 
of Lord Delamere for treason  in  1686.  Parliament has sat so 
regularly year by year that there has been  no need for such a 
court, and since the end  of  George  11's reign  there have,  I 
believe, been but  four cases of  the trial of  peers in  parliament 
otherwise than on impeachment.  These are Lord Ferrers for 
murder in  1760, Lord Byron for murder in  1765, the Duchess 
of  Kingston  for  bigamy  in  1776, and  Lord  Cardigan  for 
murder in  1841  l. 
This  same  act  of  1696 introduced  various  important 
modifications  into the procedure  in  cases  of  treason.  The 
indicted  person  was  to have a copy of  the indictment, might 
make his defence by counsel, and produce witnesses who were 
to be examined on oath.  He was only to be convicted if there 
were  two witnesses  to the same treason, he  was  only to be 
prosecuted  within  three years after the alleged treason.  He 
was to have a copy of  the panel, that is, of  the names of  the 
persons summoned as jurors, two days before the trial, in order 
that  he  might  consider  whom  to  challenge.  In  all  these 
respects a number of exceptions in favour of  persons  accused 
of  treason were made from the general law.  It was not until 
1702 that an accused felon could produce witnesses who could 
be  examined  on  oath, and  it  was  not  until  1836 (6 and 7 
Will.  IV, 114) that he  was  suffered to make his defence by 
counsel. 
The evil  practice  of  passing acts of  attainder has not yet 
fallen into disuse.  It  was by an act of  attainder that Stsafford 
perished in 1641.  It was by an ordinance of  the two Houses, 
to which  the king's  assent had  of  course not  been  obtained, 
that  Laud  perished  in  1645.  In  1660 the  turn  for  the 
regicides came ; such of them as were already dead or beyond 
the seas were  attainted of  high  treason by act of parliament. 
In  1696 Sir John Fenwick  was  attainted for the attempt to 
assassinate William  111.  This is  the last  instance of  an act 
l Lord Russell was tried for bigamy in rgor.  Lord Halsbury (Lord Chancellor) 
presided  as  Lord High Steward.  There were also present  about 160 Peers,  in- 
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passed  to inflict  the  punishment  of  death  for  an  offence 
already committed ;  but  minor punishments  have  been  in- 
flicted  by similar  means  in  later days. 
One  more  remark.  The act  which  abolished  the  Star 
Chamber did not  of  course abolish the council.  It was  still 
after the Restoration the body consulted by the king when he 
wanted advice, though already the practice is  springing up of 
consulting only a  few  of  its  members,  a  practice  which  in 
course of  time has given us the modern cabinet.  But the act 
just mentioned  did not deprive the council even of  all judicial 
power.  It was forbidden to take cognizance of any matter of 
property belonging  to the subjects of  this  kingdom ; but  it 
retained  jurisdiction  as  a  court  of  last  resort  in  admiralty 
matters, and in  all  matters civil  and  criminal arising in  the 
king's lands beyond the seas.  From very small beginnings, a 
jurisdiction over the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, this 
power  steadily grew as conquest and  colonization  gave the 
king new  lands  beyond  the  seas.  Thus the Privy  Council 
became  an  ultimate  tribunal  for  a  vast  empire-not  for 
England, not for  Great  Britain, but for all other lands of  the 
king in all corners of the globe-a  marvellous jurisdiction now 
exercised by the judicial committee of the Privy Council. 
H.  Privilege  of  Parliarneat. 
Over the privileges of  parliament  there has been  severe 
fighting.  In the first place  as regards freedom of speech we 
have Eliot's  case.  A  few  days after the dissolution  of  1629 
Eliot and others were  arrested  and committed to the Tower. 
They obtained writs of habeas corpus, and the returns to those 
writs  stated  that  they  had  been  committed  for  notable 
contempts and for  stirring up  sedition.  The judges  had  to 
consider whether they should  be  bailed or no, and seemingly 
there was no real doubt that by law bail ought to be  allowed 
-but  they temporized and  demanded from the prisoners not 
merely bail for the present charge, but also sureties for future 
good behaviour.  The attorney-general then brought forward 
a  criminal  charge  against  three of  them,  against  Eliot  for 
words spoken in the House, against Holles and Valentine for 
IV  Freedom  of Speech  321 
a  tumult  on the last day  of  the session.  The others were 
liberated.  The  prisoners pleaded that as the alleged offences 
were supposed to be committed in parliament they ought not 
to answer for them in  another court.  They relied  much  on 
Strode's case and the act of  1512 (4 Hen. VIII, c.  8)) passed 
respecting him ; this they contended was a general act.  The 
judges held  that it only applied  to suits against members of 
parliament  prosecuted  in  the Stannary courts,  and arguing 
that the King's  Bench has power to punish crimes wherever 
committed, sentenced the prisoners, who refused to plead any 
other  plea,  to  be  imprisoned  during  the  king's  pleasure. 
When  the  Long  Parliament  met  the  commons  protested 
against this as a breach of  privilege.  After the Restoration, 
the parliament, however loyal, was  not disposed to retract its 
claim of privilege.  In 1667 both Houses agreed in  declaring 
that Strode's act was a general act declaratory of  the ancient 
and  necessary  rights  and privileges  of  parliament  and  that 
the judgment  against Eliot, Holles and Valentine was illegal. 
What is more, Holles, who was still alive, caused the judgment 
to be brought  before the House of  Lords by writ  of  error, 
and the House in  its judicial capacity reversed the judgment. 
We  must  not  however  suppose  that  the  reversal  of  this 
judgment  established  the  principle  that  nothing  done  in 
parliament by any of its members can be punished as a crime 
in a court of  law.  It was conceded that had the charge been 
merely that of committing a riot in the House, the King's Bench 
might  have taken cognizance of  the case ; but words spoken 
in parliament it could not punish.  We may take it to be law 
that an ordinary crime, such as theft committed by a member 
in the House, might be punished in the ordinary courts in the 
ordinary way.  Since the Restoration there has not, I believe, 
been  any  attempt  made  by any court  of  law  to punish  a 
member  for  words  spoken  in  the House.  The Declaration  ' 
and  Bill  of  Rights proclaim  that the freedom of  speech and 
debates or proceedings  in  parliament  ought  not  to  be  im- 
peached or questioned in any court or place out of  parliament. 
The  attempt  to arrest  the  five  members  must  also  be 
noticed.  Charles had determined  to accuse five members of 
the House of Commons of high treason.  This he did, not by Constitutiorznl History 
causing  them  to be  indicted  in  the ordinary  way,  but  by 
preferring  a  set  of  charges  against  them  in  the  House  of 
Lords.  For such  a proceeding there seems to have been no 
warrant,  at least  in  later  times.  Only by  an  impeachment 
preferred  by the commons could  a commoner be brought  to 
trial  before the lords for any crime, and, as we have seen, it 
might  be  doubted  whether  a commoner  could  even  be  im- 
peached for treason or felony-thus  he would be  deprived  of 
trial  by jury.  Then the king in  person  attempted to arrest 
the five members in the House of Commons, while the House 
was sitting.  Now  a member of  parliament  has  no privilege 
of  freedom  from  arrest  on  a  charge of  treason  or felony- 
indeed, according to later authorities, he has none on a charge of 
any indictable offence.  You should therefore understand that 
outside  the  House  Pym  and  his  fellows  might  have  been 
arrcsted;  perhaps  they might  lawfully  have  been  arrested 
within  the walls  of  the  House, if  the  House had  not  been 
sitting.  But  the  attempt  to arrest  them  while  they  were 
sitting as members of  the House, we may probably reckon as 
a distinct breach of the law ; at any rate it was an extremely 
high-handed act, intended to overawe the House : it made the 
Civil War almost certain. 
After the Restoration  members of  Parliament enjoyed the 
privilege of freedom  from arrest in all civil cases.  We must 
remember that imprisonment  in  civil  cases was  at this time 
very common; debtors were imprisoned  by way of execution, 
and when  an action was begun against a  man he might very 
commonly be  at once arrested  and compelled to find bail for 
his appearance in court, or otherwise remain in prison-so  this 
privilege was a very important matter.  It was carried to great 
lengths-the  members claimed  freedom from arrest  not only 
for themselves  but  for their servants, and they claimed  that 
their  property should  be  privileged  from  execution.  These 
extensive  claims  which  were  admitted  in  the  seventeenth 
century were gradually curtailed by statute ; they had become 
serious  obstructions  to  the  ordinary  course  of  justice.  A 
statute of  1700 began this process of curtailment; statutes of 
Anne  and  George  I11  (1770) carried  the  process  further1 
2 and 3 Anne,  c.  18.  ro George 111, c.  50. 
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The servants  and  the property of  members  were  no  longer 
privileged-nothing  was left but the freedom from arrest for 
members themselves, a matter which the abolition of imprison- 
ment for debt has in our own day made of  small importance. 
As  to the power  of  punishing persons  for  contempt, the 
two Houses vied with  each other in  extending its limits.  It 
was  freely exercised  to protect  the members of  the Houses 
from  assault  and insult-under  William  I11 he  who  makes 
any insulting remark about any member of  the House runs a 
great chance of  incurring its displeasure and being imprisoned 
by  its  order.  But  further  it  becomes  dangerous  even  to 
trespass on a member's land or to fish  in his waters.  During 
the latter half of the eighteenth century the Houses gradually 
abandoned their  claim  to avenge all manner of  wrongs done 
to their members-but  of this abandonment hereafter; during 
William's reign the claim of privilege was at its height. 
A more justifiable use of  the power of the House consisted 
in  the punishment  of attacks directed not against individual 
members  but  against the House as a body.  But even in  this 
sphere  the  power  was  intemperately  used.  A  notorious 
instance  has  just  occurred.  In  1701 the  majority  in  the 
Commons' House has been  slow to grant supply.  The grand 
jury  of  Kent present a respectfully  worded  petition  begging 
them  to grant the king the money urgently  needed  for  the 
prosecution  of the war.  The House voted that this petition 
was  scandalous and an attempt to destroy the constitution of 
parliament,  and  it  committed  some  of  the  petitioners  to 
prison.  It does  not seem that they appealed  for protection 
to the  courts of  law;  parliament  was  soon  prorogued  and 
they were delivered.  By this time it  had  apparently become 
settled  doctrine  that  the  House  of  Commons  could  not 
imprison a person save during the session, so that a prorogation 
would  set its prisoners free.  They have not since the Revo- 
lution  attempted to keep a man  in  prison beyond  the limits 
of the session.  On the other hand, the House of  Lords has 
imposed fines and committed persons to prison  for  a term of 
months or of  years. 
Whether a person imprisoned  for contempt could get any 
aid  from  a court of  law, could get a court of law to entertain Constitutionn  Z  Histovy 
the question  whether  a contempt  had  been  committed  was, 
we  may say, at this time somewhat  doubtful.  Suppose the 
prisoner  obtained  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  and  the gaoler 
returned  that he was  imprisoned  by order of  one of  the two 
Houses  for a  contempt, would  the judges  be  at liberty to 
investigate  the question  whether  the alleged  acts amounted 
to  a  contempt?  In  1677 the  House  of  Lords  committed 
Lord  Shaftesbury  and  three  other  peers  for  words  spoken 
during a  debate.  Shaftesbury applied  for a  writ  of  habeas 
corpus, but the judges held that they could not inquire into a 
commitment by the lords of one of their body.  In 1680 the 
commons treated  certain  persons known  as 'abhorrers'  in a 
very  arbitrary fashion.  They brought  actions  against  the 
serjeant-at-arms who  had  imprisoned  them-he  pleaded  the 
command of the House ; but the judges on this occasion over- 
ruled the plea.  After the Revolution  the commons took this 
matter up and summoned two of the judges to the bar.  One 
of  them,  Pemberton,  made  some  show  of  argument,  but 
afterwards gave way and admitted that the command  of  the 
House would justify  the officer in  making the arrest. 
Thus stands the question at William's death.  Soon after- 
wards  (Patey's  case,  170.5) the judges  came  to the  opinion 
that they could  not investigate the legality of  a commitment 
for  contempt.  If the House committed a man for contempt 
and said no more, the courts could do nothing for him.  Thus 
each of the Houses gained a power of arbitrary imprisonment 
which had  been denied to the Court of  Star Chamber.  The 
judges  of the last century seem to me to have been almost as 
subservient to the Houses as their predecessors  of  the Stuart 
times  were  to the  king.  And  so  the  matter  rests  at the 
present day: if either House commits a man, whether he be a 
member  or no, for  contempt, there is no tribunal in which he 
can  raise  by writ  of  habeas corpus the question  whether  a 
contempt has really  been  committed. 
Turning now to military affairs we  have to recall  the fact 
that before  the days of  Charles  I  proclamations  of  martial 
law had  not been  utterly unknown.  Not  to go back  to the 
Conz~nissions  of  Martia  Z  Law 
Wars of  the Roses, Elizabeth had issued such a proclamation 
in  1588 and again in  1595.  James had followed the example 
in  1617, 1620, 1624.  Probably we ought to say of  them that 
they were illegal, though in this matter we may be prejudiced 
by what then was future history.  Charles I early in his reign 
had recourse to such commissions.  It became always clearer 
that there must be a standing army and that a standing army 
could  only  be  kept  together  by  more  stringent  rules  and 
more summary procedure than those of  the ordinary law and 
the ordinary courts.  Another grievance was  the billeting  of 
soldiers.  In 1628 the king had  to assent to the Petition  of 
Right.  After dealing with the forced loan and the imprison- 
ments  by the king's  command, it recited  that 'of late great 
companies of  soldiers  and mariners have been dispersed into 
divers counties of the realm and the inhabitants against their 
wills have been compelled to receive them into their houses. .. 
against the laws and customs of this realm.'  Then it recalled 
the words  of  Magna  Carta, Nullus  liber  homo,  and  recited 
the commissions  of  martial  law ; these  it  declared  to  be 
wholly and directly contrary to the laws  and statutes of  the 
realm.  It prayed that the king would be pleased  to remove 
the said soldiers and mariners, '  and that  your people be  not 
so burdened in time to come, that the commissions of martial 
law might  be  revoked  and annulled  and that no  such  com- 
missions  might  be  issued  for  the  future.'  This  of  course 
settled  the  law, and  no  expedient for  evading it  could  be 
discovered.  The judges  had  to inform  the  king's  generals 
that soldiers  who  offended  must  be  tried  by  the  ordinary 
courts ; that only when an army of the king was  in  presence 
of the enemy could there be any place for martial law.  Coke 
in  one of  his  latest books  lays down  that to put  a man to 
death  by  martial law  is  murder1. 
Meanwhile  the  king  and  parliament  began  to  quarrel 
about another and a still more vital point.  In whom was the 
command  of  the military forces of  the kingdom  vested?  I 
think  that historians  and lawyers  must  agree that it was in 
3  Inst.  5%.  Reference may  be  made  to  Dicey,  Lazu  of  the  Constitutiotz, 
6th ed. c.  VIII, and App. XII ;  also to The Charge ofthe Lo?-d  Chiefjustice to the 
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the king.  It would  have  been  necessary to go back  to very 
remote and revolutionary times for a precedent of an attempt 
by  parliament  to wrest  this  power  from  the king's  hands. 
However Charles was suspected, and perhaps justly suspected, 
of  desiring to use the army for the overthrow of  the parlia- 
mentary constitution ; and in  1642 the Houses asserted that 
the power of  the militia (as it was called) was or at all events 
ought to be in their hands.  This, as is well  known, was  one 
of  the immediate  causes of  the  Civil  War; the  king  was 
required  to consent  to a  bill  putting the militia, as the old 
county forces were now called, beyond  his control.  That the 
militia  and all  fortified  places  should  be  in  such  hands  as 
parliament should appoint was  one of the Nineteen  Proposi- 
tions  tendered  to him  at York  in  June,  1642.  During the 
war  which  followed  both  sides  had  recourse  to rnartial  law 
for  the government  of  their  armies'. 
I  need  not  remind  you  how  after  this  England  came 
under the domination of the army, parliament itself becoming 
the despised  slave of  the force that it had  created.  At the 
Restoration  the very name of  a  standing army had  become 
hateful  to the classes  which  were  to be  the ruling  classes. 
In  1661 a  statute (13 Car.  11,  c.  6) declared  that the 'sole 
supreme government of  the militia  and  of  all  forces  by sea 
and  land  is,  and  by  the  laws  of  England  ever  was,  the 
undoubted  right  of  the king and his  predecessors, and  that 
neither house of parliament could pretend to the same.'  The 
old  county  force was  remodelled  by this act.  But loyal  as 
the parliament might be, it would  not trust even  a  king with 
such  an engine of  tyranny as a  standing  army.  The Con- 
vention Parliament  passed  an act  disbanding the army; the 
king assented ; he also had  some  reason to dread a standing 
army.  The act of disbandment, however, sanctioned the con- 
tinuance of '  the Guards and Garrisons.'  The garrisons were 
to be  placed  in the condition  in which they existed in  1637, 
and out of  the residue  of  the soldiers the king was  to be  at 
liberty to retain a guard.  The number of  this guard was not 
specified.  Throughout the reign and on to the Revolution no 
more than  this was  legalized.  Controversy constantly broke 
Gardiner,  Constitutional  Docuttzents,  pp. 245--61. 
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out between  king and parliament as to military matters.  It 
was extremely difficult to prevent the king's  guards living  at 
free quarters, though the billeting of  them  was  undoubtedly 
illegal.  This practice had been declared  illegal by the Peti- 
tion  of  Right, and the old  prerogatives  of  purveyance  and 
preemption  with  which  it  was  nearly  connected  had  been 
abolished  along with  the military tenures.  The king could 
impress no cart for  military transport, he  could  buy no  hay, 
straw, victual, or  other thing save by free  bargain.  Anyone 
who  attempted to exercise these  old  prerogatives was liable 
to  an action  for  treble  damages  at  the  suit  of  the  party 
grieved ; anyone who  attempted to stop such an  action was 
liable to the punishments denounced  by the statute of prae- 
munire.  Also it was difficult for the king to keep his soldiers 
in hand.  In time of peace no punishment, at least no punish- 
ment extending to life or member, could be inflicted on them 
except in  the ordinary course  of  the common  law.  On the 
other hand  it was  practically  very  difficult  to  prevent  the 
officers from proceeding according to what they conceived to be 
the justice  of  martial law.  However, in 1666, articles of  war 
were issued providing for the trial of  even capital offences by 
court martial ; also forbidding that any civil magistrate should 
imprison a soldier save for treason, or for killing or robbing a 
person  not being an officer or soldier.  Seemingly the officers 
who sat on such courts martial must have risked their necks. 
Soon  after  this  Clarendon  was  impeached,  'for  that  he 
:lath  designed a standing army to be raised and to govern the 
kingdom  thereby; and  advised  the king  to dissolve  parlia- 
ment  and to lay  aside  all  thoughts of  parliament  for  the 
future, to govern  by  a  military  power and to maintain  the 
same  at free  quarters and  contributions.'  But  to  keep  a 
standing army of  any considerable size without supplies from 
parliament  was impossible, and  parliament was beginning  to 
appropriate its supplies and to impeach those who  infringed 
the  clauses  of  appropriation.  Already,  in  1666, a  subsidy 
was granted ; £30,000  and no  more was appropriated to the 
pay  of the guards, the residue  was  to be  spent  in  the war. 
In  1667 Charles  declared  that  he  was  going to war  with 
France; parliament  granted  but  appropriated ; war  was  not Constitutional Histoy31  The Fiyst  Mutiny  Act 
made ; parliament passed  an act for disbanding the army, an 
act which  contains an important clause directed against the 
practice  of  billeting-important  because  it  shows  that  the 
Petition of Right was not observed.  Money was appropriated 
for the disbanding of the army.  Seymour was impeached for 
having misappropriated  these supplies-using  them to retain 
instead of to disband the soldiers.  Danby, the Lord Treasurer, 
was  impeached 'for that he had traitorously endeavoured  to 
subvert the ancient and well-established  form  of  government 
in this kingdom, and the better to effect  that his purpose, he 
did  design  the raising  of  an army upon  a  pretence  of  war 
against  the  French  king,  and  to  continue  the  same  as  a 
standing army within  this kingdom; and to that end he has 
misappropriated  money, whereby the law is  eluded, and  the 
army  is  yet  continued.'  Nevertheless  Charles  and  James 
after him  in  one way  and another kept  the army on  foot. 
James  seems to have had  above  16,000  men.  After  Mon- 
mouth's rebellion courts martial sat to administer martial  law 
upon  the soldiers.  I  have before  me1 the record  of  one of 
these courts martial.  Peter Teat and Peter Innes of  Captain 
Bedford's  regiment  are tried  by eighteen  officers  under  one 
of the articles of war lately issued which says that '  No officer 
or soldier  shall  use  any traitorous  words  against the sacred 
person  of  the  king's  most  excellent  majesty  upon  pain  of 
death.'  They are condemned  to be hanged. 
The Bill of Rights  declared  that one of  James's  offences 
had  been  that he  had  raised  and  kept  a  standing army in 
time of  peace  without  consent  of parliament, and  quartered 
soldiers contrary to law; and further that the raising or keep- 
ing a  standing army within  the kingdom  in  time of  peace, 
unless it be with consent of  parliament, is  against  law.  The 
words  ' it1  time of  peace ' should be  noticed ; they certainly 
seem  to imply  that  in  time  of  war  the  king may keep  a 
standing army even without the consent of parliament. 
But before  the  Bill  of  Rights the first  Mutiny  Act had 
already been  passed (I William  &  Mary, c.  5).  The troops 
favourable to James were to  be shipped off to the Low Countries. 
When  they  reached  Ipswich  a  mutiny  broke  out.  It was 
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necessary to take rapid action, and a bill was hurriedly passed 
through parliament.  It is  a  very brief  affair  to this effect: 
any soldier in  the king's  service who shall excite or join  in 
any mutiny or sedition in the army or shall desert shall suffer 
death or such other punishment  as by a  court  martial  shall 
be inflicted.  Then follows a few sentences as to the constitu- 
tion of courts martial.  It is provided that nothing in this act 
shall exempt any officer or soldier  from the ordinary process 
of law; also that it shall not  affect  the  militia forces, that it 
shall only be in force until the 10th Nov. next, that is for about 
half-a-year, that  nine  out of  thirteen  officers  constituting a 
court martial must agree in passing sentence of  death.  That 
is the whole sum and substance of the first mutiny act.  The 
only crimes  that  it  sends to  a  court  martial  are  mutiny, 
sedition, desertion ; and  in  no  case  is  an officer  or soldier 
exempted  from the ordinary law.  It should be added that 
though parliament was in haste, it was careful to state in the 
preamble that the raising or  keeping a standing army within 
this  kingdom  in time of  peace, unless  it be with  consent of 
parliament,  is  against  the law.  Also  that no  man  may be 
forejudged of  life or limb or subjected to any kind  of  martial 
law, or in  any other  manner  than  by the judgment  of  his 
peers,  and  according to the known  and established  laws  of 
this realm.  By this time of course it was the orthodox belief 
of all men  that trial  by jury was the judicium parizcm  of  the 
Great Charter. 
From this time forward it became the regular  practice to 
pass temporary mutiny acts.  For a while this was  not  done 
with  perfect  regularity.  On several  occasions  during  the 
reigns of  William and Anne there was  for  a few  months no 
mutiny act in force.  Sometimes on  the other hand  the act 
was  to endure for  two  years.  But very  soon  the  practice 
became settled  of  passing  the act for  one year only and of 
passing  such an act  in  every year.  All  along through  the 
last  century  it was  regarded  as something  exceptional,  an 
evil  of  which  we  should  get  rid,  if  once  we  had  a  settled 
peace.  And  so for  two centuries, year  by year, the statute 
book  was  burdened  by  annual  mutiny  acts which  always 
tended to become  longer and  longer. PERIOD v  Uizion with Scotland  33 I 
PERIOD  V. 
Preliminary.  . 
ON passing to our new  point  of view, it  at once strikes 
us that our horizon  is enormously widened.  The parliament 
sitting at Westminster is no longer the parliament of  England, 
it is the parliament  of  Great Britain  and  Ireland.  But  even 
this, its title, does not express the whale of  the vast territory 
which  is  subject  to its legislative power.  It can make laws 
for  the  whole  of  that  huge  collection  of  lands  which  it  is 
convenient  to  call  the  British  Empire, but  which  we  must 
formally  style  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland, its  colonies  and dependencies. 
Let us very briefly recount the stages whereby new  lands 
have been brought into connexion with that system, the history 
of which we have been tracing, and let us note the legal bonds 
which bind these lands together. 
First as regards Wales.  Its incorporation in  the realm  of 
England  is  an  old  story, partly  accomplished  by  Edward I, 
partly  by  Henry  VIII.  The  great  monuments  are  the 
Statutum  Walliae  of  1284, which  declared  that  Wales  was 
not  merely  a  feudal dependency of  the  English  throne  but 
was annexed  to England ta~+tquam  pars corporis ejusdem, and 
the statute of  1535 which  provided  seats in  parliament  for 
representatives of the Welsh counties and boroughs and intro- 
duced  the  whole  body  of  English  law  into  Wales.  So 
thoroughly  had  Wales  become  a  part  of  England  that  a 
statute of  1747 laid down the rule that in  acts of  parliament 
the name England should be deemed to include \Vales. 
On  the death of Elizabeth  King James  VI of  Scotland 
became King James I of England ;  but there was no union of 
the two  countries;  they  had  nothing  in  common  but  their 
king;  the  parliament  at Westminster  could  not make  laws 
for Scotland, nor  could  the parliament  at Edinburgh make 
laws  for  England.  The English judges  did indeed hold  in 
Calvin's case, 1608, that a person born in Scotland after James 
had  become king of  England  was  not an alien in  England, 
nor subject to the many disabilities to which aliens were then 
subject, in particular the inability to hold English land.  But 
still  the  two  nations  were  two  distinct  nations. with  two 
governments.  James himself  wished  for a  closer union ;  he 
wanted  to be  king of  Great Britain; but  his  subjects were 
not prepared  for this-he  was merely  king of  England and 
king  of  Scotland.  Under  the  Protectorate  a  closer  union 
was  realised;  the  Restoration,  however,  brought  back  the 
old state of affairs;  Charles was king of  England and king of 
Scotland. 
The union  was  effected  on  I  May,  1707.  Queen  Anne 
became queen of  Great Britain.  The Act of  Union provided 
that the two kingdoms should  become one kingdom  by the 
name of  Great Britain, and that there should be not only one 
king, but one parliament for the two.  Sixteen of the Scottish 
peers  were  to be  chosen  by  their  feilows to  represent  the 
Scottish peerage in every parliament ;  and the Scottish shires 
and  boroughs  were  to  send  forty-five members.  The two 
lands,  the two  nations,  were  subjected  immediately to the 
same supreme legislative assembly ; the English  parliament 
ceased  to exist ; the Scottish  parliament  ceased  to exist ; 
there was a parliament  of Great Britain.  It became  and  is 
to this day the established rule that every act of  this parlia- 
ment  applies to both  England  and Scotland.  If  an  act is 
not  to apply to Scotland, the act says so expressly; if it is 
only to apply to Scotland, it says so expressly, 
This, however,  does  not  imply  that  the  two  countries 
became  subject to the same laws.  England  kept  and still 
keeps her common law in so far as it has not  been  abrogated 
by  statute; and  English  statutes  passed  before  the  Union 
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abrogated  by  later  statutes.  To the same extent Scotland 
keeps her own common law  and her own  old  statutes.  And 
Scottish  law  differs  considerably  from  English  law.  In 
particular,  as  regards  private  law,  the  Scots  attribute  an 
authority to Roman law which it does not enjoy on  this side 
the border.  In the sixteenth century it had obtained a footing 
in Scotland, while from England it had been excluded owing to 
the early concentration of  justice in our king's courts and the 
activity of  our  ancient parliaments'.  So the Scots  retained 
and retain to this day a system of  courts which is very different 
from  the English.  Still since  1707 the two  countries have 
been  subject  to  one  legislative  body,  fully  competent  to 
modify  or  to abrogate  any  rules  whether  of  Scottish  or of 
English  law. 
The Act of Union laid down certain rules as ' fundamental 
and  essential  conditions  of  the union.'  Of  these  the most 
important  related  to  the  two  churches  of  Scotland  and 
England; their  doctrines  and  discipline  as  established  by 
law  were  to be  inviolably  preserved,  and each  king  on  his 
accession was to swear  to maintain  them.  The fundamental 
and essential character of these provisions is insisted on with so 
much emphasis that we may say that the act goes near to an 
attempt to make law which no future parliament shall alter- 
goes near to such an attempt, but is not definitely guilty of it. 
It soon became the established doctrine that these provisions, 
like  every  other part  of  the law  of  England  and  Scotland, 
could be repealed by the parliament of  the United Kingdom. 
Blackstone writing some fifty years after the union  says this 
distinctly-'An  act of  parliament  to repeal or alter the Act 
of  Uniformity  in  England,  or  to  establish  episcopacy  in 
Scotland, would doubtless in  point of authority be sufficiently 
valid and binding; and notwithstanding such an act the union 
would  continue unbroken"'  We have no irrepealable laws; 
all  laws  may  be  repealed  by  the ordinary legislature,  even 
the conditions upon  which  the English  and  Scottish parlia- 
ments agreed to merge themselves in the parliament of  Great 
Britain. 
See Maitland,  E~tgIish  Lazu and the Renaissance, Cambridge,  1901. 
Cofn~lze~ttaries,  Introduction, $ 4  note. 
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To Irish history let us  devote some little time.  In  I 169 
some English or Norman barons, Robert Fitzstephen, Maurice 
Fitzgerald, Richard de Clare, known as Strongbow, landed  in 
Ireland, and began  to take part  in  the quarrels  of  the Irish 
chieftains.  Henry  11, fearing  the establishment  of  an  inde- 
pendent Norman state across St  George's channel, went thither 
himself  and obtained a submission  from the barons and the 
Irish chiefs: they did homage to him.  An English settlement 
was formed in the eastern part of  the island.  It was divided 
into counties; the king granted charters to its boroughs, he 
appointed sheriffs and justices  of  assize.  John took  the title 
of dominus Hiberniae.  The English settlement was regarded 
as subject to the English common law, and so soon  as John 
granted the Great Charter at Runnymede, it was sent over to 
Ireland and published there1.  The growth of a parliamentary 
constitution  in  Ireland, i.e.  among the  English  settlers, was 
parallel  to the growth  in  England.  In 1295 knights of  the 
shire  are  returned  to  a  parliament  held  by  the  viceroy ; 
burgesses appear there, though not it is said until Edward 111's 
reign.  We have  Irish  statutes of  1310, but  from  that year 
they  are lost  until  142g2.  The colony, however, constantly 
shrank-the  colonists were constantly  falling away  into the 
barbarism  of  the native  Irish  tribes.  The authority  of  the 
English king over Ireland reached  at length its lowest point 
in the reign of  Henry VII, when  it  was confined to the four 
counties  of  'the  pale,'  Dublin,  Louth,  Kildare  and  Meath 
and  a  few  seaport towns.  The Anglo-Irish  had  taken  the 
part of  the House of York and had endangered Henry's crown 
by  supporting  pretenders.  In  1495 he  obtained  from  the 
Irish parliament a statute known  by the name of  his viceroy 
as Poynings' law.  It provided that the statutes 'lately' made 
by  the  English  parliament  should  hold  good  in  Ireland. 
Whatever  may  have been the meaning  of  the word  'lately,' 
the  construction  put  upon  it  was  that  all  English  statutes 
For the 'solemn  and authoritative introduction into Ireland of  the English 
system of procedure' in 1227  see Maitland in E~zsZ.fIi~it.Reu.  July 1889,pp.  516-18. 
Record however exists of legislation for I 297, 1320,  1 324,  r 35  I, 1366,  1394, 
1402, 1409-10,  see  Statutes  and  Ordinances and Acts  of  the  Pavliament  of 
Ireland, ed.  H. F.  Berry, Dublin,  1907. Constitutional FIistory 
earlier in  date than  Poynings'  Act were  law in  Ireland.  It 
also provided  that no parliament should be held  in  Ireland 
until  the viceroy  should  have  certified  to the king all  such 
acts as were to be passed, and such acts had  been  confirmed 
by the king and his council.  Thus the king and his English 
privy  council  obtained a check  upon  all proposals for  legis- 
lation  in  Ireland.  Thenceforward  the authority of  the king 
began slowly to revive and extend itself.  In I 541 Henry VIII 
abandoned  the old  title Lord of  Ireland  for  that of  King of 
Ireland ; he was also Supreme Head on  Earth of  the Church 
of  Ireland.  The attempt of Elizabeth to force the reformed 
English  liturgy  upon  a  country  in  which  the  Protestant 
doctrines had  made no way  led  to rebellions, the rebellions 
to repression.  The power of James I was  at least nominally 
acknowledged throughout the whole island.  It was all divided 
into shires ; the franchise  was  given  to many boroughs,  the 
number of  members  in the commons' house  was brought  up 
to 232  in  1613.  Unfortunately the English persisted  in  the 
attempt to force a  new religion  upon the country, and  vast 
tracts of  land  which  had  been  forfeited  by  the  treason  of 
rebellious  lords  were  parcelled  out  among English colonists 
without regard for the rights of  the Irish  landowners.  There 
followed the rising of  1641 and the terrible reconquest  of  the 
country by Cromwell.  Vast quantities of  Irish  land passed 
illto the hands  of  the Cromwellians, and at the Restoration 
many  of  their  titles were  confirmed.  Under  James I1 the 
Catholic Irish very naturally took  the king's  side; they were 
again repressed by William; and then there was another great 
confiscation and redistribution  of lands. 
During the reigns of William and Anne the severest  laws 
were passed by the Irish parliament for the suppression of the 
Catholic religion.  Catholics were  excluded  from parliament, 
and in  1715 were  deprived  of  the  electoral  franchise  which 
they had  hitherto exercised.  Meanwhile a dispute broke out 
as to the relation  between  the English and the Irish parlia- 
ments.  That Ireland  was  subject to the king there was  no 
doubt ; he happened to be  king of  England, but he was  also 
king  of  Ireland-but  was  Ireland  subject  to  the  Engiish 
parliament ?  could  the English parliament  make statutes for 
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Ireland?  The dispute becomes prominent under William 111. 
The English parliament  passed  an  act for  Ireland, the Irish 
parliament  reenacted  it  with some alterations.  The English 
lawyers,  including Coke, had  for some time past argued  for 
the  supremacy  of  the  English  parliament.  The medieval 
precedents were not  very  decisive.  The English  theory was 
this-that  Ireland was a colony, and that a colony was subject 
to the legislature of the mother country.  This general doctrine 
was indisputable English law-even  the English  colonists in 
America admitted that in a general way they were subject to 
the parliament at Westminster, though they were soon to deny 
that  taxes  could  be  imposed  upon  them  by  the  English 
legislature.  The proposition  that  Ireland  was  an  English 
colony was much more disputable.  In 1719 the question was 
brought to a head  by a dispute between  the two Houses of 
Lords.  Each asserted its right to act as a court which  could 
correct the errors of  the Irish  courts of  law.  A  declaratory 
act was  then  passed  (6 Geo.  I, c.  5) by the English parlia- 
ment  to the effect that the English parliament has full power 
to make  laws  to bind  the people  of  Ireland  and  that  the 
Irish  House of  Lords has no  power to reverse or affirm the 
judgments  of  the Irish courts.  This act, being acquiesced in, 
definitely  subordinated  the  Irish  to the English parliament. 
Poynings'  Act  also  remained  unrepealed, and was  so inter- 
preted  that the parliament  had  little more  than  a  power  of 
accepting or rejecting the proposals of the crown. 
In  1782 the act of  1719 was  repealed,  and  in  1783 the 
English parliament  passed  a statute declaring that the right 
of the people of  Ireland to be bound only by laws enacted by 
the king and the Irish parliament  is  established, and shall at 
no time hereafter be questioned or questionable.  No appeals 
were  to  be  brought  from  the Irish  to  any  English  courts. 
Poynings' law also was repealed by the Irish parliament.  For 
eighteen years Ireland was no more subject to England than 
was  England  to Ireland.  The causes  of  this concession  of 
Irish independence, and of  the union  of  1800, lie beyond  our 
domain : but  understand  that it was  the union  of  two inde- 
pendent kingdoms, not the absorption of a dependent kingdom. 
The union  took  effect  on  I  Jan.  1801.  There  was  no longer a kingdom of Great Britain and a kingdom of Ireland; 
there  was  a  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 
So again there was a parliament  for the United Kingdom, in  . 
which  the  Irish  peers  were  represented  by  twenty-eight  of 
their number chosen by them for life, and by four bishops sitting 
according to a scheme of  rotation, and the Irish commons by 
a hundred members.  Every statute of this parliament applies 
to the whole of  the United Kingdom unless some part of  it is 
specially  excepted.  As  on  the occasion  of  the  union  with 
Scotland, articles were agreed on by the two parliaments; but 
these articles possess no  particularly essential or irrepealable 
nature.  This we  may see from the fate of what was probably 
regarded  as  the  most  important  of  them-the  churches  of 
England and Ireland were united  in one church, '  The United 
Church of  England and Ireland,' and the continuance of  this 
United Church was declared to be an essential and fundamental 
part of the union.  In 1869 the union of  the two churches was 
dissolved, and the Irish church was declared to be no longer 
an established church. 
The laws in  force in  Ireland  differ from those in  force in 
England, but the differences are not so great as those which 
separate English  from  Scottish law.  The acts of  the Irish 
parliament are still  in  force  in  so far as they have not been 
repealed  by  statutes of  the United  Kingdom; but  the basis 
of  Irish law is English common law, which has been  received 
ever since the days of  Henry VIII.  In one respect Ireland is 
kept  a  little  more  distinct  from  England  than  is  Scotland. 
From the earliest time the king has had a  representative in 
Ireland, a viceroy, lord-deputy, or lord-lieutenant, and the Iord- 
lieutenant has had  a council corresponding to the council of 
the English king.  In I 800 these institutions were not destroyed 
-there  still is a lord-lieutenant, and he has a council ; prac- 
tically,  however,  this  does  not  mean  any  great  degree  of 
separation ; the executive  government  of  Ireland  like  that 
of  England and of  Scotland is de facto under the control of  the 
cabinet.  Just at one point, and that the highest, the judicial 
constitutions  of  the three countries are united.  The House 
of Lords serves as a court of  last resort  for English, Irish and 
Scottish cases. 
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The Isle of  Man and the Channel Islands are not parts of 
the United Kingdom, though king and parliament can  make 
laws  for  them.  The statutes  made  by  parliament  do not 
affect them unless they are specially mentioned, or it is evident 
from  the context that  they  were within  the purview  of  the 
legislature.  The appeal from their courts is not to the House 
of  Lords, but  to the King in Council.  The interest  of  these 
small dependencies lies in this, that the relation between them 
and  England  formed  a  precedent  for  the  treatment  of  the 
vaster dependencies which have gradually collected round the 
United Kingdom. 
As  regards  these greater  dependencies,  we  can  say  but 
little ;  we may, however, apprehend certain very general prin- 
ciples.  First we have to note a distinction as to the mode in 
which  territories  have  been  acquired-we  must  distinguish 
colonization on the one hand from cession or conquest on  the 
other.  When a new country is colonized by Englishmen, they 
are conceived to carry with them all such part of the English 
common law and all such existing statutes as are applicable 
to their circumstances ; to distinguish what is and what is not 
applicable  is  the work  of  the courts  which  the  king  may 
establish among them, an appeal  lying from  those courts  to 
the King in Council.  The king cannot legislate for them ;  on 
the other hand, king and parliament  can  legislate for them ; 
but  the  presumption  is  that  a  statute  applies  only  to the 
United Kingdom, it does  not  extend to the colonies unless 
they are mentioned or it is plain  that the statute was  meant 
for  them.  As regards  territories  conquered  by  the  king's 
armies or  ceded  to him by  a foreign power, the act of  con- 
quest  or  cession  does  not  alter  their  law.  The king  can 
legislate  for them  and a  fortiori  the king in  parliament  can 
legislate for  them-but  they retain  their old  law, French  or 
Spanish or Dutch or whatever  it  may be, until new  laws are 
made for them by the king with  or without  the concurrence 
of  parliament.  The king  also  may  grant  to  them  repre- 
sentative  institutions  of  their  own-may  establish  in  them 
legislative assemblies-and  when such a grant has been  made 
he cannot revoke it.  Over all these territories however obtained, 
whether by colonization or cession or conquest, whether  they have  representative assemblies of  their own  or no, king and 
parliament are supreme ; but it is not considered that a statute 
applies to them unless the intention of  the legislature  that it 
should  do so appears  on  the face  of  the  statute.  The dis- 
tinction as to the mode of  acquisition affects not  the ultimate 
supremacy of  king and parliament, but the power of  the king 
to make laws without  the  consent  of  parliament-in  a land 
obtained  by  cession  or  conquest  he  can  make  laws  unless 
statute has said that he cannot : in what in the strictest sense 
is a '  colony ' he has no such power. 
As  is  well  known,  it  was  the  attempt  of  the  British 
parliament  to tax the American  Colonies which led  to the 
War of  Independence and the formation of the United States. 
Already in  1766 we  have  an act  (6 Geo.  111, c.  12) which 
recites  that  several  of  the houses  of  representatives  in  His 
Majesty's  colonies and plantations  in America "  have of  late, 
against law, claimed to themselves the sole and exclusive right 
of  imposing  taxes upon  His Majesty's  subjects  in  the said 
colonies and plantations" : it is then declared  that "the said 
colonies and  plantations  in  America  have been, are, and of 
right ought to be subordinate unto, and dependent upon  the 
imperial crown and parliament of Great Britain";  and that the 
king and parliament of Great Britain have and of  right ought 
to have full power and authority to make laws and statutes to 
bind the colonies and people of America in all cases whatsoever. 
I believe that I am right in saying that the colonists did not 
deny the general rule that the British parliarnent  might  legis- 
late for them, but disputed only its right to tax them.  The 
British parliament did not abandon its claim until it was forced 
to acknowledge that the United  States were free, sovereign, 
and independent : though during the progress of  the struggle 
it promised by an act of 1778 (18 Geo. 111, c. 12) that it would 
not tax North America or the West Indies for the purpose  of 
obtaining a revenue.  The adverse issue of  the war with the 
United States did not lead to any abandonment of  the general 
principle.  Our  parliament  claims  to legislate  for  all  lands 
which are subject to the crown of  Great Britain, and the claim 
is no idle claim.  To give but  one instance, an instance on  a 
great scale ; in 1833 by an act of the parliament of the United 
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Kingdom  (3 and 4  Will.  IV, c.  73) slavery  was  abolished 
throughout  the colonies ; and though  compensation was pro- 
vided for the slave owners, this of course was a vast interference 
with  the  rights  of  private  property.  From  time  to  time 
parliament  makes  laws for  the colonies, thus the  Copyright 
Act extends to them.  The presumptio~l  of  the  courts,  as 
already said, is  that a  statute does not extend to them, and 
therefore  if  parliament  does  mean  to  legislate  for  them,  it 
generally says so in so many words.  Even the right or power 
to impose taxes has never been  abandoned, though  it is  not 
exercised.  Students of ~ustin'i  Jurisprudence may find some 
interest in  noticing this case : the sovereign body  habitually 
refrains from making laws of  a certain class and must suspect 
that if  it made such laws they would not be obeyed. 
As  to the constitutions  of  the  colonies.  Subject to the 
general power of  the British  parliament  there is  considerable 
variety-for  some the king can legislate,  others have repre- 
sentative  assemblies  of  their  own.  In these last the consti- 
tutional  organization  is  modelled  after  that  of  the  mother 
country-a  royal  governor  represents  the  king,  and  the 
legislative  assembly  consists  of  two  houses ; but  the upper 
house is not, like our House of  Lords, a hereditary assembly. 
Their acts require the assent of  the governor as representing 
the crown-this  gives them  a  temporary validity-but  they 
are liable to be disallowed by an order of the King in Council ; 
not being sovereign, their legislative powers are limited : their 
statutes may be void.  In this they differ from the statutes of 
the parliament of  the United Kingdom, which cannot be void. 
However (at least  in general) no  attempt has  been  made to 
enutnerate  or  specify  the  subjects  about  which  a  colonial 
legislature may  legislate, or  may  not  legislate.  The general 
rule  is  laid  down by an act of  1865 (28 and  29 Vic., c. 63): 
every law made by a colonial legislature is valid for the colony 
except in  so far as it is  repugnant to any act of  parliament 
extending to the colony.  This gives the colonial legislatures 
liberal  powers, for the number  of  acts of  parliament  which 
extend  to  the colonies  is  not  very  great.  Still  a  colonial 
judge  or  (on  appeal)  the judicial  committee  of  the  Privy 
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repugnant  to  an  act  of  parliament  which  extends  to  the 
colony.' 
As to the laws in force in the colonies, of course they vary 
greatly.  In most of  them the basis is English common  law ; 
but  in  some it is French law, in  others  Roman-Dutch  law, 
that is  to say, Roman  law  as expounded  by  the jurists  of 
Holland.  Past history decides this matter :  territories acquired 
by conquest or cession from foreign states have generally been 
allowed to keep their old laws.  Then on the top of  this basis 
of  common law, whatever  it may be,  come those acts of  the 
British  parliament  which  affect  the colony,  and  the  acts of 
the colonial  legislature. 
The  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  (of  the 
constitution  of  which  hereafter)  is  the  supreme  court  of 
appeal for all the king's  lands outside the United  Kingdom. 
The business that comes before it is of the most miscellaneous 
character; the world has never seen a tribunal with such world- 
wide  powers.  It has  to  administer Mohammedan  law  and 
Hindoo  law,  French  law,  Dutch  law,  English  law;  it has 
often  to  consider  whether  the  legislative  acts  of  colonial 
legislatures are valid or invalid, for instance, it may  have to 
say that a  statute of  the Canadian  parliament is invalid  as 
repugnant to a  statute which  the  parliament  of  the  United 
Kingdom has made for Canada. 
It is impossible in a few words to say much that is profit- 
able about India, only let us remember  this : that the parlia- 
ment of the United Kingdom which we are about to describe 
is  supreme over  India, can, and  in  matters  of  the  highest 
importance sometimes does, legislate for India. 
In speaking then of king and parliament we are no longer 
speaking of what in strictness of language are merely English 
institutions ; the parliament represents  the United Kingdom, 
and king and parliament have supreme legislative power over 
territories  which lie in  every quarter of the globe.  Of  this 
parliament we must speak.  Below it there are many  institu- 
tions,  some  of  which  are  specifically  English,  specifically 
Scottish,  Irish,  Canadian,  Australian,  Indian;  for  example, 
the judicial  systems of  England,  Ireland  and Scotland  are 
distinct from  each  other, though at the supreme point  they 
unite  in  the House  of  Lords.  It is of  great importance  to 
distinguish  those  institutions  which  like  the  kingship  and 
the parliament  are (we  can  hardly avoid the term) imperial 
institutions, from those which like the High Court of  Justice 
are specifically English, and I strongly advise you  not  to use 
the words England and English when you mean what is larger 
than England and more than English.  When  we  have dealt 
with  the institutions which  have  power  over  all  the  British 
dominions, we  shall, being  Englishmen  in  an  English  uni- 
versity, deal with  some purely  English institutions, as with 
the  High  Court  of  Justice, not  with  the  Scottish  Court  of 
Sessions-but  let us keep this distinction firmly in our minds ; 
if  we  are  Englishmen,  we  are also  subjects  of  a  sovereign 
whose power extends over millions and millions of  men who 
are not English. 
Let me illustrate this by  one further remark.  There are 
two conceptions which are of great importance to students of 
international  law:  the  one  nationality,  the  other  domicile. 
Now there is no such thing as English nationality, and there is 
no such thing as British domicile.  The Englishman, the Scot, 
the Irishman, the Canadian, the Australian-all  of these have 
a nationality in  common ; if there be war between the United 
Kingdom  and  a  foreign power, say  France, all  of  them  are 
enemies of the French, any of them who side with the French 
are traitors.  But there is no such thing as British domicile- 
because there is no one system of  private law common to all 
the  British  dominions ; a  man  is  domiciled  in  England  or 
Scotland or New Zealand, and to a very large extent the law 
under  which  he lives varies  with  his  place  of  domicile.  If 
I  abandon  my  English  domicile, and  become  domiciled  in 
Scotland, this will  have most  important legal results for  me, 
but my nationality remains what it was.  So by England let 
us mean England, a land which consists of  fifty-two counties. 
There  is  another  distinction  which  we  must  now  keep 
constantly  in  view:  we  are  lawyers  dealing  with  law,  but 
an account of  our present  mode of  government  which spoke 
only  of  legal  rules  would  be  an extremely inadequate  and 
indeed  a  quite unintelligible  account.  To take  the  capital 
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is a matter of the utmost  importance-indeed  a great part of 
our  political  life  is  determined  by  the  constitution  of  the 
cabinet for the time being-but  most people know and every- 
one ought to know  that the cabinet  is  a  body  unknown  to 
the law: as a body it has no  legal  powers, rights or duties. 
We have then  to distinguish at every step what  is matter  of 
law, from what is not matter of law, from what  is matter of 
custom  or convention.  The two  are intimately intertwined; 
as  Mr  Dicey  has  shown  in  his  excellent  lectures  on  the 
Constitution1  (which I take this opportunity of strongly recom- 
mending to your  notice) the customs or conventions of  our 
constitution derive their force, a force which is often felt to be 
quite as strong as the force of law, from the fact that they are 
so much mixed up with law that they could hardly be violated 
without a violation of  law.  We must therefore keep this dis- 
tinction  before  us,  arid  whenever  we  come  to a  rule  ask 
ourselves whether it be law  or no, ask  ourselves what would 
happen if it were broken-would  anybody be punished, and if 
so how,  or  would  there merely  be  a  general  outcry  that a 
departure had been made from sound constitutional precedent? 
The necessity for this caution is due in  a large measure to 
our  careful conservation of  forms.  Our queen to-day has by 
law  almost all  the power that Henry  VII had  by  law; we 
know that as a matter of fact our present kingship is radically 
different from the kingship of  the fifteenth century ; but  law 
has done little to take away powers from the king.  When we 
have insured  by indirect  methods that such  powers shall not 
be  exercised  without  the approval  of  parliament,  we  have 
considered that enough has been done-we  have not cared to 
pass  a  statute saying in  so many  words  that  such  powers 
have  ceased  to  exist.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the 
wisdom of  this course, it renders the task of  lecturing on our 
modern constitution  a very difficult task.  One is constantly 
brought face to face with  the question-what  is  it lawful  for 
the king to do? what might  he  not  lawfully do if  he wished 
to go as near  as possible to breaking  the law?  To find  an 
answer is often hard or impossible.  Since the Revolution our 
Lectures  Introductory  to  the  Study  of  the  Lazv  of  the  Constitdion  by 
A. V. Dicey, 6th ed.  London,  1902. 
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kings have seldom gone  near to breaking  the law in  serious 
matters-by  all  manner  of  indirect  means  they have  been 
practically  restrained  from  breaking  the  law,  therefore  we 
have no modern precedents, and are thrown  back  on  ancient 
precedents, the applicability of  which to the changed  circum- 
stances of modern times can often be very plausibly disputed. 
The law then as to the extent of the royal prerogative in many 
directions  is often  very  vague, and often  we  have  to solace 
ourselves with the reflection  that any attempt to exercise the 
prerogative in these directions is extremely improbable. 
A.  The  Sovereign Body. 
I.  The  Kingsh$. 
The succession  to  the  throne  is  settled  by  the Act  of 
Settlement upon the heirs of the body of  the Electress Sophia, 
being  protestants.  It is  needless  to say that  under  these 
terms a woman can succeed.  A queen has all the powers  of 
a  king.  The husband  of  a  reigning  queen  has no powers, 
he is  not  king unless  an act of  parliament makes  him  so. 
Philip of Spain, Mary's husband, bore the title of king, Anne's 
husband  was  simply  Prince  George  of  Denmark.  Queen 
Victoria's  husband was simply Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg- 
Gotha until  1857 when the queen  conferred  on him  the title 
of  Prince Consort.  He had no legal powers. 
'The king never  dies,'  in  other words  under  the Act of 
Settlement, and for some centuries before it, the heir begins to 
reign at the moment of  the ancestor's death.  The coronation 
therefore  does not seem  to be a legally necessary ceremony. 
The terms  of  the  coronation  oath  are  however  fixed  by 
statute-this  statute passed immediately after the Revolution 
has come before us already1.  The Act of  Union with Scotland 
further  required  an  oath  to  maintain  the  two  established 
churches.  George I11 thought that this oath stood in the way 
of  his  giving his  assent to a bill  removing the disabilities of 
the Roman  Catholics;  but  it seems  only  intended  to give 
a  religious  sanction  to the  king's  duty of  maintaining  the 
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and not  to hamper  his  conscience  when  considering  a  pro- 
posed change in the law : the queen's  oath did  not stand  in 
the way  of  the disestablishment  of  the Irish  Church.  The 
king is  also  bound  by the Act  of  Settlement either  at  his 
coronation  or  on  meeting  his  first  parliament,  whichever 
happens first, to make a declaration against transubstantiation 
and  other  distinctively  Roman  doctrines  prescribed  by  the 
Act of  Settlement.  He is  also bound  by the Act of  Settle- 
ment  to join  in  communion  with  the Church of  England as 
by law  established.  He forfeits his  crown  if  he  holds  com- 
munion  with  the  Church  of  Rome,  professes  the  Popish 
religion, or marries a papist; the crown then  passes  as if  he 
were dead to the next heir.  There is no clause saying that he 
forfeits the crown if he ceases to be a member of  the English 
Church, if, for instance, he becomes a Wesleyan Methodist. 
Under the Royal  Marriage Act, I772 (12 Geo. 111, c.  I I), 
the marriage of  any descendant of George I1 is invalid unless 
the royal consent has been obtained ; but this does not apply 
to the issue of princesses married  into foreign families, and is 
subject  to a  proviso  that a  descendant of  George  I1 when 
of  the age of  twenty-five may signify to the privy council his 
intention  of  marrying without the king's  consent, and unless 
within twelve months both houses of parliament object to the 
marriage, then  he  may  lawfully  marry. 
There is,  I  think, no way  in  which  a  reigning  king can 
cease to reign save by his death, by holding communion with 
the Church of Rome, professing the Popish religion or marry- 
ing a  Papist,  and  possibly  by  abdication.  I  cannot  regard 
the events of  1327, 13gg or 1688 as legal precedents.  I  can 
deduce no rule of law from them : they seem to me precedents 
for  a revolution, not for legal  action.  If  we  had  a very bad 
king, we  should  very  probably  depose  him ;  but  unless  he 
consented to an act of  parliament depriving him of the crown, 
the deposition  would  be  a  revolution,  not  a  legal  process. 
Even  the  king's  power  to  abdicate,  except by giving his 
assent to a  statute declaring  his  abdication  may, as it seems 
to me, be doubted. 
For  the case  of  an  infant  king or a  king  incapable  of 
transacting business  our common  law makes  no special pro- 
vision.  Its doctrine seems to be that the king is never under 
age and never  incapable: he  can  always  give his  assent to 
acts of parliament.  This doctrine has in  the past  given  rise 
to some curious fictitious transactions ; but ever since the end 
of the Middle Ages a royal minority has always been foreseen 
and  provided  for  in  advance by  statute.  Thus in  1830  a 
statute was  passed  (I  Will.  IV,  c.  z) to  the effect  that  if 
William  died  while the Princess Victoria was  under the age 
of eighteen years, the Duchess of  Kent was until the queen 
reached eighteen years to be her guardian, and was to exercise 
all the royal  powers, save that she was  not to have power to 
assent to any act altering the Act of Settlement or the Act 
of Uniformity.  This act did not take effect because the queen 
had  attained  eighteen before  her uncle  died.  A  similar act 
was passed in  1840, making Prince Albert regent if the queen 
should  die  leaving  an  heir  under  the age of  eighteen, the 
regency to continue until the heir should be eighteen.  There 
is now no such act in force, and there is no immediate necessity 
for  one.  It seems  a  common  belief that a  king attains full 
age at eighteen or at some other age different  from the usual 
twenty-one ; but this is a mistake.  By common law a  king 
is  never  under age, but  statutes passed  on various occasions, 
none  of  which  are  now  in  force, have  chosen  eighteen  as 
the age at which  a  regency  shall  come to an end.  For an 
actual case of  regency due to the king's  infancy  we have  to 
go back to the case of  Edward VI. 
Our law makes no provision for a case in which the king is 
disabled from transacting business by mental or bodily illness. 
The question  arose in 1788, but  not  in  its  most  aggravated 
form for a parliament was in existence, so there was  no  need 
to decide how a parliament could be summoned.  Parliamept 
was  in  existence but  it stood  prorogued,  and  according  Ito 
precedent when a parliament  is prorogued  it  cannot  proceed 
to business  until  the session  has been opened either by the 
king in  person  or by commissioners  appointed  by him.  On 
this occasion  parliament  met and proceeded  to discuss what 
was to be done.  Some maintained  that the Prince of  Wales 
(afterwards George IV) had  a right or at least a legal claim 
to be  regent.  This contention, however, in  accordance with 
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for the precedent of Henry VI's infancy might be regarded as 
conclusive of  this  point.  It being decided, however, that the 
prince was  to be  regent  by  act of  parliament,  the question 
arose how  such  an  act  could  be  passed.  The Chancellor 
affixed  the Great  Seal to a  commission  for  opening  parlia- 
ment; a  regency  bill  was  introduced,  and  it  was  intended 
that the royal  assent  should  be  fictitiously given to this bill 
by commission under the Great Seal.  But before the bill was 
passed  the king recovered  and no  further proceedings were 
necessary.  The same difficulty occurred again in  1810.  The 
king  became  incapable,  this  time  for  good  and  all, at  a 
moment when  parliament  stood  prorogued.  The precedent 
of  1788 was followed.  The Houses agreed that the parliament 
should  be opened by commission  under  the Great  Seal, and 
the Chancellor affixed  it.  A regency bill  was  introduced ; it 
was carried  through both houses, and a fictitious  royal  assent 
was given  to it by  commission  under  the Great  Seal.  The 
commission asserted  that it was  issued  by the king himself, 
by  and with  the advice of  the lords  spiritual  and  temporal 
and commons in parliament  assembled.  The royal  authority 
was to be exercised by the Prince of Wales, subject to certain 
restrictions as to the creation of  peerages, the grant of  offices 
and the like.  These are the only modern  precedents  for  the 
treatment  of  cases  for  which  our  common  law  makes  no 
provision.  Obviously the difficulty would be greater if  there 
were no parliament in existence. 
As regards 'the royal family,' a term of very vague import, 
there  is  little to  be  said.  A  king's  wife,  a  king or queen's 
eldest son and eldest daughter, and the wife of the eldest son, 
enjoy a certain protection, if  such it  may be called, under the 
old statute of  Edward I11 defining the crime of  high treason. 
The eldest son of  a reigning  king or queen is born a peer of 
the realm, he is born Duke of  Cornwall, he is not  born to the 
title of Prince of  Wales.  All other sons and daughters of  the 
king or  queen are born  commoners, and such  they continue 
unless and until peerages are conferred upon them.  A certain 
honorary precedence is given to certain members of the king's 
family by an act of  1539-31  Hen. VIII, c. lo--an  act for the 
placing of lords, but this is a trifle. 
The Lords  Sjirituad 
I I.  The  House  of  Lords. 
The House  of  Lords  at present  consists  of  about  540 
members and is thus ten times as large as under the Tudors1. 
First  as to the bishops.  Two archbishops  and  twenty-four 
bishops have seats in  it.  When we last saw it all the English 
bishops sat there, including those whose sees were created by 
Henry  VIII, or all  except the Bishop  of  Sodor and  Man, 
who has never had a seat, and whose absence is accounted for 
by  the fact  that in  times  past  he was  not  a  bishop  of  the 
English  church;  it  was  only  under  Henry  VIII that  his 
bishopric was made part of  the province  of  York.  No  new 
see was created until  1836 ; in that year the see of  Ripon was 
created  by Order  in  Council, and the bishop  had  a  seat in 
parliament, but at the same time the two sees of Gloucester and 
Bristol were fused together so that the number of  bishops was 
not  increased.  Manchester was  created  under act of  parlia- 
ment in 1847,  Truro and S. Albans in 1877, Liverpool  in  1880, 
Newcastle  in  1882, and Southwell in  1883, all  under  acts of 
parliament which provided that the number of bishops having 
seats in  the House of  Lords should  not thereby be increased2. 
The statutory rule now is that the two archbishops, the bishops 
of  London, Durham  and  Winchester,  and twenty-one other 
bishops-the  first in  order of seniority-have  seats, the others 
have no seats.  There are now six bishops without  seats ex- 
clusive of  the Bishop of Sodor and Man who never sits3. 
Between  1801 and 1869 under the Act of  Union  the Irish 
Church was represented by one archbishop and three bishops, 
who sat there according to a scheme of rotation. 
The mode of  making bishops  remains just  what it was in 
Elizabeth's time; the chapters always elect the royal nominee ; 
if they did  not the king  would  be  able to appoint by letters 
patent under the act of  Henry VI  11. 
The number in Jan. 19 13  was 636. 
Wakefield was created in 1888, Bristol in 1897, Birmingham and Southwnrk 
in  1904. 
There are now (1913) ten bishops exclusive of the Bishop of Sodor and Man 
without seats :  i.e. Southwark, Carlisle, Worcester, Gloucester, Llandaff, Rochester, 
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The vast  increase  that has taken place  in  the House of 
Lords  is  therefore  an  increase  in  the  number  of  temporal 
peers.  It would be a great mistake to suppose that there are 
many very ancient peerages in  existence.  Counting English, 
Scottish, and Irish peerages there are not a hundred which can 
be traced as far as the Middle Ages, and about half of  these 
have been  merged  in  newer  and higher titles.  A year now 
seldom goes by without the creation of half-a-dozen new peers. 
The power  of  creating new peers  is  obviously  an important 
engine in  the hands of  a minister.  During the last  century 
peerages were lavishly created for political  purposes.  Under 
Anne in 171  I, twelve peerages were created at once in order to 
secure a majority in the House of  Lords.  The lords resisted 
this, and by the peerage  bills  of  1719 and 1720 they sought 
to limit the king's power of  creating new peers by a provision 
that when six more had  been  created  the maximum  number 
was to be reached.  The king himself  was willing to consent 
to this, but the bill  was rejected  by a  large  majority  in  the 
House of  Commons, and thus a great change in  our constitu- 
tion was averted.  In much  more  recent  times the power of 
creating new peers  has been  used  for  a great end.  In 1832 
the House of  Lords was  practically coerced  into the passing 
of  the  Reform  Bill  by  the knowledge  that  if  they  again 
rejected  it the king was prepared  to consent to the creation 
0.f  eighty new peerages.  Thus a threat to create new peerages 
may be a potent political instrument;  but for obvious reasons 
a  minister  would  shrink from  using  it  save  in  an  extreme 
case-he  could  not  see the end  of  his  action; he  would  be 
creating heritable  rights, and  the  political  opinions of  heirs 
are not always those  of  their ancestors.  For centuries past, 
as we  have seen, the invariable  mode  of  creating peers  has 
been  by  letters  patent; usually  they confer the dignity and 
the consequent right  to a  writ  of  summons on  the grantee 
and the heirs of his  body,  but  occasionally  other  forms  of 
grant are  adopted.  As we  have  already  seen  in  1856 the 
House of Lords maintained that the grant of a peerage merely 
for the life of  the grantee would  not  entitle him to a seat in 
parliament:  that was the result of  the Wensleydale  case.  A 
few ancient baronies created by writ are still in existence. 
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'CVe  have  now  to notice  that  a  peer  may  be a  peer  of 
England  or of  Scotland  or of  Ireland or of  Great Britain or 
of  the United Kingdom.  When Scotland and England were 
united Scotland possessed a large peerage of  its own.  There 
were, I think, 154 Scottish peers and but 168 English1.  The 
plan adopted was this-only  sixteen Scottish peers were to sit 
in the House of  Lords.  These sixteen were to be elected by 
the whole body of Scottish peers to represent them for a single 
parliament.  All the Scottish peers, however, were to enjoy 
the other privileges of  peerage, the freedom  from arrest and 
the right to be  tried before the House of  Lords.  Since the 
Act of  Union the king has not  been  able to create a purely 
Scottish peer, or for the matter of  that a purely English peer: 
the peers created were (if  not peers of  Ireland) peers of Great 
Britain,  who,  as  such,  would  have  hereditary  seats  in  the 
House of  Lords.  Thus the number  of  Scottish peers  who 
are to elect the sixteen representatives could not be increased 
and has steadily dwindled : for to say nothing of the extinction 
of peerages by failure of heirs, many Scottish peers have been 
promoted to peerages of Great Britain, and when this happens 
the peer so promoted having himself  a hereditary seat in the 
House of  Lords is no longer eligible to serve as a representa- 
tive of  the Scottish peerage.  Such promotions  have become 
so frequent that the day seems coming when there will  be no 
more than sixteen peers of  Scotland and they will be able to 
elect  themselves.  I  believe that there are now  only about 
thirty-two peers  of  Scotland who  are peers of  Scotland  and 
no moreP. 
On the union with Ireland a plan in some respects similar, 
in  others dissimilar, was adopted.  The Irish  peerage was to 
be represented  in the House by twenty-eight  representatives, 
elected  however for life.  It was provided that one new Irish 
peerage might be created whenever three Irish peerages  had 
become extinct until the number was reduced  to a hundred, 
and that then it might be kept up at that figure.  Sir William 
See Pike,  Constitutzonal Histovy of  Uc  House  of lords, pp.  360,  368. 
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Anson1 says that  it  was  provided  that  the number  should 
never fall below  a hundred, but that  seems to me a distinct 
mistake (39 and 40 Geo. 111, c. 67, art 4, 'it shall and may be 
lawful ').  The king therefore since the Act of  Union has had, 
and he still has, a certain limited power of creating Irish peers ; 
the other peers that he creates are peers of  the United King- 
dom with hereditary right to be summoned to parliament. 
An Irish peer who is not a representative  peer  is  capable 
of being elected a member of the House of Commons for any 
place  in  Great  Britain, but  not  in  Ireland;  while he  has  a 
seat in the House of  Commons he is treated for many purposes 
as a commoner; he has no right to be tried by the peers; the 
other  Irish  peers  whether  representative  peers  or  no  have 
such a right.  On the other hand a Scottish peer, even though 
he is not a representative  peer, is  disqualified from sitting in 
the House of  Commons. 
In  1876 a  new  class  of  peers was  created, namely Lords 
of Appeal  in  Ordinary.  By the Appellate Jurisdiction  Act 
of that year (39 and  40 Vic. c.  59)  power was  given to the 
queen  to appoint at once two  Lords of Appeal in  Ordinary, 
and on  the happening of certain events the number might be 
raised  first  to three  and  then  to four;  there  are now  four. 
The persons  to be appointed were to have  certain  qualifica- 
tions prescribed  by the act, namely to have held certain high 
judicial  offices or been  barristers  or  advocates  for  a  certain 
number of  years ; they are paid salaries ; and it is their duty 
to take part in the judicial proceedings of the House of  Lords. 
Under  the  act of  1876 they hold  their  offices  during good 
behaviour, but are to be removable upon an address presented 
by both Houses of  parliament.  Their dignity was not to be 
inheritable ; but so long as they held  office they were for all 
purposes to be peers of  the realm and members of  the House 
of Lords, capable of sitting, debating and voting as well when 
the House was acting as a legislative assembly as when it was 
acting as a court of law.  Much stress was laid upon  the fact 
that they were  not  to be  life peers, but official peers ; their 
position  was  compared  to that of  the bishops.  However  a 
few  years  afterwards one of  the lords first appointed, Lord 
Law and Czisfom of  the Corzstz'fution, Parliamenf, 3rd ed. p.  197. 
Lords  of  Appeal 
Blackburn,  resigned  his  office.  Under the act  of  1876 he 
would  thereupon have ceased to be  a peer, but  by an act of 
1887 (50 and  5 I  Vic. c. 70) it  was  decreed  that the Lord of 
Appeal  in Ordinary might continue a  member of  the House 
of  Lords during the remainder of  his life, notwithstanding a 
resignation  of  his  office.  Thus in  fact  these  peerages  have 
become rather life peerages than official peerages. 
As to the causes which may disqualify a man from sitting 
and voting  in  the House of  Lords  I may refer  you  to what 
Sir William  Anson  says about alienage, bankruptcy, infancy, 
felony, and a sentence of the House1.  We ought of course to 
distinguish a disqualification from sitting and voting from a 
forfeiture  of  the  peerage.  Down  to  modern  times  it  was 
possible  that  a  peerage  might  become  extinct  for  good 
and all  owing to the commission of  a  treason  or  a  felony. 
Owing  to successive mitigations  of  the law  beginning with 
an act of  1814  (54 Geo. 111, c. 145), it is now-a-days, I think, 
practically impossible that a  peerage should  become extinct 
in  this  manner; but  I  am not  sure that it is absolutely im- 
possible.  Suppose a:  peer  committed  treason  or  felony and 
was  outlawed  for it, the peerage would, I think, be forfeited ; 
but in practice the process of outlawry has become obsolete. 
I I I.  The House  of  Co?nmons. 
Now as regards the members of this House we have to ask 
how many there are, by whom  they are elected, who may be 
elected, how they are elected. 
(I)  We have watched  the fluctuations of  numbers in the 
English parliament  down to the end of  William  111's  reign : 
we  left  them  at 513.  On the  union with  Scotland in  1707, 
45  Scottish members  were  admitted  into the parliament  of 
Great Britain.  On the union with  Ireland  in  1801, 100 Irish 
members  were  admitted  into  the parliament  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  Thus the number became 658.  The new Reform 
Acts have made but little difference in  the total  number  of 
members or their allotment among the three kingdoms.  There 
are now  670,  495  for  England  (in  which  I  always  include 
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Wales),  72  for  Scotland  and  103 for  Ireland ; the greatest 
change is that the number  given  to Scotland  has risen from 
45 to 72. 
(2)  The history and the present state of  the law touching 
the qualification of  voters in  counties and boroughs is a com- 
plicated  matter if one attempts to study it at all thoroughly. 
I strongly recommend to you Sir William Anson's chapter on 
the subject, which seems to me a very good elementary state- 
ment].  There is also an  article on the recent act, the act of 
1884, by Sir William Anson  in  the first number of  the Lnzw 
Quarterly Review, which, I think, will be of  assistance to you 
in  unravelling a  tangled  skein.  I  intend  to speak  at some 
length  of  this  matter, and  I  shall  not  follow  Sir  William 
Anson's  treatment,  not  because  it  is  not  good-perhaps  it 
is  the best  possible-but  because  it  would  be  idle  for  me 
to repeat what  is  in  a  book  which  is, or should  be, in  your 
hands,  and  because  it  is  desirable  that  we  should  look  at 
every point of  the law from several different points of view. 
The intricacy of the law is due to the fact that, after having 
remained  almost  unaltered  for a period  of  four centuries, it 
has  three  times  during  the  last  sixty years  been  radically 
reformed.  I  refer,  of  course,  to  the  Reform  Act  of  1832 
and the Representation of the People Acts of 1867 and 1884. 
The changes  made by these acts have been  very  great, but 
the law as a whole has never  been  codified or restated ;  one 
has  still  to consider  the law  as  it  stood  before  these  acts 
and to see exactly in what  respects it has been modified  by 
them, also to see how the earlier acts have been  patched  and 
tinkered by the later. 
One more word of preface.  You will find that all through 
our  history  the  qualification  of  the  voter  has  depended 
in  some manner  or another  on  his  relation  to what, loosely 
speaking, we  may call  real  property (some land or tenement, 
or again, some dwelling-house) situated within  the county or 
borough.  Now we  have to consider what sort of  a tenement 
will  do, whether  a  dwelling-house  is  necessary,  whether  a 
warehouse  in  which  nobody sleeps  is sufficient, whether  land 
without  buildings  is  enough  (again, whether  an  incorporeal 
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hereditament such  as tithes or a freehold  office will  give the 
vote),  and  also  what  must  be  the  value  of  the  tenement, 
whether 40 shillings or £12  or £50,  and how the value is to be 
measured, is  it measured  by rental, or is it measured  by the 
assessment to poor  rates? but  (and to this I draw attention) 
we  must  also consider what  is the requisite relation  between 
the voter  and  the tenement.  Different relations have  been 
required  at different  times, by different  statutes, for different 
purposes.  Sometimes the relation  is  proprietary,  the voter 
must  have an  estate or  interest  of  a  particular  kind  in  the 
tenement: a  freehold  estate  may  be  necessary,  or  again  a 
copyhold estate may be enough, or a leasehold interest.  And 
again, lines  have been drawn between various estates of  free- 
hold.  Sometimes again, proprietary right is not enough, there 
must  also be possession : it will  not, for example, suffice that 
you are entitled to a rent-charge, it  is required that you be in 
possession  of  it.  Or  again,  the  statute may  insist  not  on 
proprietary  right but  upon  occupation, and occupation  again 
is  an  idea  which  has  required  a  great  deal of  definition  at 
the hands of  the courts.  Does a servant occupy his  master's 
house which has been  left in  his sole charge while his master 
lives  elsewhere?  Does  an  undergraduate, does  a  fellow  of 
a college  occupy what we  call '  his' rooms  in  college, or are 
they  occupied  by  the  college, by  the  corporation?  Again, 
the statutes sometimes insist  on  something  more than occu- 
pation : the voter must be an inhabitant occupier, and I  may 
occupy a house  that I do not  inhabit.  In reading  the acts, 
then, one must  carefully observe how  they describe the rela- 
tion  between  the man  and the thing, whether  they  call  for 
proprietary  right, or for possession, or  for  the two  together, 
or  for  occupation  or  for  residence.  Lastly,  some  of  the 
statutes  have  made the  payment  of  rates  an  essential  part 
of  some  of  the qualifications,  and this  has  been  done  in  a 
perplexing way. 
Now the county and borough franchises have always been, 
and still are, distinct things depending on different rules.  The 
last statute, that of  1884,  has introduced much more uniformity 
than there formerly was.  Still, however, one cannot speak of 
them  in  the same breath ;  a qualification which would  serve Constitz.ctional History 
for  a  county  will  not  always  serve  for  a  borough,  nor  vice 
versa.  However, in  the historical  sketch that  I  am now  to 
begin I shall treat them  together, (that is to say) the sketch 
will naturally fall into four periods : (a)  before 1832, (b) before 
1867, (c)  before  1884, (d) after  1884, and  in  each  period  I 
shall  speak  first  of  the county, then  of  the borough  fran- 
chise.  The  history  of  the  Scottish  and  Irish  franchises 
differs  in  many  details  from  that  of  the  English,  though 
on  the  whole  it  has  followed  the same  general  course.  I 
fear  that  here  we  can  say  no  more  of  it.  As  regards  the 
English  counties  we  must  go  back  to  the  act  of  1430 
(8 Hen. VI, c. 7) : the knights  of the shire are to be chosen 
in  every county by people  dwelling and resident in the same 
counties  whereof every one of  them  shall have  free land or 
tenement to the value of  40 shillings by the year at the least 
above  all  charges.  An  act  of  1432-10  Hen.  VI, c.  2- 
explained  that the freehold was  to be within the county for 
which the election was to be made.  It may be doubted whether 
the object of  these measures was to exclude from the election 
any large class of  persons  who had  habitually taken part in 
them;  but  the  result  was  to  establish  a  qualification  by 
property,  and  one  which  at  first  was  fairly  high,  though, 
owing  to  the  change  in  the  value  of  money,  it  became 
very  low.  You  will  observe  that  the  act of  1430 required 
of  the  voter  not  only  freehold,  but  also  residence  within 
the county.  This requirement  however-I  do not  exactly 
know  how  or when-fell  into oblivion, and was swept away 
as long  obsolete  by  a  statute of  1774 (14 Geo.  111,  c.  58). 
At the same time a still  older  requirement  that the elected 
knights  and  burgesses  should  be  resident  in  their  counties 
and boroughs, a requirement as old as 1413  (I Hen. V, c.  I), 
was  abolished:  this  also  had  long  been  disregarded.  The 
qualification for county electors thus came to be definitely a 
qualification by property, the having free land or tenement, the 
having freehold to the value of 40 shillings.  Observe that any 
freehold estate of the requisite value would give the franchise, 
even  an estate for life or pur  autre vie.  In 1832 the main 
objection to the county qualification was  not that it was  too 
high, but that it was  extremely  capricious ; a leaseholder or 
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copyholder, no matter how valuable his interest, had no vote ; 
on the other hand, a  rent-charge of  40 shillings for  life was 
enough ; votes have been claimed in respect of  freehold pews, 
and, it is said, in respect of  freehold graves.  This, of  course, 
made the manufacture of qualifications an easy matter.  Several 
statutes of  the last century attempted  to guard  against this 
abuse.  In particular an act of  1745 (I  8 Geo. 11, c. 18, sec. 5) 
required  that the voter should  be in  actual  possession or  in 
receipt  of  rents  and  profits of  his freehold estate for  twelve 
months, unless that estate came to him by descent, marriage, 
marriage  settlement, devise  or  promotion  to  a  benefice  or 
office.  The idea was this: that if  you  acquire title by  such 
means  as these, it  is  needless  to insist  on possessiotz,; if,  on 
the other hand, you  acquire it  by sale or by gift  i~zter  vivos, 
there is  danger of  an  attempt to manufacture votes, and so 
a certain  length of  possession is required  in  order to prove 
the good  faith  of  the transaction. 
You  should  further understand  that until 1832 no list  of 
voters  was  prepared  beforehand.  Since the Reform Act the 
qualifications  by  property,  occupation  and  so forth  are not 
strictly speaking  qualifications  entitling  one  to  vote-they 
are qualifications  entitling one to be  placed  on the register 
of  electors, and the only qualification that (in  strictness) en- 
titles one to vote is the fact that one is a registered elector. 
Until 1832 the would-be voter appeared  at the poll, tendered 
his  vote,  and  then  and  there  swore  an  oath  prescribed  by 
statute to the effect that he had the requisite qualification- 
that he  had  freehold, was  in  possession  and so forth.  The 
procedure now is quite different-no  one can vote who is not 
on the register  of  voters, and on the other hand the register 
is  for  many  purposes,  though  not  for  all  purposes,  con- 
clusive  that  the persons  whose names are there are entitled 
to vote. 
As to the boroughs, before the act of  1832 the requisite 
qualification varied  from  borough  to borough-there  was  no 
general  law, statutes had  hardly  meddled  with  the matter, 
each borough had  its own history, and the matter was settled 
for it either by the terms of  its charter, or by ancient usage. 
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seem to me so extremely good that if  I went over the same 
ground  I  could  only paraphrase  them1.  The qualifications 
though they were very various fell  into several great classes. 
First there was tenure.  A few  towns which  by charter had 
been  made counties of  themselves  had  adopted  the county 
qualification.  There  are,  I  believe,  now  seventeen  towns 
(besides London) which are counties of themselves, or counties 
corporatea.  In some of these the county qualification was ad- 
opted-namely,  forty-shilling freehold.  In some other towns 
burgage  tenure  gave  the franchise.  Rurgage was a  variety 
of  socage found  in  some ancient boroughs, important  in  the 
Middle Ages, for the burgage tenement was generally devisable 
by custom long before freeholds in general were made devisable 
by statute.  Residence, qualified  in  this way or in  that, con- 
stituted a second head.  I believe that if there was no charter 
and no usage to the contrary, the right was considered to be 
vested in 'the inhabitant householders,' and so if  any qualifica- 
tion can  be spoken  of  as the common  law qualification, it is 
this.  Very often indeed the right might be exercised by those 
who paid scot and lot, or to be more exact, who paid scot and 
bore lot.  This phrase refers to a participation in the ancient 
local burdens-'  scot '  refers to the money payments ; '  lot ' to 
work done in person-men  were compellable, for instance, to 
fill municipal offices: to be mayors, aldermen, constables, and 
so forth-those  liable  to burdens of  this sort bore  lot.  In 
modern times liability to poor  rate was taken as the general 
test-the  person who was  rated  was deemed to pay scot and 
lot.  Sometimes the right was vested in those who by a queer 
mistake came to be  called  potwallers, or even  potwallopers; 
the mistake arose from reading  an old  fashioned W as a B- 
the  word  is  really  potboilers.  Here  the  constitution  was 
democratic indeed : even householding was unnecessary ; the 
sole dominion of  a single room  having a  fire-place in it was 
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enough.  In a third great class of  boroughs the persons en- 
titled  to vote were the freemen, that is, the members of  the 
municipal  corporation  which  had  been  created  by  charter; 
freedom of  the borough, membership of  the corporation, was 
acquired in many ways ;  some were born free, others obtained 
freedom  by  marriage, or by  really  or nominally serving  as 
apprentices of some freeman in his craft or trade; the freedom 
of  the borough  might in  some  places  be given  or sold.  In 
London, membership  of  one  of  the trading companies,  the 
livery companies, became necessary.  Lastly there were what 
were often known  as the close boroughs ; in these the right 
to vote was restricted  by royal charter to the governing body 
of  the borough-often  a small  knot of  aldermen who elected 
their own successors.  Such charters were the outcome of the 
efforts on the part of Tudors and Stuarts to obtain more man- 
ageable parliaments-not  too successful, for these boroughs 
often  fell  under  the influence of  the great landowners  and 
became pocket boroughs. 
Such, put  briefly, was the state of  things before the first 
Reform Act.  Now as to the English counties, that act altered 
the old and introduced several new qualifications. Theold quali- 
fication was the forty-shilling freehold.  As to this, it required 
that the person claiming to be registered  should either (I)  be 
in  actual occupation  of  the tenement in respect of which  he 
based his claim, or (2) have an  estate of  inheritance in it, or 
(3) should have acquired his estate by marriage, marriage settle- 
ment, devise or promotion, or (4) should have an estate worth 
£10  a year.  To  put the matter another way, it deprived of the 
franchise freeholders whose freeholds were worth 40 shillings 
but  less than LIO, if  their freeholds were (a)  not estates of 
inheritance, (b)  not acquired by marriage, marriage settlement, 
etc., and (c) not in their own actual occupation.  But of  course 
the more important change was that the act invented several 
quite new qualifications.  It entitled to the vote (I) any person 
seised  at law or in  equity of  any land  or tenement of  copy- 
hold  tenure, or any tenure other than freehold for life or for 
any greater estate of the clear yearly value of £10  or upwards; 
(2) any person  entitled as lessee or assignee to any lands or 
tenements for a term of years originally created for a period Constitu  f  ionn  Z History  Mzmicz2a  Z Re  form 
of  60 years or more of the clear yearly value of £10;  (3) any 
person entitled as lessee or assignee to any lands or tenements 
for a term of  years originally created for a period  of  not less 
than  20  years  of  the clear  yearly  value  of  £50;  (4) every 
person  who  occupies  as tenant  any lands or tenements  for 
which  he shall be  liable  to a  rent  of  not  less  than  £50. 
Thenceforwards  then  the  classes  of  voters  were  (a)  the 
forty-shilling  freeholders,  but  as we  have  already  seen  the 
forty-shilling  freehold  would  not  in  all  circumstances  give 
the vote: £10 was required  in certain circumstances of  those 
whose  estates were but  for  life;  (p)  the £10  copyholders; 
(y) the £10  long leaseholders ; (6) the £50  short leaseholders; 
(6) the £50  occupiers.  An occupation franchise was  a  quite 
new thing in the counties ; the person occupying a tenement 
at a  rent  of  &so was to have the vote  no  matter  what  the 
character of  his tenancy.  Observe also that in this case the 
amount of  rent  payable was  made the important  thing-he 
was to be liable for a yearly rent of  not less than £50. 
As to the boroughs the act greatly simplified  the compli- 
cated state of affairs which was then in existence.  It  introduced 
one  uniform  qualificatiotl into boroughs:  the claimant must 
occupy  as owner  or tenant  any house, warehouse, counting- 
house,  shop, or  other buil'ding  of  the clear yearly value  of 
LIO,  he must occupy for twelve months next before the fixed 
day, he must (if  a poor rate has been made) have been rated 
and have paid his rates, and he must have resided for the last 
six months within  the borough  or within  seven miles of  it; 
note the difference between residence and occupation.  From 
1832 to 1867 this was the uniform qualification in all boroughs, 
generally spoken of  as the £10 occupation franchise.  As to 
the old  qualifications, which  I  may remind  you  varied  from 
borough  to  borough,  the  act  in  a  general  way  saved  the 
existing rights of persons  who were entitled to vote but im- 
posed  upon  them certain  restrictions.  This saving we  need 
not consider for its force must now  be  spent.  But, and this 
is more important, it saved ~ermanently  certain qualifications 
as regards boroughs in which those qualifications  already ex- 
isted.  These, I may say once for all, are still saved, though 
owing to more recent extensions of  the franchise they are no 
longer of much moment.  The qualifications saved were these : 
(I) the qualification of freeholding or burgage holding in those 
towns being counties of themselves in which such qualification 
already existed ; (2) the qualification  by being  a freeman, or 
by being  a  burgess, or by being  a  freeman  or liveryman  in 
those boroughs in which these qualifications already existed. 
Rut the qualification  by  being  a freeman of  the borough, or 
a burgess of  the borough, that is by being a  member of  the 
municipal corporation  according to its then  constitution, was 
put under restrictions ; residence in  or within seven  miles of 
the borough was required,  and for the future freedom of  the 
borough was  not to confer a title to a vote  unless  acquired 
either by birth or by servitude.  In some boroughs therefore 
one still meets with persons who are entitled to be registered 
as freemen. 
For the boroughs  then  the  Reform  Act introduced  one 
uniform  qualification ; some other qualifications  it preserved 
where  it found  them, but only where  it found them, and that 
in a very modified form. 
Parenthetically  we  may  notice  that  the  Parliamentary 
Reform  of  1832  was  followed  almost  immediately  by  the 
Municipal  Reform  of  1835.  Practically and with  the excep- 
tion of  London the municipal constitution of all the boroughs 
was  remodelled  on  one  uniform  plan.  Every  person  who 
occupies  a  house, warehouse,  shop, or other building  in  the 
borough for which he pays poor rates, and who resides within 
seven miles of the borough, is entitled to be enrolled as a bur- 
gess, a member of the corporation;  the municipal corporation 
consists  of  the burgesses thus enrolled.  Before the act the  , 
members of the corporation, the freemen as they were called, 
were  often  very  few.  In  Plymouth,  where  the population 
was  75,000, the number of freemen was 437 and I45 of them 
were non-resident.  In Ipswich less than two per cent. of  the 
inhabitants enjoyed corporate privileges, and of  that two per 
cent.  a  large  number  were  paupers.  I  have  said  that  the 
qualification  by  freemanship  has  been  to  some  extent  re- 
tained;  but  you  shoulu  understand  that  the  man  who  is 
burgess of  a borough under the Municipal  Corporations Acts 
has not  as such any right to a vote.  It is probable now-a- Constit~tio?zaZ  Hisf  ory  The Second  Refo~m  Act 
days, owing to more recent  extensions of  the parliamentary 
franchise, that the burgess will  have a vote  for the borough 
if  indeed  the  borough  returns  a  member.  But  this  is  not 
necessarily  the  case.  A  municipal  borough  is  not  as  such 
entitled  to  be  represented, many  municipal  boroughs  have 
now no members of their own ; again, the geographical limits 
of  what  is  called  the  parliamentary  borough  may  well  be 
different  from  those  of  the  municipal  borough,  and  again, 
though these limits coincide, yet a burgess may have no vote 
in  a parliamentary  election, while one who is no burgess may 
have  a vote;  the lodger for instance  has now  a vote, but  is 
not  entitled  to be  enrolled  as  a  burgess.  The two  things 
must  be  kept  distinct.  The main  right  of  the  burgess  as 
such is that of  voting in the election of  town councillors who 
manage the affairs of the borough. 
We  come  to the act of  1867.  As to the  counties this 
did  in the main two things.  (I) You  will  remember that in 
several  cases  the  act  of  1832  required  that the  qualifying 
tenement should be of the yearly value of £10 ; this was the 
case  as to estates for life except in  certain circumstances, as 
to copyhold  estates, and  as to long leaseholds, that is, terms 
originally created for 60 years or more.  In all these cases the 
new  act substituted £5  for £10,  thus lowering  the property 
qualifications.  (2)  In the second  place, it lowered the occu- 
pation  qualification,  or speaking more  strictly  it  introduced 
a new occupation qualification ; the person entitled must have 
been  for  the  last  twelve  months  the  occupier  as  owner  or 
tenant of a tenement of  the rateable value of £12,  must have 
been  rated  to  the poor  rate-if  any has  been  made-and 
must have paid his rates.  The then existing qualification by 
occupation consisted, you will remember, in the occupation of 
a tenement at a rent of  £50 ; this was  not swept away ; the 
new  qualification  was  placed  by  its  side,  and  it  is  quite 
possible,  at  least  in  theory, that a  man  should  be  paying 
a rent of £50  for a tenement rated  at less than  £12.  In the 
counties then the act of  1867 lowered some of  the qualifica- 
tions  by property, and it introduced  a  new  qualification  by 
occupation-occupation  of  a  tenement  worth  £12  rateable 
value. 
In the boroughs the changes were yet larger.  Two quite 
new qualifications were introduced beside the occupation quali- 
fication of  1832-what  are generally known as the household 
and the lodger franchises were created.  The former  can be 
claimed  by  a  man  who  has  been  for a year  an  inhabitant 
occu$ier  as owner or tenant of any  dzuell'ilzg-house within  the 
borough, has been  rated  to any poor rate made during that 
period  and has paid  his rates.  The latter can be claimed by 
any man  who  for  a year  has  occupied  as lodger  the same 
lodgings of the clear yearly value of  Are, if  let unfurnished, 
and who has resided during the whole qualifying year.  The 
qualification  in these cases you  observe consists not in  mere 
occupation but in  inhabitance or residence ; one must be the 
inhabitant  occupier  of  the dwelling-house;  one must  reside 
in  the lodgings, and while  the lodgings  must  be worth £10 
a year any dwelling-house will  do.  So large a definition  of 
a dwelling-house has now been given by statute, one so much 
larger than the ordinary meaning of the word, that it is some- 
tinies  very difficult to mark  off the inhabitant  occupier of a 
dwelling-house from the lodger who resides in lodgings. 
The act of  1884, to which we  now come, is a very clumsy 
document.  What it does however, broadly stated, is this :- 
it extends to the counties the £10  occupation  franchise, the 
household  qualification, and  the lodger  qualification  which 
had  been  introduced  into the borough  in  1867.  The house- 
hold qualification, you will remember, is that of the inhabitant 
occupier  of  a  dwelling-house of  any value,  however  small. 
The lodger qualification is that of  a lodger who  occupies and 
resides in lodgings of the value of £10.  But both for counties 
and for boroughs the household  qualification  is extended or, 
if  you  please, a new qualification is  created  by  a provision as 
to servants.  If  a  man  (A) himself  inhabits  any dwelling- 
house  by  virtue  of  any office,  service  or  enlployment, and 
the dwelling-house  is not inhabited by any person  (B) under 
whom such man  (A) serves in such office, service or employ- 
ment, he (A) shall be deemed to be an inhabitant occupier of 
such dwelling-house as tenant.  You see for what sort of case 
this  section  provides:  my gardener  who  as such  lives  in  a 
cottage  of  mine,  paying  no rent  but  getting  less  wages  in Co~~stitzctio?dn  Z History  The Thiyd Reform  Act 
consequence, is to have a vote : but for this section he would 
have  had  none;  my  butler  who  lives  in  the  house  that  I 
inhabit will  still have  no vote.  Then again the occupation 
qualification  in  the counties  and  boroughs  was  remodelled. 
The same qualification is to serve for both, namely occupying 
any land  or tenement  of  a clear yearly value of  £10.  This 
lowered the qualification in counties where the requisite value 
had  been £12  rateable value.  It extended the qualification 
in boroughs where up to that time the tenement which would 
give  this  qualification  was  not  any land  or  tenement,  but 
any house, warehouse  or other building.  It thus  made the 
occupation qualification  much  the  same  in  counties  and in 
boroughs;  not  however  quite the same-a  condition  of  re- 
siding in or within seven miles of  the borough is imposed on 
the borough voter, from which the county voter is free. 
Broadly speaking then the result  is  this-there  are three 
qualifications which  prevail  throughout all England, whether 
the place be in  what for this purpose is called  a county, or in 
what  for this purpose is called  a borough;  these are (I)  the 
qualification  of  the inhabitant  occupier  of  a dwelling-house, 
(2)  that of  the occupier  as lodger of lodgings of the value of 
£10, (3) that of  the occupier  of  any land or tenement of  the 
value  of  £10.  Besides  these  we  have  in  the counties  the 
property qualifications-including  the old  forty-shilling free- 
hold  qualification,  which  has  been  subjected  to  certain 
restrictions, the £5  copyhold qualification, and the $50  and £5 
leaseholder qualifications. 
It remains to be noticed that the Reform Acts, especially 
the last, have effected a very great change in the whole scheme 
of  representation.  Nominally  we  can  still  divide  members 
into borough members and county members-and  the distinc- 
tion is still of  some importance, because, as we have just  seen, 
certain  qualifications  still  exist in  what  are called  counties, 
which  will  not serve  for  what  are called  boroughs.  But  in 
truth any talk about counties and boroughs is apt now-a-days 
to be misleading. 
In the first  place,  since  1832 parliamentary organization 
has  been  quite  separate from  municipal  organization.  The 
so-called  borough  member now often sits for a district which 
has  no  municipal  organization.  This  since  1884  is  very 
frequently the case.  The larger towns have been cut up into 
districts, each  of  which  returns  a  member to parliament  for 
itself.  Thus take Liverpool : no  member sits for the rnunici- 
pally organized borough of  Liverpool, a  member  sits for the 
Abercromby division  of  Liverpool, another  for  the Everton 
division, another for the Exchange division, and so forth ; so 
East Manchester has its member, and North-East Manchester, 
and  so  forth.  The counties  again  have  been  cut  up  into 
districts.  Cambridgeshire as a whole has no members, but the 
Chesterton  Division of  Cambridgeshire  has its member, 2nd 
the Newmarket  Division, and the Wisbech Division.  Again, 
often  it  happens  that  the  area  which  returns  members  is 
larger  or smaller  than  the area which  has a municipal  con- 
stitution.  In short  the tendency of  the act of  1884 was  to 
split  up  England  into  electoral  districts,  some  known  as 
divisions  of  counties, some known  as boroughs  or divisions 
of  boroughs, which shall, roughly speaking, have equal popu- 
lations.  This principle was  not rigorously carried  out, some 
respect  was  had  to already existing  arrangements,  but  still 
a large step was  made towards a parcelling out of  England 
into equal  electoral  districts. 
The ancient  idea of the representation of communities, of 
organized bodies of men, bodies which, whether called boroughs 
or counties, constantly act as wholes, and have common rights 
and duties, has thus given way to that of  a representation  of 
numbers, of  unorganized  masses of  men, or of  men who  are 
organized just for the one purpose of  choosing members. 
A list of  the electoral qualifications should be followed by 
a list of the causes of disqualification.  The disqualified classes 
are women, infants, peers (not being Irish peers with seats in 
the House of  Commons), returning officers and persons con- 
cerned in  the election as agents, clerks, messengers or the like, 
aliens, persons of unsound  mind, persons  convicted of treason 
or felony until they have served their terms of  punishment or 
been  pardoned,  and  persons  convicted  of  certain  electoral 
malpractices, persons  in  receipt  of parochial  relief  or other 
alms; the exact extent of  this disqualification  by  receipt  of 
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Until  lately a  good  many  persons  were  disqualified  by 
statute in  consequence of  their employment in  governmental 
posts,  in  particular  revenue  officers  and policemen,  but  the 
disqualification  of revenue  officers was removed  in  1868, and 
that of  policemen  in  1887, and I think that there can now be 
hardly  anyone  disqualified  by  reason  of  his  employment, 
except returning officers and the agents and canvassers, etc., 
of  the candidates.  The clergy seem  to have voted  at least 
ever since  the time when  they ceased  to be  taxed  by  the& 
convocations. 
(3)  As to the qualification of  members  returned.  I will 
take them almost in  Sir William Anson's  order, with the view 
of  making a few additional  remarks.  I  pass by (I)  infancy, 
(2)  insanity,  (3)  want  of  British  nationality,  (4)  peerage, 
(5) clergy; the clergy of  the established churches of England 
and Scotland are excluded, so also the clergy of  the Romish 
church : ministers of  other  religious bodies are not excluded. 
Women  are excluded-Sir  William  Anson  appears to have 
forgotten this, but there can be no doubt that this is common 
law.  The fact that peeresses have never sat in  the House of 
Lords  seems  by itself  conclusive.  I  do  not  think  that  a 
woman  has ever  been  elected  to the  House  of  Commons. 
Bankrupts are disqualified  by statute.  Persons convicted of 
treason or felony and sentenced to death, penal servitude, or 
imprisonment with hard labour, or imprisonment for more than 
a year, are incapable of  sitting until they shall have  suffered 
the punishment  or been  pardoned.  This by statute of  1870, 
but  it  seems  that  common  law  would  exclude  convicted 
traitors and felons.  It remains to speak of religion, office and 
property. 
The history of parliamentary oaths and religious disabilities 
is very intricate, and I am not at all certain that I have got it 
straight.  But it begins  in  1562 with  the statute 5  Eliz., c.  1, 
13, which  required  every member of the House of  Commons 
to take the oath of supremacy-to  swear that the queen is only 
supreme  governor  of  this  realm  as  well  in  spiritual  as  in 
temporal causes, and that no  foreign person  or potentate has 
any authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within  this realm.  In 
1609 an oath of allegiance was  added (7 Jac. I, c. 6), to the 
effect that the king is lawfully king, and that the pope has no 
power to depose  him.  In  1678 (30 Car.  11, stat. 2,  c.  I) to 
these oaths was added a declaration against transubstantiation, 
the invocation  of  saints and the sacrifice of  the mass:  and 
the two oaths and this declaration were required  of  lords as 
well  as  commons.  The  doors  of  both  Houses  were  thus 
effectually closed to members of the Roman church ; some  of 
them  might  be ready to take the two oaths which related  to 
church  government, but  the  declaration  as to  doctrine was 
utterly  incompatible  with  their  most  fundamental  beliefs. 
Immediately after the Revolution the two oaths of  allegiance 
and  supremacy were  altered  in  form,  the  first  was  to  be 
merely  this, ' I  will  be  faithful  and  bear  true allegiance to 
King William and Queen Mary'; the second was 'I do abhor 
as impious and heretical the damnable doctrine and  position 
that powers  excommunicated  by the Pope or any authority 
of  the  see  of Rome  may be  deposed  or  murdered  by  their 
subjects  or  any whatsoever,  and  I  declare  that  no  foreign 
prince  or person  hath  or  ought  to have  any jurisdiction  or 
authority  ecclesiastical  or  spiritual within  this  realm.'  The 
declaration  against  transubstantiation  was  still  maintained. 
An  act  of  1701 added a  third  oath, known  as the oath  of 
'abjuration,' it is  long and of  a more political  character:  the 
swearer  abjures  all  allegiance  to  the  pretended  Prince  of 
Wales, and promises to maintain the royal succession as fixed 
by  the Rill  of  Rights  and the Act of  Settlement, and  this 
he does upon the true faith of  a Christian. 
The persons who were thus excluded were members of  the 
Roman  Church, persons who  objected  to oaths, and persons 
who were not Christians: Quakers we may say, and Jews.  In 
1696 (7 and  8 Will.  111, c.  27)  the oaths of  allegiance and 
supremacy  were  required  of  the  electors as well  as  of  the 
elected ; and the electors had also to take the oath of abjura- 
tion.  In 1696 Quakers were permitted to make an affirmation 
instead of taking an oath.  On the accession of George I, the 
oaths were slightly altered.  Catholics then  could  not  sit in 
either House until  1829, and properly speaking they could not 
vote in  parliamentary elections, but  the business of tendering 
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was  not gone through  unless  the candidates required it, and 
statute (1794, 34 Geo.  111, c. 73) permitted  this omission, so 
I daresay that Catholics did vote.  The Catholic  Relief Act 
of  1829 (10  Geo.  IV, c.  7) substituted  another  oath which 
Catholics could  take-they  had  to swear allegiance, and also 
that the pope had no civil jurisdiction  or authority within this 
realm, and that they would  not subvert the church establish- 
ment  or  exercise  any privilege  to  weaken  the  Protestant 
religion in this kingdom.  The Catholics who would take this 
oath were  thus enabled  to sit in  either  House, and  vote  at 
parliamentary elections : Catholics in holy orders were, however, 
expressly  excluded  from  the  Commons'  House.  In  the 
previous year, 1828, a great measure of  relief had been given 
to all non-conformists, by what  is  generally called the repeal 
of  the  Test  and  Corporation  Acts  (the  Test  Act was  not 
wholly repealed), but this does not concern us, the Protestant 
dissenter had  not been  excluded  from  parliament  nor  from 
voting in  parliamentary elections, but he had  been excluded 
from many offices by a requirement  that he should take the 
sacrament.  This  requirement,  ever  since  1727, had  been 
evaded  by  the  passing  of  annual  bills  indemnifying  those 
office-holders who had failed to take the sacrament.  In 1828 
a  declaration  was  substituted  for  the  sacramental  test,  a 
declaration to the effect that the declarant would  not use his 
privileges  to  the  injury  of  the  established  church.  The 
necessity  of  making  such  declaration  was  removed  in  1868 
(31 and 32 Vic., C.  72).  But to return to parliamentary tests. 
All oaths to be exacted from  an elector  disappeared  in 
1832 under the Reform Act, except an oath as to his identity- 
that he was the person  named on  the register.  In 1858 (21 
and 22 Vic., c. 48) the old oaths of  allegiance, supremacy and 
abjuration were swept away, and a new form devised, to the 
effect that the swearer will  bear true allegiance to the queen, 
and maintain  the succession fixed  by the Act of Settlement, 
and that he declares that no foreign power, prelate or potentate 
has  any jurisdiction  or  authority, ecclesiastical  or spiritual, 
within  the realm.  The special  oath for Roman Catholics, as 
settled in 1829,  was still maintained.  Another act of the same 
year,  1858 (21 and 22 Vic., C.  49), enabled either House to 
dispense, in the case of a Jew presenting himself as a member 
of that House, with the words '  in the true faith of a Christian.' 
This was  a  compromise: for some years past  the House of 
Commons had  been  sending up bills for the relief of Jews to 
the  House of  Lords,  which  rejected  them.  The commons 
admitted Jews; the lords could exclude them.  In 1866 the 
parliamentary oath was simplified (29 Vic., c.  ~g),  it became 
an oath to be faithful to the queen, and to maintain  the royal 
succession  as fixed by the Act of  Settlement ; there were no 
words  about  the  pope,  and  'the  true  faith of  a  Christian' 
disappeared ; Catholics and Jews could take the oath required 
of  other members.  In 1868 the oath was once more simplified, 
it  was  cut  down  to  this, 'I will  be  faithful  and  bear  true 
allegiance to Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, accord- 
ing to law, so help me  God.'  What is  more, failure to take 
the oath does  not vacate the seat, it subjects the member to 
a penalty of A500 every time he votes.  The results, as worked 
out in Bradlaugh's cases, are lucidly explained by Anson1.  In 
1888 (51 and 52 Vic., c. 46) an act was passed which enabled 
any person to substitute for an oath a solemn affirmation, if he 
objects  to  being  sworn,  and  states as  the ground  of  such 
objection,  either that he  has  no religious  belief, or  that  the 
taking of an oath is contrary to his religious belief. 
And now as regards office, the only common law disquali- 
fications seem to have been  those of  the sheriffs (who might 
not sit for their own shires) and the judges of the three common 
law  courts,  and  these  have  been  swallowed  up in  statutory 
disqualifications which  comprise  all  returning  officers, and 
almost all persons who  can  be comprised in the term judges : 
this includes the judges of the  High Court of Justice and the 
Court  of  Appeal,  the  County  Court judges,  and the police 
magistrates.  A  recorder  may not  sit for the town  of  which 
he is  recorder ; a revising barrister may not sit for any place 
comprised within his district.  On the other hand, the unpaid 
magistrates,  the  justices  of  the  peace,  are  not  excluded. 
Judges  are not  excluded  from  the  House  of  Lords-very 
frequently  the  Lord  Chief Justice  is made a  peer. 
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As regards other offices legislation  has  been very compli- 
cated.  As  showing  the  view  taken  by  parliament  at the 
beginning  of  the last century, we  may  start with  the broad 
principle laid  down  in  the Act of  Settlement, that no person 
who has an office or place of  profit  under the crown shall be 
capable  of  serving as a member of  the House of  Commons. 
This rule was  to come into force so soon  as the Hanoverian 
House should  come to the throne.  But  before it could take 
effect  it  was  repealed  in  1705  by a  Statute (4 Anne,  c.  8) 
which in  substance  laid  down  the  rule  which  was  repeated 
in  1707  by  6  Anne,  c.  41, an  act  still  in  force, and  the 
foundation of  all subsequent  legislation.  What it  says is in 
short this, that no person  having any office or place of  profit 
under the crown, created since 25 Oct. 1705, shall be  capable 
of being elected or sitting in the House of Commons; secondly, 
if any member shall accept any office of profit from the crown, 
his election shall be void, and a new writ shall issue as though 
he were dead, provided, nevertheless, that he shall be capable 
of  reelection.  This then  divided offices  into new offices and 
old  offices,  the  holding  of  a  new  office  was  to  be  utterly 
incompatible with  a seat in  the House; not so an old office : 
a person accepting such an office is  to vacate his seat, but be 
capable of  reelection.  Offices are ' new' or 'old,'  according as 
they were or were not created since the 25th  Oct. 1705. 
I need hardly pause to point out how different would have 
been  the history of  parliament, had  the clause in the Act of 
Settlement become a permanent  part of  the law of  the land. 
Our modern  ministerial system would have  been  impossible, 
and the House of  Lords, to which the king would have called 
his ministers, would have become far more important than the 
House of  Commons.  The act of  Anne is  the basis of  much 
intricate  legislation.  Parliament,  in  enabling  the  king  to 
create a new office,-and  owing to the appropriation ofsupplies, 
it has been very difficult for the king to create a new  office 
without  act of  parliament-Parliament  I  say has  generally 
provided  in  express words  into  which  of  three  classes  the 
office shall fall : (a)  shall it be wholly incompatible with a seat 
in the House of  Commons ?  or (b) shall acceptance of it vacate 
a seat, but the holder be eligible for election? or (c) shall it not 
render its holder ineligible, nor even make him vacate his seat 
if he has one?  Out of these miscellaneous statutes one can get 
a rough general rule; but, of course, in every particular case one 
must go to the statute book, must ask whether the office be new 
or old, and whether any express provision has been made about 
it.  The rough general outcome is this, that the holders of  the 
high offices  of  state can  sit in  the House, but  acceptance of 
such an office vacates the seat.  On the other hand the holders 
of subordinate offices  in  the civil service of  the crown are in 
general absolutely disqualified from sitting in the House.  Our 
present  system  demands that the heads of  the great depart- 
ments,  those who  collectively form  the ministry, shall  be  in 
parliament  and answer for the business  of  their departments. 
I say our system demands  this; our  law, of  course, does not 
demand  it; there is  no  law to the effect  that ministers must 
be  in  parliament, and sometimes for a short while a minister 
cannot find a seat, but the business of  the nation could not be 
carried  on  in  the wonted way unless  almost all the ministers 
were in parliament, and if  they could not find seats, they would 
soon  have  to  resign  their  offices.  On  the  other hand  the 
subordinate officers of  the civil  service are excluded  by law, 
and the consequence is that we have a permanent civil service, 
a body of civil servants unidentified with any particular policy- 
were they in  parliament  they might easily fall out with  their 
superiors, and we  should have the whole civil service changing 
with the ministry.  Such is the general outline.  Military and 
naval  officers are not excluded  from the House of Commons. 
As to pensioners and contractors it is needless to speak. 
As to the property qualification.  We have  seen  that  at 
times during theMiddle  Ages attempts were made to secure that 
the so-called knights of the shire should really be knights, or at 
least notable esquires.  This demand, however, seems to have 
become obsolete in  the sixteenth  century, and there  was  no 
property qualification during the seventeenth century.  In 1696 
a bill  for establishing  a qualification  of  real  property passed 
both  Houses ; at the Revolution  the landowners had  become 
the ruling class : but  the king refused  his consent to the bill. 
A  more  successful effort was  made in  1710, when  a statute 
(9 Anne, c.  5) was  passed, establishing that a member must have an estate in land, worth per annum for a county member 
£600,  for a borough  member £300.  This remained law  until 
after  the  Reform  Act; but  in  1838 (I and  2  Vic.,  c.  48)  a 
change was made ;  the qualifying income was still to be of the 
old  amount, but it might  be derived  from personal as well as 
real  property.  In 1858 (21 and  22 Vic., c.  26) the property 
qualification disappears altogether.  The consequence is that 
a  man  may  be  qualified  to sit in  the House of  Commons, 
though he is too poor to have a vote in a parliamentary election. 
(4)  As regards the mode of  electing members, the chief 
point to notice is the passing of the Ballot Act in 1872 (35 and 
36 Vic., c. 33), down to which time elections were open.  The 
Ballot Act was a temporary act passed for but eight years, but it 
has since been  kept alive by annual acts, and I suppose that 
we must regard  it as having become in fact a permanent part 
of the constitution.  The claims of  the ballot had been pressed 
in parliament for some forty years before it was adopted. 
The registration  system was, as already said, introduced 
by the first Reform Act.  No one can vote whose name is not 
on the register, and in  general (but this  does  not seem quite 
true) every one can vote whose name is on  the register.  The 
register  is  annually  revised  by  barristers  appointed  for  the 
purpose by the judges, revising barristers who hear claims and 
objections.  In 1843 (6 and 7 Vic., c.  18) an  appeal from the 
decision of the revising barrister on points of  law was allowed 
to the Court of  Common  Pleas.  The appeal now lies to the 
High Court of Justice, and thence with  its permission  to the 
Court  of  Appeal. 
(5)  The power  of  determining a  disputed  election  is  a 
different matter.  We have seen that in  the days of  James I 
the House of Commons claimed and won this power as one of 
its privileges.  In the eighteenth  century it  was  shamefully 
misused for party purposes.  The question whether a member 
was  duly returned  or no  became  a question of  confidence in 
the  government.  In  I770  the  famous  Grenville  Act  was 
passed which committed this power to a committee of thirteen 
members,  constituted  by  a  process  which  was  some  slight 
security for  impartiality (10 Geo. 111, c.  16).  Some further 
improvements were made in  1839,  but the House showed itself 
very unwilling  to surrender  what  it  regarded  as a privilege. 
At last, however, in  1868, an act was  passed  (31 and 32  Vic., 
c.  125) which made over the matter to the Court of  Common 
Pleas.  The jurisdiction  is now exercised by the High Court 
of Justice.  There are several  different  grounds on  which an 
election return may be questioned.  Thus it may be alleged that 
the majority of lawful votes was not in favour of the candidate 
returned, and in that case it may be questioned whether some 
of  the persons  who  actually voted  were  lawfully entitled  to 
vote.  As regards some matters the register will apparently be 
conclusive, as regards other matters it will not: thus a person's 
vote might be struck off  on the ground that he was an infant 
or  an  alien,  but  not  on the ground  that he  had  no  proper 
qualification  by property, occupation or residence1.  Or again 
the  election  may  be  disputed  on  the  ground  of  bribery. 
The legislation  against  bribery  and other  corrupt  practices 
is  now  very complicated and minute, and is hardly a subject 
for  elementary study.  Bribery  was  a  common  law  offence, 
and an election might be made void  on the score of  bribery 
without  any aid from statute law.  Bribery became common 
after the Restoration.  Legislation against it begins in 1696, 
but  the parliaments of the last century were  never in earnest 
against  bribery,  and  were  extremely jealous  of  any inter- 
ference  on  the part  of  the courts of  law  with  any matters 
connected with parliamentary elections.  Something was done 
in  1762, and something more serious, after the lapse of eighty 
years, in  1841.  Our  modern  law  is  to  be  found  chiefly in 
three acts belonging  respectively  to  1854, 1863 and  1883- 
whether even the last is severe enough remains to be seen. 
The right to wages, four shillings per  diem for the knight 
of  the shire,  two  shillings fbr  the  burgess, has never  been 
expressly abolished-it  was  still  exacted  in  the seventeenth 
century-but  we  may well  doubt whether  the redistribution 
of  seats has  not  tacitly  abolished  it. 
(6)  A member of  the House of  Commons may  cease to 
be a member by death, by a resolution of the House declaring 
him insane, by becoming an alien or a peer, by taking orders, 
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by conviction  for corrupt practices or for certain other crimes 
(we have noticed these disqualifications), by remaining  bank- 
rupt for six months, by acceptance of  office.  A member has 
no power to resign  his  seat.  It is well known, however, that 
this  rule  is  evaded ; the member  who  desires  to  resign  is 
granted  the stewardship of the Chiltern  Hundreds or some 
other nominal office under the crown, and this under the act 
of  Anne vacates his seat.  Possibly the office would be denied 
him if he sought it in order to escape expulsion. 
The House has an undoubted power of expelling a member, 
and the law does not attempt to define the cases  in  which  it 
may be  used.  If  the House voted  the expulsion of A.B. on 
the ground  that he  was  ugly, no court could  give A.B.  any 
relief.  The House's own discretion is the only limit  to this 
power.  Probably  it  would  not  be  exercised  now-a-days, 
unless  the  member  was  charged  with  crime  or with  some 
very gross misbehaviour falling short of  crime, and in general 
the House would wait until  he  had  been tried  and convicted 
by  a  court  of  law.  In  1856  a  member  who  had  been 
indicted  for  fraud  and  who  had  fled  from  the  accusation 
was  expelled. 
During the seventeenth century, when the House expelled 
a member, it often declared him incapable of  being re-elected. 
This of  course was  a considerably greater exercise of  power 
than  mere  expulsion.  In  1769  the  House  expelled  John 
Wilkes  for  a libel.  He was immediately  re-elected  without 
a contest:  then the House resolved that having been expelled 
he was incapable of  sitting during the present parliament, and 
declared the re-election void.  Again he was elected, and again 
the election was declared void.  As the passions of the House 
cooled  it came to the conclusion  that it  had  acted illegally, 
and  in  1782 the resolution  of  1769 was  expunged  from  the 
journals  as  subversive  of  the  rights  of  the whole  body  of 
electors of  this  kingdom.  We may  take it  then  as  certain 
that the House  has no  power  to  declare a  man  ineligible. 
Without being  expelled a  member  may be suspended  from 
sitting  in  the  House for  a  certain  time;  of  late years  this 
power  has been  not  infrequently  exercised. 
The  Triennial Acts 
IV.  Frequency and  Duration  of  ParZiame?zt. 
As regards  the frequency of  parliaments, there is still in 
force one statutory enactment.  There are altogether five acts 
to  be  remembered.  First  there  are  the  two  old  acts  of 
Edward  I11 (1330  and  1362)  about  annual  parliaments. 
These  were  practically  overridden,  though  not  definitely 
repealed  by  the  three  later  acts  that  I  have  to  mention; 
and  just  lately  they  have  been  repealed  as  obsolete;  the 
act of  1362 was  repealed  in  1863, the act  of  1330 in  1881 
(44  and  45  Vic.,  c.  59).  Then  there  is  the  act  of  1641 
(16 Car. I, c.  I), which  provided  that a parliament  should  be 
holden at least in every third year, even though not summoned 
by the king.  This was repealed in  1664 by 16 Car. 11, c.  I, as 
contrary to the king's  just  rights, and  instead  thereof  it  was 
enacted  merely  that the sitting  and holding  of  parliaments 
shall not be intermitted above three years at the most.  This 
again  was  repealed  in  1887 by  50  and  51 Vic.,  c.  59,  as 
unnecessary  on  account  of  the act  of  William  and  Mary, 
which  I  am about to name.  The act of  William  and Mary 
(6 and 7 W. and M., c.  2, 1694), which settled  the duration of 
parliament  at three years, provided  also  that  a  parliament 
shall be holden  once at least  in  every three years; and this 
provision is still in  force, and is the only enactment touching 
the frequency of  parliaments that is in  force, if  we except the 
vague words of  the Bill of  Rights, that parliaments  ought  to 
be held frequently. 
As a matter of fact, however, we know that parliament sits 
every year.  I think that a parliament has sat in  every year 
since the Revolution.  We know also why this is necessary- 
(I) the maintenance of  a standing army is only legalized  for 
a  year  at a  time,  (2) supply  is  only  granted  to the crown 
sufficient for  one year's  expenditure.  In this  case therefore 
practical necessity lays down a rule more stringent than  that 
which stands upon the statute book. 
As to the duration of  parliaments we must note a change. 
The first limit set to the power  of  the crown in this direction 
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rendered that assembly indissoluble without  its own  consent, 
the Triennial Act of  1694  (6 and 7 Will. 111, c. 2), which laid 
down  the rule that no  parliament  should  endure for longer 
than  three years.  The Septennial  Act  of  I715  substituted 
seven for three years.  It has been noticed that this act is an 
excellent illustration of the supremacy of parliament : a parlia- 
ment summoned for three years by its own  act declared that 
it might  sit for  seven years-if  for seven years  why  not  for 
seventy?  Various  schemes  for  shortening the  duration  of 
parliament have from time to time found  favour-some  have 
I 
advocated triennial, others annual parliaments-at  the present 
moment we hear little of  them1. 
The king without breaking the law can  dissolve a parlia- 
ment whenever he pleases.  Any restraints that there  are on 
this power are not legal restraints.  We are not likely  to see 
it  abused.  The king must  have supplies, to get supplies he 
must have a parliament, there can be no good in his dissolving 
a parliament unless he believes that it does not fairly represent 
the wishes of  the nation. 
In  1867 the continuance of  parliament  was  made  inde- 
pendent of the demise of  the crown.  If when the king dies a 
parliament is in existence it will continue in existence just  as 
though nothing had happened, but of dourse may be dissolved 
by  the new king (30 and  31 Vic., c. 102).  The first step in 
this  direction  was  taken  in  1696 (7 and 8 Will. 111, c.  15)- 
parliament was to endure for six months after the king's death, 
unless sooner dissolved by his successor. 
V.  Privileges of  Parliament. 
The privileges of  the two Houses occupy a large space in 
our books of constitutional law and history.  Their importance 
in  the past has  been  great; their  importance in the present 
we  are  apt,  I  think, to overrate.  Let us  briefly  see  what 
they  come  to;  for  a  fuller  account  I  can  refer  you  to 
Sir William  Anson. 
1 The proposal to limit the duration of parliament to five years formed part of 
the  scheme  shadowed  out  by  the  Prime  Minister  on June  a+  1907,  and  was 
embodied in  the  Parliament Act  of  xgr  J. 
(I)  Freedom  of  speech.  Freedom  of  speech  as against 
the crown was, we may say, secured  at the Revolution ; since 
then  there  have  been  no  legal  proceedings  by  the  crown 
against members for words uttered in the House.  During the 
last century, however, the king did occasionally as a matter of 
fact take notice of  opposition to his  wishes, and make things 
unpleasant  for  the opponents  by  depriving  them  of  offices. 
This it was  difficult to prevent, the offices  were held  during 
the king's  good  pleasure,  and he  was  not  bound  to give  a 
reason when he exercised  the legal  power of  dismissal.  We 
are  not  very  likely  to hear  of  any  repetition  of  such  pro- 
ceeding  at the present  day.  At the present  day it may be 
more important  to notice  that this freedom  of  speech holds 
good not only against the crown, but against private individuals 
also.  A member speaking in either House is quite outside the 
law  of  slander.  He may  accuse any person  of the basest 
crimes, may do so knowing that his words are false, and yet 
that person will have no action against him.  Had he uttered 
the words elsewhere he might have had to answer for them in 
a court of law, but for what he says in the House he cannot be 
sued.  In 1837 an attempt to extend this privilege from words 
uttered in the House to words printed by the authority of the 
House gave rise  to the famous case of  Stockdale v. Hansard, 
and to a violent collision between the Commons and the Court 
of  King's Bench.  Messrs Hansard, by order of  the House of 
Commons, printed a report of the inspectors of  prisons, which 
contained some defamatory words about Stockdale.  He sued 
Hansard:  and  he  failed  because  the jury  thought  that  the 
words were true; but Hansard had in the first instance set up  . 
the order of the House as a complete defence, and Denman, C. J., 
and the other judges of the court, held that it was no defence : 
the order of the House of Commons would not justify anyone 
in publishing a libel.  Stockdale brought another action ; the 
House  of  Commons  took  offence, resolved  that  there was  a 
breach of  privilege, and refused to let their printer put  in  any 
defence  but  the order  of the House;  Stockdale obtained  a 
verdict for £600  damages, and the sheriffs of Middlesex levied 
that amount.  Then the House committed the sheriffs  to prison, 
as also  Stockdale and his  solicitor.  The sheriffs obtained  a Coa~stitzttional  History 
writ of  habeas corpus before the King's Bench.  The  serjeant- 
at-arms who  had  them  in  custody  returned  that they  were 
imprisoned  under a warrant of  the Speaker for a contempt of 
the House of  Commons.  Upon this the judges held that they 
had no  power to set the prisoners  free, and so the wretched 
sheriffs remained in prison for doing what the court declared 
was  their  legal  duty.  Thereupon  a  bill  was  introduced  to 
settle this disputed privilege for the future ;  and it passed into 
an  act  which  provides  that no  civil  or  criminal  proceedings 
can be taken in  respect of  any defamatory matter  contained 
in  any paper printed by the order of the House.  This settled 
one  point;  as to the point  raised  by  the committal of  the 
sheriffs we  must  speak  again. 
Of course  the principle  that a  member  speaking in  the 
House  may  speak  ill  with  impunity  does  not  involve  the 
principle that I,  or anyone else, may safely report his speeches. 
However, it has been decided that the editor of  a newspaper 
may publish  fair and honest reports of  what has been said in 
parliament  and cannot  be  sued  for  this,  though  he  reports 
remarks which are untrue and defamatory.  This was decided 
in  1868  in  Wuon v.  Walter (L.R. 4,  Q.B.  73), an  action 
brought  against  the editor of  the Tinzes for reporting some 
words  uttered  by  Lord  Chelmsford  in  the  House of  Lords 
which  accused  the plaintiff  of  falsehood  and malignity. 
We ought here to remember that during the whole of  the 
last  century the  Houses insisted  that no one was  entitled to 
publish reports of  their proceedings, and committed to prison 
those who broke the rule.  This perhaps  we  ought to regard 
as in its origin a measure of  self-protection against the crown ; 
so long as the Houses had  to dread  the action of  the crown, 
they did well to insist that their proceedings should be  secret. 
To this day reports are made on sufferance and published  on 
sufferance.  The House at any time  may order strangers to 
withdraw; the  House  may at any time resolve that its pro- 
ceedings shall not be reported, and commit to prison  as for a 
contempt all those who report them.  However, save in  some 
extraordinary  emergency, we  are  not  likely  now-a-days  to 
find either  of  the  Houses  desiring  to  hide  its  light  under 
a  bushel. 
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(2)  Freedom from arrest is now no very important matter, 
because  this  immunity does  not extend to imprisonment  on 
the charge of an indictable offence, and in  1869 imprisonment 
for debt was abolished.  There are still some cases in  which 
a person may be imprisoned in the course of civil proceedings, 
as for not paying trust monies which he  has been  ordered  to 
pay  by  a  court  of  justice,  and in  these cases  a  member  of 
parliament  would  enjoy  a special  immunity; but  this  is  no 
great matter. 
In the case  of  members  of  the  House  of  Commons  this 
privilege is enjoyed during the session of  parliament, and for 
40  days  before  and  40 days after.  On the  other  hand  a 
peer,  as  I  understand,  enjoys  this  immunity  at  all  times. 
Sir  William  Anson1 seems  to  deny this, and  to confine  the 
privilege  'within the usual  times of  privilege  of  parliament' 
(whatever  that  may  mean),  but  certainly the  old  rule  was 
that 'the person of a peer is for ever sacred and inviolable' (as 
Blackstone  phrases  it), and  I  know  not  how  it  has  been 
altered ; further Irish and  Scottish peers  who  have  no  seats 
in the House of Lords enjoy this privilege:  it is indeed rather 
a privilege of the peerage than a privilege of parliament. 
(3)  The power of punishing for contempt.  First as to the 
extent and nature of the punishment.  The House of  Lords 
has, it seems, power to fine and to imprison, and it can imprison 
for  a specified term  which may endure beyond  the duration 
of  the session.  Thus in  1850, two days before a prorogation, 
it committed two persons to prison for a fortnight.  I  do not 
think that  it  has  of  late exercised  its power  of  imposing a 
fine, but we cannot deny that the power exists.  On the other 
hand it seems that the House of  Commons cannot impose  a 
fine; it  has not  done so  since  1666, and any imprisonment 
that it inflicts comes to an  end  with  the end  of the session. 
Of  the power of  expelling or suspending its own members we 
have already spoken. 
In the second place, for what offences can the House inflict 
this punishment of imprisonment?  Our answer must  be that 
it is the power  of the House to inflict it  in  a quite arbitrary 
Lam a7rd  Czrstom of the Conslitz6fio7z, Parlianrent, 31d ed. p.  226. way.  In the last century it was  established  by decisions of 
the law  courts  that  if  a  prisoner  committed  by  the  House 
obtained a writ  of  habeas  corpus, and the return to the writ 
was that he had been committed for a contempt of the House, 
the  court  would  inquire  no  further  but  would  remand  the 
prisoner  to his  gaol.  Some precedent  for this doctrine was 
to be  found  in  the  fact  that  the superior  courts  have  long 
exercised a power of summarily committing persons  for con- 
tempt, and a commitment made by one of  them could not be 
questioned  in  another;  thus  if  the prisoner  had  been  com- 
mitted for contempt by the Court of Common Pleas, it would 
have been  useless for him  to obtain  a writ  of  habeas corpus 
in  the  King's  Bench:  on  its  appearing  that  he  had  been 
committed  by  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  for  contempt, 
the judges  of  the sister court  would  have refused  to inquire 
whether  any contempt  had  actually been  committed.  Still 
it will strike you that each  House has by this means obtained 
just that power of  arbitrary imprisonment, which was wrested 
from the council of Charles I.  This, however, was established 
by a series of decisions  in  the last century, and is  not now 
to  be  doubted.  Possibly  if  the  House  in  its  warrant  for 
commitment  stated  the  facts  of  the  case  a  court  of  law 
would  consider whether  they constituted  a contempt; but if 
it says merely that A.B. is committed  for contempt, A.B. will 
appeal to the law  courts in vain.  We have seen this in  the 
case  of  the  sheriffs  of  Middlesex:  they had  to  remain  in 
prison, though in the view of  the Court of  King's Bench they 
had  only done what  it was  their  legal duty to do.  Again a 
person so committed would have no action against the officers 
of the House who arrested him. 
Thus it would  seem  that the House has a legal  power to 
turn into a contempt just  what  it pleases, and the same may 
be said of  the superior courts of  law.  Still we  may  inquire 
how  this  power  has  been  actually  exercised:  and  on  the 
whole it  has  of  late been exercised  temperately enough save 
in  some  moment  of  irritation,  such  as that  which  occurred 
when  the House of  Comn~ons  was  at issue  with  the  Court 
of  King's  Bench  over the case of  Stockdale v. Hatzsagd  and 
committed  the sheriffs of  Middlesex. 
Sir Erskine May  divides breaches  of  privilege  into four 
classes:  (I) disobedience to general orders or rules of  either 
House,  (2) disobedience  to  particular orders,  (3) indignities 
offered to the character of proceedings of parliament, (4)assaults 
or insults upon members or reflections upon their character and 
conduct in parliament or interference with officers of the House 
in discharge of  their duties1.  His instances of  the first class 
consist  almost  entirely  of  publications  of  debates at a  time 
when this was  forbidden  by general rules  of  the House.  In 
the  second  place  we  have  the  neglect  of  orders  directing 
persons to come and be examined before the House or before 
a  committee, and breaches  of  other  similar  orders.  In the 
third class we have libellous reflections on  parliament.  The 
last case that he gives is  from  1819,  when  Mr  Hobhouse was 
sent to prison  by  the House of Commons for 'a scandalous 
libel containing matter  calculated  to inflame the people  into 
acts of violence against the legislature and against this House 
in  particular.'  Then  as to  attacks on  individual  members : 
assaults on members on their way to or from the House have 
been  punished,  also  libels  on  members.  In  the  past  this 
power has been liberally used, but the more  modern doctrine 
is that in order to be a contempt of the House the libel must 
be a  libel  on  the  member  in  his  character  of  member:  to 
accuse a member of  having taken a bribe  for his  vote, would 
doubtless be treated as a contempt; on the other hand  if one 
accused a member of bigamy he would probably be left to use 
his  legal  remedy,  an  action  for  slander  or  libel.  Then  to 
obstruct the officers of the  House in  the execution  of  their 
duties, and again  to tamper  with  witnesses who  are to give 
evidence before the House are treated as contempts. 
To a  certain  extent the  House acts according  to  rules; 
precedents  are collected  and  to some  extent respected, but 
too  often  we  see  questions  of  privilege  treated  as  party 
questions, and then the House, whatever it may think of itself, 
becomes  truly contemptible.  That it  has a very dangerous 
power in its hands is obvious. 
I  do  not  think  it  convenient  (though  this  is  sometimes 
done) to treat as matters of  privilege the special  functions  of 
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the two Houses, such e.g. as the special function of the House 
of Commons in relation to money bills or the special function 
of  the House  of  Lords as a  court of  law.  These are  the 
outcome of rules of constitutional law, and stand on a different 
footing from the matters that we have been considering.  The 
same may be said of  the power of  the House of  Commons to  .-. 
decide all matters relating to disputed elections, a power which,  -. 
as we have seen, it has recently made over to the cour,ts of  law. 
VI.  The  Work  of  Parliament. 
We have  now  to  see  what  the work  of  parliament  is. 
Doubtless its most important work is that of making statutes. 
But this is not all that it does.  I leave out of sight for a time 
the judicial power of the House of Lords as a court for the trial 
of peers, and as a court to which appeals can be brought from 
the lower courts ;  also I leave out of  sight the procedure by way 
of impeachment-these  matters are better treated in connexion 
with  the administration  of  justice.  But we  ought to notice 
that the Houses of  parliament  do a great deal of  important 
work without passing statutes or hearing causes  In the first 
place they exercise a constant supervision of  all governmental 
affairs.  The ministers  of  the  king  are  expected  to be  in 
parliament and to answer questions, and the House may be 
asked  tc condemn  their  conduct.  The legal  power  which 
enables the Houses to insist  that ministers shall answer what 
are deemed  to be  proper  questions is in the  last resort  the 
power  of withholding  supplies, or of  refusing to legalize the 
existence of  a  standing army.  Of  course  it is  needless  to 
have  recourse to these powers-their  exercise  would  throw 
the whole  business  of  the  country  out  of  gear-still  there 
those powers are and a ministry could not long exist if  it had 
not the confidence of  the House of  Commons or refused  to 
give such information as the House thought itself entitled to 
have.  Then again  by  means of  committees the Houses now 
exercise what we may call an inquisitorial power.  If anything 
is going wrong in public affairs a committee may be appointed 
to investlgate the matter ; witnesses can be summoned to give 
evidence on  oath, and  if  they  will  not  testify they can  be 
committed for contempt.  All manner of subjects concerning 
the public  have of  late been  investigated  by  parliamentary 
commissions;  thus  information  is  obtained  which  may  be 
used  as a basis for legislation  or for the recommendation of 
administrative  reforms. 
But the chief function of  parliaments is to make statutes. 
We have observed the history of  the legislative  formula; for 
two centuries it has been accurately preserved, '  Be it enacted 
by the king's most excellent majesty by and with  the advice 
and consent of the lords, spiritual and temporal, and commons 
in this present parliament assembled and by the authority of 
the same.'  The essence of  the statute seems  to be the con- 
currence of  the king, the House of  Lords and the House of 
Commons.  Each House we know has a well-settled order of 
business:  thus it requires  that every bill  shall be read  three 
times1.  This procedure  is  in  part  defined  by  the standing 
orders which each House makes  for itself, partly by tradition. 
In its  main  outlines this procedure  is  ancient; thus we can 
trace the three readings to the end of  the Middle Ages, but it 
is not a procedure imposed  by law.  Each House has a very 
large  liberty  of  regulating  its  own  procedure,  and  just  at 
present we constantly see the House of Commons engaged in 
this task.  But not only has each House the power of making 
rules for itself, we must add that a disregard of  its rules will 
not vitiate  the statute.  A court of  law, we  may safely say, 
would  never  go into the question  whether  an  act has been 
passed  in  disregard  of  the usual  formalities.  The furthest 
that it would  go would  be to insist  that the whole act had 
received  the consent  of  king, lords, and commons; it would 
never for example permit the question to be raised whether a 
bill had been read three times-the  rule which requires three 
readings, ancient and punctually  observed  though it may be, 
is no rule of  law.  On the other hand  the assent of  the king 
and the two Houses to the whole act in its ultimate form seems 
essential.  Some delicate questions might arise as to this in 
case the officials  of the House made mistakes.  Suppose a bill 
carried  through  the  House  of  Commons;  the  lords  make 
amendments in it ; it ought then to go back  to the commons 
This principle has been  modified by  the  Parliament  Act  of  1911 (I and 
.I Geo. V, c  13)  wh~ch  provldes that under certain circumstances bills may become 
statutes w~thout  the consent of the House of Lords.  See Appendu. Constitutional History 
in order that they may consider  whether  they will  assent to 
the bill thus amended.  But suppose that this step is omitted; 
that the bill is then presented  to the king and that he gives 
his assent  Is this bill a statute? I take it that it is not; but 
the question how far a court of law would  hold  itself bound 
by a statement on the bill that it had received  the assent of 
king and both  Houses, whether  it would permit a litigant to 
dispute this statement, is a somewhat difficult question.  Such 
mistakes have occurred more than once in  the present  reign. 
Thus in 1844 there were two Eastern Counties Railway bills 
in  parliament;  one had  passed  all its stages, the other was 
still pending in  the House of  Lords, when  by  mistake  the 
queen expressed  her consent to the latter instead  of  to the 
former.  The mistake was discovered, and  another act  was 
passed declaring that the bill to which assent had been  given 
should  not  be  deemed  to  have  received  the  royal  assent. 
Other mistakes of a similar kind have been similarly corrected. 
I may explain that a vellum copy preserved  in  the House of 
Lords is the ultimate evidence of  a statute.  Perhaps a court 
of law would allow a litigant to prove that as a matter of  fact 
this document had never  received the consent of  king, lords 
and commons ;  but I am not sure of this. 
For a long time past political  theorists have insisted  on 
the distinction between legislation  and the other functions of 
government, and of course the distinction is important though 
it is not always easy to draw the line with  perfect  accuracy. 
But it seems very necessary to notice that the power of  a statute 
is by no means  confined within  what  a jurist  or a political 
philosopher  would  consider  the domain  of  legislation.  A 
vast  number  of  statutes he would  class  rather  as priz,ilegia 
than as leges; the statute lays down no general rule, but deals 
only with  a  particular  case.  This is  particularly noticeable 
in the last century.  The Revolution had, once for all, put an 
end to the ordaining and dispensing powers of  the king, and 
parliament sought to do the work itself by means of  statutes. 
If  we  take  up  any volume  of  eighteenth  century  statutes 
we  find  it very  bulky.  Apparently  parliament  got through 
much more work then than it gets through in our own  day. 
But on inspection we  find that anything that in the strictest 
sense can be called legislation, any alteration of  the general 
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rules of  law, was  much  rarer then than it is in  our own day, 
rarer than  it was  in  the days of  the three  first Edwards.  I 
take up a list of the statutes of  1786.  There are 160 so-called 
public acts, and 60 so-called private acts.  But listen  to the 
titles  of  a  few of  the public  acts : an act for establishing  a 
workhouse at Havering, an act to enable the king to license 
a playhouse at Margate, an act for  erecting a house  of  cor- 
rection  in  Middlesex,  an  act  for  incorporating  the  Clyde 
Marine  Society, an  act for paving  the town  of  Cheltenham, 
an  act  for  widening  the  roads  in  the  borough  of  Bodmin. 
Fully half  of the public  acts are of  this petty local character. 
Then as to the private acts, these deal with particular persons: 
an act for naturalizing Andreas Emmerich, an act for enabling 
Cornelius Salvidge to take the surname of  Tutton, an act for 
rectifying  mistakes  in  the marriage  settlement of Lord  and 
Lady Carnelbrd, an  act to enable the guardians of  William 
Frye to grant leases, an act to dissolve the marriage  between 
Jonathan  Twiss and Francis Dorrill.  Then there are almost 
countless acts for enclosing  this, that and the other common. 
One is inclined  to call the last  century the century of frivi- 
Legin.  It seems  afraid  to rise  to the  dignity of a  general 
proposition ; it will  not say, 'All commons may be  enclosed 
according  to  these  general  rules,'  'All  aliens  may  become 
naturalized  if  they  fulfil  these  or  those  conditions,'  'All 
boroughs  shall  have  these  powers  for widening their roads,' 
'All  marriages  may  be  dissolved  if  the wife's  adultery  be 
proved.'  No, it deals with  this common and that marriage. 
We  may  attribute  this  to jealousy  of  the crown : to  have 
erected  boards of  commissioners  empowered to sanction the 
enclosire of  commons  or the widening of  roads, to have en- 
abled  a  Secretary  of  State to naturalize  aliens, would  have 
been  to increase the  influence  and patronage  of  the crown, 
and considering the events of  the seventeenth century, it was 
but  natural  that  parliament  should  look  with  suspicion  on 
anything that tended  in that direction. 
As time has  gone  on  parliament  has  become much  less 
suspicious  of  the  crown, because  'the  crown'  has  come  to 
mean  a very different  thing  from what  it meant  in  the last 
century.  The change is  a gradual one, but I think we  may 384  Co?~stitutio~znZ  History  PERIOD 
say  that  it  becomes  very  apparent  soon  after  the  Reform 
Act  of  1832.  Parliament begins  to legislate with remarkable 
vigour, to overhaul the whole law of the country-criminal  law, 
property law, the law of  procedure, every department of  the 
law-but  about  the  same  time  it  gives  up  the  attempt to 
govern the country, to  say what commons shall  be  enclosed, 
what roads shall be widened, what boroughs  shall have paid 
constables and so forth.  It begins to lay down general rules 
about these matters  and to entrust their  working  partly  to 
officials, to secretaries of  state, to boards  of  commissioners, 
who for this purpose are endowed with new statutory powers, 
partly to the law courts.  I will  give a few examples of what 
I  mean.  In the last  century the administration of  the poor 
law was  altogether  a  local  affair entrusted  to the parochial 
overseers of  the poor and the county justices.  By the great 
Poor  Law  Reform  Act  of  1834 certain  poor  law  commis- 
sioners were given very large statutory powers of  regulating 
this matter for the whole kingdom.  Later statutes gave them 
ever greater powers.  In 1871 these commissioners gave place 
to the Local  Government Board, which  exercises very great 
powers over local affairs.  A vast number of things that in the 
last centuiy could only have been done for the parish of  Little 
Peddlington  by  a  statute can  now  be  done without statute 
under an order, or with the sanction of the Local Government 
Board.  Then again in  the last century, if  an alien wished to 
become naturalized  he had to go to parliament for a statute. 
In 1844 a  general  statute was  passed  giving  power  to the 
Home Secretary to grant certificates  of  naturalization : thus 
recourse to parliament was rendered unnecessary.  Then again 
in the last  century there  was  no  court which  had  power to 
dissolve a marriage.  The ecclesiastical courts could pronounce 
a divorce, a mensa et thoyo, could  decree, that is  to say, that 
the husband  and wife  need  not live together, but in  order to 
dissolve their union and set them free to marry again, recourse 
to parliament was necessary, and acts dissolving the marriage 
between  X and Y  were by  no  means  uncommon.  In  1857 
however  a  new  Court  for  Divorce  and  Matrimonial Causes 
was created, and was empowered to dissolve marriages when- 
ever certain facts should be proved. 
v  Legislation and  Govern+zze?zt  385 
These are but a few examples of a general tendency which 
has been at work  for the last fifty years, a tendency we  may 
say on the part of parliament  to confine itself  to the work of 
legislation, of  framing general rules of law, and to entrust the 
power of dealing with particular cases to the king's ministers, 
to boards of commissioners, to courts of  law.  Still parliament 
has not  renounced  and, according to our  accepted theory of 
sovereignty, could  not  renounce  the  power  of  dealing  with 
particulars, and  in  certain  cases  it  still habitually exercises 
that power.  The most important instance of this is to be found 
in  the appropriation of  supplies.  When  a supply of  money 
is  granted  to the king, parliament  proceeds  to  appropriate 
that supply with great minuteness, to say, that is, how much 
of it may be spent for this purpose, how much for that.  Thus 
in 1886 it appropriated ~2,902,900  for the payment of seamen 
and marines, £964,400 for their victuals and clothing, £1 1,477 
for the maintenance of  the British  Museum  and the Natural 
History Museum, £2,1m,ooo  for  public  education, £r,ooo  as 
a  gratuity for  the  widow  of  a  certain  distinguished  public 
servant.  Now an  act saying to the queen, 'You  may spend 
£~,ooo  in  giving  a  gratuity to Lady A' is  certainly not  in 
the jurist's  sense a law, it is no  general rule, but this minute 
appropriation of supplies is a most important part of the work 
of every session, and it is effected by statute ; the same formula 
is used as though a general law were being made : it is enacted 
"by the  king's  majesty  with  the  advice  and  consent"  etc. 
Nor must you suppose that this instance, though it is the most 
important, stands alone.  To take another very common case : 
a railway company wants the power to compel landowners to 
sell the land necessary for the construction of its line ; it must 
go to parliament  for a statute.  There is  no general statute 
which empo\vers such companies to force the sale of land, but 
parliament in  each case authorizes this particular company to 
compel  the  sale  of  those  particular  lands.  Parliament  has 
kept this matter in its own hands.  Again it is not very often 
now-a-days that private persons succeed in obtaining or desire 
to obtain  special  acts of parliament dealing with  their  par- 
ticular  cases:  formerly the tenant  of  a  settled  estate  used 
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do without the aid of a statute ; recent legislation as to settled 
estates has made it much  easier to deal  with  settled  estates, 
and private estates acts have become very unusual ; still they 
are sometimes wanted, and are sometimes passed. 
The power of  a statute to descend to particulars receives 
its  most striking and terrible  illustration  in  an act of  pains 
and penalties, an  act  inflicting  punishment  upon  some  par- 
ticular  person  for some particular  act.  We have before this 
spoken of  acts of  attainder1.  The last instance, I  believe, of 
capital  punishment  being thus inflicted  was that of  Sir John 
Fenwick,  who  was  executed  in  1697.  He,  no  doubt,  was 
guilty of  high treason in taking part in  the plot to assassinate 
William 111, but it was impossible to get two witnesses against 
him,  and  as you  remember  two  witnesses  are necessary  in 
case  of  high  treason.  So instead  of  being  tried  in  a  court 
of  law, he  was  attainted  by  act  of  parliament.  Since then 
there  have been  other acts inflicting  punishment,  but  never 
I think the punishment of death; thus Atterbury was banished 
in  I 720.  Now-a-days such acts would  be very properly con- 
demned, but even within  quite recent times individuals have 
been disfranchised by act of  parliament on account of  bribery. 
In  1876 certain  voters  for  the  City  of  Norwich  were  thus 
disfranchised. 
An act then can punish; so also it can absolve from punish- 
ment.  Acts of indemnity are occasionally passed freeing this 
or that person from the penal consequences of what they have 
already done.  Thus a year or two ago it was discovered that 
certain  lords had  sat in  the Upper House without taking the 
oaths, and  had  thereby incurred very heavy money penalties. 
Acts were  passed  absolving them  from the consequences  of 
their  inadvertence2.  A curious little act of  1887 has just  met 
my  eye.  The Duke of  Connaught was  Commander-in-chief 
of  the  Presidency of  Bombay.  Under  a statute of  1793, if 
any  Commander-in-chief  in  India  comes  home  to  Europe, 
he thereby resigns his  office.  The duke wished to be present 
at the  Queen's  Jubilee.  An  act  of  parliament  was  passed 
1  bee above, pp. zr5-16,  319-20. 
2  43 and 44 Vict. Pr~vate  Acts. 
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enabling him to do this without forfeiting his command'.  A 
statute about so trivial a matter is, I think, a good illustration 
of  the supremacy of parliament.  If  it  can  do the greatest 
things, it can  do the least also; if  it can  make general laws 
for a vast  empire, it can  make a particular  exception  out of 
them in favour of a particular individual.  The one thing that 
it cannot do is to prevent its own repeal. 
To what  extent  parliament  actually  and  habitually  ex- 
ercises this vast  power-what  can  be done without an act of 
parliament, for what purposes an act is  necessary-these  are 
questions  which  can  only be  fully  answered  by  stating the 
whole  law  of  England.  For iastance, can  a company  lay a 
tramway through the streers of Cambridge without obtaining 
an act of  parliament, and if  so, can  it use  steam  engines to 
draw its carriages ?  To answer such questions, one must look 
to the statute book  and see what parliament  has said about 
tramways.  Generalizations,  we  shall  find,  are  dangerous 
things ;  we  cannot  describe in  wide  terms  the sort of  acts 
which parliament  passes ; we  must read, and read  patiently, 
the acts that it has passed. 
B.  The ' Crown' aad '  The  Governmeizt.' 
We know however as a  matter of  fact that a great deal 
of  the  utmost  importance  is  done  towards  governing  the 
kingdom that is not done by parliament;  indeed in  common 
talk  we  constantly  make a  contrast between  parliament  on 
the one hand, and what we  call the government on the other. 
What then is this government ?  The answer to this question, 
if it is to be true, must be both long and difficult.  The reason 
is this.  During the last two centuries there has grown up an 
organization which  is  not a legal organization.  Of  course, I 
do not mean that it is an illegal organization ;  rather I should 
prefer  to say that it is an extra-legal organization ; the law 
does  not  condemn  it, but  it  does  not  recognize  it-knows 
nothing about it.  I mean the organization to which we point 
when we  use  such terms as '  the Cabinet,' '  the Ministry,' '  the 
Government,' '  the Prime  Minister,'  '  Mr  Gladstone's second 
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Ministry,' '  Lord Salisbury's administration.'  This certainly is 
a most curious state of things, that the law should not recognize 
what  we  are  apt to  consider an  organ  of  the  state second 
only in importance to the parliament.  The only explanation 
that can  be given  is  a historical  explanation.  We must  go 
back to William 111's time. 
We may start with this.  William I11 as king of  England 
had very great powers.  The revolutionary settlement, in par- 
ticular  the Bill of  Rights, set certain  limits to those powers. 
The king was to be  distinctly below statute ; he was to have 
no power  to suspend  statutes or  to dispense  with  statutes; 
he could not by his prociamations create any new offence ; he 
could not keep a standing army in the realm in time of  peace 
without consent of  parliament ; parliament had  begun to ap- 
propriate supplies ; the military  tenures were gone ; he had 
no powers  of  purveyance  and preemption ; he could  not try 
men by martial law; the judges were no longer to hold office 
during his  good  pleasure ; the courts of  politicians whereby 
the Tudors and two first Stuarts had enforced their will were 
gone;  there  was  no  Star Chamber,  no  High  Commission. 
Still the  king's  legal  powers  were  great:  it  was  a  goodly 
heritage  that was  settled  on  King William.  Indeed, as we 
have seen, there  was  a  plausible  case  for  holding  that the 
Revolution was a restoration, a restoration of  the ancient con- 
stitution as it stood in the days of the Lancastrian kings.  All 
the old  prerogatives  existed save in so far as they had  been 
expressly  abolished  by  statute,  and  they were  wide,  and  it 
was intended that William should  exercise them.  It was no 
honorary president  of  a republic that the nation wanted, but 
a real working, governing  king-a  king with  a  policy-and 
such a king the nation got. 
Then the  king  has  a  council,  a  privy  council;  from  a 
remote time this has been so ; we  can trace back the history 
of this council at least as far as the beginning  of  Henry 111's 
reign.  It has already four or five centuries of definite history 
and is very well  known to the law.  Before this I have tried 
to point out, however, that the const~tution  and the functions 
of the council have always depended to a great degree on the 
will of  the king.  The councillors are councillors  only during 
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the king's  pleasure.  Only during  minorities  or during brief 
revolutionary periods has parliament determined who shall be 
councillors.  And again  no  law compels the king to take or 
even to ask  the advice of  his  councillors.  Great as are the 
powers that the council exercises under the Tudors and the 
Stuarts they are in  law, at least generally, the king's  powers, 
the royal prerogatives-powers  which the king might lawfully 
exercise  himself  were he  capable  of discharging  personally 
the vast business of  government.  A privy councillor as such, 
though the law knows him, has hardly any legal powers. 
We  notice  also  that  the  act  which  abolished  the  Star 
Chamber  weakened  the council;  not  merely did  it  deprive 
the council of almost all its judicial  powers, but  by so doing 
it  rendered  regular  meetings  of  the  council  less  necessary 
to the king.  Charles I1 has a council whom it is needless to 
keep together in  permanent session ; there is now no judicial 
work  for it to do ; while as to the work  of  advising the king 
upon  the  exercise  of  his  prerogatives, no  law  compels  the 
king to seek  th'e advice of  all his  councillors1.  As a matter 
of  fact  Charles does not seek their  advice on  all  occasiotis: 
he  has  business  on  hand which  can  be trusted  to very few, 
and he  trusts  very  few.  Something  like  an  inner  circle  of 
advisers  is  formed  consisting of a  few privy councillors who 
hold  some  of  the  highest  offices  in  the state.  Men  speak 
of  it as the Cabal ; it so happens  that the  initial  letters of 
the names of  its members  make this word : Clifford, Ashley, 
Buckingham, Arlington  and  Lauderdale  The privy  council 
is at this time a large body, consisting of  some fifty members- 
too large a body for united action.  Sir William Temple evolved 
a plan for reforming the council and restoring it to the position 
that it had formerly held, that is to say, the position of  a body 
whom  the king does really consult; but the plan broke down. 
Under William it became obvious that there was a circle of real 
councillors within the wider circle of  nominal co~~ncillors,  and 
this  inner circle gradually acquired the name of  the Cabinet 
Council-the  council  held  in  the king's  own  cabinet.  This 
was  looked on with considerable suspicion by the parliamen- 
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tarians of the time, and one more attempt was made to restore 
the privy  council to its  lost  position.  When  in  1700 it be- 
came necessary to settle the crown on the House of  Hanover, 
it was enacted by the Act of  Settlement, that so soon as that 
house  should  succeed  to the throne 'all  matters  and things 
relating  to  the  well-governing  of  this  kingdom  which  are 
properly  cognizable  in  the  privy  council  by  the  laws  and 
customs  of  this  realm  shall  be  transacted  there,  and  all 
resolutions  taken  thereupon  shall  be  signed  by  such of  the 
privy  council as shall  advise  and  consent  to the same.'  It 
was  feared that a Hanoverian  prince would  be  in  the hands 
of  foreign favourites,  and  it was  desired  that  everyone who 
gave the king counsel should  do so under  his hand, so that 
his  responsibility  for  the advice  might  be  brought  home  to 
him.  What would  have  been  the  effect  of  this  clause  had 
it ever  taken  effect, it  is  hard  to  say; for  it  seems  to say 
no  more than that things which by law ought to come before 
the council ought to come before the council.  My impression 
is  that  whatever  ancient  usage  may  have  required, law  did 
not  require  the king to consult  his  privy  council  about the 
exercise of his prerogatives.  And this became apparent after- 
wards.  However the clause in  question never came into force. 
It was  repealed  in  I705 before  the House of  Hanover came 
to  the  throne.  That  it  would  not  work  had,  I  suppose, 
become  apparent.  During Anne's  reign  men  became  more 
and  more  familiarized  with  the existence  of  a cabinet, and 
the abandonment of  the attempt to exclude placemen  from 
the  House  of  Commons  made  possible  our  modern  system 
of  government. 
A  great deal however  remained  to  be  done before  that 
system would assume the shape which is  familiar  to us ; but 
before we trace the process any further we must turn back to 
consider the position of  those whom I will call the high officers 
of state.  All along there have  been such officers.  It would, 
I  think,  be  interesting  could  we  take  the  history  of  each 
office:  for  this,  of  course,  we  have  not  time;  still  a  few 
things  should  be  remembered.  In  very  ancient  times  the 
chief officers of the king are the officers of  his household : his 
steward, his  butler, his  chamberlain, his  marshal  or the like. 
The Great O$ices  of State 
Their activity spreads outwards from the household  over the 
kingdom, and the greatest men of  the kingdom  are proud to 
hold  offices  which  in  their  origin  we  may  call  menial.  In 
the  German  Empire  the Count  Palatine  of  the  Rhine  was 
steward,  the  Duke  of  Saxony  was  marshal,  the  King  of 
Bohemia cup-bearer, the Margrave of Brandenburg chamber- 
lain.  Soon after the Norman  Conquest we  see similar high 
officers  in  England,  and  their  offices  are  hereditary.  The 
high  stewardship is hereditary in the House of  Leicester, the 
office of  constable  in  the descendants of  Miles of  Hereford, 
and that of  chamberlain in the family of Vere and the butler- 
ship in that of Albinil.  But in England owing to the strength 
of  the Norman  kingship, we  may state as a general rule that 
an  office  which  becomes  hereditary  becomes  politically  un- 
important: it becomes an office of show and ceremony.  Two 
of  the most ancient offices still exist : the Earl of  Norfolk is 
Marshal  of  England,  the office  of  Lord  Great  Chamberlain 
is  held  jointly  by  Lady  Willoughby  dlEresby  and  Lord 
Carrington.  The offices  of  Lord  High  Steward  and  Lord 
High  Constable  fell  into  the  king on the accession  of  the 
House of  Lancaster.  Since that time these offices have not 
been  granted out as hereditary offices.  They are,  I  believe, 
granted for the purpose of  coronations and similar pageants, 
and  when  a peer  is to be tried by his  peers  a high steward 
must be appointed for the occasion-a  fact that may remind 
us  that  the king's  steward  would  very  naturally have been 
the president  of  the king's  court just  as the lord's  steward 
presided  in  the court  of  the manor.  These great offices  of 
the first rank, however, have  long  been  so purely  honorary 
that  we  find  a  reduplication  of  offices;  even  the household 
work  which would  naturally be  done by these officers is done 
by another set of  officers.  Thus besides the hereditary Lord 
Great  Chamberlain  who  does  nothing  and is  paid  nothing, 
there  is  a  Lord  High  Chamberlain,  who  has  duties  in  the 
king's  household  and is paid a salary.  Beside the hereditary 
Earl-Marshal, there is a non-hereditary Master of  the  Horse, 
So again  there  is a Lor2 Steward of  the Household  whose 
office is not hereditary, and who receives a salary. 
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But it is  not these officers of the oldest and highest rank 
who acquire governmental functions.  Another group of officials 
collects  round  the  Norman  king, and  their  offices  are not 
hereditary.  Foremost  among them  is  the justiciar, capitalis 
jzbstitiarius  AtzgZiae.  His office comes to an end before  the 
death  of  Henry  111,  and  its  extinction  leaves  as the  two 
chief  officers of the realm the Lord Chancellor and the Lord 
High  Treasurer.  Throughout  the  later  Middle  Ages, the 
Chancellor  and  Treasurer  are  the  king's  right-hand  men. 
Other offices grow up.  Under the Tudors a Lord President of 
the Council is sometimes appointed, and under the Stuarts this 
office  becomes  more permanent.  Then, as we  have  already 
seen, confidential clerks begin to intervene between the king 
and his chancellor.  There is  the Lord Keeper of  the Privy 
Seal,  who  already  in  Henry  VIII's  reign  ranks  next  to 
the  Chancellor,  Treasurer,  and  Lord  President.  Then  the 
king's  secretary  intervenes  between  the king  and his  privy 
seal, and  in  1601 he  becomes  'our  principal  secretary  of 
estate.'  The growth of  the Court  of  Chancery  has an im- 
portant influence on the distribution of offices;  the Chancellor 
with his increasing burden of judicial duties cannot be always 
at the king's  side.  Sometimes there  are two  Secretaries of 
State (Henry VIII appoints a  second  in  1539)~  sometimes 
even three;  under  Charles I  it becomes  the regular rule  to 
have two, until 1708, when, on the occasion of the union with 
Scotland, the number was increased to three.  There are now, 
as we  shall  see hereafter, five.  On  a  somewhat  lower  level 
stood the Chancellor of the Exchequer, also the Lord  High 
Admiral. 
Occasionally  we  find  that some of  these  offices  are put 
into  commission;  thus  instead  of  a  Lord  Chancellor,  the 
great seal is  entrusted to commissioners.  At the beginning 
of George  1's  reign  the  office  of  Lord  High  Treasurer was 
put into commission, and it has remained in commission ever 
since.  It  is  executed by certain persons who are collectively 
Lords Cornmissioners for executing the office of the Lord High 
Treasurer, or as they are generally called  the Lords of  the 
Treasury;  the one who  is  first named  in  the patent of  ap- 
pointment is the First Lord of the Treasury.  So  also or, the 
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accession  of  William  111,  the office  of  Lord  High Admiral 
!"as  put in  commission ; it was  revived  for  a short while  in 
Anne's  reign.  Her husband, George of  Denmark, was  Lord 
High Admiral.  It  was revived again for a few months in I 827, 
when the Duke of Clarence became Lord High Admiral.  But 
except during these intervals it has been in commission, exe- 
cuted by Lords Commissioners for executing the office of Lord 
High Admiral, that is to say, by a First Lord of the Admiralty 
and several other lords.  Now these servants of the king, more 
especially the older of  them, were  known  to the law, to the 
common law.  They had legal powers.  The king could not 
have got on without them.  For instance, the Chancellor had 
become a judge ; with the assistance of  a Master of the Rolls 
and certain Masters in Chancery he had to discharge the ever 
increasing business of a great court.  Take another and more 
important  instance:  in  Elizabeth's  reign  the judges  had  to 
consider whether a certain sum of  money had been  lawfully 
issued  out of  the king's  exchequer; they laid down two pro- 
positions : (I) that no money could be laivfully issued without 
the king's own warrant;  (2) that such a warrant would not be 
sufficient,  it must  be sealed  with  the great seal or with  the 
privy  seal ; the  king's  command  by word  of  mouth  is  not 
enough, the  king's  command  signed  by his  own hand  and 
countersigned  by his secretary is  not  enough-the  great, or 
at least the privy, seal must be  attached.  And so in  other 
cases, the courts would take no notice of the king's command 
unless  formally  sealed.  A mass of  laws grew  up about this 
matter;  for some purposes the great seal was  indispensable, 
for others the privy seal would do, for others again the signet 
kept by the secretary: in a few cases the king's oral command 
would be enough-thus  undoubtedly he could dissolve parlia- 
ment by word of mouth.  This doctrine of the seals practically 
compelled the king to have ministers entrusted with the seals 
who could be called in question for the use that they made of 
them.  We must  not  think, even  now-a-days, of  'the  seals 
of office' as mere ceremonial  symbols like the crown and the 
sceptre; they are real  instruments of government.  Without 
a great seal, England could not be governed.  Every corpora- 
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common  seal,  and  a  great many  things  can  only  be  done 
by  the use  of  the common  seal.  It is  somewhat  the same 
with  the seals of  office:  courts  of  law  take notice  of  these 
seals, and insist that they must be affixed. 
We return now to the growth of  the Cabinet.  The inner 
circle of  councillors which grows  up within the Privy Council 
consists of  a few holders of these high offices.  With their aid, 
the king can exercise all the powers with which the law entrusts 
him.  They keep the various seals of office, and if they will affix 
them, then the king's  business  can  be  done.  Certain things, 
it is true, must according to settled usage  be  done by Order 
in Council, that is, by an order made by the king at a meeting 
of  the Privy Council.  Thus from  a remote time it has been 
the practice  that  the  summoning  of  a  parliament  shall  be 
determined on  at a  council.  The writs  of  sumlnons recite 
that by the advice of  his  Privy Council, the king has deter- 
mined  to  call  a  parliament.  Settled  usage,  I  say,  requires 
this-it  might be too much to say that it is required by law- 
but  at any rate,  law  does  not  require  that all the members 
of  the council shall be summoned to a meeting.  A meeting 
of  the king with just  a  few of  its members  selected by him 
is a meeting of the Privy Council, and a resolution  passed  at 
such a meeting and published  is an Order in Council. 
We  now  see  how  it  is  legally  possible  for  the work  of 
government to fall  into the hands of  a small number  of  the 
council-those  members  who  hold  the high offices  of  state 
and who  have  control  over the seals of  office.  If the king 
has  with  him  the  Chancellor,  the  Treasurer  or First  Lord 
of  the Treasury, the Lord  Privy  Seal, and the Secretaries of 
State, he can get his work  done without consulting the mass 
of privy councillors.  If, for any purpose, an Order in Council 
is required, a meeting of  the king with just these few intimate 
advisers will  be a good  enough meeting of  the Privy Council 
at which Orders in Council can be made.  So much as to the 
legal possibility of cabinet government. 
Still  cabinet  government,  in  our  modern  sense,  is  but 
slowly  perfected ; our  idea  of  it  involves  several  principles 
which were by no means acknowledged  principles in  the days 
of  William  111, which  hardly  obtained  complete recognition 
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until  late  in  the  last  century.  In  the  first  place  there  has 
been  a  further  change  in  the mode  of  conducting  business. 
William  and  Anne  were habitually  present  at the  meetings 
of the Cabinet Councils, which also, as we have just seen, were 
legally meetings of  the Privy Council.  But then there comes 
a  change.  George  I  ceased  to attend  the meetings  of  the 
Cabinet.  He and  George I1 could  not  speak  English,  and 
felt little concern as to the internal policy of  England ; they 
were more concerned for Hanover.  The Cabinet then begins 
to meet without  the king's  presence.  The results  of its dis- 
cussions  are, when  this  is  necessary,  conveyed  to  the king 
by one of  the ministers.  If  an  Order in  Council is  wanted, 
then  a  few  ministers  are got together, and what  is  formally 
and  legally  a  meeting  of  the  Privy  Council  is  held  under 
the king's  presidency.  But  the business  of  such  a  meeting 
becomes merely formal; it is held in order that it may register 
a  foregone conclusion, a  conclusion  debated  in  the Cabinet 
and communicated to the king.  George 111, though he had 
a will  of  his  own  and  strong views  of  policy, did  not inter- 
fere with this arrangement  At the deliberative meetings  of 
the Cabinet  Council the king  was  not  present;  the formal 
meetings of  the Privy Council at which he was  present were 
not meetings for debate or discussion, but merely meetings at 
which  the king would  give his  formal  assent  and  authority 
to matters which  had  been  already before the Cabinet  and 
about which the king's pleasure had been already taken. 
Then again we  must notice the growing  solidarity of the 
Cabinet.  This solidarity (I can  find  no  better  word  for  it) 
we may analyze into three principles : (I) political unanimity, 
(2)  common responsibility to parliament, (3) submission to a 
common head. 
(I)  Only by degrees does  it  come to be considered that 
the king ought to choose all his ministers from one of  the two 
great parties.  The ministries of Anne's reign are partly Whig, 
partly Tory.  The Whig  administration  of  Sir Robert Wal- 
pole sets the precedent for party ministries and thenceforward, 
though there are occasional aberrations, the bonds of party are 
drawn tighter.  Of  course there may be coalition  ministries, 
but then a coalition  ministry has a policy of  its own, though 
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permanent  parties, the existence of  which we  have  come to 
regard as natural. 
(2)  Connected  with  this  is the principle  of  common  re- 
sponsibility to parliament, by which is meant that the ministry, 
if  defeated, will  resign  in  a  body.  This  principle  was  not 
fully admitted  until the last century was  far advanced.  We 
may  find  one  minister  resigning  because  he  cannot  get on 
with parliament, while his colleagues retain office; quarrelling 
with him is not quarrelling with them, nor are they in  honour 
bound to support his cause.  We must remember in this con- 
text that the presence of ministers in the House of Commons 
was long disliked by the House.  So far from wishing to have 
ministers there to answer for their doings, the House struggled 
to exclude them.  But the ideal changed ;  the House wished to 
have the ministers before it-became  accustomed to have them 
before it-to  support them, to attack them, to regard them  as 
a whole, to regard them  not  merely as the representatives  of 
the king, but also as the representatives  of  a party, so that a 
defeat of a minister would be a defeat of a party, 
(3)  Such organization of  a ministry almost of  necessity 
involves  some  degree  of  subordination  and  very  slowly  it 
becomes  acknowledged,  not  by  law,  but  by  parliamentary 
practice  that there  is  among the ministers a Prime Minister, 
one who has a certain amount  of  authority over his  fellows, 
one who, to a  certain  extent, stands between  them and the 
king.  But this is the gradual outcome of  practice.  Walpole, 
for  example, though, as a  matter  of  fact, he had  great  au- 
thority  over  his  colleagues,  protested  against  being  called 
Prime  Minister,  and  to  this  day  the  law  knows  no  such 
person1.  Lord  Salisbury, we  say, is  Foreign  Secretary  and 
Prime  Minister;  to  the  law  he  is  merely  one  of  H.M. 
principal  Secretaries of  State, and whatever  power  he may 
have over his colleagues is  not  legal power-he  has no more 
legal power  to give them  orders than they have to give him 
orders ; he  has  no  more  power  to dismiss  them  than they 
have to dismiss him.  Still, before the end of  the last century 
constitutional practice  required  that there should be a Prime 
1 The Prime  Minister was granted precedence next  after the Archbishop of 
Canterbury by  royal  warrant dated Dec.  4,  1905, and appearing in the  Z~ndon 
Gaecftc  of Dec. 5.  The warrant does not constitute an office, but grants precedence 
to the person holding a particular pos~tion. 
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Minister, and in the present century his ascendency has become 
still more marked. 
Then again, we have to notice the growth of the principles, 
which of  course are no principles of  law: (I) that the king is 
bound (at least  in  all  grave matters) to act on  the advice of 
his  ministers, (2)  that he must choose his ministers, or rather 
his  first  minister, in  accordance  with  the will  of  the  House 
of  Commons.  We  cannot  trace  step  by  step  the  process 
whereby  the king's  personal  will  and  pleasure  has  come  to 
count  for very little in  our  government.  The reigns  of  the 
two  Hanoverians, George I  and George  11, had  much  to do 
with  it.  George 111's attempt to govern as well  as to reign 
was, we  may now say, a retrograde attempt; it is improbable 
that we shall see such an attempt in  the future.  The process 
of  which we  are speaking is a very gradual process, and it  is 
very difficult to say with  any accuracy how  far  it  has  gone. 
Few  indeed  are  the  people  who  really  know  how  much 
or  how  little  the  queen's  own  wishes  affect  the  course  of 
government.  I  strongly suspect that  her  influence  is  rather 
underrated  than overrated  by the popular mind.  Persons in 
general do not know how vast a mass of  business  is brought 
before her, how  many  papers  she has to sign  with  her  own 
hand.  Still  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  is  expected  of  her 
that  in  all  grave  matters  she  should  accept  the  advice  of 
her  ministers.  It much rather concerns us as legal  students 
to see how  this  non-legal  rule  is  intimately connected  with 
legal arrangements.  Without parliament's consent, given year 
by year, no standing army can be kept on foot.  Without the 
grant of  supplies the king will  have no money, or at any rate 
not  enough  money  to enable  him  to carry on  the work  of 
government.  Thus parliament, and in particular the House of 
Commons, has a most  efficient check  upon  the king's  action. 
An attempt to keep  in  office ministers who  could  not  com- 
mand  a majority  in  the House of  Commons would  speedily 
fail:  the  House  could  refuse  to  renew  the  Army  Act,  or 
refuse  to  grant supplies.  An  attempt  to overrule ministers 
who  commanded  such a majority might  be  met  in  a similar 
fashion.  The most  important  choice  that a  king  can  have 
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ministers are practically chosen for him by the Prime Minister, 
and even  here  he  seldom  has  much  choice.  It is even  laid 
down as constitutional  practice that when a ministry resigns, 
the king ought to offer the premiership to the person named 
by the outgoing minister. 
We here  find  ourselves  among rules  which  most  clearly 
are not rules of law ;  we may call them rules of constitutional 
morality, or the customs or the conventions of  the constitu- 
tion.  We find  them  of  every degree of  stringency and  of 
definiteness:  on  the  one hand  there  are rules  so  stringent 
and so definite that they practically operate as rules of  law; 
on  the  other  hand  there  are  rules  which  have  hardly  yet 
obtained general recognition, and the very existence of which 
is  disputable.  For instance, we  may  now  take it as a well- 
settled understanding that when a bill has passed both Houses 
of  parliament,  the king  will  not  withhold  his  assent.  The 
last occasion on which  such assent was withheld  occurred  so 
long ago as Queen Anne's reign, when she rejected a Scottish 
Militia Bill.  We now expect the royal assent as though it were 
a mere  matter  of  course, and (to say the least) the circum- 
stances would  have to be  of  a very  extraordinary character 
which  would  allow  the  king  to withhold  his  royal  assent 
without  a  breach  of  a  well-settled  constitutional  under- 
standing.  On the other hand, we  seem to see a rule growing 
up to the  effect  that  the  House  of  Lords  ought  not  per- 
sistently to  resist  the will  of  the House of  Commons about 
matters  of  first-rate  importance.  At  present  this  rule,  if 
rule we  may  call  it, is  of a very vague character; we  have 
to use in expressing it such elastic terms as 'persistently' and 
'matters  of  first-rate  importance,'  and  our  view  as  to  the 
existence of  the rule  is  likely to be  affected  by our  political 
opinions : if we be Tories we shall perhaps deny it, if Radicals 
we shall affirm it : if  we  try to be impartial we shall have to 
say something very loose: as, for instance, that this rule has 
been  observed  more  or less  for  some time  past  and seems 
to be  growing stricter.  An instance of  a more definite  rule, 
which yet is no rule of law, is that the lords are not to make 
changes  in  a  money bill, but  must  accept  it as a whole  or 
reject  it  as a whole.  As an  illustration of a very debateable 
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matter, we  may  take  the power of  the  House of  Commons 
to make use  of  this rule  as to money  bills  for  the purpose 
of forcing other  measures  through the Upper  House.  Is it 
unconstitutional  for the commons to, as the phrase goes, tack 
a bill  granting money to the crown  to another bill to which 
the lords  object, and  thus to put  the  lords  in  the dilemma 
of having  either to  pass  the obnoxious bill  or to leave the 
crown  without  money?  There  are a  few  instances  of  this 
having  been  done,  and  more  of  its  having  been  threat- 
ened; I  do not  think  that  it  has  actually  been  done  since 
William  111's  reign.  The lords  contend  that  such  a  pro- 
ceeding  is  unconstitutional-the  commons  might  take  a 
different  view.  There is  no  impartial tribunal  before which 
such questions can  be  brought, no  tribunal  which  even pre- 
tends to be impartial.  In each particular  case there is likely 
to be  a  brisk  party conflict, but  slowly  understandings are 
established.  And  thus it  is  as to the personal  wishes  and 
opinions of  the king: they have come to count for little, but 
for how much few of  us can say. 
But we must not confuse the truth that the king's personal 
will  has  come to count  for  less and  less with  the falsehood 
(for  falsehood  it would  be) that his legal  powers have been 
diminishing.  On  the  contrary,  of  late  years  they  have 
enormously  grown. 
The principle being established that the king must govern 
by  the advice of  ministers who  are approved  by the House 
of  Commons,  parliament  has  entrusted  the king  with  vast 
powers-statutory  powers.  Many  governmental  acts, which 
in  the last  century  would  have  required  the passing  of  an 
act  of  parliament,  are  now  performed  by  exercise  of  sta- 
tutory powers conferred on the king.  Acts which give these 
powers often  require that they shall be exercised  by order in 
council.  Thus in addition to his prerogative or common law 
powers the king now has statutory powers.  All this, coupled 
with the delegation of  other powers to this minister and that, 
is the result of a new movement which began about 1830. 
These  brief  remarks  about  history  are  intended  as  an 
introduction  to  an  examination  of  the  present  state  of 
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the government  is  organized, and  we  must  carefully distin- 
guish between rules of  law and rules which, however  binding 
they may be  considered, are not rules of  law and could  not 
be enforced by any legal proceedings. 
We have to begin with describing the present constitution 
of the Privy Council, the Cabinet, the Ministry. 
(I)  The Queen has a  Privy Council and in  some sort is 
obliged by law to have one, not indeed quite directly, but the 
legal  pressure  amounts to necessity, for  many things  which 
must be done (if  government is  to go on at all) can only be 
done by the Queen  in  Council.  This is  the result  (for  the 
most  part)  of  statutes passed  within  the  last  fifty  years,  a 
mass  of  statute  law  growing  rapidly  year  by year.  One 
statute we  may specially  note: 
The Act of  Union with Scotland provides that there shall 
be but one Privy Council for Great Britain. 
(2)  The legal  composition  of  the Council is  as follows. 
No number is fixed; no legal quorum is demanded; the Queen 
of  her  own  will  can  make any man  (not an alien)  a  privy 
councillor.  Summons and oath make the privy councillor- 
in  substance he swears to advise the king to the best of  his 
discretion.  From  the  form  of  oath, which  is  very  ancient, 
little is  to be learned.  The privy councillor swears to keep 
the king's  counsel secret, to avoid  corruption, to do all that a 
good  counsellor  should  do.  He is  dismissible  at pleasure, 
without  cause assigned. 
(3)  In  actual  composition  the  body  consists  of  some 
two hundred  and  fifty members-about  half  peers  and  half 
commoners. 
It contains  all  present  and past cabinet ministers, a  few 
members of the royal family, two Archbishops and the Bishop 
of  London, a  number of  the highest  judges  and  ex-judges, 
and  a  number  of  persons  selected  on  grounds  of  military, 
political, scientific, literary and even philanthropical services. 
Certain  offices  carry with  them  a  const~tutional  claim  to a 
seat in the privy council : a cabinet minister is  always called 
to  the  council  board,  also  the  lord  chief  justice,  the  lord 
justices  (a  relic  of  former  tlme),  the  Archbishops  and  the 
Bishop  of  London.  De  facto  councillors are not dismissed; 
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indeed it probably would not be considered constitutional (i.e. 
it would  raise an outcry) to dismiss them except for crime or 
gross  immorality.  It follows  from  the  composition  of  the 
body that if  the Privy  Council  really met,  it would  do no 
business  for  it  would  comprise  members  of  both  political 
parties : Salisbury, Gladstone, Hartington, Morley, Chamber- 
lain, Randolph Churchill. 
(4)  The queen is not bound  by law  nor  by any consti- 
tutional understanding to summon all her councillors; on the 
contrary, modern constitutional understanding requires of  her 
that she shall summon but a small selection of them.  A privy 
councillor made so as a mere honour-e.g.  an ex-judge-goes 
to the council board once to take the oath, and he never goes 
again.  Perhaps it may be said  that he has a  constitutional 
(it can hardly be a legal) right  to be heard, if  he has advice 
to give.  Perhaps it would be considered that the queen ought 
not to refuse  him  an audience; but obviously,  if  this  right 
were really insisted on, our constitution would  soon be topsy- 
turvy : as, for  instance, if, while the present  ministry remains 
in power, Gladstone insisted on constantly having the queen's 
ear.  Possibly  a  formal  meeting of  the whole  Privy Council 
would  be  summoned  at  the  beginning  of  a  new  reign1. 
Again, a meeting might be summoned in some extraordinary 
national  emergency.  A  full  meeting was held  in  1839  when 
the queen's approaching marriage was announced. 
(5)  But a meeting of the Sovereign with any of the Privy 
Council  (subject  to such understarldi~lgs  as may exist with 
regard to a quorzrm, the presence of  the Clerk of  the Council, 
or the books of the Council2) has enormous power.  It is the 
constitutionally correct and in some cases the legally necessary 
mode  of  exercising the comrnon  law  powers, 'prerogatives' 
of the crown.  It is the statutory means of exercising many- 
most, and those the most important-of  the statutory powers 
of the crown. 
At the accession  of  King  Edward  VII a  full  meeting  was  summoned  at 
St  James Palace Jan. 23,1901, and attended by four Royal Dukes, two Archbishops, 
the Lord Chancellor,  the Lord President and 97 other Lords of the Councll. 
An accurate record  IS kept of  the proceedings of  the Prlvy Councrl, though it 
is not in terms described as ' Mlnntes.'  I owe this information  to the kindness of 
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(6)  It is legally requisite that the Sovereign  should  have 
certain high officers of state, a Lord Treasurer, for instance, or 
commissioners  for executing his office, a  Lord  Chancellor or 
Lord Keeper of the great seal or commissioners entrusted with 
the great seal, at least one Secretary of  State.  It is legally 
requisite, because it would become utterly impossible to govern 
England lawfully without such officers, impossible, for instance, 
to get a penny out of  the Bank of  England without the com- 
mission of  a high  crime.  This is true in a less degree of  the 
Board of  Trade, the Local Government Board, the committee 
of  Council for Education ; grave public  affairs would be  in  a 
mess if these bodies  were non-existent for a month.  This is 
the result of  modern statutes. 
(7)  A certain  number of  these high  officers  of  state are 
said  to constitute '  the cabinet ' : these,  together  with  other 
officers, are said to constitute 'the ministry.'  Neither of these 
terms is known to the law.  No  official document constitutes 
the cabinet.  Some officers are always (by practice) members 
of  the cabinet, for instance, all  Secretaries of  State, the first 
Lord of  the Treasury, the Chancellor, the Chancellor  of the 
Exchequer, the first  Lord  of  the Admiralty.  As  to other 
officers,  the  practice  varies :  the  Postmaster-Ge~~eral,  the 
President of  the Local  Government  Board, the President of 
the Board of  Trade, the Lord  Privy  Seal, the Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster are generally members of the cabinet. 
In practice every member of  the cabinet holds a legal office : 
most  members  hold  extremely important legal offices ; even 
when  it  is wished to have the presence  of  some one who  is 
past  work, he  is  given  an office-though  one  to which  few 
duties are annexed-the  Chancellorship of  the Duchy or the 
like. 
(8)  The truth that the cabinet  is unknown  to law must 
not  be  converted into the falsehood  that  it  is  a  meeting of 
persons who  have  no legal  powers.  Each cabinet  ~ninister 
is  a privy councillor, each is  a high  officer, each  has  usually 
large legal powers.  But the legal powers of  a cabnet meeting 
are only the sum of the legal  powers  of  its  members.  The 
cabinet has no corporate powers. 
(9)  The cabinet  is  a  selection  out  of  a  larger  body of 
'ministers';  the 'ministry'  consists  of  those holders of office 
under  the crown  who  according to constitutional  usage are 
expected to be members of one or other House of  Parliament 
and to act together.  Recall the law as to the qualification for 
the House of Commons.  Office under the crown either does or 
does not disqualify from  a seat in Parliament ;  the law must 
be sought in a variety of  statutes ;  but the general result  is 
that  only those  holders  of  civil  (as  distinct  from military) 
offices  under the crown can sit who are intended and expected 
to act together and to form a coherent body in parliament. 
There seem to be forty or fifty such offices.  A ministry 
consists  of  forty to fifty  men, of  whom  fifteen  to seventeen 
form the cabinet'.  As  instances of ministerial offices which are 
not cabinet offices we may cite the law officers of  the crown, 
the  Attorney-general  and Solicitor-general for  England  and 
for  Ireland, the  Attorney-general and  Solicitor-general  for 
Scotland, the junior lords of the Treasury, the junior lords of 
the Admiralty, the first Commissioner  of  Worl<s and public 
buildings, the Paymaster-general, the two Secretaries to the 
Treasury,the political secretaries representing the Home Office, 
Foreign  Office, India Office, Colonial  Office, War Office, the 
Board of  Trade, the Local Government Board, the Secretary 
to the Admiralty.  The general idea is that each great depart- 
ment of  State shall have one representative in  each  House: 
thus if  the Secretary of  State for Foreign  Affairs be in  the 
Lords, the political Under-Secretary will be in the Commons. 
It is a general rule, though not of course a rule of law, that 
all ministers should be  in  one House or the other.  The case 
of the Naval Lords appears to be the sole exception. 
Further there are some understandings, though less distinct, 
as to which House shall contain a particular  minister.  The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer must be in the Commons ;  a rule 
seems to be growing  up that the  Home  Secretary must  be 
there  likewise.  And  it  is a  legal  rule  that not  more  than 
four under-secretaries of State may sit in the Commons? 
Again  it is a  general  rule  that other offices  in  the civil 
service are to be permanent  and not political;  but this is a 
The number of the cabinet in  1913  is 21, the number of the ministly 59. 
21 and 22 Vict. c. 106.  See also 27  and 28Vict. c. 34. Constitutionn  Z History 
constitutional understanding not law.  When there is a change 
of ministry, but  a few officials are changed, though these are 
the highest. 
It is  just  worth  noting  that  the highest  officers of  the 
Household are changed-the  Master of the Horse,the Master of 
the Buckhounds, the Mistress of the Robes-but  this is a relic. 
(10)  The quasi-corporate character of  the '  cabinet '  and 
of the '  ministry ' is entirely extra-legal.  One minister is not 
legally answerable for what another does: he is answerable of 
course for aiding and abetting, answerable as accessory before 
or  after  the  fact,  but  probably  responsibility  does  not  go 
beyond this:  'probably,'  for who shall say what might happen 
upon  an impeachment?  but  the question  might  quite con- 
ceivably be raised upon an indictment in an ordinary court of 
law, and there  seems no  principle  in  our  law  which  could 
hold  A  guilty because  he  was a member  of  the cabinet at 
the time when  another member  B committed  some crime in 
the execution  of  his  office. 
Still the law not very indirectly compels harmony among 
ministers ; this is noticeable in particular  as to Secretaries of 
State who are fungible-if  Secretary X were always revoking 
(as legally he might) the orders given by Secretary Y, there 
would  soon  be an intolerable confusion.  However  unity  is 
secured in  the main by extra-legal  rules ; rules which require 
that ministers shall either agree with their colleagues or resign, 
which  require that as regards  important  practical  questions 
ministers  shall  have  the same  policy.  These  rules, though 
they  have  grown  more  strict  since  the  beginning  of  the 
century, are and must be pretty vague ; there is no impartial 
tribunal to enforce them.  It does not belong to us to discuss 
them:  their  sanction  is  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence, and 
beyond  that the impossibility of carrying on  business  in the 
teeth of such a vote. 
So  also the cabinet is expected to meet, to  discuss measures, 
to have  a  policy.  The meeting  of  the cabinet  is  perfectly 
informal;  it receives  no  summons from  the Sovere~gn;  the 
Sovereign is never present ; no record is kept. 
The Prime Minister is unknown to law;  nor is the premier- 
ship annexed to any particular office. 
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(11)  All these high officers of  state, indeed all officers of 
state, hold  office legally durante beneplacito.  But the queen 
is  expected  to choose a  Prime Minister  who will  command 
the confidence of the House of  Commons ;  and to appoint his 
nominees  to office.  Ministers  expect  to collectively  resign 
their offices if  they cannot command a majority in the House 
of  Commons.  A  defeated  minister  has  the choice between 
resigning, and counselling a dissolution of  parliament.  As to 
when  he may counsel a dissolution, no very precise rule can 
be laid down.  All  we  can  say is that, according to modern 
precedent, he is not bound to await a conflict with parliament, 
in which he will certainly be defeated. 
Officers of state, or the queen's executive servants, not being 
members of the ministry, hold  office durante beneplacito; still 
de facto  their tenure is very permanent;  they do not 'go  in 
and out with  the ministry' ;  they cannot (as a rule) sit in the 
House of  Commons, and are expected not to take any very 
active part in party politics. 
(12) NOW  let us consider  the relation  of  these informal 
extra-legal bodies to the Privy Council. 
The Government of the country is carried  on  chiefly by 
the exercise of statutory powers:  to some small extent by the 
exercise of prerogative powers. 
Statutory governmental powers  are most  miscellaneous : 
we  might  classify them  (a)  according to the nature of  the 
work to be done, as whether it be that of issuing general rules 
(subordinate  legislation)  or that of giving  particular  orders, 
or  (b)  according  to  the  mode  in  which  the  power  is  to 
be  exercised.  It is with  (b) that we  are now  concerned. 
Of these statutory powers there are two  great groups:- 
though classification is difficult, and in every particular  case 
the statute must  be consulted  and punctually  obeyed. 
(i)  Powers given to the Queen in Council:  'it shall be 
lawful  for  H.M.  by  Order in  Council! 
(ii)  Powers given to one of  the high  officers  of  state, or 
to some combination of  them:  'it shall be lawful  for one of 
H.M. principal secretaries of state.' 
(I  3)  Roughly~peaking~the  most important powers aregiven 
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How are they to be exercised ?  By the queen at what  is 
legally a meeting of her Privy Council.  The queen holds such 
meetings from time to time.  Summonses are sent out by the 
Lord President of the Council to a  few privy councillors.  It 
is, I believe, usual  to get six members to attend, just  a few of 
the cabinet ministers ;  sometimes one of  the queen's sons ; as 
already so often  said, no  one has a right  to be summoned1. 
The business, I believe, is of the most formal kind, the orders 
have  been  prepared  by the minister  whose department they 
concern, if  of  importance  they  have  been  discussed  in  the 
cabinet;  their  nature is  explained  to  the  queen,  who  says 
'approved';  there is, I believe, no debate.  The order is drawn 
up  and  signed  by  the  Clerk  of  the  Council, a  permanent 
officer: such is an Order in Council. 
The use of requiring a formal meeting of this sort is, I take 
it, that  to  any Order  in  Council  several  members  of  the 
cabinet must almost necessarily be committed, if  not legally, 
at least  constitutionally.  When  power  is  given  (say) to a 
Secretary of  State to issue rules, orders and regulations as to 
the discipline of the police, and  he exercises this  power, it 
might be difficult, even in  parliament, to hold  the Chancellor 
of  the  Exchequer  in  any  sense  answerable  for  what  his 
colleague  had  done  if  he  chose  to  repudiate  the  act:  it 
would,  I  imagine,  be  much  more  difficult  for  any cabinet- 
minister to deny responsibility for an Order in Council.  Here, 
however, we go beyond the law. 
The form of an Order in Council is as follows : 
October 4,  1887. 
At the court at Balmoral the 15th day of September, 1887. 
Present, 
The Queen's  most Excellent Majesty in Council. 
-. 
Whereas  under  certain  statutes the Ecclesiastical  Com- 
missioners have prepared a scheme for making new parishes. 
1 Mr  Almeric Fitzroy, the  Clerk  of the  Council, kindly informs  me  that so 
far  as  he  is  aware, no rule  has been laid down as  to  the  quwum necessary for 
Orders  in  Council;  but  that  in  practice  the  rule  embodied  in  an  Order  of 
Feb.  ao,  1617 has  been  followed.  It  requires  the  presence  of  three  of  the 
Lords of the Council.  The presence of the Clerk of the Council is necessary, as it 
is his attestation which affords legal proof of the document. 
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And  whereas  the  scheme  has  been  approved  by  H.M.  in 
Council.  Now  therefore H.M. by and with the advice of  her 
said Council is pleased to order and direct that the said scheme 
shall come into force on a certain date. 
C.  L. PEEL. 
The London  Gazette is prima facie  evidence of  an Order 
in  Council.  Such  orders  are very  different  from  statutes; 
judges are not bound to take judicial  notice of them. 
The various powers which parliament has delegated  may 
be classified according to their nature. 
(I)  Power of  laying down general rules which shall have 
the force of  law-much  is  now  done in  this  way : thus the 
Home Secretary has power to issue general orders as to the 
discipline and pay of the police, the Local Government Board 
has power  to issue  general rules  as  to the  government  of 
workhouses,  etc.  In other  words  they  exercise  powers  of 
subordinate legislation.  The validity of  these rules may be 
questioned, they may be zdtrrt  vires and so invalid. 
(2)  Power of issuing particular commands: thus supposing 
that a sanitary board will  not  make proper sewers, the Local 
Government  Board,  on  being  satisfied  of  such default, may 
order the sewers to be made and order the defaulting authority 
to pay cost. 
(3)  Power  to grant licenses  for this and  that: thus the 
Home Secretary may license a  person to practise vivisection, 
may license a Jesuit to remain in England. 
(4)  Power to remit penalties : not uncommonly given. 
(5)  Powers  of  inspection :  factories,  mines,  stores  of 
explosives. 
(6)  Inquisition : holding inquiries into explosions, railway 
accidents, etc. 
We will  now  take a  brief  survey  of  the powers  of  the 
various high officers of  state, taking them one by  one.  Our 
sketch must be very brief and imperfect, but still it may serve 
to  give  us  some  insight  into  the real  practical  working  of 
English  public  law. 
I.  First we have the Treasury.  There are five lords com- 
missioners for executing the office of Lord High Treasurer : a The  Treasztry  ConstitutionaZ History 
First  Lord  (Mr  Smith,  Cabinet),  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer  (Mr  Goschen,  Cabinet)  and  three  junior  lords 
(Mr  Herbert,  Col.  Walrond,  and  Sir  Herbert  Maxwell)'. 
Legally they have, at least  for  the most  part, equal  powers. 
During the eighteenth century the Lords of the Treasury used 
to meet  as  a  board  and transact  business  as a  board, and 
the practice of  holding formal meetings was maintained until 
some forty years  ago2.  The supreme control  fell  more  and 
more into the hands of  the Chancellor of  the Exchequer, and 
now  the  junior  lords  are  in  the  view  of  parliament  very 
distinctly his  subordinates.  The First  Lord  does  very little 
official  work.  Very  commonly  he  is  Prime  Minister;  at 
the  present  moment  he  is  not  Prime  Minister,  but  he  is 
the recognized leader of  the House of  Commons ; he devotes 
himself,  I  believe,  rather  to  a  general  superintendence  of 
the government  business  in  the House of  Commons than to 
the exercise of  those  legal  powers  which  he has  as a  Lord 
of  the  Treasury.  Now  acts  of  parliament  frequently  say 
that this  that  and  the other  matter  shall  or  may  be  done 
by 'the Treasury.'  An act of  1849 declares this to mean that 
the requisite  document shall be  signed  by two of  the Com- 
missioners3.  Such a document is required for a vast  number 
of  purposes.  To take one  of  the  most  important:  when 
parliament has  granted  a supply to the king no  money  can 
come out of  the Exchequer except in  obedience to a warrant 
under  the royal sign manual countersigned  by  two Lords of 
the Treasury ; not a sixpence of  the money voted  by parlia- 
ment can lawfully be spent until the king has signed a warrant, 
and this is countersigned by the Lords of the Treasury (29 and 
30 Vic., c. 39).  I  doubt  whether  it  is generally known how 
many documents the queen has to sign : were she to lose the 
use of her hand  for a month  a great deal of public  business 
would soon be in utter confusion.  In  1830 George IV found 
it  difficult to write,  an act of  parliament had  to be  at once 
'  Written in  1887-8. 
'Since  1856 the meetings have been discontinued,' Anson, The Crown, p.  172. 
'  By  the  Interpretation Act of  1889 (52 and  53 Vict., c.  63) the expression 
'The Treasury' is defined to mean '  the Lord High Treasurer for the time being or 
the Commissioners for the time being of H.M.  Treasury.' 
passed  authorizing  the use  of  a stamp  to be  afixed in  his 
presence  to documents which  required  the use  of  the royal 
sign  manual.  In  1811, when  George  I11 lost  his  wits, the 
difficulty  was much more serious; the ministers  could  get no 
money because the king could not sign the necessary warrant: 
parliament  had  to  pass  a  resolution  authorizing  and  com- 
manding the issue of money; and it may be doubted whether 
even  this  resolution, to which  the king, of  course, could  not 
consent,  made  the  issue  legal.  But  not  only  is  the  sign 
manual  necessary, the counter-signature  of  two Lords of  the 
Treasury  is  necessary  also.  That is  one  illustration  of  the 
powers of  the Treasury, but very generally you will  find  that 
nothing whatever can be done which in any way  involves the 
expenditure  of  public  money  without  the  consent  of  the 
Treasury:  this  is  required  by  law,  by  statute.  Then  it  is 
the duty of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to present to the 
House of  Colnmotls the estimates of expenditure and to make 
proposals for grants by which such expenditure shall be met, 
to recommend the imposition and the remission of  taxes. 
2.  We turn  next to H.M. principal  Secretaries of State. 
There are now five.  During the greater part of the eighteenth 
century there were  but  two,  though  for  a while  there  were 
three.  In  1801  we have three : one for Home Affairs, one for 
Foreign  Affairs,  one  for War  and the Colonies.  In  1854 a 
fourth was appointed, War being separated from the Colonies. 
In  1858, when  an  end was put to the East India Company, 
a fifth Secretary of  State was appointed to look after Indian 
Affairs.  We of course freely talk of the Home Secretary, the 
Foreign Secretary and so forth, but this division of  labour  is 
hardly known to the law.  The language of statutes generally 
is '  it shall be lawful for one of  H.M. principal Secretaries of 
State.'  Legally any one of  the five  secretaries may  exercise 
that power-the  subject matter of the act wiil decide who shall 
really exercise it, thus if the act relates to the Colonies  then 
it will  be  exercised  by the Colonial  Secretary.  However, to 
this  rule  there are exceptions.  I  know  of  one instance  in 
which a statutory power is given to the Secretary of State for 
the Home Department (23 and 24 Vic., c. 34, an Act to amend 
the Law relating to Petitions of  Right). Co%stitutionnl  History  The Home  Secretary 
Now each Secretary of State has very large powers-a  few 
given him by the common law, a vast number given to him by 
statute.  Thus it seems certain that a Secretary of  State may 
by the common law commit to prison on suspicion of  treason 
or any treasonable  offence, i.e. commit  for trial.  This is no 
great  matter  now-a-days  and  the  power  is  not  exercised, 
because it is easy enough to take the suspected person before a 
justice of the peace.  But it made a great noise in the eighteenth 
century  in  connection  with  the proceedings  against  Wilkes. 
Lord  Halifax, the  then  Secretary  of  State,  was  guilty  of 
issuing warrants  which  the courts of  law held  to be  illegal : 
e.g. a warrant to seize, not A. B., but the author of a particular 
seditious libel, No. 45  of  the No~th  Briton, and a warrant to 
seize the papers of  A. B., suspected of  being  the author of  a 
seditious libel.  However, the Court of  Common  Pleas had 
somewhat reluctantly to hold that the Secretary of State had 
power to issue a warrant for the arrest of  A. B., suspected of 
a treasonable or  seditious offence:  how he had  acqurred  that 
power was much questioned, but it had been exercised during 
the earlier part of the century, and its existence could not be 
denied.  This power, however, is a small matter, though it has 
made much noise, compared  with the vast powers with which 
the Secretary of State has been entrusted by modern statutes. 
A  few examples may be given of the powers entrusted by 
statute to the  Home  Secretary. 
By the statute instituting the modern  police  force, 1839, 
(2 and 3 Vic., c. 93, s. 3) the Secretary may from time to time 
issue rules for the government, pay, clothing and accoutrenients 
of the constables.  The County force cannot  be  increased  or 
diminished  without  leave  of  the  Secretary.  So too  in  the 
government  of  prisons, he possesses enormous powers : thus 
he may make rules  as to classification of  prisoners, and may 
interfere  in  particular  cases,  substituting  one  kind  of  hard 
labour  for  another. 
Again he has received  vast powers over the regulation of 
factory labour and the regulation and inspection of mines and 
collieries.  The attempt, characteristic  of  modern  times,  to 
protect  the  economically  weaker  classes  has  given  rise  to 
statutes which  bristle with powers entrusted to the Secretary 
of  State.  Thus, for instance, his license  is required  for vivi- 
section (1876, 39 and 40 Vic., c. 77). 
Again, he is empowered to grant certificates  of  naturaliza- 
tion,  a  discretionary  power.  Notice  this  'devolution'  of  a 
power  once kept by  parliament  in  its  own  hand. 
These are instances of  statutory powers : but  the Home 
Secretary is also the proper adviser of the crown as to the exer- 
cise of certain prerogative powers:  for instance, that of pardon. 
Perhaps the Home Secretary is more interesting to us than 
other secretaries ; but  they also have many statutory powers 
of  the utmost importance.  Thus, to take but  one example: 
the act which put an end  (1858) to the government  of  India 
by  the East India Company provided  that 'all the  powers 
and  duties then  exercised  or  performed  by  the  East  India 
Company should in future be exercised and performed by one 
of  H.M. principal Secretaries of State.' 
To a  large  extent the powers  of  these four  Secretaries 
consist in this, that it is for them (each in his own department) 
to advise  the queen  as to the exercise  of  powers  which  by 
law are her powers, either ancient prerogative powers or more 
modern  powers  given  to her  by statute.  Still (especially in 
the case of  the army) we  find powers given  expressly to the 
Secretary for War. 
All Secretaries are invariably in  the cabinet: each has a 
parliamentary Under-Secretary, who is a minister but without 
a seat in the cabinet. 
3.  The Admiral's  office is  in  commission : a  first  lord 
(cabinet) and three junior  lords, two '  naval '-not  necessarily 
in  parliament-and  one  'civil,'  in  parliament;  all  of  them 
in  the '  ministry.' 
This is a really deliberative board. 
4.  Of  the Lord-Lieutenant of  Ireland and his principal 
secretaries, one of  whom  is  often in  the cabinet, we  have no 
time to speak ; nor  of  the new  Secretary (not of  State) for 
Scotland, created  in  1885  to  exercise  for  Scotland powers 
theretofore exercised by the (Home) Secretary and some others 
taken  from  various  English  departments.  More  interesting 
to us are : the Board of  Trade, the Local Government Board, 
the Education Department, the Board of Agriculture. Constitutional History  High Ofices of State 
5.  The Board  of Trade is  in  form  a  committee  of  the 
Privy Council, consisting of  a President and certain ex  oficio 
members.  The First Lord of the Treasury,the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the Secretaries of State, the Speaker of the House 
of Commons, and the Archbishop of  Canterbury.  But all its 
powers  can  legally  be  and  are  exercised  by the President, 
who  practically  is  the Board.  These  powers  are vast  and 
most various : in particular as to railways, and as to merchant 
shipping, as, for instance, the detention of  unseaworthy ships. 
The whole of our mercantile marine has by an elaborate code 
been placed very much under the governance of the Board of 
Trade.  Then again since 1883 the working of the bankruptcy 
law has been placed in the hands of official receivers, appointed 
and dismissible by and answerable to the Board of Trade. 
6.  The Local  Government  Board,  created  by an act  of 
1871, consists of  a President and of certain ex  oficio  members 
(Lord President of the Council,  Secretaries  of  State,  Privy 
Seal and Chancellor  of  Exchequer), but all its powers can be 
exercised  by the President with  the counter-signature  of  his 
secretary or assistant secretary.  Thus it is a board  only in 
name1. 
Manifold statutory powers in the working of  our poor law 
and sanitary law have been conferred upon it. 
The Poor Law Amendment Act of  1834, declared central 
control  to be  necessary and  lodged  it in the hands of  three 
Poor Law Commissioners.  Then (1847) came the Poor  Law 
Board  consisting  of  a number of  high  state officials headed 
by a  President.  Finally in  1871 this  Board  was  merged in 
the newly-constituted Local Government Board. 
In a most general  way  all  paupers  are placed  under  its 
'rules, orders and regulations.'  It exercises strict control over 
the local administrators-boards  of  guardians ; can give them 
orders, and (within wide bounds) can legislate for them. 
So too  with  regard  to  the  sanitary  system:  the  great 
code of 1875, the Public Health Act, is worked in districts by 
'local  sanitary authorities' who  are much  controlled  by the 
Local Government Board. 
7.  The Education  Department  is  also  in  form  a com- 
mittee of  the Privy Council:  a '  Committee of the Council for 
Education.'  More recently it has received the title of 'Educa- 
tion  Department.'  It consists of  the Lord  President  of  the 
Council and the Vice-President of the Committee, and certain 
ex  oficio  members, e.g. the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  The 
powers of the committee are practically exercised by the Lord 
President  (for  whom  duties have  thus  been  found) and  the 
Vice-President'.  The great  system  of  Public  Elementary 
Education  introduced in  1870 is placed under control of  this 
department,  which  thus  has  very  large  statutory  powers, 
both of  giving particular  orders and of  laying down general 
rules. 
8.  In 1889 (52 and 53 Vic., c. 30) a Board  of  Agriculture 
was created2,  consisting of  a President of  the Board, the Lord 
President  of  the Council, the Secretaries of  State, the First 
Lord of  the Treasury, the Chancellor  of  the Exchequer, the 
Chancellor  of  the Duchy.  Here also  the powers  are really 
wielded  by  the President. 
g.  Of  the  other  high  officials  of  state  the  Yostmaster- 
General possesses many statutory powers  and sometimes sits 
in the cabinet, the Lord Privy Seal has  merely formal duties, 
while  the  Chancellor  of  the Duchy has  now  little work, for 
though the old  Palatine Court is kept up, the judicial work is 
done by a Vice-Chancellor who is a judge. 
10.  Lastly  (though  he  is  highest  in  rank)  the  Lord 
Chancellor, of whom more hereafter, is always a member of the 
cabinet.  It is curious that one who is the highest of judges is 
a  member  of  the  cabinet, a  politician  actively engaged  in 
party warfare, who 'goes  in  and  out with  the ministry.'  It 
is  curious:  it  is  a  reminder  that  in  the past  judicial  and 
governmental  functions have  been  much  blended. 
An an illustration of the actual working of our government 
system we cannot do better than take the Municipal Corpora- 
tions Act, 1882 (45 and 46 Vic., c. so), our best specimen of a 
code;  we  find powers  given  to the Queen  in  Council, to a 
1 The Committee of  Council for Education was superseded by a Board In 1899. 
34 and 35 Vict.,  c. 70.  62 and 63 Vict., c.  33. 
a  Since 1903 the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries. Constitutional History 
Secretary  (Home)  of  State, to the Treasury,  to  the Local 
Government  Board. 
Sec. 23.  A Town Council may make bye-laws, not to come 
into force for forty days:  a copy to be sent to the Secretary ; 
if  within  that  time  it is  disallowed  by  the queen  with  the 
advice of  her  Privy  Council  it  is  not  to come  into force. 
Sec. 28.  Accounts  to be  sent to the Local  Government 
Board,  which  is  to lay an  abstract  before  Parliament. 
Sec.  30.  If two-thirds of a Town Council agree to petition 
for the division of the borough into wards, it shall be lawful for 
H.M. by Order in Council to fix the number of wards.  There- 
upon the Secretary shall appoint commissioners to determine 
the boundaries;  the scheme of  boundaries  to be sent to the 
Secretary, who is to submit it to H.M. in Council for approval. 
Sec. 62.  Day for electing auditors of borough accounts is 
I  March  or  such  other  day as the Town  Council  with  the 
approval of the Local Government Board shall appoint. 
Sec. 105.  We come to the borrowing powers of the Town 
Council : here the '  approval of the Treasury ' is necessary ; so 
for leases and sales of corporate land. 
Sec. 154.  Administration  of  justice.  It shall  be  lawful 
for  the  queen  from  time  to  time to assign  to any persons 
H.M.  commission  to act  as justices  of  peace  [this  implies 
the action  of  the Lord  Chancellor]. 
Sec.  161.  If  a  stipendiary  magistrate  be  wanted,  the 
Town  Council  may  petition  the  Secretary  to  make  an 
appointment, and thereupon it shall be lawful for the queen to 
appoint a barrister of seven years' standing. 
Sec. 162.  If the borough wants a separate Court of Quarter 
Sessions, the queen on petition to H.M. in  Council may grant 
the court. 
Sec. 164.  The Table of  fees of  the Clerk  of  the Peace is 
to be submitted to the Secretary of  State for confirmation. 
Sec. 210.  Grant of  new  charters.  On petition  of  the in- 
habitants the queen by the advice of  her Privy Council may 
grant  a charter, but  the petition  must  first  be  referred  to a 
committee  of  the  Lords  of  H.M.  Privy  Council,  so  that 
objections  may  be  heard. 
etc.  etc. 
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My object in  saying so much  of  the statutory powers by 
means of  which our  government  is now-a-days conducted, is 
to convince you that the traditional lawyer's view  of  the con- 
stitution has become very untrue to fact and to law.  By the 
traditional lawyer's view I mean that which was expressed by 
Blackstone in the middle of  the eighteenth century, and which 
still maintains a certain orthodoxy.  According to that view, 
while the legislative power  is vested in  king and  parliament, 
what is called the executive power is vested in the king alone, 
and consists of the royal prerogative.  Now most people know 
that this is  not altogether true to fact-they  know that the 
powers  attributed  to  the  king  are  really  exercised  by  the 
king's  ministers,  and  that  the  king  is  expected  to  have 
ministers  who  command  the  confidence  of  the  House  of 
Commons.  Still  I think  that they would say that this was 
a  matter  not  of law, but  of  convention, or of  constitutional 
morality-that  legally  the  executive  power  is  in  the  king, 
though constitutionally it must be exercised by ministers.  But 
the point that I wish to make is that this  old doctrine is not 
even  true  to law.  To a very large extent indeed England is 
now ruled by means of statutory powers which are not in any 
sense, not  even  as strict matters  of  law,  the powers  of  the 
king.  Let us take an instance or two.  Look  at the police 
force, that most powerful engine of  government.  That force 
was gradually created by means of a series of statutes ranging 
from 1829 to 1856.  To some extent it was placed under the 
control of  local authorities, of  the justices of  the peace in the 
counties, of  watch  committees in  the boroughs: but a power 
of  issuing  rules  for  the government  was  given-to  whom? 
not to the queen, but to one of  H.M. principal  Secretaries of 
State, which  means  in  practice  the  Home Secretary.  It is 
not  for  the  queen  to  make  such  regulations:  it  is  for  the 
Secretary.  So as to the administration  of  the poor law.  In 
1834, when  the law was  remodelled,  a central authority was 
created  with  a  large  power  of  issuing  rules,  orders  and 
regulations  as  to  the  relief  of  the poor.  This power  was 
given, not to the king, but to certain poor  law commissioners, 
and  it has since been  transferred  to the Local Government 
Board.  Look again at the powers of  regulating the mercantile 416  Constitzdionad History  PERIOD 
marine created by the great Merchant Shipping Act of  1854 
or the powers  relating to public elementary education  given 
by the act of  1870. These are not given to the queen-they 
are given in the one case to the Board  of  Trade, in  the other 
case to the Education Department1. 
How vast a change has taken place since Blackstone's day 
we  may  see  from  a  very  interesting  passage  in  his  book, 
Book  I, chap.  Ix2  He has  a chapter  on  the  Subordinate 
Magistrates.  In this he speaks of  sheriffs, coroners, justices 
of the peace, constables, surveyors of highways, and overseers 
of  the poor.  He prefaces it with these words, ' In a former 
chapter of  these commentaries we  distinguished  magistrates 
into  two  kinds:  supreme, or  those  in  whom  the sovereign 
power of  the state resides ; and subordinate, or those who act 
in  an inferior secondary sphere.  We have hitherto considered 
the former kind  only, namely the supreme legislative power 
or parliament, and the supreme executive power, which  is in 
the king; and are now to proceed  to inquire into the rights 
and  duties  of  the principal  subordinate  magistrates.  And 
herein  we  are  not  to  investigate  the powers, and duties of 
his  majesty's  great officers of  state, the lord  treasurer,  lord 
chamberlain,  the  principal  secretaries  or  the  like; because 
I  do  not  know  that they  are in  that  capacity  in  any con- 
siderable  degree  the  objects  of  our  laws  or  have  any very 
important share of  magistracy conferred  upon  them : except 
that  the secretaries of  state are allowed  the power  of  com- 
mitment in  order to bring  offenders to trial.'  Now that is a 
very memorable sentence, and on  the whole (though perhaps 
it is a little exaggerated) I think that it was true in Blackstone's 
day.  The lord treasurer, the secretaries of  state, were of  course 
very important persons-perhaps  quite as important then  as 
now-but  the law knew  them  not, or merely  knew them  as 
persons who advised the king in  the use  of  his  prerogatives. 
The law gave powers to sheriffs and coroners, to surveyors of 
highways  and overseers of  the poor; it gave few  powers  to 
The Merchant  Shipping Act of  1854 is now superseded  by the Merchant 
Shipping Act of  1894. 
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the high  officers of  state, to the men who  for good  and evil 
had really the destinies of England in  their hands : the powers 
that  they  in  fact  exercised  were  in  law  the king's  powers. 
But I know no proof  of  the power of  Blackstone's  genius so 
striking as the fact that the sentence that  I  have just  quoted 
should  be repeated  now-a-days in  books which profess to set 
forth  the modern law of England.  Does  not our  law  know 
these high officers of  state?  Open the statute book, on almost 
every  page  of  it  you  will  find  'it  shall  be  lawful  for  the 
Treasury  to  do  this,'  'it  shall  be  lawful  for  one  of  the 
Secretaries of  State to do that.' 
This is  the result  of  a  modern  movement, a  movement 
which began, we may say, about the time of  the Reform  Rill 
of  1832.  The new wants of  a new  age have been  met  in  a 
new manner-by  giving statutory powers of  all  kinds, some- 
times  to the Queen  in  Council, sometimes to the Treasury, 
sometimes  to a Secretary of  State, sometimes to this Board, 
sometimes to the other.  But of  this vast  change our institu- 
tional  writers have hardly yet taken any account.  They go 
on  writing  as though  England  were governed  by the royal 
prerogatives,  as  if  ministers  had  nothing  else  to  do  than 
to  advise  the  king  as  to  how  his  prerogatives  sho~ild  be 
exercised. 
In my view, which I put forward with some diffidence and 
with  a fill1 warning that it is not orthodox, we can no longer 
say that the executive power  is vested in the king:  the king 
has powers, this  minister has powers, and that minister  has 
powers.  The requisite harmony is secured by the extra-legal 
organization  of  cabinet  and  ministry.  The powers  legally 
given  to the king  are certainly the  most  important, but  I 
cannot consent to call them supreme.  To be able to declare 
war  and peace  is certainly an important power, perhaps  the 
most important power that the law can give, and this belongs 
to the king.  But the power to make rules for the government 
of  the police force is  also an  important power, and this our 
law gives  to a  secretary of  state.  The one power  may  be 
vastly  more  important  than  the other, but  it  is  in  no  sense 
supreme over the other.  The supremacy of the king's powers, 
if  it  is  to  be  found  anywhere,  must  be  found  in  the  fact that  the ministers legally hold  their offices  during his  good 
pleasure. 
There is one term  against which I wish to warn you, and 
that  term  is  'the crown.'  You  will  certainly read  that the 
crown does this and the crown does that.  As a matter of fact 
we  know that the crown does nothing but lie in the Tower of 
London  to be gazed  at by sight-seers.  No, the crown  is  a 
convenient  cover  for  ignorance:  it  saves  us  from  asking 
difficult questions, questions which  can  only be answered  by 
study  of  the  statute  book.  I  do  not  deny  that  it  is  a 
convenient  term  and you  may have to use it; but  I do say 
that you  should  never  be  content  with  it.  If  you  are told 
that the crowri has this power or that power, do not be content 
until  you  know who  legally has the power-is  it the king, is 
it one of  his secretaries:  is  this  power  a  prerogative  power 
or  is  it'the  outcome  of  statute?  This question  is often  an 
extremely  difficult  question,  and  one  ~f the difficulties  by 
which  it  is  beset  is  worthy  of  explanation. 
We find  that there  is  often  great  uncertainty  as to the 
exact limits of the royal prerogative.  Since the settlement of 
1688 very little has  been done towards depriving the king by 
any direct words of any of his  legal  powers.  Those powers 
were great, and they were somewhat indefinite.  Very seldom 
has any statute expressly taken them away, very seldom has 
any statute said  in so many words '  it shall not be  lawful for 
the king  to do this.'  But without directly destroying these 
prerogative  powers  statutes have  created  a large number of 
powers dealing with the same matters, some given to the king, 
some to one or to another of his great officers.  Such modern 
powers have been definite and adapted to the wants of modern 
times, and  they have  been  freely used.  On  the other hand 
the  old  prerogative  powers  have  becomc  clumsy and  anti- 
quated, and have  fallen into disuse: the very uncertainty  as 
to their limits has made them impracticable.  Still they have 
not  been  expressly  abolished,  and  to the legal  student the 
question  must  often  occur  whether  they are  or  are not  in 
existence.  Kcmember this, that we  have no such doctrine as 
that a prerogative  may cease to exist because it is not  used. 
On  the  other  hand  we  shall  often  find  that  it  would  be 
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extremely  difficult to use  these  prerogative  powers  without 
doing  something  definitely  unlawful.  Let  me  give  a  few 
examples. 
What  an  outcry  there  would  be  if  the queen  were  to 
attempt to debase the coinage.  Probably  such  an attempt 
would  cost her her throne.  Nevertheless Sir M. Hale was of 
opinion  that the king had  power  to debase the coinage, and 
with the decided cases before us  it  is difficult to say that he 
was in the wrong  Even Blackstone was not certain that this 
power did not exist1.  Well, so far as I am aware, that power 
has  never  been  expressly taken  away by statute.  We may 
say pretty confidently that the power does not exist, but why? 
Not  because  it has been expressly taken away, not because it 
has fallen into desuetude, but because for a very long time past 
statutes have fixed the amount of gold and silver in the coins : 
thus by statute a sovereign  is to weigh  123'27447 grains, and 
is to be eleven-twelfths gold  and one-twelfth alloy.  So long 
as  such  statutes  exist  the prerogative  power  of  regulating 
the coinage cannot be used, but  it is not  until we  have gone 
through those statutes and seen how they deal with the whole 
matter  that  we  are  entitled  to  say that  the  prerogative  is 
superseded. 
Take a more difficult case.  Can the king erect new courts 
of justice ?  Most indubitably this power was exercised in the 
Middle Ages.  Nothing was commoner than for the king by 
his  charter to grant to some town or some lord  of  a manor 
the  right  to hold  a  court.  Even  when  in  the  seventeenth 
century the Courts of Star Chamber, of  the Council of Wales, 
of  the Council of the North, had become hateful  burdens, no 
one seems to have questioned the king's power of erecting new 
courts of  common  law.  A  distinction  was  drawn  between 
courts of  common law and other courts : he might not create 
a  new  court  of  equity.  Has the queen  then  now-a-days  a 
power  to create  new  courts?  It has  never  been  expressly 
taken away, and I believe we must say that it exists.  I take 
this  from  a  recent  judgment,  ' It is  a settled  constitutional 
principle or rule  of  law, that although the crown may, by its 
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prerogative,  establish  courts  to  proceed  according  to  the 
common law, yet it cannot create any new court to administer 
any other  law; and  it  is  laid  down  by  Lord  Coke  in  the 
Fourth  Institute  that  the  erection  of  a  new  court  with  a 
new  jurisdiction  cannot  be  without  an  act  of  parliament' 
(In re Bp. of  Natal, 3  Moore, P.C. (N.S.)  152).  AS a  matter 
of  fact  this  prerogative  power  of  erecting  new  courts  has 
not  been  used  in  England  for  a  very  long  time  past.  In 
recent  years  the  whole  country  has  been  covered  by  a 
network  of  new  local  courts-the  (so-called)  new  county 
courts.  But  this  was  not  done  under  an  exercise  of  the 
prerogative, but  by  virtue  of  powers  given  to the Queen  in 
Council  by  a  statute  of  1846 (9 and  10 Vic.,  c.  95) which 
regulated  the  jurisdiction  of  these  new  courts.  There  are 
two  reasons  why  this  prerogative  has  fallen  into  disuse. 
(I)  Owing  to  inodern  changes  in  the law  a  court  which 
could administer nothing but  common  law would be a some- 
what  useless  and  very  clumsy  affair.  (2)  Owing  to  the 
appropriation  of  supplies  the queen  would  have  no  money 
with which to pay the judges of new courts unless she took it 
from  her privy purse.  Still we cannot say that the preroga- 
tive is gone ; at any moment it might become important.  In 
the first part of the eighteenth century courts were established 
in  India by virtue of  the royal prerogative, and as regards the 
colonies  I  am not sure that the power has not been exercised 
for them in much more recent times.  In 1827 the law officers 
advised the king that the extent of  his power to create a new 
court in Canada was very doubtful, and that it would be wiser 
to obtain an act of parliament. 
Often  enough  this difficulty must  occur to anyone who  is 
studying our constitutional law.  He will be told that a prero- 
gative power exists ;  then he will find a modern statute taking 
no notice of  that prerogative, but  enabling the king, or some 
one of  the high  officers, to exercise  a  more  limited  power. 
Then the question will occur to him-how  far does this modern 
statutory power take away the old  prerogative  power ?  You 
will  understand  the difficulty better from an example.  The 
great Municipal Reform Act of  1835 (now represented by the 
Municipal  Corporations  Act,  1882, 45  and  46  Vic.,  c.  50) 
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empowered  the  king  to  create  in  any borough  a  separate 
Court  of  Quarter Sessions  for  that  borough.  It laid  down 
rules as to the exercise of  that power, for instance, the court 
was  to be held  by a  recorder, who was  to be  a barrister  of 
five years' standing, and to hold office during good behaviour. 
No notice was taken of the prerogative power of erecting new 
courts.  Now  suppose  that  the  queen  creates  a  Court  of 
Quarter  Sessions  which  does  not  exactly comply  with  the 
language of  the statute-has  she power to do this?  Not by 
statute ; but  how  about  the prerogative  power?  We have 
to consider, and it  may be  a very delicate  question, how  far 
the act has tacit& curtailed the royal prerogative.  In practice 
such  questions  may  seldom  arise-the  queen's  advisers  are 
careful to keep  within  the limits  of  the statutory powers- 
but for the student, for the lecturer, the difficulty is very great. 
He will  hardly dare to say that in no conceivable case could 
the old  prerogative  power  be used  and used lawfully.  This 
comes  of  our  great  civility  to  the  king;  we  have  seldom 
said  to  him  'you  may  not  do  this,'  we  have  said,  'you 
may  do  that,'  and  then  left  to  ourselves  or  our  judges 
the problem of  deciding how far the '  may '  necessarily implies 
a '  may not.' 
One more  illustration  of  a simpler kind.  We find it laid 
down that if the king, under his great or his privy seal, prohibits 
a man  from leaving the realm, or enjoins  him to come back 
from  foreign  parts,  and  this  command  is  disobeyed,  the 
disobedience  may  be  punished  by  fine  and  imprisonment. 
I  believe that we  must  say that this is  the law, though  for 
a  long time past it has  not been used, and though any use of 
it except in  very extraordinary circumstances would  surprise 
the  nation  and  create  a  great  outcry.  Thus  our  course 
is set  about with  difficulties, with  prerogatives  disused, with 
prerogatives of  doubtful  existence,  with  prerogatives  which 
exist  by  sufferance,  merely  because  no  one  has  thought  it 
worth  while  to abolish  them. C.  CZassz>catiotz  of  the Powers of  the Cromn. 
Still we  must do our best, and I will  venture  to suggest 
the following classification of  the powers of 'the crown' (by 
which  phrase  I  understand  the powers  of  the king and the 
powers of the high officers of  state) : 
I.  Powers  relating  to  the constitution,  assembling  and 
dissolving of parliaments, and of  assenting to statutes. 
2.  Powers relating to foreign affairs, to peace and war, etc. 
3.  Powers of appointing and dismissing officers, civil and 
military, executive and judicial. 
4.  Powers  relating to the collection  and expenditure of 
the revenue. 
5.  Powers relating to military and naval forcer,. 
6.  Powers connected with the administration of justice. 
7.  Powers connected with maintenance of order. 
8.  Powers  connected  with  social  and  economic  affairs, 
such as public health, education, trade, etc. 
g.  Powers  connected  with  religion  and  the  National 
Church. 
I will  now say a few words as to the powers  of  the first 
three of  these classes ; the others we will treat if  time serves 
when we try to view as a whole the Fiscal System, the Military 
System, the Administration of Justice, the Police, Social and 
Economic Government, and the National Church. 
I.  As we have already seen, the king's power of summon- 
ing, proroguing,  dissolving  parliament, is very large.  I will 
not go over this ground again.  Briefly the law comes to this, 
that a parliament  cannot be  kept in  existence beyond seven 
years.  At the end of that period it would be dissolved without 
the king's  action;  on  the other hand  the law  requires  that 
a parliament  shall sit once in every three years, but does not 
provide any machinery whereby  a parliament  can come into 
being without  royal  summons, should  the king disobey  this 
rule. 
Then, without the king's  assent, no  bill  can  become law. 
A statute is enacted by the king, by and with the advice and 
consent  of  the  lords, spiritual  and  temporal, in  parliament 
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assembled, and by the authority of the same.  It is only since 
1445 that these last words,  'by the authority  of  the same,' 
become  a  regular  part  of  the legislative  formula.  Go back 
half  a century further, and acts are passed  by  the advice of 
the lords at the petition of the commons.  But to this day the 
form makes the statute the act of the king.  To speak of  his 
power  as a veto is hardly correct; the bill  will  not  become 
law if he merely abstains from  interfering, it will  not become 
law unless he expressly assents.  The last occasion on which 
that assent was withheld, was in  1707, when Anne withheld it 
from the Scotch Militia Bill.  William I11 had withheld  it on 
several  important  occasions.  It seems  to  me  that  circum- 
stances might be conceived in which the king's ministers might 
advise him to refuse consent, and yet escape general condem- 
nation, as on  the sudden outbreak of  a war or some similar 
unforeseen  emergency. 
Really, however, in a working sketch of the constitution  it 
is more  important  to notice  that the king has a considerable 
power in  constituting one of  the two Houses.  If the bishops 
are not royal  nominees, this is merely because a bare form of 
election  by  the  cathedral  chapters  is  kept  up.  The king 
again can create as many temporal peers as he pleases, but the 
hereditary principle makes any recourse to this power for the 
purpose  of  packing  the  House  an  objectionable  measure. 
A threat, however, of using it, has on more than one occasion 
proved  effectual, and without  doing anything that is  thought 
at all strange, a modern  cabinet  can  use this prerogative  to 
reward  or shelve its followers, and to divide the members of 
the ministry between the two Houses. 
2.  Next,  I  should  place  the prerogative  of  making war 
and peace.  This power, of  the utmost importance, belongs to 
the king.  Without the consent of  parliament  he can  direct 
the invasion of  a foreign country.  Of  course, parliament has 
a  certain  check  on  this  power.  It might refuse to vote  the 
necessary supplies.  What is mare to the purpose, it insists on 
knowing  from  the  king's  ministers  what  are  the  relations 
between  the king and foreign governments, on having diplo- 
matic correspondence laid before it, and so forth.  Still it takes 
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and practically a ministry has a great deal of  power as regards 
foreign affairs, and might even force a  reluctant  nation  into 
a war from which  it would  be  impossible  to withdraw.  This 
is really a great matter. 
Stephen (following Blackstone) says that to make a war 
completely effectual it is necessary that it be publicly declared, 
and duly proclaimed  by the sovereign's authority1.  I believe 
that to be misleading, and that neither  English law, nor what 
is called International Law, requires any formal declaration of 
war"  1 believe that an English court would hold that there 
was war so soon as the queen had authorized acts of  hostility. 
Close to this  power  of  making war and peace, Blackstone 
speaks of  the power of  making treaties, and says what seems 
to me very untrue.  ' It is also the sovereign's  prerogative to 
make treaties, leagues  and alliances  with  foreign  states and 
princes.  For  it  is  by  the  law  of  nations  essential  to  the 
goodness of a league, that it be made by the sovereign power; 
and then  it  is  binding  upon  the whole  community; and in 
England the sovereign power, poad hoc, is vested in the king. 
Whatever contracts therefore  he engages  in, no  other power 
in the kingdom can legally delay, resist or annul3.' 
Now in  contradiction  to this we  may, I  believe, say that 
a  treaty  made  by  the  king  has  in  general  no  legal  effect 
whatever4.  The king, as just  said, can  mAke  peace  and  can 
make  war,  and  the  making  of  either  will  of  course  have 
important  effects:  whether  an  act  be  a  laudable attack on 
a public  enemy, or mere piracy, is one of the many questions 
that might thus be decided.  Also it seems certain that as an 
incident  to a  treaty of  peace,  the king  may  cede  territory, 
may at all events cede territory acquired  by him  during the 
H. J. Stephen, New Comntenta~ies  o~z  the Laws of E~z~Zatzd,  14th edn. vol.  11, 
p. 495 allows that 'the modern practice is by no means uniform.'  "  Convention  was  signed  at the  Hague  Conference  in  1907  according  to 
which  'the  Contracting  Powers  recognise  that  hostilities  between  themselves 
must not commence without  previous or explicit  warning  in the form either of  a 
reasoned  declaration  or of  an  ultimatum  with  conditional  declaration  of war.' 
Pad. Papers, MisceZlar~eous,  No.  I, 1908. 
~o~orrzn~entaries  1,  c. 7 §  i r . 
*  This view  was upheld  by the Privy Council  in  Walker  v.  Baird,  LR. AC. 
1892, P.  491. 
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war1.  Exactly  how  far  this  power  extends is  a  somewhat 
debateable matter, and I think it very doubtful  whether the 
queen can cede land subject to the British parliament, except 
in a treaty of  peace ;  could she sell Jersey, Guernsey, or Kent 
to  France?  I  much  doubt  it.  When  in  1782 it  became 
necessary  to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  American 
Colonies,  an  act  of  parliament was  passed  authorizing  the 
king to make peace and to repeal all statutes relating to those 
Colonies2.  But as to the more general principle put forward by 
Blackstone and Stephen, its unsoundness can be easily proved 
by reference to the law about extradition.  The common law 
of England, at least for a long time past, has been that though 
the king bound himself  to surrender criminals, still the treaty 
could not be carried out, save by virtue of an act of parliament. 
Suppose that under  such a treaty a person  was  arrested and 
brought before one of  the courts by habeas corpus; the treaty 
would have been treated as waste-paper-the  king has no power 
to send men out of the country, and cannot give himself power 
by making a treaty.  This has  been  law at least all through 
the nineteenth  century.  It is  fair to Blackstone to say that 
the point  was  not  so  clear  in  his  own  day.  The Court of 
Exchequer seems to have thought that the king might hand 
over fugitives.  However, there is  no doubt about the matter 
now.  Our  earliest  extradition  treaties  were  individually 
sanctioned by  parliament.  The general  act, 1870 (33 and 34 
Vic.,  c.  52), now  in  force,  enables  the  queen, by  Order  in 
Council, to apply that act in the case of any foreign state with 
which she has made an arrangement for reciprocal extradition. 
This is a good instance of a power given to the queen by act of 
parliament, one of those royal powers which me  do not usually 
call  prerogatives.  I  take  extradition  as  one  example, but 
the general  principle is  quite  unsound.  Suppose the queen 
contracts with  France that English  iron or coal shall not be 
exported to France-until  a statute has been passed forbidding 
exportation, one may export and laugh  at the treaty.  Still, 
1 For recent cases and debates bearing on the cession  of  territory,  see Ilbert, 
Gozarttnrent of ltzd~a,  and edn. p. 20;. 
22 Geo.  III,  c. 46: see Forsyth, Cases aud Opiltiunx in ConstitutionalLa~u, 
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though  this  is  so, we  must  remark  that the king  has here 
a very substantial power, though it does  not operate directly 
on  the  law.  It would  obviously  be  a  serious  step,  were 
parliament  to refuse to pass the laws necessary  for carrying 
out a  treaty already  concluded.  The honour  of  the nation 
might be  already pledged.  The interrogation of ministers in 
parliament, perhaps, is a sufficient guard against this danger. 
In this context the power to send and receive ambassadors 
deserves  notice.  It has  some  important  legal  effects.  An 
ambassador accredited to the queen occupies a very privileged 
place.  To a  large  extent  he, his  family,  his  suite and  his 
servants, are  placed  outside  the ordinary  civil  and criminal 
law of  the country, it  being unlawful  and criminal to arrest 
them, or  to exercise any compulsory process  against them. 
In this matter the English courts receive what  they consider 
to be the best doctrines of International Law.  But the arrest 
of an ambassador, or of any servant of his, publicly registered 
as such, is punishable under a statute of  1708 (7 Anne, c.  12). 
That statute was passed in consequence of  the ambassador of 
Peter the Great having been arrested for debt, and it denounces 
a very severe punishment against those who are guilty of  like 
acts in the future.  The exact limits of  the privilege  are not 
in all respects well defined, and are, I think, best discussed as 
a topic of  International Law. 
A brief  note  on the treatment  by our law of  aliens  may 
not be out of  place.  By the common law, and down to 1870, 
an  alien  could  not  hold  real  property  in  England.  The 
common  law allowed him  to hire a house for his own habita- 
tion, and  an act of 1844 (7 and 8 Vic., c. 66),  allowed him  in 
certain  circumstances  to  take  a  lease  for  21  years  at  the 
!ongest.  He was  incapable  of  inheriting  land,  and  if  he 
purchased  land  the king became  entitled  to it-might  turn 
him  out, and  take the land to himself.  On the other hand 
the  alien  could  hold  movable  goods,  could  deal  with  them 
freely, and bring actions for debts or for wrongs done to his 
person  or his  goods.  In 1870 the law was  changed  by  the 
Naturalization Act (33 and 34 Vic., c. 14),  which declared that 
real  and  personal  property  of  every  kind  in  the  United 
Kingdom  might  be  acquired,  held,  and  disposed  of  by  an 
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alien,  as though  he were  a  British  subject;  but  he was  not 
qualified to be the owner of a British ship, and the act did not 
qualify him for any office, or for any parliamentary, municipal, 
or other franchise.  I believe that, as regards all that we can 
call private law, property, tort, co~~tract  and so forth, we have 
no need now-a-days to distinguish between  subject and alien, 
save in that one matter of the ownership of British ships.  On 
the other hand I think we may say that as a general rule  our 
common law, still in  force, excludes aliens from political offices 
and political rights, and the act of  1700 settling the succession 
to the crown expressly declares that no alien can be a member 
of  the Privy Council, or of  either House of  Parliament.  But 
an alien  can  gain  even  political  rights by ceasing to be  an 
alien : by becoming naturalized. 
An act of parliament might  of  course turn  an alien  into 
a subject, and until lately acts having the object of naturalizing 
this  or  that  foreigner  were  not  uncomnlon.  A  statute, 
however, was necessary ; it seems to have been  established at 
an  early  time,  certainly  before  Coke, that the king without 
parliament  could  not  turn  an  alien  into  a  subject  for  all 
purposes.  He might for some, but not for all.  This doctrine 
gave rise  to the class of  persons  known  as denizens-inter- 
mediate  between  subjects and  aliens.  The denizen  was  so 
made by the king's  letters patent, i.e. by an act done by the 
king without  parliament.  The limit  to the royal  power  (as 
I  understand it) was  this: the person  whom  the king made 
a denizen of his realm  became  capable of  acquiring lands by 
purchase or devise, and of  holding them  when acquired, and 
in  general  he became  a  subject  of  the realm,  but  the king 
could  not  make him capable of  inheriting.  An act of parlia- 
ment  might of  course do even this, and  Naturalization Acts 
(I believe) usually did  it, but  the king could not do it.  This 
is worthy of notice as a good illustration of a matter of which I 
have already spoken.  Neither now nor at any time past can we 
say  with  any  exactness  that  the  function  of  the  English 
parliament  is  purely  legislative,  that  cf  the  English  king 
purely executive.  Parliament habitually passed acts natural- 
izing  this  person  and  that  by  name;  if  we  &all these  acts 
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patent, which  do almost exactly the same thing?  The line 
between  making  A. B. a denizen and naturalizing him  is not 
the line between executive and legislative functions.  The act 
of  1870, amending  the  previous  act  of  1844, has  provided 
a mode whereby persons may be  naturalized  without special 
act  of  parliament,  but  has  expressly preserved  the queen's 
power of granting letters of denization.  I should imagine that 
such power is  seldom  if  ever used, for it is easy to become 
naturalized.  British  nationality  can  now  be  granted  by  a 
Secretary of State.  The applicant must have resided in  the 
United Kingdom for five years, or have been in the service of 
the crown for five years, and  must  intend  when  naturalized 
to reside in the United Kingdom, or to serve under the crown. 
The Secretary has  an absolute discretion  in  giving or with- 
holding the desired  certificate, and need  assign no reason for 
refusal.  The oath  of  allegiance  must  be  taken.  If  the 
certificate be granted, then  the naturalized alien shall, within 
the United Kingdom, have all political  and other rights and 
privileges to which a British subject is entitled1. 
3.  I  think  it  well  to  notice  separately  that  almost  all 
those who  have any governmental  or judicial  powers of  any 
high  order  are appointed by the queen ; if  their powers are 
of  a  judicial  kind,  they  generally  hold  office  during  good 
behaviour; if  their powers are not judicisl, they generally hold 
office merely during the queen's  good  pleasure and no reason 
need  be  assigned  for  dismissing  them.  I  think  it  well  to 
notice  this separately, for  it is these powers of  appointment 
and  dismissal  which  give  to our scheme of  government  the 
requisite unity.  The privy councillors hold their places during 
good pleasure, so do those high ofiicers of  state who form the 
ministry.  It is not usual  to remove  a  privy  councillor, and 
as  regards  the  choice  of  ministers,  the  king  is  practically 
obliged to suit himself to the will of  the House of  Commons. 
But the legal  power  is  absolute;  and  it  is just  because  the 
legal  power is absolute that our system of  party government 
is possible. 
I  mention  this  power  of  appointing  and  dismissing  the 
A criticism of the Act may be found in the Report of  an Inter-departmental 
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high officers of  state by itself because it is so very important, 
but of course the king has a very general power of appointing 
not only those whom we  speak of  as collectively forming the 
ministry, but all or almost all of those who hold public offices 
of first-rate importance.  Blackstone calls him the fountain of 
honour, of office and of privilege.  As regards mere honours, it 
were needless to say much; the making of knights and baronets, 
the  invention  of  new  orders  of  knighthood,  the  conferring 
of  ceremonial  precedence,  is  no very  great matter;  and  as 
to  the  power  of  making  peers,  which  is  of  considerable 
importance, we  have already spoken.  But look at the whole 
legal  structure  of  society, and  we  shall generally  find  that 
the holders of  important public  offices  are appointed by the 
king and very commonly hold  their  posts  merely during his 
pleasure.  I do not think it possible to lay down any sweeping 
principle about this matter : the terms and mode of  appoint- 
ment vary very greatly.  Thus allnost  all persons  who  have 
any judicial  duties  to  perform  are appointed  by  the  king, 
but  that  is  not  universally  true;  the  county  court  judges 
are appointed by the Lord Chancellor under statutory power. 
Again, we  may say that since  1700, it has been  the general 
policy  of  the legislature  to secure  the independence  of  the 
judges  by making their  tenure of  office  tenure  during good 
behaviour.  The judges  of  the  superior courts hold  during 
good behaviour, but can be dismissed on an address presented 
by  both  Houses  of  Parliament.  The tenure of  the county 
court judges  is rather different : they can be removed  by the 
Lord Chancellor for inability or misbehaviour.  On the other 
hand the justices  of  the peace, whose duties may perhaps be 
said to be in part judicial, in part executive, hold  only during 
good  pleasure and can  be dismissed  without the assignment 
of  any cause.  It is, on the other hand, the general  policy of 
our modern law that executive officers shall hold only during 
good  pleasure,  shall  be  dismissible without  the  assignment 
of  any cause.  But we  must  look  to the statute book  about 
each  office,  and  not  rely  very  confidently  on  any  general 
principle.  For instance, take the Comptroller and Auditor- 
General:  we do not call him a judge ; still it has been thought 
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person,  and looking to the act under which he  is appointed 
(1866,  29 and  30 Vic., c.  39), we  find that  he holds  during 
good behaviour subject to removal on an address presented by 
both Houses of Parliament.  We must remember too that we 
cannot  state this general policy  as  a  rule  of  common  law; 
formerly the king had  a very large power of  granting offices 
on what terms he pleased ; down  to William 111's  reign, we 
find the judges  appointed dz~mnte  beneplacito ; on  the other 
hand  a large  number  of  executive offices, as we  should  call 
them, places  in  the Exchequer and so forth, were  held  for 
life or for several lives.  To take one more instance:  a county 
police force is under the command of a chief constable.  Now 
a pviori we cannot tell whether or no this officer is appointed 
by the king;  were we  to guess that he  is, we  should  guess 
wrongly, for he is appointed by the justices in quarter session. 
The extent to which what I may call the subordinate govern- 
ment  of  the country is  under  the control  of  the king,  the 
central government, the extent to which it is ordered by local 
authorities, the quarter sessions, the municipal  counties, the 
constitution  of  these  local  authorities-these  are  matters 
regulated  in  various ways  by countless  acts, which  can  only 
be  studied  in  detail.  A  great  vague  phrase  such  as 'The 
executive  power  is  in  the  king  and  is  exercised  by  the 
ministry'  gives  us  no  help  whatever. 
D.  The Fzscal  System. 
We turn to say a  little of  our  fiscal  system-of  the col- 
lection and expenditure of  the royal  or the national revenue. 
The first  point  that  we  have  to seize  in  dealing  with  this 
subject historically is that in  old  times the national  revenue 
was very really the king's revenue, or, to put  it another way, 
there was no national revenue ; whatever money came to the 
king's  hand  was  his  to deal  with  as he  pleased,  whether it 
consisted  of  the rents  of  his  demesne  lands,  or the  profits 
of the feudal tenures, or the outcome of  the aids or subsidies 
granted  to  him  by  the  great  council  of  the  nation.  The 
crown lands were the king's  lands; what  is  more, the king's 
lands were the crown lands-a  distinction between the king's 
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private capacity and his public capacity was not yet observed. 
Before the Norman  Conquest  there was  indeed  land  which 
was  conceived of  as belonging  to the people, the folk-land ; 
and the king himself could make no part of  it his own without 
the consent of  the wise1.  But at the Conquest  this simply 
becomes  terra  Regis,  and  very  probably  the  Conquest  did 
but  hasten the end  of a  process that had  already gone far. 
In later days we  find  the practical  denial of  any distinction 
between  the property  which  the king  has, as king, and  the 
property that he has, as man, carried  to its logical extreme. 
'If,'  says  Coke, 'the  king  purchaseth  lands  of  the  custom 
of  gavelkind and die  leaving divers sons, the eldest son shall 
only inherit  these lands1!  So on  the death of  Edward VI 
all  his  fee  simple  lands,  however  acquired,  descended  to 
the Lady Mary, to the exclusion  of  her half-sister  the Lady 
EIizabeth.  All  the  lands  of  the  king,  by  whatever  title 
acquired, were his to grant away as he pleased ;  on the other 
hand,  he  could  not  devise  them  by  his  will.  The notion 
that the king was  in  any sense a  trustee for the nation  of 
these lands grew  up  but very slowly;  rather the notion  was 
that the king had  a large property of his  own, and that he 
ought not  therefore to come begging of  his subjects except 
on special occasions.  No distinction was taken between land 
which the king had bought with money out of his own pocket 
and land which came to him by way (for example) of escheat. 
Nor  was this singular;  other persons besides  the king got 
lands by way of escheat.  Complaints against the king's lavish 
grants to his favourites are from time to time loud, but they 
do not issue in prospective legislation;  they issue in  acts of 
resumption-acts  enabling or obliging the king to resume the 
lands granted away by himself or his predecessors.  Thus in 
1450 a  general  act of  resumption  was  passed,  by which  all 
grants made since the accession  of  Henry VI in  1422  were 
annulled.  A  similar act was passed in 1473  under Edward IV. 
In 1485, immediately after the Battle of Bosworth, the grants 
made by the kings ot the House of York were annulled.  This 
was, I believe, the last  precedentqor  an  act of  resumption 
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when  in  1700 William  I11 was  compelled to assent to an act 
annulling all  his  grants of  Irish  land.  The passing  of  this 
act is described  at the very end  of  Macaulay's  history ; it is 
perhaps the most noteworthy example of the practice known 
as '  tacking a money-bill '--the  assent of the House of Lords 
to a  measure  which  may  well  seem to us  extremely  unjust 
was extorted  by the addition  to the bill  of  clauses granting 
the land  tax ; the lords, it was contended, could  not amend 
this money-bill, while to reject it would  have been to deprive 
the crown of  the means of  carrying on  government.  It was, 
I  believe, this  incident which  led  to the first prospective  re- 
straint on the king's  power  of  granting away his lands.  On 
the accession of Anne an act was passed  (I Anne, c.  I) which 
restricted  the queen's  power  of  alienation to the granting of 
leases, which in general were not to be for more than 31 years 
or three lives, and were to reserve the ancient rent or a reason- 
able  rent.  Now  even  this  act drew no distinction  between 
lands belonging to the queen in her public, and those belonging 
to her in  her private capacity.  It placed the same restriction 
on  the  alienation  of  any of  her  lands.  It is just  another 
century before the distinction, to which I have  referred, finds 
expression  in  the  statute  book.  This  was  done  in  1800 
by  39  and  40  Geo.  111, c.  88.  By,a  process  which  I  shall 
describe hereafter, a distinction  had  by this  time been  made 
between  that part  of  the royal  revenue that was  devoted to 
the support of the king's  household  and of  the honour and 
dignity  of  the  crown  of  Great  Britain  and  the  great bulk 
of  the revenue which was to be used for what we may loosely 
call national purposes, and  since the accession of  George I11 
the revenue  of the crown  lands  had  come  under  the  latter 
head.  It was at least a serious question whether lands which 
King George had  bought out of  what may be styled his own 
pocket-money were not subject to that restraint on alienation 
that was  imposed  in  1701.  SO in  1800  parliament  enabled 
the king to hold land in a private capacity.  Land purchased 
by him  out of  money devoted  to  his  privy  purse  was  to be 
held  by him with all  that liberty of alienation that a subject 
has; he was, for  example, to have power to devise them  by 
his  will.  However  a  good  many other  statutes  have  been 
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required  to  make  this  matter  clear,  and  I  think  that  it  is 
not until  1862 that we  find in the statute book such a phrase 
as 'the private estates of  Her Majesty.'  I am  not very sure 
that one part of  the old law does not yet prevail.  The king, 
it  used  to  be  said, could  have  no  heir  but  the heir  to the 
crown.  I have given  you  Coke's  illustrations  of  this  and  I 
cannot  find  that the  rule  has  been  altered ;  so  that  if  the 
queen died  intestate and  if  according to the usuaI  canons of 
inheritance, three  daughters would  be  her  co-heiresses ;  the 
eldest would  inherit not only the crown  of  Great Britain  but 
also Osborne House  or whatever private estates in  fee simple 
the queen had at her death.  But I will not say this confidently, 
for there are many long acts of parliament. 
I mention  these  things  in  order  to  show how  slow  and 
how recent has been the growth in  our law of  that distinction 
between  the national  revenue  and the king's  private pocket- 
money  which  we  naturally  suppose  to  exist.  It has  taken 
many  statutes  to  get  this  matter  clear.  It  becomes  clear 
gradually as parliament takes  upon  itself  to appropriate the 
supplies that it grants, to say that they  are only to be  used 
for  certain  definite  purposes.  Of  the  early history  of this 
appropriation  of  supplies  we  have  already  said  something. 
In 1665 Charles I1 asked  a very large sum  of  money for the 
Dutch war, and consented  that  a  clause  should  be  inserted 
in  the  act declaring  that  the  money  raised  under  that  act 
should  be applicable only to the purposes  of  the war.  This 
was an important concession, and similar appropriations were 
afterwards made during his reign.  Since the Revolution the 
practice  has,  I  believe, never  varied;  in  granting  money  to 
the  crown, parliament  has  appropriated  the  supply  to par- 
ticular purposes more or less narrowly defined. 
At this point  it  becomes necessary to remember that the 
king had  a very considerable revenue which  was not granted 
to him by parliament.  This is what Blackstone speaks of  as 
the  king's  ordinary  revenue  as  contrasted  with  that  extra- 
ordinary revenue  which  arises  from  taxation1.  He classifies 
it thus : first there are revenues of  an  ecclesiastical  kind, the 
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custody of  the temporalities of  bishops,  the  first-fruits  and 
tenths, and some minor matters.  Next come the rents of the 
demesne lands, the profits of  tenure, wardships and marriages 
(abolished  at the Restoration), also the prerogatives of  pur- 
veyance  and  preemption  (abolished  at the same time), the 
profits of  the royal  forests ; the profits of  the king's  ordinary 
courts  of  justice,  fines, forfeitures, amercements ; royal  fish ; 
wreck of  the sea ; royal mines ; treasure trove; waifs, estrays, 
deodands, escheats, idiots.  Many of  these sources of  income 
must always have been trifling, others became trifling in course 
of  time, but still  in  the seventeenth  century the king  had  a 
considerable revenue which was  all  his own ; he  required  no 
grant from  parliament  to  help  him  to this,  and  to  dictate 
to him  how he should  spend  this would  have been  a strong 
measure;  in  such case  he  might  plausibly  have  complained 
that  he  was  treated  more  harshly  than  the  meanest  of  his 
subjects, who would  be  suffered  to spend  his own  income  in 
his  own  way.  The crown  lands  were  still  of  considerable 
value and much profit could be made of the feudal rights, also 
of  purveyance and preemption. 
Now  at the Restoration the most profitable sources of this 
hereditary revenue  were abolished.  You  will  have been  ac- 
customed to consider the abolitionaf the military tenures as 
an  incident  in the history of the law of  real  property.  It is 
far more than this:  it  is a great  event in the history of  the 
royal  and national revenue.  It was necessary to compensate 
the king for the loss of  income that he was to sustain ; '  and 
now,'says the act, 'to the intent and purpose that his Majesty 
his heirs and successors may receive a full  and ample recom- 
pence and satisfaction' for the abolished rights, 'be it enacted 
that there  shall be  paid  to the king's  Majesty his  heirs  and 
successors for ever hereafter in  recompense  as aforesaid' the 
rates  and  duties  following.  The act  then  imposes  certain 
excise  duties  on  beer, cider, spirits  and  so  forth.  Now this 
is the hereditary excise, given to the king, his  heirs and suc- 
cessors  for  ever  as a  valuable  consideration  for  abolition  of 
the  military  tenures.  This then  gave  to the king  a  source 
of ordinary and hereditary revenue consisting of a tax.  Also 
it imposed  a perpetual  tax, and this  was  a new thing.  The 
indirect taxes, the customs, tonnage and poundage had indeed 
been granted to the king for life from the time of  Henry VII 
to that of James  I, but  only for  life;  and,  as  you  will  re- 
member, parliament  had  refused to grant them to Charles I 
for more than a year.  The direct taxes, the subsidies, tenths 
and fifteenths were granted for the occasion only. 
But it is  not of  the manner  of  taxation that I would  at 
this  moment  speak, but  rather  of  the gradual  separation  of 
what, using unlawyerly terms, we  may call the king's private 
pocket-money from the national revenue.  When William I11 
came to the throne he had the hereditary excise, also he had 
what  remained  of  the old  hereditary  revenue.  Parliament 
granted to him and Mary a further excise for their joint  lives 
and the life of  the survivor.  This revenue was the king's and 
unappropriated.  In 1695 a step was made.  I think we  may 
say that for the first time the notion of  a civil list appears on 
the statute book.  It is intended, says the act, that the sum 
of  £700,000  a  year  shall  be supplied  to his  majesty for the 
service of  his household  and family, and for other necessary 
expenses alld occasions.  A new tax, a tonnage and poundage, 
is granted to the king for his  life, but  it is provided  that if 
the revenue  arising  from  certain  sources  there  mentioned, 
including the crown lands, many of  the smaller prerogatives, 
the hereditary excise, the excise  which  William  has for  his 
life and the tax now granted  him  shall  in  any year  exceed 
the L~OO,OOO,  then  no more  than that sum is to be issued 
or applied  to any use  or purpose without  the authority of 
parliament (9 and 10 Will. 111, c. 23).  A somewhat different 
arrangement was made in 1700, and on the accession of Anne 
we  find  again that certain sources of  revenue  are declared to 
be for the support of  her majesty's household and the honour 
and dignity of  the crown.  These are in  the main  such as 
I have lately mentioned, the old prerogative rights, the crown 
lands, the hereditary  excise, and certain excise  and customs 
duties which  are granted to Anne during her life.  A similar 
arrangement was made on the accession of George I, but with 
this addition that besides the sources of revenue thus set apart 
for him, he was  to have a  furthp sum  of £~zo,ooo  for the 
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and occasions.  This sum was to come out of  the produce of 
certain taxes which were to be massed together to form what 
was to be called 'the aggregate fund.'  It was intended that 
the  king  should  thus  have  at his  command  an  income  of 
£700,000.  A  very  similar  arrangement  was  made  on  the 
accession of George 11, but parliament promised that the sum 
at his disposal should be £800,000  per  annum.  On the ac- 
cession of  George  111 another  large  step was  made, for  the 
king gave up  for his  life  the greater part  of  the hereditary 
revenues  ~f the  crown  including  the crown  lands, many  of 
the minor  prerogatives  and  the hereditary excise.  In return 
a sum of £800,000  was to be  paid  to him yearly out of  'the 
aggregate fund.'  In  1780, however, his majesty had to come 
to parliament for the payment  of  his  debts.  Parliament  in- 
sisted on a more economical management of what had come to 
be called his civil list revenues, and forbad him to charge them 
with pensions beyond a limited amount.  It divided the pay- 
ments that were to be made out of  such revenues  into eight 
classes ; and we  can learn from the act in question that these 
were  still of  a  miscellaneous  nature:  the second  consists  of 
the  salaries  of  the judges,  the  third  of  the  salaries  of  the 
ambassadors, the fourth of tradesmen's bills.  George IV again 
on  his  accession gave up the same hereditary revenues  that 
George I I I had given up.  In return he was to have £850,000 
out  of  what  had  now become  the Consolidated  Fund.  This 
sum  still  included  the salaries of  judges, ambassadors, com- 
missioners  of  the  treasury;  but  there  is  now  set apart, as 
what is to be the king's  pocket-money in the narrowest sense, 
A60,000 per annum.  William  IV gave up what his  brother 
had  given  up  and  he gave  up somewhat  more,  namely  the 
droits of  the admiralty and the droits of  the crown ; in return 
he  was  given  what  seems  much  less, namely  £f;51o,ooo per 
annum ; but  at this  time the civil  list  was  relieved  of  the 
salaries of  judges  and ambassadors.  The queen  again gave 
up what her uncle had given up, and was to receive £385,000  a 
year  out  of  the Consolidated  Fund.  Besides  this she was 
given  a  power  of  granting  pensions  to  a  certain  limited 
amount-£1  200 in  each  year. 
I have been  obliged to deal with these details  in  order to 
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explain what the  law  now  is  as to the hereditary revenues. 
If  the  queen  were  now  to  die  the Prince  of  Wales  would 
become  entitled  to these revenues,  including  the hereditary 
excise.  This is curious, for the hereditary excise is not now 
collected.  As  an expedient  for  raising  money,  it  has  long 
since been superseded.  But when William IV died, the queen 
immediately became entitled to it ; the officers  of  the inland 
revenue  proceeded  to collect  it, and had  not the queen con- 
sented to give it up, it would  be  collected now under the act 
of  Charles  I1 which  abolished  the  military  tenures.  AS a 
matter  of  fact, a  few  months  after  her  accession  she  gave 
her consent to the act settling a revenue upon  her, and that 
act remitted  all money which  had become due for the here- 
ditary excise.  If the Prince of  Wales now came to the throne 
this would  happen  over  again :  what  he would  be  entitled 
to would  be  the hereditary revenue, including the excise-a 
tax which  would  have to be  collected  under the provisions 
of  the act of  1660, 12 Car. 11, c. 24.  This may well  seem 
rather absurd.  It seems as if  parliament had considered that 
a king could not, even with parliament's concurrence, deprive 
his successors of  their hereditary rights, or that at all events 
it would not be fair to ask a king to do it1. 
Practically,  then,  we  have  come  to have  a  king  with  a 
salary.  The sum of  £385,000  was to be paid yearly out  of 
the Consolidated  Fund  for  the purposes  of  the civil list, but 
the queen has had and still has  a limited power of  granting 
pensions payable  out of  the Consolidated  Fund, and  in  con- 
sequence of  the exercise of  this power the civil list  payments 
now amount to something more than £~po,ooo  a year.  Even 
this sum, however, is to a certain extent appropriated  by the 
act  passed  on  the  queen's  accession.  Thus,  for  example, 
£1  3 1,260 is a~signed  for 'salaries of her majesty's household and 
retired allowances.'  Only £60,000  is allotted to H.M.'s privy 
purse, and  we  may  say that this is the only sum paid by the 
nation  to the  queen  over  which  she  has  an  absolutely un- 
fettered power.  I do not mean that this is all that the queen 
Ry the Civil List Act of  1901 (I Ed. VII, c,  4) the hereditary revenues were 
again directed to be paid into the Exchequer and to form part of the Consolidated 
Fund. Co~stitzctionnd  History  The Arationnd Debt 
receives-she  holds,  for  instance,  the  Duchy  of  Lancaster, 
and has not  surrendered  the revenue  arising from  her ducal 
rights, and it may be that there are some minor  prerogatives 
of  the crown the revenue of  which has not been  surrendered : 
the  revenue  derived  from  the first-fruits  and  tenths  of  the 
clergy has long been given up (as you may read in Blackstone) 
to  form  Queen  Anne's  bounty  for  the augmentation of the 
maintenance of the poorer clergy.  Still we have come to this, 
that the 'royal revenue,' using that phrase in  its large sense, is 
now hard on  £go,ooo,ooo  a year, out of  which less than  half 
a  million is  devoted  to the queen's  civil  list, and ,&~O,OOO  to 
the  queen's  privy  purse.  And  yet  to give  the name royal 
revenue to the whole ninety millions is not  foolish.  All of  it 
is granted by  parliament  to the queen, though  appropriated 
to particular services ; none of  it comes out of  the Exchequer 
without a warrant under the queen's sign manual1. 
Let us  now  take a brief  view  of  the legal  aspect  of  the 
national  finance at the present  day.  We have  to  consider 
how this large revenue of  £go,ooo,ooo is obtained, and how it 
is spent.  First a few words about the Consolidated Fund and 
about  the National  Debt.  Back in the Middle Ages we find 
our kings large borrowers ; they pledge, or  profess to pledge, 
what  they  can;  sometimes  the proceeds  of  taxes  not  yet 
collected, sometimes  the crown  lands, sometimes  the crown 
jewels ; in  the days of  Edward I and Edward I1 some of  the 
taxes are farmed  by  Italian  merchants.  Practically  in  the 
end the nation has to pay; this is one of the king's expedients 
of  practically  forcing  parliament  to grant  him  money;  his 
debts  must  be  paid, or his  credit  arnong  foreigners  will  be 
ruined.  Under  Henry  VIII  parliament  does  a  scandalous 
thing: it declares that the king need not pay his debts.  At all 
times  it  is  difficult enough  to get money from the king--one 
cannot  sue him.  A  flagrant  case  occurs  under  Charles  11. 
The London  goldsmiths (the goldsmiths  of  those  days were 
The revenue  raised in 1905-6  was over 144  millions.  By the Civil List Act 
of  1901  (I  Ed. VII, c.  4)  the Civil  List  was  fixed  at £.+70,ooo appropriated as 
follows:  Privy Purse  £1  ~o,ooo;  Salaries of  Householcl  £125,800; Expenses  of 
Household  £193,000 ; Works  A20,ooo ;  Royal  Bounty,  Alms  and  Special 
Services  £13,200; Unappropriated  ~8000. 
also the bankers) had lent Charles about £13,000,  and he had 
pledged  for  the repayment  of  this sum  part of  his  revenue. 
Suddenly the Exchequer was shut against them.  It was  not 
convenient to pay them their principal; they must be content 
with the interest.  Perpetual annuities were granted  to them 
and  charged  on  the hereditary  excise.  The annuities were 
paid for four years  and then  further  payment ceased.  Even 
when  William  and  Mary  had  come  to  the  throne  it  was 
extremely doubtful  whether  these bankers  had  any remedy 
except by  petition  of  right,  and  to that remedy  they could 
not  come  except  by  the  king's  fiat.  Thus it  was  evident 
enough  that  if  money  was  to  be  borrowed  for  national 
purposes  upon  good  security,  that  security  must  be  some- 
thing other than the king's word, or the king's  letters  patent. 
In  1692 there  was  pressing  need  for  a  large  sum  for  the 
French war, and in that year it is usual to date the foundation 
of  a national debt, a debt contracted upon the security of  act 
of  parliament.  A  million was  to be borrowed.  New duties 
were to be imposed for ninety-nine years upon beer and other 
liquors.  These duties when collected were to be brought into 
the Exchequer to a separate account and were to form a fund 
for paying annuities to the creditors.  Life annuities  were to 
be granted ; each subscriber of  £100 was to have an  annuity 
of  £10  (which  was  to  be  reduced  to £7  in  1700) for  life. 
But there was an element of  gambling in  the transaction ; as 
the annuitants died their annuities were to be  divided  among 
the survivors until only seven should be left ; after that what- 
ever  fell  in  was  to  be  for  the use  of  the king.  The act 
directed  the officers of  the Exchequer to pay  the  annuities 
out of  the produce of  the tax devoted to this purpose, gave 
an  action  for  treble  damages  against  any  officer  who  dis- 
obeyed  the act; so  the creditor  would  lend  no  longer upon 
the security of  the king's  word, but  upon  the security of  an 
act  of  parliament.  You  will  observe  that  only  a  particular 
fund  was  pledged,  not  the revenue  in  general, only certain 
excise duties.  You  will  observe also  that the lenders  were 
not to see their principal again : iqstead of  this they took life 
annuities with a benefit of  survivorship. 
Now  it  is  not  for us to trace the growth  of  the national Co~stittttionad  History  The  Consolidated Fztnn! 
debt ;  enough that it grew rapidly ;  at the accession of  Anne 
it  amounted  to above  16 millions, at that  of  George  I  to 
above  54  millions, at the Peace  of  Paris  in  1763 to above 
138 millions.  During the peace it fell to 128 millions, during 
the American War it grew to 249 millions ; in  1817 after our 
long wars with France it was above 840 millions ; it has since 
been reduced to a  little below 698 millions1.  But during the 
earlier  part of  the ~eriod,  over  which  I  have just  ranged, it 
would  be  more  correct  to speak  of  the national  debts than 
of  the  national  debt.  We  have  seen  that  in  1692  certain 
specific taxes, excise duties, were imposed, and their produce 
was  charged  with  the payment  of  certain  annuities.  This 
device was repeated  over and over again in  a manner  most 
perplexing to anyone who  goes  to the statute book  for  his 
information.  Often  the return  given to the lender  took  the 
form  of  a  perpetual  annuity,  payable  to him, his executors, 
administrators,  or  assignees, but  redeemable  at  any time? 
In  1752 (25 Geo. 11, cap.  27) two great masses  of annuities 
charged  upon  various  taxes  were  consolidated  with  the 
consent  of the  proprietors;  the  taxes  on  which  they were 
charged  were  to be  carried  to  a  common  fund,  and  these 
various  annuities  were  to be  paid  out of  it.  The annuities 
thus consolidated came to be known as the consolidated  3 "1, 
bank annuities, and the consolidated 3+ "lo  bank annuities. 
Other  measures  towards  simplifying finance  were  taken 
at  various  times:  thus  the  prbduce  of  certain  taxes  was 
brought  into  one  fund  known  as  the  aggregate  fund; but 
still the whole matter was enormously complicated until  1787 
(27  Geo.  111,  C.  13), when  a  very  great  act (very  great  in 
every  sense)  was  passed;  a  very  large  part  of  the revenue 
had been  raised  by indirect  taxes, customs duties and excise 
duties, which  were  levied  under  a  vast  multitude of  acts of 
parliament;  these  were  swept  away  and  new  duties  were 
imposed  in  their  place.  But all or  most  of  the old  duties 
had  been  pledged  for  the payment  of  annuities;  it became 
necessary  to provide for these.  The whole produce  of  the 
1 In 1912 the Net Debt 3tod at &f;718,~06,~a& 
a See for instance  1% Geo.  I, c  a. 
new taxes, the revenues of  the crown lands (which George I I I, 
as you will  remember, had  surrendered), the revenue  of  the 
Post Office, in short, I believe that I am right in saying, almost 
all that could be called royal revenue was to be  brought  into 
one consolidated fund, and out of  this the various annuitants 
were  to be paid.  Since that time the Consolidated Fund has 
been the central point of English finance; whatever is received 
in  the way  of  royal  revenue  forms  part  of  that  fund,  and 
statutes direct how the annuities which are held by the public 
creditors shall be  paid  out of  that fund.  A  similar measure 
was taken in  Ireland, and in  1816 the Consolidated Fund of 
Great  Britain  and  the Consolidated  Fund  of  Ireland  were 
consolidated  into  the  Consolidated  Fund  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland. 
The  Consolidated  Fund  of  Great  Britain  is  then  the 
public revenue or royal revenue  of  Great  Britain, as collected 
under  the  laws  in  force  for  the  time  being.  No  creditor, 
therefore, of the nation can say that he has any legal interest 
in  this  or  that  mode  of  taxation.  Taxes, as we  know,  are 
frequently  readjusted-an  old  duty is  abolished-this  is  no 
breach  of  faith ; he  trusts  that parliame~lt  will  always  keep 
sufficient taxes imposed for  the payment of  his  annuity; he 
trusts that  parliament  will  not  repeal  (or, if  it  repeals, will 
substantially re-enact) the laws which direct that  his  annuity 
shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund for the time being. 
The greater part of  our national debt consists of  perpetual 
but redeemable annuities.  The person who had £1000  consols 
was entitled to be paid £30  per annum  for ever ; he  was  not 
entitled to be paid  A~ooo;  but  the queen  had  power at any 
time to redeem the annuity by paying him ,&~~oo--to  redeem 
the debt at par.  The full title of  what we  briefly call  A~ooo 
consols  is  a sum  of  £1000  consolidated 3  "1, bank annuities. 
It was this power of  redemption which enabled the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in  1888 to reduce (as we  say) the interest 
on  the national  debt; he  could  say  to  the holders  of  these 
annuities 'We shall redeem you by paying you off  at par, or if 
you prefer it you  can  have  certain  new  annuities  which  will 
bring you in 2f "1, instead of  3 ",I,.'  These are 'bank' annuities 
because the Bank of England is charged with  the business of Cotzstitz~tionad  History 
paying them, and  they  are  transferable  by  entry  in  books 
kept by the bank.  Of  the Bank of  England I should like to 
say more, but can  only say this, that though  it is a banking 
corporation  composed  of  private  individuals,  so that you  or 
I inight be lucky enough to be members of  it, still its position 
is unique.  In return for extremely valuable privileges granted 
to it by charter and acts of  parliament it has come under a 
large number of  public duties.  The same may be said of  the 
Hank of  Ireland.  Our government  banks  with  tliese  banks. 
The various commissioners who are charged with  the duty of 
collecting the taxes, pay what they collect into an account  at 
these banks called 'The account of  Her Majesty's  Exchequer.' 
Sums sufficient to meet the payments becoming due from  the 
Consolidated Fund to the national  creditors are drawn  from 
this  account  and  paid  to the chief  cashier, who  is bound  to 
see  to the payment.  This  operation  involves  the action  of 
the Treasury  and  of  the Co~nptroller  and  Auditor-General, 
but no act of parliament, no  vote of  the House of  Commons, 
is required. 
A  word  of  explanation  as to the terms  funded  and  un- 
funded debt.  Debt is funded when  the indebted nation is not 
under any obligation to pay  the principal  of  the debt, but is 
merely bound to pay the interest  for ever, or until  it  chooses 
to pay the debt.  The marl  who  has £100 of our  debt has 
no  right  to LIW  in  cash; he  has  a  right  to  £2.  15s. per 
annum  for  ever,  subject  to  the nation's  right  to pay  him 
AIW and so extinguish  his  annuity.  The holder  is  liable 
to be paid off at a year's  notice.  *Any vote  or resolution  of 
the House of  Commons signified by the Speaker in  writing 
inserted  in  the Lo~zdon Gazette  and  affixed  on  the  RoyaI 
Exchange in London, shall be deemed sufficient notice.  Rut 
besides  the funded debt there is always a certain amount of 
unfunded  debt.  Money  is  borrowed  upon  what  are  called 
exchequer bills for short and definite times, and  under  these 
the creditor  is  entitled  to receive his  principal  at a certain 
time  and  meanwhile  to receive interest. 
Now  let  us  look  at  the  revenue  which  forms the  Con- 
solidated Fund.  It is  hard  on  ninety millions.  By  far  the 
greater part of it consists of the produce of taxes and govern- 
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ment  monopolies.  Less than half-a-million  comes  from  the 
crown lands; there are the dividends  on  shares  in  the Suez 
Canal, and  there are certain  miscellaneous  receipts ; but  the 
great sources  of  revenue  are taxes and  monopolies.  I  say 
'and  monopolies,' for about ~g,ooo,ooo  come  from  the  Post 
Office, and the Post  Office, as our  Cambridge colleges have 
lately  been  reminded,  has  a  monopoly  of  carrying  letters. 
The great  heads  of  revenue  are  customs  producing  about 
twenty  millions,  excise  twenty-five  millions, stamps twelve 
millions, income-tax twelve  millions, house-tax  and  land-tax 
near three millions1.  Now by far the greater part of this large 
sum is raised under permanent acts of  parliament.  It requires 
no annual act.  If parliament  had  not  sat this year it would 
still have been levied.  If you  take up any recent volume  of 
statutes you  will  find  that only a small  part  of  the existing 
burden  of  taxation is imposed  by anything in  that book.  I 
think that at present  there are only two taxes which would 
come to an end if an act of parliament did not reimpose them, 
namely, the income-tax  and a duty on  tea.  All  the taxing 
that parliament now does in any one year is generally done by 
a single act.  I have the act of  1885 before  me.  It is a short 
act.  It continues for one year a custon~s  duty on tea at the 
rate of 6d. per lb.  It makes a few alterations in the permanent 
excise duties.  It imposes the income-tax for one year  at the 
rate  of 8d. in  the  pound.  It imposes  an  entirely  new  tax 
upon the property of  corporations.  All this  can  be  done by 
a  few  brief  sections.  The machinery  for collecting taxes is 
permanent.  There are commissioners of  customs at the head 
of  one  department, commissioners  of  inland  revenue  at the 
head of another; the manner in which taxes are to be assessed 
and collected, the duties of excise officers and customs officers 
are set  forth  in  permanent  acts.  It is  a simple thing to say 
that for yet  another year a customs duty of  6d. per  Ib. shall 
be  charged  on  tea ; that  the  income-tax shall  be  levied  at 
this or that rate.  But what it is most desirable to understand 
1  Nearly  r+g  millions was  raised  for  the financial  year,  1907-8.  The chief 
heads of  revenue (in millions) were : Customs 32 ;  Excise 30; Stamps 72;  Income 
Tax 31 ;  Estate Duty 14;  Post Office 17 ;  House Duty and Land-tax 2:;  Telegraph is  that  parliament  does  not  annually  vote  the  taxes.  If 
parliament  never  sat  again,  still  under  acts  of  parliament 
now  in  force a great  quantity of  taxes would  be  collected; 
the commissioners of  inland  revenue,  the commissioners  of 
customs, the postmaster-general, would continue to pay in vast 
sums of  money to the account of  her majesty's  exchequer. 
And money  would flow out of  the Exchequer also, to the 
amount of something like twenty-five millions a year1.  Under 
permanent  acts of  parliament  certain payments become due 
from  the Consolidated  Fund, and there  are officers charged 
with  the duty  of  seeing  that  these  are paid.  By  &r  the 
greatest  item  here  consists  of  the interest  on  the  national 
debt ; this would  be paid though parliament  never sat ;  then 
there is the queen's civil list, and a mass of  judicial and other 
salaries which parliament has made permanently payable.  It 
has  been  thought  undesirable  that  the  question  whether 
Mr Justice A.B., or the comptroller and auditor-general, shall 
be paid  his salary, should  be  annually submitted  to a  vote. 
On the other hand it has been the policy of  late years not to 
charge upon the Consolidated Fund the salary of any executive 
officer or the cost of  any government office, but to bring all 
such matters annually under the review of parliament. 
No payment  can be  made out of the Consolidated  Fund 
without the authority of an act of parliament.  Some payments, 
as we have just  seen, including the large item of interest on 
the debt, are provided  for by permanent  acts.  And now  as 
to other  payments.  These are provided  for  by  acts which 
grant supply to the queen, and then  appropriate the supply 
so granted.  The form  of  a  supply  act  is  this: 'We, your 
Majesty's  most  dutiful  and  royal  subjects,  the  Commons 
of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  in 
Parliament assembled, towards making good the supply which 
we have cheerfully granted to your  Majesty in this session of 
Parliament, have resolved  to grant to your  Majesty the sum 
hereinafter mentioned, and do therefore humbly beseech  your 
Majesty  that it may  be  enacted, and  be  it  enacted  by the 
Queen's most Excellent Majesty by and with the consent and 
advice of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in 
1 Now (1913)  over 36 millions. 
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this  present  Parliament  assembled, and by the authority of 
the  same as follows:  The Commissioners  of  her  Majesty's 
Treasury for the time being may issue out of  the Consolidated 
Fund and apply towards making good  the supply granted to 
her Majesty for the service of the year ending 31 March, 1886, 
the sum of £45,361,227.'  The appropriation clause takes this 
form:  'All  sums granted  by  this  act  are  appropriated  for 
the purposes  and services expressed in the schedule annexed 
hereto.'  Turning to the schedule we find that the appropriation 
is pretty minute.  There are sums great and  small.  These 
are instances : 
For wages, etc., to 59,000 seamen and  marines.. .  ,&z,7~8,100 
For the expense of  dockyards  and naval  yards 
at home and abroad  ...  ...  .  ..  £1,639,300 
For the volunteer corps' pay and allowances  .  ..  ,&606,ooo 
For the maintenance and repair of  Marlborough 
House  .  .  .  ...  .  .  .  ...  .  .  .  £7,120 
For the cost of  erecting a monument to the late 
Major-General Charles George Gordon  .  .  .  £500 
For her majesty's foreign and other secret services  &~O,OOO 
Now observe first that this is supply granted to the queen; 
none  of  it  will  go  out  of  the  Exchequer  without  the  sign 
manual, and the warrant of the Commissioners of the Treasury. 
Parliament does not grant money to the seamen and marines, 
or to the sculptor who makes a monument to General Gordon. 
Of  course  all  this  might  be  done, but  it  is  not  done; it  is 
thought very undesirable  that it  should  be done.  Money is 
granted to the queen ; it is placed at the disposal  of  her  and 
her  ministers.  But  she and they  are not  bound  by law  to 
spend it, at least  not  bound  by  the  Appropriation  Act.  Of 
course if  the queen's advisers withdrew all  ambassadors  from 
foreign courts, or disbanded the navy  or  the like, they might 
be  severely  blamed  and possibly  they might  be  impeached. 
But  statute does  not say to the queen  'You shall spend  so 
much on your embassies, so much on your navy.'  Rather its 
language is : ' Here is  money  for  this  purpose  and  for that; 
spend  it  if  you  please;  we  trust  the  discretion  of  your 
advisers ; the account  of  the expenditure will  be  presented Constitutional History 
to us, and votes of censure may follow.  This, however, applies 
only to expenditure within  the limits laid  down by the act: 
here is two and a quarter millions for warlike stores, £roo,ooo 
for  the royal  parks,  one hundred guineas  for expenses con- 
nected with the observation of  the transit of  Venus ; if more 
is  drawn  out  for  any of  these  purposes,  someone  will  have 
committed a crime, indeed  in  all  probability  several persons 
will have conspired to commit a crime'.'  I  may here remark 
that soldiers, sailors,  and  civil  servants  are servants  of the 
queen and of no one else, generally dismissible at a moment's 
notice and without cause assigned.  The  pay, salaries, pensions, 
for which they serve, are paid to them on behalf of the queen, 
and at least in general they can  bring no action for their pay 
against the queen's  ministers; the contract is with the queen, 
and the remedy on  it  is  a petition  of  right.  The fact  that 
parliament has voted  a supply to the queen for the payment 
of  such  salaries  or  pensions  does  not  give  them  a  remedy 
against  the lords  of  the treasury or  the secretaries  of  state 
who  are  charged  with  the  expenditure.  No  one  can  say, 
'  Under the Appropriation Act, the secretary of state for \tzar, 
or the lords of the admiralty, have received money which they 
hold upon trust for me.' 
In speaking of  the grant  and  appropriation  of  supplies 
I  have  somewhat unduly  simplified  the  course  of  busi~iess. 
Only one Appropriation Act  is  passed in each year, and that 
near  the  end  of  the  session;  that  provides  for  the whole 
estimated expenditure of  the then current year.  But  before 
the  whole  of  the  estimates  can  be  considered  it  often  is 
necessary  that the queen should  have  money.  Early in  the 
session the House of  Commons forms itself  into a committee 
of  supply  and  begins  going  through  the  estimates.  The 
minister  in  charge of  the  business  proposes  grants  one by 
one, as, for  instance, that a  sum  not  exceeding &IO,OOO  be 
granted to her majesty for the object specified in the estimate. 
1 This is  en~phasized  by a now  usnal clause,  which  empowers the treasury in 
case of  necessity to use  money appropriated  to one military purpose  for another 
military purpose.  In 1883-4  advantage was taken of this;  an act of  188j  declares 
that  what  was  done  was  lawful..  On the other  hand  even  at  a  pinch  money 
appropriated to the navy cannot be applied to the army.  F.W. M. 
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The House also forms itself into a committee of ways and 
means and therein considers how the supply thus voted  shall 
be raised : it votes that so much money be granted out of the 
Consolidated  Fund  towards  making good  the supply voted 
to her majesty.  This resolution  is  then  embodied  in  a bill 
passed early in  the session.  For instance I take up the statutes 
of  1885.  On  the  28th  of  March  an  act  obtains  the royal 
assent; it states that the Commons towards making good the 
supply voted to Her Majesty have granted the sum hereinafter 
mentioned, and that it is enacted  by Queen and  Parliament 
that the Commissioners of  the Treasury may issue out of  the 
Consolidated Fund and apply towards making good the supply 
voted  to  Her Majesty for the year ending 3 I  March, 1886, a 
sum of  ten millions odd.  The act contains no  further words 
of  appropriation ; merely says that the Commissioners of  the 
Treasury may apply this sum towards making good the supply 
that has been voted:  this supply however has been  voted, as 
I  have  already  described, for  specific purposes.  On  21 May 
another  act  of  the  same  kind  is  passed  granting  another 
thirteen millions.  On 14  August we have the Appropriation 
Act.  It grants another forty-five millions.  Then it proceeds 
to appropriate the whole of  these three sums of  ten, thirteen, 
forty-five millions, and it appropriates them'retrospectively.  It 
says that all sums granted by the two acts of March and May, 
and the present act, are appropriated and shall be deemed  to 
have  been  appropriated  as from  the date of  the passing  of 
the first  of  those  acts, for  the  purposes  expressed  in  the 
schedule to the present  act.  This, however, is rather a detail 
of  business. 
E.  The MiIitnry  System. 
We have traced  the legal  history of  our  military system 
down to the reign of  William  111.  From that time onward it 
becomes  the history of an act  passed  in  every year-known 
as the Annual Mutiny Act-an  act legalizing the existence of 
a standing army consisting of  a  certain  specified  number  of 
men  for  one  year  more.  Tlle practice  of  passing  a  whole 
Mutiny Act in every year was  continued until  1879.  In that Constitutional History  The Army Act 
year an act of a different kind was passed  and in  1881 a  new 
edition  of this act was  passed.  This act of 1881-the  Army 
Act of  1881-now  governs  the army.  But it is  an  act of  a 
very  peculiar  character-it  always  requires  another  act  to 
keep it in  force-and  in  every session  of  parliame~lt  a  brief 
act  is  passed  renewing  the  act  of  1881.  This  was  but  a 
change in  parliamentary procedure, the principle is  still pre- 
served  that  the  army shall  be  legalized  only  from  year  to 
year. 
I  have  said  that  the  legal  history  of  the  British  army 
from the days of William  I11  to the present  time is  chiefly 
the history of these annual mutiny acts.  We sometimes talk 
about the Mutiny Act being re-enacted, but do not be deceived 
by this into thinking that the same act was passed  year after 
year.  The acts grow and grow  in  bulk, and become always 
minuter and more precise.  The first Mutiny Act is a trifling 
little thing.  I  think that  I  have  stated to you the whole  of 
its sum and substance.  The act of  1881 is  a  vast code, has 
193 sections and  takes up more than 60 octavo pages.  Now 
to trace this process of growth would  take a very  long time; 
I can  only ask your attention to a few salient points.  In the 
first place  we  always have the solemn  recitals  'Whereas the 
keeping of a standing army in time of peace within the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland without the consent of 
parliament  is  against  law,'  'And  whereas  no  man  can  be 
forejudged  of  life and limb, or subjected  in  time of  peace to 
any kind  of punishment within this realm  by martial  law, or 
in  any other manner than by the judgment  of  his peers and 
according  to the  known  and  established  laws of  the realm.' 
The words 'in time of  peace' in  this last recital were not  in 
the  earliest  mutiny  acts ;  their  presence  certainly seems to 
suggest that in time of war  the subjects of  this realm  might 
be  punished  by  something  called  martial  law.  That  is  a 
point to which  I  shall  return.  As to the judgment  of one's 
peers, that I think has become sorry old nonsense.  A subject 
of  this  realm  can  be  sent  to  prison  by  one  stipendiary 
magistrate-I  fail  to  see how  he gets the judgment  of  his 
peers in any sense in which  he would not get it were he tried 
by court martial. 
Then  the  modern  acts  specify  the  precise  number  of 
soldiers that may be kept.  It is adjudged necessary  by the 
queen  and  parliament  that  a  body  of  forces  should  be 
continued  for  the  safety  of  the United  Kingdom  and  the 
defence of  the possessions  of  Her Majesty's Crown  and that 
the whole  number of  such forces  should consist  of  142,194 
men.  The queen, I take it, is not in the least bound  to keep 
that number ; it is a maximum. 
Next we  will  notice that the act expressly empowers the 
queen to make Articles of  War for the better government of 
officers and  soldiers.  The act  does  not  constitute  by any 
means  the  whole  of  our  military  code-there  is  besides  a 
large body of  Articles of War.  If  you  wish for an example 
(I have before this mentioned others) of  delegated legislative 
powers  I  know  of  no  better  than  this-for  the  queen  is 
empowered to legislate for the better  government of  officers 
and  soldiers  and she can  create new  offences.  But  the  act 
goes on to mark the limit.  No person  by such articles is to 
be subject to any punishment  extending to life  or limb,  or 
to be  kept  in  penal  servitude,  except  for  crimes  which  are 
by this  act expressly  made  subject  to such  punishment  as 
aforesaid  or  be  subject, with  reference  to any crimes  made 
punishable  by this act, to be punished  in  any manner which 
does not accord with the provisions of this act.  Now probably 
there is  a  certain (or  I  had better say uncertain) prerogative 
power  for  making articles  for  the government  of  the  army. 
The earlier Mutiny Acts only deal with mutiny and similar 
crimes, crimes which  they punish with  death, but  during the 
reigns  of  William  and  Anne Articles  of  War were  issued 
dealing with  minor  offences, and the legality of  these  seems 
to have been  admitted by parliament.  What the limit to the 
prerogative  power  was  supposed  to  be  I  am  not  certain, 
probably life and limb.  Historically, as it seems to me, there 
are difficulties in drawing any line.  The annual acts protested 
that no man should be subjected to any kind  of  punishment 
by  martial  law-if  the  king could  order that drunkards  be 
flogged, why not that mutineers be hanged?  In the act of 
3  George I, however, the king was  expressly empowered  to 
make articles  for  the better government  of his forces as well Constitutional History  Legal Position  of  Soldiers 
within the realm as without, and to inflict pains and penalties 
to be pronounced by courts martial.  This became,  I  believe, 
a standing clause in the act.  Gradually parliament expressly 
dealt with more and more offences, going always into smaller 
details, and  thus in  effect  the scope of  Articles of  War was 
limited-for  it was established as early as 1728 that the king 
could  not  impose by articles  a graver  punishment  than that 
which  the  Mutiny  Act  had  imposed.  Also  the  king  was 
advised by his law officers in  I727 that he could not commute 
the sentence pronounced  by a  court  martial  under  the  act 
-could  not substitute flogging for death. 
Now though an express power  of making articles is given 
by the annual acts this would  not  take away any previously 
existing prerogative ; so, on the whole, we  ought probably to 
believe  that when  parliament  has legalized a standing army, 
has said that the queen may keep soldiers in her pay, she has, 
if  nothing more  be  said, a power of  making  regulations  for 
their  government,  a  power  extending  to the  denunciation 
of  punishments  short  of  life  and  limb.  The modern  acts, 
however,  give her  expressly a  power  which  is more limited ; 
her articles may not inflict penal servitude or vary the punish- 
ments for the many offences for which the act itself provides. 
As to  what  these  offences  are  I  cannot  go into  many 
particulars.  There are a considerable number of offences for 
which  death  may be  inflicted.  For  instance, anyone  who 
'  misbehaves or induces others to misbehave before the enemy 
in such a manner as to show cowardice '  may be sentenced to 
death.  Some offences there  are which  are punishable  with 
death if  committed  while  on  active  service, but are  not  so 
punishable  if  committed  in  other circumstances.  Desertion 
is  a  case  in  point;  anyone  who,  while  on  active  service, 
deserts  or  attempts  to  desert  can  be  sentenced  to  death. 
Anyone who  deserts while  ndt on  active service can get no 
severer punishment  than imprisonment.  As to disobedience 
the rules are these : he who disobeys, in such a manner as to 
show a wilful defiance of authority, any lawful command given 
personally by his superior officer in the execution of his office, 
is liable to suffer death; he who disobeys any lawful command 
given by his superior officer is liable, if he commits the offence 
while  on  active  service,  to penal  servitude, if  otherwise  to 
imprisonment.  The punishments  which  can  be inflicted  are 
death,  penal  servitude  for  five  years,  imprisonment  for two 
years,  for  officers  cashiering,  for  soldiers  discharge  with 
ignominy,  forfeiture,  fines,  stoppages.  Flogging  has  lately 
disappeared ; a maximum punishment of 300 lashes was fixed 
in  I 8  I 2, of 200 lashes in I 832, in  I 867 it was confined to a few 
offences, in  1868 it was  abolished altogether in time of peace. 
In the act of I 879 it appears for the last time-25  lashes  may 
be inflicted for certain offences if  committed on active service. 
It is not to be found in the act of 1881. 
Hitherto we  have  been  dealing with  what  we  may call 
military  offences.  Now as to  other  offences,  crimes against 
the general law of  the land, the policy  of these acts has for 
a  long  time  past  been  not  to exempt the soldier  from  the 
ordinary rules  and the ordinary processes  of  the  law.  You 
may have noticed this when I was  speaking of  the first of  all 
the Mutiny Acts.  The principle is laid down broadly in what 
is  now  the standing act.  'A person  subject to military  lam 
when  in  his  majesty's  dominions,  may  be  tried  by  any 
competent civil court for  any offence for which  he would  be 
triable if he were not subject to military law.'  What is more, 
he can seldom be tried by court martial for an offence against 
the ordinary civil law-never  within the United Kingdom ;  but 
outside the United Kingdom, and if more than a hundred miles 
from any town in which  there is  a competent civil court, he 
may be tried for treason, treason-felony, murder, manslaughter 
or rape.  When the jurisdictions of courts martial and ordinary 
courts overlap, the fact that the offender has been  punished 
under  the  military  law  is  no  bar  to criminal  proceedings 
against  him, but  the  court  is  ordered  to take his  previous 
military  punishment into consideratio11 when  awarding sen- 
tence.  As regards debts and other civil causes of  action, one 
can sue a soldier and have execution against his property, but 
his person  is exempt unless the sum due be above £30.  This 
does not mean  very  much, now  that imprisonment  for  debt 
has been abolished. 
The act  contains  elaborate rules  as to the constitution 
of  courts  martial ; their  procedure  is  for  the  most  part left to regulations made by the queen and signed by a secretary 
of  state.  The act, however,  provides  how  a  prisoner  may 
challenge  his  judges,  and  provides  also  that  the  ordinary 
English  rules  of  evidence shall  be observed. 
One great branch of the act then deals with  these matters 
and the like.  It enacts a military penal code, and provides 
special  courts for enforcing that cod?.  Another large branch 
deals with billeting and the impressment of carriages.  Billet- 
ing has  been  found  necessary,  and year by year the section 
about it in the Petition of Right is solemnly suspended.  But 
the burden  is  not,  I  think, very heavy.  Soldiers  can  only 
be billeted  on  those  whom,  roughly  speaking, one  may call 
keepers of  public-houses-victualling  houses  is the statutory 
word.  The prices  to be  paid  for  accommodation  are fixed 
from time to time by parliament, and the act goes into detail; 
indeed it chronicles small beer, for not more than two pints 
thereof need be provided for any soldier per diem.  So carriages, 
carts, horses may be impressed for the transport of regimental 
baggage, all to be practically paid for at parliamentary rates. 
There is a third  great branch of  the act which deals with 
enlistment.  Now parliament for a long time left the king to 
make what  terms  he  pleased  with  his  soldiers.  Gradually, 
however, clauses  as to enlistment  make  their  way  into  the 
Mutiny  Acts.  Their object was  to provide  that the recruit 
should  really  understand  what  he  was  about,  and  not  sell 
himself  half-drunk  into  a  life-long  service.  Similar  clauses 
appear still ; the recruit must be taken before a justice  of  the 
peace, sign a declaration and so forth.  But of late parliament 
has interfered  with  the terms  of  the enlistment in  order  to 
carry  out a  policy  of  short  service.  The act of  1881 says 
that a person may be enlisted  for a period of twelve years, or 
for such less period as may be from time to time fixed by the 
queen, but not for any longer period.  There are also clauses 
providing  for passing  men  in@ the reserve.  This reserve '  it 
shall be lawful for Her Majesty in  council ' to call out, '  in case 
of imminent national danger or of great emergency by procla- 
mation, the occasion being first communicated  to parliament 
if  parliament -be  then  sitting, or if  parliament  be not  then 
sitting, declared by the proclamation.'  But though the soldier 
engages for a term of  years, the queen  is not bound  to keep 
him  for that term, he can always be  dismissed without cause 
assigned; this applies to all officers and soldiers alike from the 
general commanding in chief downwards. 
It is, I believe, a common mistake that since the Revolution 
we have no such thing as impressment or conscription  for the 
army.  Of course  no permanent  law provided  for  it, because 
there was no permanent law for the army.  Also it is true that 
this means of raising a force was only made lawful in  times of 
war, and was applied in a limited way.  But in the first place it 
was at times applied to insolvent debtors.  Imprisoned debtors 
were discharged on condition of their enlisting or finding a sub- 
stitute. This seems to  have been done on manyoccasions during 
the eighteenth century.  Then again convicted criminals were 
released upon condition of  their enlisting.  This was, I believe, 
done until the end of the Peninsular War.  Thirdly, conscription 
was applied to the pauper class.  In 1703 justices  are to raise 
and levy such able-bodied men as have not any lawful calling 
or  employment,  or visible  means  for  their  maintenance  or 
subsistence, and hand them over to the officers of  the queen's 
forces.  Similar  acts  were  passed  during  the  reigns  of 
George I1 and George 111, the persons liable to be  impressed 
were 'all  such  able-bodied, idle and disorderly persons, who 
cannot  upon  examination prove  themselves  to exercise and 
industriously follow some lawful trade or employment, or to 
have  some substance  sufficient for  their  support  and  main- 
tenance.'  I believe that clauses directing the impressment of 
able-bodied paupers were in force until 1780.  A British army 
of the eighteenth century must have been largely composed of 
bad characters, insolvent debtors, criminals, idle and disorderly 
persons.  The army was  never  popular;  the  soldiers, as  a 
class, were despised.  For a long time past we  have depended 
for supplies of men upon voluntary enlistment. 
Now  under the acts of  parliament, and within  the limits 
which  they set, the command, government, disposition  of  the 
army  is  in  the  queen.  Probably  it  is  within  this  military 
sphere  that  the  personal  will  of  the  king  has  been  most 
efficacious  within what  we  may  call  recent  times.  Even  to 
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brought under the queen's own notice. and her sign manual is 
required for many purposes.  But down to 1793 there was no 
Commander-in-chief,  or  rather  the  king  himself  really  and 
truly commanded the army.  A general might be appointed 
for a time to conduct a campaign  on  the continent; but the 
true  head  of  the  army  was  the  king.  What  led  to  the 
appointment of  a Commander-in-chief was, it seems, the use 
for  political  ends  of  the  king's  power  of  appointing  and 
dismissing  officers.  It was  thought that in  such  matters he 
ought to act on the advice of one who was primarily a soldier, 
and who stood outside party politics.  On the other hand the 
disposition, the general administration of the army has always 
been  falling  more  and  more  into  the  hands  of  a  political 
minister, a member of parliament and of the cabinet.  This is 
a particularly complex  piece of  history, and I must  shirk  it. 
Until the  beginning of the Crimean War responsibility was much 
divided between a Secretary at War, who was not a Secretary of 
State, and the Secretaries of State.  At that time the office of 
Secretary of State for War was created, and a few years after- 
wards the much  older  office Secretary at War was abolished. 
The legal necessity of  his counter-signature as an authentica- 
tion of the queen's orders, even when such orders are addressed 
to  the Commander-in-chief, secures that his  advice shall  be 
taken in  all matters relating to the disposition of  the forces, 
and he has to answer in parliament  for the advice he  gives. 
The Commander-in-chief  is trusted with a large power  as to 
the  discipline  of  the  forces,  appointment  and  promotion. 
A  political  minister ought not, it is thought, to interfere with 
these matters ;  but the highest appointments, the command in 
chief on foreign service, have the approval of  the Secretary of 
State, and in important cases become 'cabinet questions.'  As 
to the employment  of  troops in war, I believe we  may safely 
say that the Secretary of  State must always become responsible 
for this, and that his  signature is legally necessary.  But the 
relations  between  the Horse Guards and the War Office are 
delicate and  intricate, and  I cannot  pretend  to have studied 
them  closely1. 
This dualism ceased when by Orders in Council of  29 Dec. 1887 and ZI Feb. 
1888, the whole administration of the army was centred in the Commander-in-chlef, 
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And now we must go back  to the Restoration to take up 
the tale of  the militia.  The necessity for a standing army was 
denied, thing and name were hateful, the ancient force was to 
be reorganized.  The Statute of Winchester was still in force, 
the old  principle was  to be  revived.  First, however (1662), 
the act recited that 'the sole and supreme power, government, 
command and disposition of the militia, and of all forces by sea 
and land is, and by the laws of England ever was the undoubted 
right  of  his  majesty  and  his  royal  predecessors,  kings  and 
queens of England ; and that both  or either of  the Houses of 
Parliament cannot, nor ought to pretend to the same.'  Now 
the original plan of this militia is something of this kind.  The 
king appoints a Lieutenant for each county, who with the king's 
approval  appoint  Deputy-Lieutenants.  They at a  meeting 
(this comes to be called a lieutenancy meeting) are to charge 
the inhabitants of the county with the duty of finding men and 
armour  according  to this  scale:  Anyone with  a revenue  of 
£5oo, or with £6,000 in goods, must find one horse, horseman, 
and armour, and so in  proportion  if  his wealth  be  greater; 
anyone who has less than this, but has a revenue  of  £50  or 
£600  in  goods,  must  find  a  foot  soldier  and  arms.  This 
county force the Lord-Lieutenant is to command ;  the subor- 
dinate officers are to be comlnissioned by him, unless the king 
shall exercise a reserved  power of  making the appointments ; 
these officers the king can  dismiss.  Ordinarily the force can 
only  be  called  out  for  a  certain  very  limited  quantity  of 
-.xercise in  the year:  once  a year  for  four  days  there  is  a 
general  muster  and exercise of  regiments;  four times  a year 
for  two  days at a  time there  may  be an exercise  of  single 
companies and troops.  No  person  can  be forced to serve in 
person, but must send a sufficient man and pay him a certain 
statutory maintenance, twelve pence per day for a foot soldier; 
ammunition  the county must  provide; if  the force is  called 
himself  responsible  to  the  Secretary of  State for  War.  The authorrty  of  the 
Commander-in-chief was  somewhat abridged  by  Orders in  Council  of  21  Nov. 
1895, and the office  itself  was abolished after the Boer  War in  1904, when  an 
Aimy Council  was  created by  L-tters  Patent.  All  powers  exercised  under  the 
royal prerogative by the Secretary of  State for War and the Commander-in-chief 
were transferred to the Council, which in 1908 consists of  seven members including 
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into actual  service the king is  to pay wages, but these have 
to be advanced in  the first instance by the persons who  are 
charged to provide the men.  Now the object for which this 
force can be employed  is this: the Lord-Lieutenant may call 
it together, and in  case of  insurrection, rebellion, or invasion, 
may  conduct  and  employ  it  for  suppressing  of  all  such 
insurrections, and rebellions, and repelling of invasions accord- 
ing as he shall from  time to time receive directions from the 
king.  For this purpose the force may be led into any part of 
England, but this act 'is not to be deemed or taken to extend 
to the giving or declaring of any power  for the transporting 
of  any of  the subjects of  this  realm, or any way compelling 
them  to march  out of  this kingdom, otherwise than  by the 
laws of  England ought to be done.'  A force of this kind the 
opinion  of  the day considered  the  proper  force  to protect 
the kingdom  against invasion  and  rebellion.  The curiously 
aristocratic nature of  the force  will  not  escape your  notice. 
It  is to be provided by and officered by the landowners of the 
county. 
The statutes  of  Charles  I1 remained  the  basis  of  the 
militia  law  during the  first  half  of  the eighteenth  century. 
The force which it created must have been a very clumsy and 
very costly force, and despite all the grand things  that were 
said of  it, it hardly became an effective  institution.  In 1757 
(30 Geo. 11, c. 25) all the earlier statutes were swept away, and 
the force was reorganized-there  was fear of a French invasion. 
All men between  eighteen and  fifty, except certain specially 
exempted  classes,  are liable  to serve,  or to find  substitutes 
who will serve as privates in the militia.  The quota, however, 
of men for each county is fixed by statute ;  thus for Hunting- 
donshire it is 320, for Middlesex 1,600.  This requisite quota 
is to  be obtained in each county by ballot.  Within the county 
the apportioning of numbers, first to hundreds (or lieutenancy 
sub-divisions) and then  to parishes, is  accomplished  by the 
Lieutenant and Deputy-Lieutenants at lieutenancy meetings, 
and  they look  after the ballot.  A man drawn  in  the  ballot 
or his  substitute must  serve for  three years: the amount of 
exercise that can be required of him  is  minutely defined.  In 
case of actual invasion or immindht danger thereof, or in  case 
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of rebellion, the king (notifying the occasion  to parliament  if 
parliament  be then sitting) can draw out and embody all the 
militia, and place them under general officers.  The force can 
then be obliged  to serve in any part of the kingdom.  When 
the militia  is  thus embodied, the militiaman is to receive the 
pay of a regular soldier, and will come under the Mutiny Act 
and the Articles of War.  No provision was made for the pay 
of the  militia  during  training  and  exercise.  This  was  an 
intentional omission, it made necessary an annual act for pay 
and clothing, and thus gave the House of Commons a control 
similar  to that which  it  had  over the  regular  army.  The 
power oi  the crown  in  the appointment of officers was some- 
what  increased,  but  an  officer  was  to  have  a  fairly  high 
property qualification-Lso  a year for  an ensign, £200  for a 
captain, and so forth. 
In  1786 again  a  clean  sweep was  made by 26 Geo.  111, 
c. 107; this is a long and intricate militia code of 136 sections. 
The general plan of the force, however, remains that settled in 
1757.  This again  gave way  in  1802  to a  new  code of  178 
sections.  I  can  only say that  the plan  remains  much  the 
same.  Very  rarely  indeed  had  the  militia  been  drawn  out 
and embodied.  It was embodied during the Seven Years' War, 
again between  1778 and  1783, again between  1792 and  1803. 
Each embodiment is marked by a new code.  In 1815 an act 
was passed empowering the king to embody it because of  the 
war  with  France.  A  profound  peace  followed.  The ballot 
was suspended,  and I believe that even the annual exercising of 
voluntarily enlisted  militiamen was very generally suspended. 
Then in 1852 there was a new terror, and consequently a new 
act.  It did not sweep away the previous acts, indeed the act 
of 1802 is  still, to a considerable  extent, the basis of  the law. 
It  endeavoured  to make  the  militia  a  more  flexible  and 
serviceable force.  The number of men is fixed at 80,000,  but 
in  case of  actual  invasion  or  imminent  danger thereof  the 
queen may direct that 40,000 more be  raised  In this case 
she must first communicate the reason to parliament, if there 
be a parliament sitting ; if parliament be prorogued  she must 
summon it to meet  within  fourteen  days-that,  by the way, 
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together.  The  quotas for the counties are now to be fixed by 
Order in Council ; the numbers are to be raised by voluntary 
enlistment, but if this fails to produce the requisite total, then 
the ballot is to be resorted to.  In the main  the old law as to 
the obligation to serve or find a substitute is kept on  foot.  The 
whole, or part of  the force, can  be  exercised  for twenty-one 
days in a year.  By Order in  Council, however, the time may 
be  extended to fifty-six  days; by similar means the county 
force can, if  necessary,  be  exercised out of its county.  The 
law  as to embodying  the militia  for  actual  service  remains 
much  as  before.  Many  alterations  are  made  as  to  the 
appointment and qualification of  officers, tending  to give the 
commissions rather to real s~ldiers  than to the landed gentry. 
However, the ballot  really remained  in suspense.  It was 
suspended by an act of 1829 for a year, and I believe that it 
then became  the practice to pass  a similar act in every year. 
In 1865 an act of  this  kind was passed,  and  since then  the 
practice has been to include the act of  1865, which suspended 
the ballot, in the Expiring Laws Continuance Act.  But even 
while  that act remains in  force the ballot may be introduced 
by Order in Council.  This was aciually done in  1830, and the 
balloting  clauses  remained  in  play  until  February, 1832.  I 
believe that since then there has been no ballot.  The bounties 
and  pay  are  high  enough  to procure what  is  considered  a 
sufficient number of men. 
There have been a great many more changes, culminating 
in  an  important  Consolidation  Act of  1882 (45  and 46 Vic., 
c. 49).  Briefly  the result  is  this: all  the duties and  powers 
of  the Lords-Lieutenant, over or in relation to the militia, are 
taken  from  them.  These are now exerciseable by the queen 
through  a  Secretary of  State, or  any officers  to whom  the 
queen may, by the advice of a Secretary of  State, delegate such 
duties or powers.  The officers are commissioned directly by 
the queen, but  the Lieutenants have still a certain power  of 
recommending  for  first  appointments.  There  is  now  no 
permanent  statute fixing  the number  of  the militia.  It is 
lawful for her majesty to raise and keep up a militia consisting 
of such number of men as may from time to time be provided 
by  parliament.  Militiamen  are to be  enlisted voluntarily for 
some term  not longer than six years.  They go through six 
months' preliminary training ; then they are liable each year 
to be exercised for twenty-eight days, but by Order in Council 
this can be extended to fifty-six.  The force can be embodied 
for actual service by Royal Proclamation in case of  imminent 
national  danger  or  great emergency.  In  that  case, if  par- 
liament be prorogued, it must  be  summoned to meet  within 
ten days; the force can then be kept embodied until the queen 
disembodies it by proclamation.  It can be sent into any part 
of the United Kingdom, but not out of  it ; though with their 
own consent the men may be sent to Gibraltar or Malta.  As 
well  when  they are training, as when  they are embodied, the 
officers and men are under the Mutiny Act. 
As you will see, the militia while keeping its name has by 
slow degrees-every  step can be traced on the statute book- 
become  something utterly different  from what  it was  in the 
seventeenth, even in the eighteenth century.  In truth it is very 
like a second standing army.  Owing to the fact that England 
is an island, we have never taken kindly to compulsory military 
service;  the  consequence is  that  we  have  two  professional 
armies.  The old ballot clauses of 1802 are still hanging over 
our heads, but they would  be rusty machinery for the present 
day.  The militia is now quite as much  under the control of 
the crown as is the regular army.  The Lord-Lieutenant  has 
ceased to be a military officer, the militia has now but little to 
do with any organization of  the county1. 
1 Under the Territorial  and  Reselve  Forces Act  of  1907  (7  Ed. VII, c.  9) 
County Associations were establ~shed  for the purpose of rarsing a Territorial Force 
for  home  defence.  Under  Pt 111,  §  33 of  the  Act  the Army Council  was  em- 
powered  to form  Special Reservists  into regiments, battalions and other military 
bodies, as provided in the Reserve Forces Act of  1882.  The  old Militia Battalions 
do not form part of the Territorial Force, and are quite independent of the County 
Associations.  They form  'Special  Reserve  Battalions'  of  the Line regiments to 
which  they  severally  belong  and  are liahle  to active service  with  the  regular 
Battalions whenever and wherever  required.  Their officers are  'Special  Reserve 
Officers'  of  the regular  army.  The old  Militia  therefore  has ceased  to exist  in 
name, In fact and in law, for though with the exception of twenty-three suppressed 
Battalions, the old  Militia  Battalions have been  transferred  to the new ' Special 
Reserve,'  they are no longer  liable only for service in the United  Kingdom and 
Ireland, nor are they enlisted on the old Milltia basis.  The Volunteer Territorial 
Force (whlch  includes  Yeomanry  and Volunteers)  is  more  akin to the ancient Constitutional History 
The treatment which  the navy has received  at the hands 
of  parliament  has been  curiously  different  from  that of  the 
army.  While the statute book  bristles  with  acts about the 
army, acts about the navy are very  few.  I  can  only notice 
a very few points. 
In the first  place  it has not been asserted that the main- 
tenance of  a  standing navy  even  in  time of  peace, without 
the  consent of  parliament, is  against  law.  In point  of  fact 
parliament  has long since acquired just  as much power over 
the navy as over the army.  This power has been(acquired by 
means of appropriation acts.  In 1885, for example, a sum of 
2Q  millions odd was appropriated for the wages, etc. of 59,000 
seamen  and  marines,  so  much  for  victuals  and  clothing, so 
much for the expenses of  dockyards, and so forth.  This has 
practically obliged the king to have in parliament a minister 
who will state the needs of the navy, and the manner in which 
money  is  spent.  Rut  no  act of  parliament  is  necessary  to 
legalize the very existence of a royal navy.  As to discipline: 
this was  long regulated  by a  statute made immediately after 
the Restoration (13 Car. 11, c.  g).  This having been  several 
times amended was  replaced  by an act of  1749 (22 Geo. 11, 
c. 33).  This code, with some amendments, remained  in force 
until  1860, when it was replaced by another.  The act now in 
force  is the Naval  Discipline  Act of  1866 (29 and  30 Vic., 
c.  log).  It covers  much the same ground  as the act which 
regulates  the  discipline  of  the  army: defines  offences  and 
imposes  punishments.  In the past  there was  this  difference, 
that while  the military penal  code was to be found largely in 
Articles-of War made by the crown, ever since the Restoration 
there has been a statutory naval penal  code defining offences 
and  awarding  punishments.  Rut  for  some  time  past  there 
has really been  little difference in  this respect, for the Army 
Acts have always been becoming more detailed  and precise. 
The act now in  force  for the army expressly provides  for  all 
or most of the offences which can be considered as very serious, 
and so takes them out of  the sphere of  articles made by the 
fyrd.  Whether or no the Ballot Act (+z  George 111,  c. go) could be legally put in 
force to obtain men for the ' Special  Reserve'  or for the Terntorial Army, whose 
conditions of  service more resemble those of the old Militia, is very doubtful. 
1m.ressment for  the Navy 
queen.  On the other hand the Naval Act has a very general 
clause, which provides for the punishment of any act, disorder 
or neglect, to the prejudice of good order and naval discipline 
not hereinbefore specified ; and again, it provides that when 
no punishment is mentioned in the act, an offence against the 
act may be punished  according to the laws  and customs in 
such  cases  used  at sea.  There is,  however,  this  difference, 
that the Naval Act provides for offences  against the ordinary 
criminal law.  A sailor of the royal navy who commits murder 
or larceny or any other crime on sea, or on land outside the 
United Kingdom, can be tried by a court martial administer- 
ing the ordinary criminal law of England.  It is only in quite 
rare circumstances that a soldier can be tried by court martial 
for one of the common crimes. 
Rut to students of the history of  law the most interesting 
thing about the  navy  is  impressment.  The history  of  the 
word  itself  is very  curious-doubtless  pressing  suggests the 
notion  of  compulsion, physical  restraint-and  doubtless for 
a  very long time past  people  have  had  this  notion  in  their 
minds when  they talked about impressment, pressing sailors, 
the press-gang  and so forth.  But it  is, I  believe,  quite well 
established  that  the  word  originally  bore  a  quite  different 
sense.  In the National  Debt Act of  1870 (33 and 34 Vic., 
c.  71, sec.  14), one may read  that the money  issued  for  the 
payment of dividends  is to be paid to the chief cashier of  the 
bank  by  way  of  imprest.  It is  from  impraestare-think  of 
the French wordpr&ter-money  is imprest when it is advanced 
for  a  specific  purpose ; and '  imprest  money ' was  the  sum 
advanced or given to soldiers and mariners upon  enlistment. 
Now  the  impressment  of  marines  for  the  purposes  of  the 
royal  navy had been  clearly recognized  as legal  by statutes 
going  back  to  the  reign  of  Richard  11.  And  in  1743 in 
Rex v.  Broadfoot  it was contended by Sir Michael Foster, that 
'the right of impressing  mariners for  the public  service  is a 
prerogative inherent in the crown, grounded  upon  common- 
law and recognized by many acts of  Parliament.'  Broadfoot 
had  killed  one  of  a  press-gang  while  engaged  in  pressing 
seamen  under a  legal warrant executed in an illegal manner, 
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entrusted  to a commissioned  officer, and this was  not  done. 
Foster admitted that the press-gang were not acting in terms 
of  their warrant, and so were engaged in  attempting to make 
an illegal arrest; but  he thought it well to discuss the whole 
subject, and produced  a long array of  authority in  favour of 
the  legality  of  pressing.  Afterwards  both  Mansfield  and 
Kenyon  upheld  its legality, and there can  now  be  no doubt 
at all, to  press  sailors into his  service  is  one of  the  king's 
prerogatives.  It has never  been  taken  away.  I  cannot say 
when last  it was  used; it is not used  in  time of  peace; but 
we  should  be  rash in  saying that it  would  never  be used  in 
case of a great naval war: at any rate there the power is, and 
parliament has left it alone.  It has been so long disused that 
there is  some  difficulty  in  saying  who  might  be  impressed. 
However, I believe it certain that they must in some sense be 
sailors-they  must use the sea.  There is an act of  I740 still 
in force, which exempts persons above forty-five years of  age, 
or below eighteen ;  persons  who  use the sea are by the same 
act exempted for two years  after the beginning  of  their first 
voyage1. 
I?.  Administration  of Justice. 
It is important  at the outset of  legal study to have some 
notion of  the history of  the courts and of  their procedure, for 
a large portion  of  our law is not  statute law, but case  law- 
'common  law'  and 'equity '; and case  law  cannot  be  read 
unless  uTe  know  a  little of  the courts. 
We  must  first  dismiss  with  a  few  brief  words  what  is 
perhaps the most  important  court held  in  England, because 
(save in  some comparatively minor matters) it is not a court 
for England-the  Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
The act which  abolished the Court of  Star Chamber did 
not deprive the Privy Council of  all jurisdiction.  In particular 
z  Ric.  11, stat.  I, c. 4; z and 3 Phil.  and Mary, c.  16; z and 3 Anne, c.  6; 
4 and 5 Anne, c.  19;  7 and 8 Will. 111, c. zr.  For Rex v. Broadfoot, State  Trials, 
XVIII,  p.  1323 ff.  For Mansfield's  judgment  in  Rex v.  Tubbs (1776)  Cowper, 
ReporZs,  11, p. 51%  ff.  For Kenyon in Ex  Parte  Fox, State  Trials, v, 276.  For 
the whole subject Broom, Constitz~tional  Layo, pp.  I I 1-1  14.  Robertson, Statutes 
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it remained the supreme Court  of  Appeal  for all the king's 
lands beyond  the seas.  This was then  a small  matter; the 
king's  lands  beyond  the  seas  were  the  Isle  of  Man,  the 
Channel  Islands,  a  few  struggling  colonies.  Now  it  has 
become  a very great affair, as the king by cession, conquest, 
and colonization, has  acquired  new  lands in  every quarter of 
the globe. 
Until 1833 this jurisdiction  was, in fact, exercised  by such 
members of the Privy Council as had held high judicial offices. 
In that year a committee was created by statute, consisting of 
the members who should be holding, or have held, certain high 
judicial  offices, and this committee was to do the judicial work. 
In 1871 four paid members were appointed, and they, together 
with  the  Chancellor,  do  almost  all  the  work  of  the  Court. 
According to a scheme at present at work, these four members 
will  also be the four  Lords of  Appeal in Ordinary, and thus 
the two supreme tribunals  of  the empire, the Privy  Council 
and the House of  Peers, will  for practical purposes consist of 
the same members. 
Practicaily this committee  is a court  of law, but adminis- 
trative forms are in some respects maintained.  Its 'judgment ' 
is not technically a judgment, but advice to the queen, where- 
upon an Order in Council is  made, affirming or reversing  the 
judgment of  the colonial court, against which appeal is made. 
Only one opinion is expressed-secrecy  is insisted on.  These 
features form a curious reminder of the time when judicial and 
governmental functions were intimately blended, and the same 
council advised the king on acts of state and judicial business. 
The Council does a little work  for England-is  the Court 
of Appeal from the ecclesiastical courts-and  until 1875 from 
the Court of Admiralty; but the business of the ecclesiastical 
courts has become small for a reason soon to be given. 
Turning to the English courts, we  must  first  distinguish 
between  civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction-some  courts  have 
both jurisdictions, some only one. 
Now  with  respect  to civil jurisdiction  our  whole judicial 
system has been recast within the nineteenth century. 
Let me recall the leading dates in  this process : 
1846.  Formation of  new County Courts. 
Cases and Doczments, 1).  344. 464  ConstitutionnZ History  PERIOD 
1857.  Transfer to new Courts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
in testamentary and matrimonial causes--(I)  Court of Probate, 
(2) Court of Divorce. 
1875.  Fusion  of  all  superior  courts  of  law  and  equity 
(except House of Lords) into a new supreme court. 
1876.  Reformation  of  the House of  Lords as a judicial 
tribunal. 
a.  The Civil Courts.  There is one court of  first instance 
for the whole of England, with an unlimited competence in all 
civil cases-the  High Court of  Justice.  From this an appeal 
lies to the Court of Appeal.  From this again an appeal lies to 
the House of Lords.  These courts are central and superior. 
Besides these there are some five hundred '  county courts ' 
which are local, inferior, and of limited competence, and from 
them an appeal lies to the High Court. 
First we will speak of the county courts.  We have already 
spoken of the centralization of justice  and  of the great work 
that it did  for us in  the past, giving us a common law.  But 
owing  to the  decay of  the old  local  courts  this  extreme 
centralization  produced  many  evils.  The system  was  too 
costly and  dilatory for small  causes, and often  amounted  to 
an absolute denial of justice.  Attempts were made to correct: 
this evil in  the eighteenth  century by the creation of  petty 
covrts here and  there,  'courts  of  conscience,' or 'courts  of 
requests,'  before  which  (without  trial  by jury)  debts  might 
be  recovered.  But no  general  reform  was  attempted  until 
1846, when  a new  system  of  courts  was  created  throughout 
the land.  To these new courts was transferred such remnants 
of contentious jurisdiction as were possessed by the old county 
courts-those  county  courts  which  played  so  important  a 
part in the earlier Middle Ages.  But though the new courts 
are called  'county  courts,'  they really have little to do with 
the  county  system.  The 'old  county  courts'  still  have  a 
theoretic existence, though not as judicial tribunals, thus the 
coroners are elected in what is a county court of  the old type 
which all freeholders may attend ;  and I  am not sure that to 
this day, even with our system of vote by ballot, the members 
for  a  county  are  not  supposed  to  be  elected  in  what  is 
theoretically a county court of the old type. 
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These  new  so-called  county  courts  have  been  steadily 
growing  in  importance.  Parliament  has  frequently  given 
them fresh powers1.  They exercise a civil jurisdiction limited 
in two ways-(I)  by the amount at stake, (2) by geography. 
(I)  Ordinarily  (but  there  are  some  large  exceptions) 
the amount claimed  must  not exceed  A~o. 
(2)  They are local courts.  The  defendant must (ordinarily) 
be sued in the court of the district within which he dwells or 
carries on business. 
In  many  cases  a  plaintiff  has  a  choice  between  the 
county court  and the  High  Court; in  some he must  go to 
the county court, and suitors are discouraged (by rules about 
costs) from  taking  to the High  Court matters which  might 
have been heard in the county court. 
The county court is presided  over by a judge ;  there are 
about  fifty county court judges,  each of  whom therefore has 
generally  several  districts.  The judge  is appointed  by the 
Lord Chancellor from among barristers of seven years' stand- 
ing; he can  be  removed  by the Chancellor  for  inability or 
misbehaviour ;  he is disqualified from practising as a barrister 
and  from  sitting in  the House of  Commons;  his  salary is 
charged on the Consolidated Fund. 
In  most  cases  either  of  the  parties  to the  action  can 
insist  on  having a  question  of  fact tried  by  a jury  of  eight. 
But  trial  by  jury  in  a  county  court  is  very  uncommon; 
generally the judge  decides both  fact  and law. 
From the judge's  decision on any point  of  law,  but  not 
from his decision of  matter of  fact, there lies an appeal to the 
High  Court of  Justice.  With the leave of  the High  Court, 
but  not  without, there  is  an  appeal  to the Court of  Appeal 
and so to the House of Lords. 
A few other local courts survive.  The most important is the 
court held by the Vice-Chancellor of  the County Palatine of 
Lancaster.  But  all  England  has now  been  brought  within 
this system of  new county courts, and almost every year they 
gain something in dignity and importance as parliament  gives 
them new powers.  Their business is entirely civil business. 
'  The County Courts  Act of  1888 (51 and  jz Vict.,  c.  +3)  is  the last  com- 
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We have  already  noticed  how  beside  the old  courts of 
common  law, there  grew up  in  later  Middle  Ages  a  court 
administering equity; how equity obtained  a  large field  for 
itself  by  the invention  of  uses and trusts;  and how  equity 
became a fixed body of rules to be discovered in the decisions 
of the Chancellors. 
I believe that we may think of equity as becoming a fixed 
and  well  ascertained  body  of  law  towards  the  end of  the 
seventeenth century; perhaps 1688, the year of the Revolution, 
would be as good a year as any to name.  Lord Nottingham, 
who  became  Lord  Keeper  in  1673 and shortly  afterwards 
Lord  Chancellor, has been  called  the  father  of  equity, and 
seems to have done much  towards defining the jurisdiction 
By the middle of  the next century Blackstone could explain, 
though explanation was still necessary, that courts of  equity, 
like other  courts,  were  bound  by  fixed  rules  and were not 
free to do just what might seem to be fair and right  to their 
judges.  'The system,'  he writes1, 'of our courts of equity is a 
laboured connected system, governed by established rules, and 
bound  down  by precedents  from which  they do not  depart, 
although the reason of some of them may perhaps be liable to 
objection.'  He then  mentions  some  rules  which  he thinks 
irrational (for  instance, the husband  is allowed curtesy of a 
trust estate, but the widow is not allowed dower).  'All these, 
he says, 'and other cases that might be instanced, are plainly 
rules of  positive law supported only by the reverence that is 
shown and in general very properly shown to a series of former 
determinations.'  Blackstone, like other common lawyers, was 
not  very  fond  of  the chancery.  The view  of  the thinking 
English lawyer of his time seems to  have been that the chancery 
was  a  necessary evil, though  they were unwilling to confess 
what may seem to us the truth, namely that trial by jury was 
becoming an antiquated form of  trial  inadequate to meet the 
complicated problems which arise under modern law. 
I propose now to say a little about the domain of  modern 
equity; and first about the courts and their procedure.  At  the 
beginning of the eighteenth century there were but two judges 
in the Court of Chancery, the Chancellor [or Lord Keeper] and 
Commentariu, voL  1x1,  p.  433. 
The Court  of Chancery 
the Master of the Rolls; and the Master of  the Rolls was not 
competent  for  all  business.  In early  times  the Chancellor 
was  assisted  by certain persons  known as Masters in  Chan- 
cery;  they  sat in  court  as his  assessors  and  did  some  of 
the  subordinate work  under  his  supervision.  Of  these  the 
Master of  the Rolls was the foremost  and gradually, as it 
seems, he became more and more an independent judge.  In 
the reign of  George I1 his functions became the subject of  a 
smart controversy;  it was  affirmed and denied  that he was 
more  than a  delegate of  the Chancellor.  An  act of  parlia- 
ment of  the same reign  set this question  at rest  (3 Geo.  11, 
cap.  30).  The Master  of the Rolls became an independent 
judge, but there were a good many matters that he could not 
hear, and a case which had  been before him might be taken 
before  the  Chancellor  for  a  rehearing.  In  1813  a  Vice- 
Chancellor was created ; in  I 841 two more Vice-Chancellors, 
though the third Vice-Chancellorship was not made permanent 
until  1852.  In  1851 the  Lords  Justices  of  Appeal  were 
appointed.  The final constitution  of  the court when  it was 
abolished  in  1875 was  this:  there were  four judges  of  first 
instance,  viz.  the three Vice-Chancellors  and the Master  of 
the Rolls.  From the decisions of  any of these there lay an 
appeal to what had  come to be  called the Court of  Appeal 
in Chancery.  Of this there were three judges, viz. the Chan- 
cellor and the two Lords Justicesl.  From the Lord Chancellor 
and from the Court of  Appeal in Chancery the appeal was to 
the House of Lords.  I have already noticed  how  near  the 
end of  the seventeenth century the House of  Lords asserted 
and  established  its  right  to  entertain  appeals  from  the 
ChanceryS.  Such  an  appeal, unlike  a  writ  of  error,  might 
reopen  all  questions, as well  questions of  fact  as questions 
of  law.  In the Chancery what has been called 'the one-judge' 
system  prevailed.  A  suit  was  begun  before the Master  of 
the Rolls or one of  the Vice-Chancellors  and every step in 
the suit was  taken before him ; and he sat by himself.  This 
The Chancellor by himself,  or  the  two  Lords Justices together, would be 
competent for all appeals; some matters might come before a single Lord Justice. 
The Lad Chancellor might sit as a judge of first instance, though it became rare 
for him to do so.  F.W. M. 
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was  in  sharp contrast to the procedure  of  the common  law 
courts where a question of law was  usually argued before and 
determined by all the judges of  the court.  Then again there 
was no jury in the Court of  Chancery; it had  not the power 
to summon a jury.  Sometimes it would send an issue of  fact 
to be tried  in  a court  of  common  law by jury;  this was  at 
one  time  a  pretty  frequent  practice,  but  it  grew  rarer  as 
time  went  on,  and  at last  very  rare  indeed.  Usually  the 
judge determined all questions both  of  fact  and of  law.  It 
was also the practice  before  1852 that if  a question of  mere 
common law (law as opposed to equity) arose in  any suit- 
and such  a question  might  well  arise  incidentally-to  send 
a  case  for  the  opinion  of  one  of  the  courts  of  common 
law.  That practice was abolished by statute in  1852 (15 and 
16 Vic., c. 86, sec. 61).  It is well  worth mention  as showing 
how distinct law and equity had  been.  The Chancellor was 
not  supposed to know common  law, nor  were  the judges  of 
the older  courts supposed to know any equity.  After  1852 
the chancery judges could decide questions  of  pure  common 
law if they arose during the progress of a suit. 
The first step in  the commencement  of  a  suit (it was a 
suit  in  equity,  an  action  at  law)  was  the  filing  of  a  bill 
addressed  to the  Lord  Chancellor;  this  stated  the  matters 
whereon  the plaintiff  relied  and  prayed  the  desired  relief. 
Then  followed the obtaining of a  writ  of  subpoena.  Now 
this differed very  materially from  those writs  original at the 
common law of  which I have  lately spoken.  It did not  give 
the defendant any knowledge  as to what was the complaint 
against him ; it did not mention any cause of  action.  There 
was  but  this one simple and  perfectly  general  form of  writ 
instead of  the many different  forms of  writ  whereby  actions 
were  begun.  This  from  the  first  made  equity  a  flexible 
system;  so to speak, it  left  room  for  growth; and indeed 
when  contrasted with the procedure of  the common  law the 
procedure  of  equity  was  comparatively  formless.  I  do not 
mean that chancery pleading  did not  require  great technical 
skill-that  would be quite untrue-but  there were not a fixed 
number  of  definite  forms between  which  a choice had  to be 
made.  In 1852 a  certain  change was  made which  rendered 
needless the issue of  a writ  of  subpoena; the defendant was 
to be served with  a  printed  copy of  the bill, in  which there 
was  an  indorsement  directing  him  to appear, but  into this 
I need  not go.  The generality of  the writ  from the earliest 
time is the point  to which I ask attention.  Also it should be 
noticed  that  until  a comparatively recent  time there was  no 
need that the plaintiff should specify the relief that he wanted; 
a prayer just  for such  relief as the  nature of  the case might 
require  was  sufficient, and  the plaintiff  could  be  given  any 
relief to which he was entitled by the facts alleged and proved. 
This was afterwards changed, still it remained the practice to 
the end to pray for general as well as special relief, and much 
could  be  granted in answer to this general prayer.  All  this 
was  very  different  from  what  went  on  in  the common  law 
courts where a plaintiff might fail fatally because he had sued 
in Trespass when he ought to have sued in  Case or in Trover. 
One other point of  procedure is  of  very great importance. 
The chancery had  for  the most  part borrowed  its procedure 
from  the ecclesiastical  courts.  The defendant  was required 
to answer the matters alleged against him  in  the bill, and to 
answer upon oath.  The statements of the bill were turned into 
an interrogative  form, and the defendant had  to answer the 
questions thus put to him fully and  in  detail.  Now here is a 
great contrast to the common  law procedure, and I have no 
doubt that here  was  one cause  for the great unpopularity of 
the Court of Chancery at an  early  time;  the  defendant, it 
was said, was forced  to accuse himself.  It is still the general 
rule  of  our criminal  procedure  that  the accused  cannot  be 
questioned, and indeed cannot give evidence even if  he wishes 
to do so, though some exceptions have already been admitted 
and the rule seems to be upon  its last legs1.  But until very 
lately what  is  still  true  of  criminal  procedure  was true  also 
of  civil  cases.  Any person  interested  in  the  question  was 
incompetent  to testify; this included  of  course  the plaintiff 
and the defendant, they could not  give  evidence.  This rule 
was abolished bit by bit by a series of statutes extending from 
1 In  1898 (Act to amend the  Law of  Evidence,  61 and 62 Vict., c. 36) every 
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1833 to 1853.  The first great  alteration  took  place in  1843, 
when interested persons other than the parties, their husbands 
and wives, were rendered competent  witnesses  (6 and 7 Vic., 
c. 85).  In 185 I (14  and  I 5 Vic., c. 99) the parties, except in 
criminal proceedings, were  made  competent  and compellable 
to give evidence;  a  later act of  1853 (16 and  17 Vic., c.  83) 
dealt  with  the evidence  of  husbands  and wives.  It is  very 
necessary to remember this in reading old cases-not  so very 
old  either, forty years  old-we  have become  so very  much 
accustomed  to  seeing  parties  as  witnesses  that  we  easily 
forget that this is only under modern statutes.  Now the rule 
against interested witnesses prevailed in the chancery as well 
as elsewhere, and the parties could not give evidence  in  their 
own favour.  Still the defendant had to answer the bill  upon 
oath, and could thus be obliged to give evidence in  the plain- 
tiff's  favour.  This was  not  indeed  regarded  as a  giving of 
evidence;  it was  a  sworn  answer (answer was  the technical 
word)  to the charges  made  against  him  in  the  bill.  Well 
then  in  the  chancery  you  could  (to  use  the proper  term) 
'obtain discovery' from the plaintiff; you could, to use a slang 
phrase, '  scrape his conscience.'  I  believe that here we  have 
one of  the causes why the chancery came to be  known as a 
court of  conscience ; the defendant could be obliged to reveal 
what he knew-to  make sworn confession.  Indeed at almost 
every point chancery procedure differed radically from common 
law procedure.  Sometimes it seems as if  the mere fact that 
one rule prevailed in the old courts was a sufficient reason why 
another should  prevail  in  the new.  Nor  is this mere  fancy. 
The chancery  had  been  obliged  to  keep  very  clear  of  the 
province  of  the other courts;  any open  usurpation  of  their 
powers would have been  resented, and if ever there was what 
,  might fairly have been called usurpation  it was concealed  by 
a  difference  of  terminology.  The two  procedures  were so 
distinct  that a lawyer seldom  knew  much  about both:  this 
emphasized and exaggerated the differences between  the two 
bodies of  substantive rules, the body known as common  law 
and that known as equity. 
Equity in  the course of  the eighteenth century became a 
great body of rules supplementing the common law, enforcing 
v  Fusion of Eqttity nnd Common Law  47  I 
certain obligations which common law did not enforce, giving 
certain remedies which the courts of  common law did not and 
could  not give.  The main  illustration  of  a purely equitable 
obligation  is  the  duty of  a  trustee  and  person  who  holds 
property upon trust for another.  Of any such  obligation the 
courts of common law knew nothing. 
Again,  the  Court  of  Chancery  gave  new  remedies  for 
common law rights, e.g. injunction and specific performance of 
contracts.  You  build  a  wall  darkening  my  ancient  lights : 
the Court of Common Law will give me money damages, the 
Court of  Equity will enjoin you to pull  the wall  down.  You 
contract  to  sell  me  land  and  refuse  to  carry  out  your 
contract:  the Court of  Common  Law  will  give  me  money 
damages, the Court of Equity will command you to fulfil your 
contract, and in case you disobey will put you in prison. 
It is easy to see how awkwardness would  arise from such 
a dual system.  In order to get complete justice  I may have 
to go to two courts. 
Mitigations  of  the evil were  introduced  in the nineteenth 
century.  It  was settled, for instance, that the Court of Co~nmon 
Law might grant injunction, and the Court of  Equity might 
give damages.  But at length it was determined to abolish the 
dual system.  This was effected by the Judicature Act, which 
came into force in  1875 and amalgamated all the old courts, 
i.e.  Chancery,  King's  Bench,  Common  Bench,  Exchequer, 
Court of Admiralty, Court of  Probate, Court of Divorce. 
The Court of Admiralty had  a  long history of  its own- 
from the close of the Middle Ages. 
The Court  of  Probate  and  the  Court  of  Divorce were 
created  in  1857, and the old jurisdiction  of the ecclesiastical 
courts over  testamentary and matrimonial  causes was  trans- 
ferred  to them, together with  some new powers, such as that 
of  completely  dissolving  a  marriage. 
In place of  these we have the High Court of  Justice and 
the Court of  Appeal. 
The High Court of  Justice is a court of  first  instance for 
all England with  unrestricted  competence in all civil actions, 
capable of administering and bound  to administer both law 
and equity in every case. Constitzttiotza  Z History  House  of  Lords 
Originally it had five divisions-Chancery  ; King's Bench; 
Common Bench ; Exchequer ; Probate, Divorce and Admiralty. 
Hut  an  Order  in  Council, 16 Dec.  1880, fused  the Common 
Bench  and  Exchequer  in  the King's  Bench  Division.  We 
have therefore now three divisions-Chancery  ; King's Bench; 
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty. 
To each  of  these  divisions  certain  business  is  specially 
assigned.  Often a plaintiff  has  a choice ; sometimes there is 
but one division to which he ought to go.  But this  distribu- 
tion  of  business  is  an  utterly  different  thing  from  the  old 
distinction between courts of law and of  equity.  Any division 
can now deal thoroughly with  every action ;  it can  recognize 
all rights whether they be of  the kind  known as ' legal ' or of 
the kind  known  as 'equitable' ; it  can  give whatever  relief 
English law (including '  equity ') has  for  the litigants.  They 
can no longer be bandied about from court to court.  Also it 
is  regarded  as  a  mere matter  of convenience  which  might 
be  altered  at any time  by  rules  made by  the judges.  Its 
chief  practical  import  is  that  in  cases  of  a  kind  specially 
assigned  to the Chancery Division  there  can  be  no trial  by 
jury without leave of  the judge.  In other cases either of  the 
parties can insist that any question of  fact that there may be 
shall be tried  by jury.  But  really trial  by jury in  civil cases 
is becoming less and less common.  Very usually both parties 
are willing that all questions whether of  law or of  fact  shall 
be disposed of by the judge. 
From  the High Court, in  almost all cases, lies an appeal 
to the Court of Appeal and thence again to the House of  Lords. 
All questions of law (and  often  of fact) may be reopened.- 
There is no jury in  Court of  Appeal or House of  Lords. 
The number  of  judges  is  small-twenty-nine  for  High 
Court and Court of Appeal together, including the Chancellor'. 
All (except the Chancellor) are appointed by the crown; paid 
by salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund; may not sit in 
the House of  Commons ; hold  office during good behaviour, 
but can be removed by the sovereign on an address presented 
by both Houses. 
From  almost  every judgment  or  order  of  the  Court  of 
Appeal appeal lies to the House of Lords. 
We have seen how in the Middle Ages the House of Lords 
became a court capable of  correcting errors of the lower courts 
of  common  law, and how  in  the seventeenth  century it suc- 
cessfully asserted the right to hear appeals from the Chancery. 
It is  well, however, to note the discrepancy between  law 
and  actual  practice.  In  the  eighteenth  century  it  became 
custonlary for the lords to leave their judicial  business  to be 
done  by  such  only  of  their  number  as  were  distinguished 
lawyers.  So late as 1844 some 'lay lords' were with difficulty 
restrained from voting on difficult questions of law arising out 
of the trial of Daniel O'Connell.  We have come to regard  it 
as a 'constitutional'  rule  that only the law  lords  are to sit, 
and now by a statute of  1876 there must  be  three law lords 
present-but  the rule  is only a '  constitutional ' not a ' legal ' 
rule-every  lord  who  has  a  right  to sit  and vote  when  the 
House is about  its legislative  business, has also a right to sit 
and vote  when  the  House  is  acting as a  Court of  Appeal, 
though  this  right  is  not  exercised. 
The act of  1876 introduced  lords of  a new  kind, lords  of 
appeal in  ordinary-salaried  and holding office  during good 
behaviour,  but  dismissible  on  address  presented  by  both 
Houses.  Their dignity is  not hereditary.  At present  there 
are three such  lords-there  will  hereafter  be  four along with 
the Chancellor-and  with some help from other law lords they 
do the judicial  business of the House. 
b.  The  Crimitzal  Courts.  Punishable  offences  fall  into 
two classes-indictable  and non-indictable. 
A vast quantity of petty offences are by statute punishable 
upon  summary  conviction-this  means  trial  without  jury 
before  two justices  (or one police  magistrate). 
We have  traced the history of  this jurisdiction1.  It grows 
rapidly  during  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries. 
Statute  after  statute  prescribed  that  this  and  that  petty 
offence  might  be  summarily  punished  by the justices.  At 
last, in  1848, a  statute was  passed  regulating  the procedure. 
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The courts  in  which  this  jurisdiction  is exercised  are often 
spoken of  as Petty  Sessions. 
The  punishments  inflicted  by  these  courts  can  seldom 
exceed  three  months  imprisonment  and  for  the most  part 
consist  of  fines of  varying  amount.  The province  of  this 
summary justice  is variegated.  At the one end of  the scale 
there are what would commonly be called the smaller crimes 
-assaults,  small  thefts, malicious injuries to property ;  at the 
other, disobediences to statutory rules framed to secure some 
economic or social good, as, for instance, public health, educa- 
tion, the well-being of  factory children, a revenue from  excise 
and customs and the like:  between these poles lie the breaches 
of good order, such as disorderly drunkenness and vagabondage 
in  its various forms, the pettier kinds of dishonesty-adultera- 
tion, the use of false weights and measures, cruelty to animals, 
some electoral  malpractices  and other  particulars  not  to be 
classified.  How  vital  a  part  of  our  system  this  summary 
justice  has become  may best  be shown by figures.  In 1883 
the number of  persons convicted by juries  did not amount to 
IZ,OOO,  while  more  than  80,ooo  sentences  of  imprisonment 
were passed by justices without any trial by jury1. 
Generally, but not always, there is an appeal to Quarter Ses- 
sions and questions of law can be brought before the Highcourt. 
In  some  large  towns  this  work  is  now  done  by  paid 
justices of the peace known as police magistrates, or stipendiary 
magistrates.  The  system was gradually introduced into London 
by  statutes beginning  in  1792, and since  1835  a  municipal 
borough  may  have a  stipendiary  magistrate  if  it chooses to 
ask for one and pay for one.  These magistrates are appointed 
by the queen, and hold  office  like the other justices  of  the 
peace merely during good pleasure. 
The graver offences (felonies and misdemeanours) can be 
punished  on  an  indictment.  Indictment  (as  already  said) 
is still in  form  an accusation  made  by  a  grand  jury.  An 
indictment  may  be  the first  step in  a  prosecution.  As  a 
matter  of  fact  grand jurors  do not  now  proceed upon  their 
own  knowledge.  Someone prefers  a  bill  of  indictment, and 
1 Of 6r,+fj3 persons tried for indictable offences in  1905, 49,138 were tried 
summarily.  judicial  Statistics, Engiand and  Wales, Pt.  1. 
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they, after hearing  evidence for the prosecution, but not  for 
the defence, decide whether there is sufficient cause for putting 
the accused upon his trial : if  so, they find the bill a true bill, 
if not,  they ignore  it.  The grand jury  must  consist  of not 
less than  twelve,  not  more  than  twenty-three. 
'Any person  may present a bill  to a grand jury, accusing 
any other person of  any crime whatever '-this  is the general 
rule towhich as yet hardly any exception has been made'.  Thus 
anyone may prefer a bill against one of the queen's ministers. 
An  indicted  person  will  be  tried-unless  he  cannot  be 
found, in which case he may (theoretically) be outlawed.  An 
outlawry, however, would  be a tedious process conducted by 
the sheriff; the outlaw, in  case of  felony or treason, would be 
in the same position as if he had been tried, and even in  case 
of  misdemeanour  his  goods would  be forfeited.  Outlawry is 
not used now-indeed  is not worth using. 
There are other  means besides indictment of  bringing a 
man to trial for an indictable offence-but  these are of limited 
applicability. 
(I)  A  verdict  of  a  coroner's  jury  of  manslaughter  or 
murder  is  equivalent to indictment. 
(2)  So too is a criminal information by Attorney-General 
or the Master of the Crown Office in case of misdemeanour. 
A person thus accused by indictment, inquest, or informa- 
tion, is tried  by  a  petty jury. 
The criminal courts are (I) Quarter Sessions, (2) the High 
Court  of  Justice. 
Quarter Sessions are not competent to try quite the worst 
offences, such as murder, treason, and  some others-perjury, 
forgery, libel, etc.  They are constituted, as of old, by justices 
of the peace-who  are the judges of law-while  a jury decides 
questions of fact.  An elected chairman presides? 
Since  1875  all  the  other  courts  which  try  indictable 
offences  are theoretically branches of the High Court of Justice 
-this  is a reform of  a highly technical character.  Prisoners 
are tried  either before  the High Court  in  London, or at the 
Central  Criminal  Court, or before  Commissioners of  Assize, 
Oyer  et Terminer,  Gaol  Delivery;  but  such  Commissioners 
Mr G. J. Talbot, K.C.,  reminds me that a very  considerat~le  inroad on the 
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(though  they  are not  in  all cases  permanent  judges  of  the 
High Court) hold  the High  Court of  Justice  in  the various 
shire towns.  To ex~lain  this  would  take us  too far. 
In  these  criminal  cases  there  is  properly  speaking  no 
appeal.  But (I)  occasionally the High Court will grant a new 
trial after a conviction for misdemeanour : it does not grant a 
new  trial  in  case  of  felony, or  after  an  acquittal  for  mis- 
demeanour.  (2)  There  is- a  procedure  b;  writ  of  error 
whereby (with the Attorney-General's  consent)  cases can  be 
taken  to the Court of  Appeal  and thence  to the House of 
Lords : but this procedure- can only be used in very few cases 
-it  can only be used when there is an '  error apparent on the 
record.'  It is difficult to describe without going into details 
what errors are 'apparent  on the record'  and what  not, but 
the main  matter is this, that no error made by the judge  in 
charging the jury will appear on  the record, and a wrong  or 
even  perverse  verdict  cannot  be  thus  corrected.  In  truth 
writs of error are extremely rare1.  (3)  On a conviction (but not 
an acquittal) the judge  may, if he thinks fit, reserve a question 
of  law (but not of  fact) for a Court for Crown Cases Reserved 
which will consist of  five  or  more judges  of  the High Court. 
Lastly the king can pardon a criminal, either absolutely or upon 
condition, and-this power, wielded  by the Home secretary, is 
sometimes used as a means (a clumsier means there could not 
be) for practically nullifying an unsatisfactory verdicts. 
It  should just be noticed that the House of  Lords has other 
judicial functions besides that of acting as a Court of  Appeal, 
functions which, were they exercised at all, would, I take it, 
even at the present day, be exercised  by  the whole body  of 
the House, and not merely by the law lords.  (I)  As of old a 
peer  accused  of  felony  or  of  treason  must  be tried  by his 
peers.  He cannot even (it seems) elect to be tried  by a jury 
as a commoner would be8.  (2)  There might be an impeach- 
1 By the  Criminal Appeal Act, 7  Edw. VII, c.  13, 1 20, writs of  error were  -. 
abolislyed. 
In 1907  (Criminal Appeal Act,  g  Edw.  VII, c.  23)  a  Court  of Criminal 
Appeal was established.  A person convicted on indictment may  appeal  on any 
g~ound  of  appeal which  involves a question of law  alone.  If  a  question  of fact 
alone or  of  mixed law and fact is involved he must obtain the leave of the Court 
of Criminal Appeal or the certificate of the judge who tried him.  The powers and 
authority of the C.C.R. are now vested in the Court  of Criminal Appeal, and  its 
old procedure by case stated may  still be used in certain cases. 
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ment-a  procedure of which we have already spoken1.  Since 
the death of  William  111 there have been  but  nine;  in  the 
nineteenth century but one, that of Lord Melville in  1805;  the 
most  famous case of course is the trial of Warren  Hastings 
which dragged on  its weary length at irregular intervals for 
seven years.  It seems highly  improbable  that recourse  will 
again be  had to this ancient weapon unless we  have a time of 
revolution  before us.  If a statesman has  really committed a 
crime then he can be tried  like any other criminal : if  he  has 
been guilty of  some misdoing that is not a crime, it seems far 
better that it should go unpunished  than that new law should 
be  invented  for  the  occasion,  and  that  by  a  tribunal  of 
politicians  and  partizans;  for  such  misdoings  disgrace and 
loss of office are now-a-days sufficient  punishments.  Lastly a 
modern  House of  Commons will  hardly be brought  to admit 
that in  order to control the king's advisers it needs the aid of 
the House of  Peers.  However  there the old weapon  is-an 
accusation  by  the  commons of  England  at the  bar  of  the 
House  of  Lords. 
We have  said  that indictment  may be  the  first  step  in 
prosecution;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  is  not  usual. 
Generally before the accused  is indicted, he  is subjected  to a 
magisterial examination and is committed to prison to await 
his  trial  or  else  he  is  bailed.  Magisterial  examination, of 
which  we  have  already  traced  the  historical  beginnings  in 
statutes of Philip  and  Mary, has now  become a preliminary 
trial2.  Both prosecutor and accused may produce witnesses- 
have  power  to  compel  the  attendance  of  witnesses.  The 
accused  is  not  questioned,  is  not  bound  to  say  anything, 
receives 'the usual caution.'  The procedure is regulated by a 
statute of  1848 (11 and  IZ  Vic., c. 42).  An application for a 
writ of habeas corpus is a ready means for bringing before the 
High Court any question as to the legality of  an imprisonment. 
The famous act of  1689 was  made yet more  efficient  by an 
act of  1816. 
Of substantive criminal law  we  must  say but a very few 
words.  At the beginning  of  the last century the number  of 
See above, pp.  31 7--8. 
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capital  crimes was very  large; it  has  been  diminished  by a 
series of acts beginning in 1827  and extending to 1861. In that 
year it was reduced  to treason, murder, piracy with violence, 
and setting fire to dockyards and arsenals.  As regards treason 
the basis  of  our law is still the statute of  1352 on which we 
have already commented1.  The process of glossing its elastic 
language  about  'imagining  the king's  death,'  and  'levying 
war  against the king,' went on during the eighteenth century. 
And in  1795 an act was passed, which is still in force, giving 
statutory  authority  to  several  of  the  interpretations  which 
judges had put upon the old act.  At the end of the eighteenth 
century there  was  a  great outcry against  what  were  called 
the constructive treasons-the  doctrines whereby judges had 
stretched  the  words  of  the statute of  Edward  111 beyond 
their natural  meaning.  Those doctrines, however, seem still 
to be law, though some of  the offences which they declare to 
be treason  can  now be dealt with  under a statute of  1848 as 
felonies subjecting the offender to a maximum punishment of 
penal servitude for life. 
The  old  classification  of  indictable  crimes  as  treasons, 
felonies and misdemeanours is still maintained and has some 
procedural consequences.  A  trial  for  felony differs in  some 
respects  from a  trial  for  misdemeanour.  But  owing  to the 
abolition of the punishment of  death in all, except a very few, 
cases, it has  lost  most  of  its old  meaning and  is  now  little 
better  than  an  absurdity-a  misdemeanour  is  now  often 
punished  more  severely  than  a  felony.  But  of  all  these 
matters you  will  have to learn  a great deal more when  you 
come to study criminal law.  I think, however, that a lecturer 
on constitutional law is bound to try to bring out the relation 
between what we call '  the government' and the administration 
of justice. 
c.  Goverfzwzent and Justice.  Notice : (  I )  The indepen- 
dence of the judges.  Of  the terms of  their appointment we 
have already spoken : they hold office on good behaviour  but 
are liable to be  removed  on  an address  presented  by  both 
Houses.  The Lord Chancellor  is  a curious exception to the 
See above, pp.  226-8,  319. 
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general rule.  Again, since their  salaries are charged  on  the 
Consolidated  Fund,  their  conduct  does  not  come  before 
parliament  year  by  year.  Further,  for  a  judge  to give an 
opinion as to a case which was to come before him judicially 
would  now  be considered distinctly wrong.  Coke condemns 
the practice  in  the Institutes, though  it  had  been  common, 
and  he himself  had  given  opinions to the crown.  We have 
also heard  Coke assert the doctrine that the king, though he 
is the source of  all justice, cannot act as a judge.  Since the 
fall of the Star Chamber no king has sought to do this. 
(2)  The crown  has  no control  over  civil  justice.  The 
process of  the  superior  courts  runs  in  the queen's  name- 
'  Victoria Dei Gratia etc. commands the defendant to appear '- 
but a plaintiff obtains such a writ as a matter of  right and the 
queen herself could not prevent its issue.  So when the plaintiff 
has  obtained  judgment,  execution  follows  as  a  matter  of 
course;  he  obtains  a  writ  commanding  the  sheriff, e.g.,  to 
sell the goods of  the defendant to satisfy the debt.  The writ 
runs in  the queen's  name-'  Victoria D.G. etc. commands the 
sheriff to an execution';  but  Victoria  cannot stop the issue 
of the writ.  The sheriff would  be  bound  to execute it, even 
if he had a command  to stop from  the queen's own mouth or 
from a Secretary of  State.  And a sheriff who disobeyed the 
writ would be liable not merely to criminal proceedings (which 
the queen might  stop) but  to civil proceedings at the suit of 
the party damaged. 
Again, the royal power  of  pardon does not extend to civil 
proceedings,  If A owes B a debt, the queen has no power to 
forgive the debt.  So if  A  assaults  or  libels  B,  the  queen 
cannot forgive A, or stop B from suing A.  This is so, even 
when  the wrong  is a crime  as well  as a  tort (civil injury). 
Thus in the case of  false imprisonment, which is both a wrong 
and a  crime-the  queen can  pardon  the crime, but  not the 
tort  The importance of  this can be seen if  we suppose the 
person  guilty  of  false  imprisonment  to  be  a  Secretary  of 
State, for the queen cannot  prevent  his  being sued.  Heavy 
damages have before now been  recovered against a Secretary 
of State-the  crown could not protect one of its most eminent 
servants. Covtstitutional History 
(3)  On  the other hand legally the crown has a considerable 
control over criminal proceedings.  (i)  It can  pardon  any 
crime before  or after conviction.  This power is exercised for 
the king by a Secretary (Home) of  State.  A  may commit a 
brutal murder, the king can pardon him and so stop any trial. 
An explanation of  this wide legal power may be seen in this, 
that during the Middle Ages there were  two methods of pro- 
ceeding against  a  felon-the  appeal  brought  by the person 
injured by the crime, for instance, the person whose goods were 
stolen, or the next kinsman  of the murdered  man-and  the 
indictment, a royal procedure at the king's suit.  The king by 
pardon might free a man from indictment, but not from appeal. 
But  appeals  of  felony  have  long  been  disused  and  were 
abolished  in  1819 (59 Geo.  111, c.  44).  Thus the king  can 
completely pardon  any crime.  The one limit to the efficacy 
of  a  pardon is that imposed by the Act of  Settlement (I~oo), 
namely, that a pardon cannot be pleaded to an impeachment. 
In Danby's  case,  1678, it  had  been  questioned whether  an 
impeachment could  be prevented  by a  pardon; it had  been 
contended  that  an  impeachment  should  be  considered  as 
analogous rather to an appeal of  felony than to an indictment 
at the king's  suit.  We must, I  think, take it as the result of 
that case that, as the law  then stood, an impeachment  could 
be prevented by a pardon-but  the Act of  Settlement altered 
the law.  A  pardon  then  cannot  stop an  impeachment-it 
cannot be pleaded  as a bar to an impeachment-but  there is 
nothing to  prevent the king from pardoning after the impeached 
person  has  been  convicted  and  sentenced, and some of  the 
Scottish lords who were  impeached  for the rebellion of  1715 
received pardons. 
The legal power of pardon  then  is very extensive indeed. 
The check upon  it is  not  legal but consists  in  this, that the 
king's secretary may have to answer in the House of Commons 
for the exercise that he makes of this power. 
The king has no power  to commute a  sentence.  When 
we hear of sentences being commuted, what really happens is 
that a conditional pardon is granted : a condemned murderer is 
pardoned on condition of his going into penal servitude.  It  is 
a nice question whether he might not insist on being hanged. 
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(ii)  The king's  Attorney-General  has power to stop any 
criminal prosecution  without pardon.  All criminal  proceed- 
ings (now that appeals are abolished)  are in  law  at the  suit 
of  the king-Rex  v.  A. B.  If  the  king's  Attorney-General 
states that he will  not prosecute (enters a ?zollt~rosepzti)  then 
proceedings are at an end, though other proceedings may be 
begun.  This power is sparingly exercised to stop prosecutions 
which  are  obviously  vexatious.  The safeguard  consists  in 
this, that the Attorney-General  is  expected to be  a  member 
of  the House of  Commons, and according to usage a member 
of the Ministry, though not of  the Cabinet.  Any use he may 
make of  this  power  might  thus  be  called  in  question : he 
could not use it for political  purposes without the approval of 
the House of  Comnlons. 
On  the  whole,  though  the  crown  has  thus  by  law  a 
complete  control  over  criminal  justice,  the  prosecution  of 
offenders has hitherto been left very much in the hands of the 
public.  The king  has  had  officers, 'law  officers,'  Attorney- 
General  and  Solicitor-General,  charged  with  the  duty  of 
bringing  the  greatest  offenders  to  justice,  but  it  is  in  the 
power  of  any  man  to  begin  a  criminal  prosecution  by 
presenting a  bill  of  indictment  to  a  grand  jury,  and  as a 
matter  of  fact, until  very  lately, it  has  generally been  left 
to those  who  have  suffered  by crime  to bring  an ordinary 
criminal to justice.  This work is now falling more and more 
into the hands of  a Director of  Public Prosecutions, an officer 
first  appointed  in  1879, but we  have  as yet  made  no  large 
inroad on  the general principle, that any person  may prefer 
a bill of indictment against any other person  accusing him  of 
any crime.  The assent of the Director of  Public Prosecutions 
has been required in certain libel  cases by an act of  1851, but 
that, I think, is  as yet the only exception.  This principle  is 
an important one: if  I  think  that  the  Home Secretary has 
been guilty of any criminal offence, e g. of  bribery or extortion, 
I can present a bill  to a  grand jury-simply  as a  member of 
the  public,  and  although  the  alleged  crime  has  done  me 
personally no harm-and  it would be a  very serious step for 
an Attorney-General  to shelter  his  colleague  by stopping a 
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law is  not ur~important  because  \ve never hear of  it; indeed 
we  may say that the most  efficient  rules  are those of  which 
we hear least, they are so efficient that they are not broken. 
No person, even  though  he be a  minister  of  the crotwl, can 
commit an indictable offence without running the risk of some 
member of the public beginning a prosecution against him. 
(iii)  And now as to proceedings against the lting.  Here 
we meet the maxim that 'the king can do no wrong.'  This we 
may translate thus, ' English law does not provide any means 
whereby  the  king  can  be  punished  or  compelled  to  make 
redress.'  I  think  that you  ought to distinguish quite clearly 
this proposition  of English  law  from  the  doctrine of  some 
writers  on  jurisprudence,  that  a  subject  can  have  no  right 
against  the sovereign, that the sovereign  can  have  no legal 
duty to the subject.  I confess that this doctrine seems to me 
merely a matter of words.  Suppose, to take the simplest case, 
that an absolute monarch declares it his will that his subjects 
may sue him for  any money they lend him, shall we say, is it 
convenient  to say, that, while  this  law remains unaltered, it 
gives the subjects a  right against  their sovereign ?  I believe 
that  in  the  United  States  a  citizen  can  sue  the  sovereign 
people.  Rut  at any rate one should not, as Blackstone does, 
identify this speculative doctrine with our English rule.  Our 
king is not in  the jurist's  sense sovereign, there is  no reason 
in  the nature of laws, rights, remedies, why our king should 
not  be  liable  to be  sued,  and  even  to be  prosecuted.  As 
a matter of  fact the Judicial Committee of  the Privy Council 
has lately held  that according to the law  in  force in  Ceylon 
the crown can  be  sued (g  Ap., Cas. 571); it is said that kings 
of Scotland were sued by their subjects ; it has been said that 
our Henry I11 was sued by his subjects, but this is extremely 
doubtful, and I do not think that our law has ever known any 
mode of suing the king, save the petition  of  right and some 
similar  proceedings  which  are  mere  appeals  to  the  king's 
conscience. 
Proceedings on a petition of right are nolv regulated by an 
act of 1860 (23 and 24 Vic., c. 34).  The petition is presented 
to the Secretary for the Home Department, and  by him  it is 
submitted to the queen.  If she thinks fit  she grants her fiat 
that  right  be  done,  and  then  there  is  in  effect  a  lawsuit 
between  the petitioner, or suppliant as he is  called, and the 
Attorney-General.  We  may  regard  it  as a  constitutional 
usage, but certainly not as a rule of law, that the queen ought 
not to withhold her fiat.  The scope of this remedy by petition 
of right  seems in  former times to have been  limited to cases 
in  which  the king was  in  possession  of  some hereditament, 
or some specific chattel to which the suppliant claimed a title. 
The judgment,  if  favourable  to the suppliant, was  that  the 
king's  hands be  removed  and possession  be restored  to the 
sup  pliant-qz~od  71za7zz~s domini regis amoveaatz~r  et possessio 
restitzdatur petenti, saA~o  j~re  domini regis.  In I 874, seemingly 
for  the  first  time, the  question  was  decided  whether  this 
remedy  could  be  employed  as  a  remedy  for  a  breach  of 
contract.  In Thomas v. Reg. (L.R. 10, Q.B. 31) the suppliant 
asserted  that  he  had  invented  a  certain  system  of  heavy 
artillery, and that in consideration of his placing his invention 
at the disposal of the royal ordnance department, the Secretary 
of State for War had promised that a reward should be given 
him, the amount of which was to be determined by the Hoard 
of Ordnance.  He asserted further that this promise had been 
broken.  The Attorney-General,  for  the sake of  argument, 
admitted that the Secretary for War had  authority to make  . 
this contract as agent for  the queen ; so the legal point was 
argued  whether  the petition  of  right  could  be  used  as  a 
remedy for  breach  of contract.  Blackburn  delivered  a very 
learned  judgment  holding that, despite the apparent narrow- 
ness  of  the  old  precedents,  which  dealt  solely,  or  almost 
solely with  demands for  specific lands, the petition  of right 
was  a  remedy applicable to breaches of contract.  Judgment 
could be given in  the suppliant's favour to the effect that he 
was entitled to a particular sum by way of damages.  Now in 
these  days breach  of  contract is  likely to become the most 
common and useful field of  the petition of  right.  The queen 
and her officers are no longer in the habit of seizing land upon 
all  manner  of  pretences;  there are few  pretences  available, 
escheat is very rare, but contracts with  high officers of  state, 
who  contract on behalf of  the queen, are by no means rare, 
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the subject, the other  contractor, has a remedy.  The court 
can  only declare that he  is entitled  to such  and such  relief, 
e.g. to L10,ooo damages ;  no execution  can issue against the 
queen.  Still it is obvious  that a very strong moral  pressure 
can thus be brought to bear on the queen's advisers.  It would 
be  a very unpopular thing were they to advise the queen to 
prevent  any really  arguable question  coming  before a court 
of  law, but still more unpopular  to deny the suppliant that 
redress to which he had been declared entitled by the judgment 
of a court. 
(iv)  We can  hardly lay too much  stress on the principle 
that  though  the  king  cannot  be  prosecuted  or  sued,  hfs 
ministers can be both prosecuted and sued, even for what they 
do by the king's  express  command.  We often  say that in 
this  country  royal  immunity  is  coupled  with  ministerial 
responsibility:  but when we speak of ministerial responsibility 
we  too often  think  merely of  the so-called  responsibility of 
ministers to parliament.  Now that is an important matter ;  it 
is an  important  matter  that  our king cannot  keep  in  office 
advisers  who have not the confidence of  the majority of  the 
House of  Commons-in  the last resort this impossibility could 
be  brought  home  to him  by  a  refusal  to  grant  supplies, or 
a  refusal  to renew  the Army Act.  But  let  us  look  at the 
matter a little more closely.  Strictly speaking, ministers are 
not  responsible to parliament ; neither  House, nor  the  two 
Houses together, has  any legal  power to dismiss one  of  the 
king's  ministers.  Hut  in  all  strictness  the  ministers  are 
responsible  before the courts of  law and before the ordinary 
courts  of  law, and  they  are there  responsible  even  for  the 
highest acts of  state ;  for those  acts of  state they can be sued 
or  prosecuted, and  the High  Court  of  Justice will  have  to 
decide whether they are legal or no.  Law, especially modern 
statute law, has endowed  them with  many great powers, but 
the question  whether they have overstepped those powers can 
be  brought  before  a  court  of  law, and the plea  'this  is  an 
official act, an act of state' will not serve them.  A great deal 
of what we mean when we talk of  English liberty lies in this. 
Decline  of  the Sherzf 
G.  The Police  System. 
We must  speak  briefly of the system  by which  order  is 
maintained, and suspected persons are brought to justice, even 
though we can take but a superficial view of what has come to 
be a great department of law. 
The decline  and  fall  of  sheriffs  office  has  already been 
traced down  to the seventeenth century1.  During the whole 
of  our  period  this  process of  decay  is  continued, the sheriff 
loses  function  after  function.  We  know  the  High  Sheriff 
now-a-days  as a  country gentleman, who  (it  may  be  much 
against his will) has been endowed for a single year with high 
rank, and burdened with a curious collection  of  disconnected 
duties, the scattered fragments of  powers that once were vast. 
He receives the queen's  judges  on their  circuits, he acts as a 
returning officer in  parliamentary elections  for his county, he 
executes  civil  judgments,  and has to see  to the hanging of 
those who are appointed to die.  He has lost almost all other 
duties.  Long  ago  the  institution  of  justices  of  the  peace 
gradually deprived him  of all penal  jurisdiction, and in 1887 
the court in  which he exercised that jurisdiction-the  sheriff's 
tourn-was  formally  abolished  (he  had, I  think, ceased  to 
hold it for quite two centuries); in  1846 such civil jurisdiction 
as the old  county court  had  was  transferred  to the so-called 
new county courts ; in  I 865 he was relieved of  the custody of 
prisoners, except those appointed to die.  I think that I have 
mentioned  what now are his main  duties.  Civil  execution  is 
the most  important  of  them, i.e.  the  seizing  and selling  of 
lands  and  goods  in  order  to satisfy the judgments  of  civil 
courts.  Such  duties  are  performed  for  him  by  an  under- 
sheriff, but  the sheriff is  answerable tor  the mistakes  of his 
subordinates.  Some  fees  and  percentages  are  payable  for 
this work, but the sheriff has no salary, and is always a loser 
by his office.  He is still appointed by the king, who  chooses 
the  sheriffs  (pricks  the  sheriffs)  from  a  list  settled  at  a 
meeting,  at  which  some  of  the  judges  and  some  of  the 
ministers are present, and under the old  statutes, of  which we 
have formerly spoken, he can hold office but for one year2. 
See above, pp. 232-4. 
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We have  seen  how  in  old  times  it was  one of  $is  main 
duties  to pursue and  arrest  malefactors,  and  also  how  this 
work  fell  more and more under the control of the Justices of 
the Peace, the arrests being  actually made by the parish  or 
township constables under warrants of  the justices.  The old 
system of parish or township constables lingered on far into the 
nineteenth century.  During the eighteenth century, this  and 
that big town obtained a special act for the creation of  a paid 
force of  watchmen, and London began to get a force of  paid 
constables in  1792, a force which gradually increased  in  size 
and was  placed  more  and  more directly under the control of 
the Home  Secretary.  But  for  England  at large, the  only 
constabulary was that old parish  or township constabulary of 
the early history of  which we  have spoken.  So late as 1842 
an  effort was made to put  new life  into the old svstem.  By 
an act of  1842 (5 and 6 Vic., c.  109) the general principle was 
put upon the statute book that every able-bodied man resident 
within  any parish, between  the ages of  twenty-five and fifty- 
five, rated to the poor rate at £4 or more, was  liable to serve 
as constable for the parish ; but certain classes were specially 
exempted, and  the  list  of  exemptions  was  long.  Lists  of 
persons liable to serve were to be laid before the justices, and 
they were thereout  to appoint  so  many  constables for  each 
parish as they should think fit; substitutes were allowed ;  and 
a man who had served in  person or by substitute was exempt 
from serving again until every other person liable to serve had 
taken his  turn ; he was  not  bound, as a general  rule, to act 
outside his parish ; he  might  earn certain fees, but otherwise 
was unpaid.  Thirty years later, in  1872,  the new police forces 
having been created in the meantime, a statute ordained that 
no parish constables should be appointed for the future, unless 
the justices at Quarter Sessions should think  fit.  The act of 
1842 can still be put in force if need be; the able-bodied man, 
not specially exempted, is liable to be constable for his parish 
or to find  a substitute; but  practically this  statute is  never 
put in force.  Then there is another act of  1831  in force, which 
enables the justices, in case of any reasonable apprehension of 
riot  or felony, to force men to serve as special constables.  A 
Secretary of  State has even greater powers-he  can oblige the 
The Police 
exempted classes to serve as special constables ; we must not 
regard this power as obsolete, on occasions it would doubtless 
be used. 
But gradually a  new  police  force was  called  into being. 
The Metropolitan  force was  created in  1829 by an act intro- 
duced by Sir Robert Peel.  In 1839 the City of  London force 
was created.  In 1835 occasion was taken of the great reform 
of  the municipal boroughs, to insist  that every such borough 
should  have a paid  police force.  In 1839 the counties were 
permitted, in  1856 they were compelled, to create paid county 
forces.  Thus by the beginning of 1857 the whole of England 
had been brought within the new system. 
There is no one police force for the whole of England, but 
rather  a number of  distinct local forces.  Part of  the expense 
(if the force is reported as efficient) is paid by the nation, part 
is paid by the counties and boroughs.  The various forces are 
annually  reviewed  by  royal  inspectors,  who  report  to  the 
Home Secretary, and only, if  their  report  is  favourable, does 
the nation  contribute to the expense.  There are some very 
considerable differences between the various forces.  Thus in 
the Metropolitan  district there is very perfect  centralization, 
no  'local  authority'  has  anything  to  do  with  the  system. 
A  Commissioner  and two Assistant  Commissioners, holding 
office during the queen's good pleasure, regulate and command, 
appoint and dismiss the constables, but a supreme supervisory 
control is reserved to the Home Secretary. 
But  take a county force: the Home Secretary can  make 
general  rules  as  to  the  government,  pay  and  clothing  of 
constables;  but  the  justices  in  Quarter  Sessions,  with  the 
Secretary's  consent, determine the number  of the force, and 
appoint  and  can  dismiss  the  chief  constable1.  The  chief 
constable  has  the general  command  of  the force, subject to 
the lawfill orders of the justices  in  Quarter Sessions, and he 
at his pleasure can dismiss any of his subordinates. 
Under  the  Local  Government Act  of  1888 (51  and  52 Vict.,  c.  41) the 
County  police  was  placed  under  the  general  control  of  the  Standing  Joint 
Committee  of  Quarter  Sessions  and  the  County  Council.  The  control  over 
individual  constables is  however  retained  hy the  Quarter  Sessions and  even  by 
individual  justices.  See  Jenks,  Agt  Outline  of  E~zylisA  Lord Government, 
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Let us then  consider briefly the position  of  a police  con- 
stable,  he  has  peculiar  duties  and  peculiar  powers, and  is 
subjected to a peculiar  discipline.  Take this last point  first. 
The peculiar discipline to which he is subject is  not nearly so 
stringent as that of  military law; we  have no  court martial 
for the policeman.  A county constable can  be dismissed  at 
the will  of  the chief  constable.  The chief  constable, if  he 
thinks him  remiss or negligent  in  his duties, can reduce him 
in rank, or fine him one week's pay.  On a summary conviction 
for  neglect  or  violation  of  duty,  he  can  be  fined  £10  or 
condemned to a month's  hard  labour; but  on  the whole he 
has been left  much  to the general  law, and if  guilty of  any 
offence against it, can be treated like another offender. 
Now looking at his powers and duties, we find that he has 
in  the first place powers  and  duties concerning the arrest  of 
offenders.  It is his duty to execute warrants for arrest issued 
by the justices, and in so doing he is protected.  Unless there 
is some flagrant illegality apparent in the warrant he is bound 
to obey  it, and  safe  in  obeying  it.  But  then  without  any 
warrant  he  may, in  certain  cases, arrest  suspected  persons. 
What those cases are, you will have to learn  some day when 
you  study  criminal  procedure.  You  will  find  that  in  this 
respect every person, every member of  the public has certain 
powers, but that a constable has greater powers.  The distinc- 
tion  between  felonies and misdemeanours here plays a large 
part.  For example, there are a number of misdemeanours for 
which a man may be arrested without warrant, if  he is caught 
in  the  act by a constable, while  a  person  not  a  constable 
would not be safe in arresting him.  You must remember this, 
that it does not follow that because I have committed a crime 
therefore I can be arrested without warrant either by anyone, 
or by a constable.  If I have committed  murder anyone may 
arrest  me  without  a  justice's  warrant,  if  I  am  drunk  and 
disorderly a constable may arrest me without a warrant ; but 
if  my  crime  is  perjury  or  bribery,  it  will  be  unlawful  to 
arrest me without warrant.  He who  does so, whether  he  be 
a constable or no, does an unlawful act, does me a wrong; and 
he  does  a dangerous  act, for  I  may lawfully  resist  him, his 
attack is unlawful and my resistance is lawful. 
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Now  it  is in  these  peculiar  powers  of  arrest, and in  the 
duty to exercise them, that lies the chief difference between 
the constable  and  the private  man-he  may lawfully  make 
arrests which  the private  man  cannot  make lawfully.  But 
statutes have gradually been heaping other powers and duties 
upon police constables, e.g. empowering them to enter public- 
houses to detect violation of the Licensing Acts.  If it occurs 
to parliament  that  steam  thrashing-machines  are dangerous 
things  that ought to be fenced, then  it passes  an act saying 
that 'any constable may at any time enter on  any premises 
on which he has reasonable cause to believe that a thrashing- 
machine  is  being  worked  contrary to the provisions  of  this 
act, for the purpose of  inspecting such machines.'  Examples 
might be indefinitely multiplied. 
We may pass to a few words about the provision that our 
law makes for the maintenance of order in extreme cases, and 
we may start with this, that it is the common  law right and 
duty of  all  persons,  whether  constables  or  no, to  keep  the 
peace, and according totheir power to disperse, and if necessary 
arrest, those who  break it.  From an early time the common 
law  was  supplemented  by  statutes,  statutes  of  the  Tudor 
reigns  which  made  it  felony for  twelve  persons  or  more  to 
continue together  riotously  for  an hour  after they had  been 
ordered to disperse by a justice of the peace.  These statutes 
were  temporary,  and  expired  at the death of  Elizabeth; in 
1714  they were  replaced  by  the famous  Riot  Act (I Geo.  I, 
st. 2, c.  5), which is still in force.  It makes it felony for twelve 
rioters to continue together for an hour  after the reading  of 
a  proclamation  by  a  magistrate  ordering  them  to disperse. 
It then  requires the magistrates  to seize and  apprehend  all 
persons  so continuing  together, and it provides that if any of 
them happen to be killed, maimed or hurt in dispersing, seizing 
or apprehending them, the magistrates and those who act under 
their orders shall be held guiltless.  This act then gives to the 
magistrate and those who act under his orders special protection 
in case rioters remain together for an hour after the reading of 
the proclamation (commonly but erroneously called the read- 
ing of the Riot Act), but it does not say, nor does it mean, that 
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As regards the employment of  soldiers for the purpose of 
putting down riots, we have no special statutes, it is left to the 
common law and to the Riot Act.  The general principle seems 
to be  this, that the soldier, like every other citizen, is bound 
to do what in him lies to preserve the peace, and if necessary 
to  suppress  unlawful force.  'The  military  subjects  of  the 
king,' said  Tindal, C. J., '  like his  civil subjects, not only may 
but  are bound  to do their utmost of  their own authority to 
prevent  the perpetration  of  outrage, to  put  down  riot  and 
tumult, and to preserve the lives and property of the people1.' 
Our law does not even say that  military officers must not act 
without the command of the civil magistrates; it is prudent not 
to do so; but in a great emergency a military officer is entitled, 
nay  bound,  to suppress unlawful  force by force.  A  person 
may be  indicted for  not  doing what he could  to suppress a 
riot:  magistrates can  be, and  have been, indicted for neglect 
of their duty of preserving the peace. 
In connexion with this subject a few last words  should be 
said  of  martial  law.  We have  already seen  that  under  the 
provisions of the Army Act which is called into force year by 
year  we  have among us  a large number of  persons  who  are 
living under a special law.  This law is to be found partly in the 
Army Act  itself, partly in articles which  can  be  made from 
time to time by the queen in exercise of powers given by that 
act ; and it seems probable that, apart from the act, the queen 
has some, not very well defined, power  of  making Articles of 
War for any troops that she is lawfully keeping.  This special 
law for soldiers is administered by tribunals known as courts 
martial, and is frequently spoken  of  as martial  law; but  in 
the act it is  called 'military  law,'  and it seems very desirable 
that we  should  adopt that term  rather than the other.  For 
at times the belief has prevailed that there is some other body 
of rules known  as martial  law,  some  body of rules  that the 
king  or  his  officers  could  in  cases of  emergency  bring  into 
force by way of proclamation  and apply to persons who  are 
not soldiers and who therefore are not subject  to that special 
code of military law of  which we have just been speaking. 
Charge to the Grand Jury of  Bristol in  1832.  State  Trials, N.S.,  vol. 111, 
p. 5.  See also D~cey,  Law ofthe Co~rrlrfution,  6th edn., Note VI,  pp. 460-2. 
Now  it may, I  believe, be  pretty confidently  denied that 
there is any such body of  rules.  In  the first place  you  will 
reinember that the Petition of  Right, after  reciting  that com- 
missions  under  the  great  seal  had  of  late  been  issued  to 
certain persons to proceed 'according to the justice of martial 
law,' declared that such commissions were  illegal, and prayed 
that  no  commissions  of  the like  nature should  issue  in  the 
future.  Then  again  our  annual  acts  legalizing  the  army 
declare that 'no man  can  be  forejudged  of  life  or  limb  or 
subjected to any punishment within this realm by martial law 
in time of  peace.'  The words '  in  time of  peace,' which were 
not in the earliest Mutiny Acts, certainly seem to suggest that 
in  time of war men may be punished by martial law.  But we 
can find a sufficient meaning for them by saying that in  time 
of  war soldiers may  be  punished  by  martial  law; that  is  to 
say, apart from the Army Acts the crown would  have some 
power in  time of  war  of  maintaining  discipline in  its troops 
by regulations  similar to those of  our present  military code. 
It must  be  confessed  however  that  a  parliament-an  Irish 
parliament after the rebellion of  1798-has  spoken of  martial 
law as though it were some known body of  rules that might 
in  times  of  great emergency  be  applied  to persons who  are 
not soldiers-that  there can be such a thing as a proclamation 
of  martial law.  If however we  ask, where are we to find  this 
body of  rules? what  is  martial  law? we  shall  hardly  get an 
answer to our question.  When considered  the  matter  seems 
to resolve itself  into  this-it  is  the right and  duty of  every 
subject  to  aid  in  the  suppressioll  of  unlawful  force;  it  is 
more especially the right  and duty of  magistrates  and peace 
officers of  all  degrees  to do so.  The common  law  defines, 
though  from  the  nature  of  the  case  not  very  exactly, the 
occasions on  which  force may  be  repelled  by  force, and  the 
amount of  force that can be  used ; and in great emergencies 
it may become necessary that even death should  be  inflicted, 
and deliberately inflicted, for the suppression of disorder.  A 
proclamation  of  martial  law  can  have  no  other  legal  effect 
than  this-it  is  a  proclamation  by  the king, or  by  persons 
holding  office  under  the king, announcing  that  a  state  of 
things exists in which it has become necessary that force shall Constitutional History 
be  repelled  and  suppressed  by  force;  it  is  a  warning  that 
the part of  our  common  law which  sanctions such  repulsion 
and  suppression,  has  come  into  play.  A  court  of  law,  an 
ordinary court of  law, may afterwards have to judge whether 
really  there was  a  legal  justification  for  these  high-handed 
acts which  were done in  the name of  peace  and  order; but 
doubtless  it  might, and in  appropriate circumstances would, 
take into consideration  the fact  that  those  who suffered  by 
such acts had had full notice that they were about to be done. 
Rut suppose one of  the rebels captured, there is no court that 
can  ~YJJ him save the ordinary criminal  courts of  the country. 
In particular circumstances it might perhaps become necessary 
to shoot him in  order that he might  not escape or be rescued, 
and undoubtedly  in  such a  case, if  time  permitted, it would 
be  well  for  those  who  had  him  in  custody  to satisfy  them- 
selves that he was a rebel.  But  any inquiry that they might 
make about this could  not have the effect  of  a  trial before a 
competent  tribunal ; it would  be  a wise  precaution, but  not 
a  judicial  proceeding  having  force  as such.  He would  not 
really be  tried  and condemned by any body of  rules  known 
as martial law-we  know not where to look for any such body 
of rules-if  lawfully put to death, he would  be  put  to death 
under a rule of  our common law, which justifies  the suppres- 
sion  by  force  of  unlawful  force.  As  to the whole  of  this 
matter see the opinion of  Edwin James and Fitzjames Stephen 
in the case of Governor Eyre (Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on 
Constitutional Law, p.  5 5 I)'. 
H.  Social Afai~s  arzd Local Govenzment. 
There  is  a vast  domain  of  our  public  law  at which  we 
ought to take a brief  glance ; we  ought  to know at least that 
it  exists,  that  its  boundaries  are  being  extended  year  by 
year, and that it is constantly becoming of  greater importance. 
The  title  which  I  have  chosen,  ' Social  Affairs  and  Local 
Government,' is, I fear, not very satisfactory, but you will gain 
a notion of what I mean as time goes on. 
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And  first  a  few  words  as  to the organs of  local govern- 
ment.  We have already said a little about the history of  the 
justices of  the peace.  Instituted in the reign  of  Edward 111, 
their  functions have  from  that  time to the present  become 
ever more and more miscellaneous.  At the present day their 
Quarter Sessions  are a court  for the trial  of  criminal  cases; 
two  justices  can  form  a  court  of  summary  jurisdiction  to 
punish  any of  those  thousands  of  petty  offences  which  can 
now  be punished  without  trial  by jury;  they hold  the pre- 
liminary examination of persons accused of  indictable crimes, 
they can commit the accused to prison  or bail  him  for  trial. 
We have  seen  also  how  they  have  a control over  the con- 
stabulary, and  how  they are bound  to keep  the peace  and 
suppress riots.  These functions of  theirs fall under the head- 
ings-The  Administration of  Justice and The Police System. 
But they acquired other functions of  the most miscellaneous 
character.  Already in  Elizabeth's  day, Lambard, who  wrote 
an excellent book  on  the office  of  the justices,  expressed  a 
fear  that  they  were  being  overladen  with  work,  that  their 
backs  would  be  broken  by  these  'not loads,  but  stacks of 
statutes1.'  His '  stacks of  statutes ' would seem very small to 
our eyes.  During the last two centuries parliament  has  con- 
tinued to heap work  upon  the justices.  The Commission of 
the Peace  had  become  the  one  vigorous  and healthy  local 
institution.  The old  communal  courts  of  the hundred  and 
the shire had  fallen  into utter  decay;  they  had  become  at 
best courts for petty debts held by the under-sheriff.  A non- 
representative  assembly  of  freeholders  was  an  antiquated 
institution  quite  unsuited  to the wants  of  the time, and  no 
attempt was  made  to  introduce  representative  government 
into  local  affairs.  The  municipal  corporations  again  were 
becoming utterly unfit for any governmental work.  With the 
view of  getting favourable  parliaments  the Tudor and Stuart 
kings  had  spoilt  the constitution  of  the boroughs;  by  their 
charters they had vested the local government along with the 
parliamentary franchise in  small  oligarchical  bodies-mayor, 
aldermen and  councillors-who  had  the right  to  fill  up  the 
1 See also Dicey, Laze,  of the  Corzstitzdtiotz, 6th edn.,  Note XII, pp. 502-19.  1  Lambard, E~re?zarrRa,  Book  I,  c.  7. 494  Constitutionad History  PERIOD 
vacancies in their own  bodies.  These bodies  became  hope- 
lessly corrupt; some belonged to the crown and returned to 
parliament the nominees of  the ministry ;  others belonged  to 
great landowners, Whig or Tory, and returned their candidates; 
others sold  themselves  from  time  to time  in  open  market. 
The justices, on the other hand, were competent members  of 
the ruling class, and  nothing  was  more  natural than that a 
parliament of landowners (and remember that in the eighteenth 
century members of  the House of  Commons had to be land- 
owners)  should  trust  them  with  all  manner  of  duties  and 
governmental powers ;  some to be exercised in their Quarter 
Sessions, others to be exercised  by a justice  or two justices 
out of Quarter Sessions. 
A word about the appointment and qualification of justices. 
They were and still are appointed by the king (in practice by 
the Lord Chancellor), who usually acts upon the recommenda- 
tion  of  the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  the  county.  They  held 
and still hold office merely during good pleasure.  Gradually, 
however, we have come to expect that a justice  will  not  be 
removed save for some misconduct.  If George I11 dismisses 
justices  on  political grounds, we  look  back  upon  this as an 
unconstitutional act.  From of  old it has been  required  that 
justices  should  have landed property in  the county; in  1439 
(IS  Hen.  VI,  c.  11)  the  minimum  value was  fixed  at £20 
per annum.  This in the eighteenth century had become very 
low,  and  in  1732  was  raised  to £100  per  annum,  because 
as the act (5 Geo. 11, c.  18) says 'the constituting of  persons 
of  mean  estate to be justices  of  the peace  may be highly 
prejudicial  to the public  welfare.'  Not  until  1875 (38 and 
39 Vic., c.  54) was this relaxed, and then only to the extent 
that  the  occu:patio?z  of  a  dwelling  house  assessed  at LIW 
per  annum  should  also be  a  qualification1.  In the  Middle 
Ages  the justices  (like  members  of  parliament)  were  not 
unpaid, they were entitled to four shillings a day at Quarter 
Sessions;  but  this sum having become small, like the wages 
of  the members, was not demanded, and practically the office 
became  honorary:  in  1855 the  payment  was  abolished. 
l The property qualification of  county justices  has now been removed by the 
Justices d  the Peace Act of 1906,  6 Ed. VII, c. 16. 
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Thus the local  government  of  England  came to be  govern- 
ment  by  country gentlemen.  But  observe  that  there  was 
nothing feudal or patrimonial  in  it.  The country gentleman 
did  not  do justice  or  govern  the  county  in  his  own  name 
or as  a  landlord;  he  was  one  of  the  justices  assigned  to 
keep  the king's  peace;  the justices  were  expected  to obey 
orders  sent  to  them  in  the  king's  name  by  the  Secretary 
of  State,  and  the  courts  of  law,  which  were  never  very 
friendly  to  the  summary jurisdiction,  were  very  ready  to 
entertain  complaints  as to  any irregularities  committed  by 
the justices. 
By  degrees  the  justices  of  the  county  became  very 
numerous.  In the  Middle  Ages  the  demand  is  that  there 
shall be some six or eight in  every shire.  In Elizabeth's day 
this  was  already far  exceeded.  At the  present  time  there 
are, I  believe, more  than  eight hundred  in  Lancashire, and 
even Rutland has twenty-five, but about o'ne-half of  these are 
but  titular justices;  they have  not  taken  the requisite  oaths 
and so become acting magistrates. 
Much  about  their  governmental  powers  we  shall  not  be 
able to say; still  we  shall  return  to them hereafter.  Mean- 
while we have to notice that in the days of  the great Reform 
Bill  a  new  current  of  legislation  sets  in  which  has gone on 
flowing  ever  since-the  creation of  representative  local  in- 
stitutions. 
The first  great  achievement  that  we  will  notice  is  the 
municipal  reform  of  1835.  All  the  boroughs  in  England, 
except London and a few small places which we  need  hardly 
notice, were reformed and were reconstituted  according to a 
uniform  model, and  power  was given to Queen in.Counci1 to 
give  the same constitution to other  towns as yet unincorpo- 
rated.  We have now about two hundred and fifty incorporated 
boroughs-'municipal  boroughs.'  I have before this asked you 
to notice  that the parliamentary and municipal organizations 
have now  fallen quite apart.  In the later  Middle Ages, after 
the representation of  towns  in  parliament  had  begun,  every 
borough  returned  its two burgesses to parliament;  you  will 
remember what the sheriff's instructions were, he was to send 
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this became  the test whether  a town  was  a  borough  or  no; 
those towns were boroughs which sent members to parliament. 
Now-a-days the two things are quite distinct; a borough fully 
constituted for municipal purposes  may send no  members to 
parliament; and again  members, who  are known as borough 
members, may be  returned by a district which is  not under 
the government of any municipal corporation.  We distinguish 
then between the 'parliamentary borough' and the 'municipal 
borough.'  The former is but an electoral district ;  it is of the 
latter that we have to speak.  Now the municipal constitution 
is briefly this.  The corporation consists of  the mayor, alder- 
men and burgesses ;  thus the proper  style of the corporation 
of  Cambridge  is  'the  mayor,  aldermen  and  burgesses  of 
Cambridge.'  In case of a city (generally a municipal borough 
which is also a bishop's see) we  speak  of citizens instead of 
burgesses.  Every  person  who  occupies  a  house  or  other 
building  for  which  he  or she pays  rates is  entitled  to be 
a burgess, and becomes so on  having his name put upon the 
burgess roll.  Women may be burgesses.  The main  right  of 
the  burgess  is to vote  in  the election  of  the town  council. 
The government of the borough is vested in the mayor, alder- 
men  and  councillors.  The number  of  councillors  is  fixed 
upon the incorporation  of  the borough.  The councillors are 
elected by the burgesses and hold office for three years ;  since 
I 872  the election has been by ballot.  The  number of aldermen 
is one-third of  the number  of  councillors.  They are elected 
by  the council, and  hold  office for six years.  The mayor is 
elected  by  the  council, and holds  office  for  a  year.  This 
governing body, consisting of  mayor, aldermen and councillors, 
has very considerable powers;  it manages the property of the 
corporation  (which in  some  cases  is considerable);  it must 
maintain a proper police force; it must see to the paving and 
lighting of the town, and so forth ;  and it enjoys some legisla- 
tive power, for it may make such bye-laws as seem meet for 
the good  rule  and government of  the borough  and for  the 
prevention and suppression of  nuisances.  A fine of  £5  is the 
heaviest punishment that it can denounce for the breach of its 
bye-laws.  Power, however, is given to the Queen in Council 
to disallow any bye-law in whole or in part. 
The Poor  Lnw 
The extent to which the borough  is  exempted out of  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  county  justices  varies  somewhat  from 
borough  to borough;  some  boroughs  have  a  separate com- 
mission of the peace and a court of  Quarter Sessions held  by 
an officer known as the Recorder.  Others have a colnmission 
of the peace but no court of Quarter Sessions.  Others again 
have no separate commission of the peace, but in every borough 
the mayor is  ex  ojicio a justice  and remains so for  one year 
after he has ceased to be mayor.  Then again some boroughs 
maintain  their  own  police, while  others are ' policed  by  the 
county.'  Into  these  variations  we  must  not  go.  What  we 
are concerned to observe is the growth of  democratic, repre- 
sentative government.  Under the act of  1835 in  all the great 
tow~is  of  England, except London, there was  erected  a body 
consisting  of  persons  elected  by  the  ratepayers  and  by  the 
representatives of  the ratepayers which was armed with many 
governmental powers. 
Another great  step was  made one year earlier, in  1834. 
The administration of  the poor law, which  down to this time 
had been carried on  partly by  parochial  officers, overseers of 
the poor, partly  by  the justices  of  the peace, had  for  a long 
time past become very unwise and extravagant.  A thorough 
reform was necessary if England was not to be made bankrupt 
by its paupers.  The country was  mapped  out into districts, 
consisting of  a number of parishes, which were to be united for 
many purposes of  the poor law : of  these '  Poor Law Unions' 
there are now about 650.  Each Union has a Board of Guardians 
of  the Poor.  The justices of  the peace resident in the Union 
are ex  ojicio guardians,  and  besides  there  are a  number  of 
cted  guardians.  They  are  elected  by  the  ratepayers 
according  to a  scheme of  plural  voting;  a  voter  may have 
from one to six votes according to his property qualification : 
property rated at less than £50 gives one vote, property rated 
at £100  two votes, and so on  up to six1.  The constitution 
therefore of a Board of  Guardians is not so democratic as that 
1  By  the Local  Government Act of  1894 (56 and  57 Vict.,  c.  73,  sec.  zo) 
ex o@cio  guard~ans  were abolished, and each  elector was entitled to give one vote 
and no more for each  of  any number of  persons not  exceeding the number  to be Constitutional History 
of a municipal corporation.  The Board has very large powers 
in administering relief  of  the poor  within  the district of  the 
union.  But I want you to observe that every reform of  local 
government has hitherto meant an addition to the powers  of 
the central government.  A large control over the whole poor 
law  system  was  in  1834 given  to certain  Poor  Law  Com- 
missioners ; they had wide powers of  checking the actions of 
the guardians, and even of legislating ; they could  issue rules, 
orders and regulations as to all matters relating to the relief 
of  the  poor.  It was  expected  that  the commission  would 
only be necessary for a time, but it was renewed and renewed 
again  and  developed  first  into  the  permanent  Poor  Law 
Board, and then  into the existing Local  Government  Board, 
which  as  we  have  seen  is  but  nominally  a  board,  for  its 
President, a cabinet minister, can and habitually does exercise 
all its most multifarious  powers.  These two processes  have 
been  going on  side by  side; on  the one hand  we  get new 
organs of  local  government, on  the other hand  we  get new 
organs of  central  government, the organs of  central govern- 
ment being some or other of  those high  officers of  state who 
according to constitutional usage form the cabinet. 
The elaborate system of sanitary law which  exists in  our 
own days we can carry back only to  1848.  The main stages 
in  its  development  are  marked  by acts of  1848, 1858 and 
1875 ; it is now represented chiefly by a great statutory code, 
the Public Health Act of  1875.  Throughout England  local 
sanitary authorities have been created.  In some places they 
are the municipal corporations, in others again the guardians 
of the poor, in others again they are Hoards of Health elected 
by the ratepayers for  the purpose.  The central authority is 
the  Local  Government  Board.  Then  we  have  the  great 
educational  system  introduced  by  the  act  of  1870.  It is 
worked  by  school boards  and school  attendance committees 
elected  by the ratepayers and  controlled  by the  Education 
Department,  a  board  consisting of  cabinet  ministers  whose 
powers  are exercised  chiefly by  the Lord  President  of  the 
Council, and the Vice-President of  the Department'.  Then 
The Education  Act  of  1902  abolished  the  School  Boards  and  entrusted 
Education  to  the  'local  Education author~ty,'  i.e.  the Council  of  a  County or 
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again  we  have elected  Highway Boards  and elected  Burial 
Boards1. 
As a general result  we  have a  pretty wild  confusion  not 
easily to be described in elementary lectures.  For one thing 
we  may  note that each  of  these systems  of  which  we  have 
spoken had a geography of  its own.  In 1834 when  the new 
Poor Law was passed  and the country was  mapped out into 
Poor  Law Unions  the fatal  mistake  was  committed  of  dis- 
regarding  the old  territorial  divisions, the county boundary. 
Often a Union extends into two or more counties.  We have 
now  one  geography  for  civil  justice,  another  for  criminal 
justice,  another  for  police, another  for  poor  law, another  for 
sanitary law and so forth. 
Perhaps we have lived to see the beginning of  the end of 
this disorder.  I  refer to the great Local Government Act of 
1888 (51  and  52 Vic., cap. 41).  The result  of  this has been 
to add to the number of  the organs of  local  government by 
creating County Councils.  The constitution of  the boroughs 
has been  taken  as a  model  for the counties.  Each  county 
has a Council elected  by the ratepayers, and to this Council 
have  been  transferred  all  or  most  of  those  powers  of  the 
justices of  the peace that we can  in  any sense call  adminis- 
trative.  The government of  the county police  force is given 
to the Council and the court of  Quarter Sessions jointly, and 
is to be exercised by a joint committee.  On the whole we may 
say that it is  intended  that the Council shall be the govern- 
mental assembly of  the shire, while the justices  both  in  and 
out of  Quarter Sessions keep all  those powers which  can  be 
called  judicial.  I  need  not,  however,  warn  you  again  that 
these  are not  the words  of  the  statute book;  it  goes  into 
County borough, and also (but only for  elementary purposes) to the Council  of  a 
borough with more than ro,ooo and to the Co~incil  of an Urban District with more 
than zo,ooo inhabitants. 
The Local  Government Act of  1894 created  Parish  Councils  and  District 
Councils.  The Parish Council is empowered to adopt the Burial Acts,  and where 
the area of a Burial Board is identical with that of a rural parish, the Burial Board 
will merge in the Council.  The District  Councils inherit the functions formerly 
dischargeci  by  the  Highway and  Sanitary Boards.  An  Urban  District  Counc~l 
may also by consent  or by  Order in  Counc~l  become  the sole burial  authority 
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minute details, and in  England it would often be hard enough 
to say  on  general  principles  whether  a  power  was  to  be 
deemed  administrative or deemed judicial.  But  this  (it  is 
expected) is  by  no means all  that the County Councils will 
in course  of  time do for us.  Listen  to this clause (sec. 10): 
it is an extremely good instance of  the way  in  which parlia- 
ment legislates for  us  now-a-days, '  It shall be lawful  for the 
Local  Government  Board  to  make  from  time  to  time  a 
provisional  order  for  transferring  to  County  Councils  any 
such  powers,  duties, and  liabilities  of  H.M.  Privy  Council, 
a Secretary of  State, the Board  of  Trade, the Local  Govern- 
ment  Board,  or  the  Education  Department,  or  any  other 
government department, as are conferred  by or in  pursuance 
of any statute and appear to relate  to matters  arising within 
the county and to be of an administrative character.'  Such a 
provisional order will require an act of  parliament to put it in 
force.  The hope,  I  suppose, is  that  some measure  of  de- 
centralization  will  become  possible,  a hope  which  can  only 
be fulfilled if  the County Councils  prove  themselves capable 
and honest.  For the moment, however, this act only adds to 
the  existing  confusion ; we  have  one new  'local  authority,' 
but  the older  local  authorities still  exist:  the guardians  of 
the  poor,  the  school  boards,  the  sanitary  authorities,  the 
highway  boards  and so forth.  It may  be that some day a 
lecturer will be able to state in  simple and general terms the 
chief outlines of  our local government; but that time has not 
come  yet.  That between  the  township  or  parish  and  the 
shire there  should  be  some intermediate district  is  an  idea 
which  crops  up  again  and again  in  all. our  legislation  and 
schemes of  legislation : it is, we  may say, the old idea  of  the 
hundred.  Some day it may become possible for a lecturer to 
say England is  divided  into shires, the shire into hundreds, 
the hundred  into townships ; each  township, each  hundred, 
each  shire has one and only one organ of  local government 
appropriate to itself: but that time seems far distant. 
This you will say (and I will not contradict you) is a very 
poor lecture, but I do think it worth our while just to see that 
there are these vast tracts of modern constitutional law, though 
we can do little more than barely state their existence.  I say 
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of constitutional law, for it seems to me impossible so to define 
constitutional law that it shall not include the constitution  of 
every  organ  of  government  whether  it  be  central or  local, 
whether  it  be  sovereign  or  subordinate.  It must  deal  not 
only with the king, the parliament, the privy council, but also 
with the justices of  the peace, the guardians of  the poor, the 
Boards  of  Health, the  School  Boards,  and  again  with  the 
constitution  of  the Treasury, of  the Education  Department, 
of  the Courts of  Law.  Naturally it is  with the more exalted 
parts of  the subject that we  are chiefly concerned ; they are 
the more intelligible  and the more elementary : but we must 
not  take  a  part  for  the whole  or  suppose  that matters  are 
unimportant  because  we  have  not  yet  had  time  to explore 
them thoroughly.  Year  by year the subordinate government 
of England is becoming more and more important.  The new 
movement  set in with  the Reform  Bill of  1832 : it has gone 
far already and assuredly it will go farther.  We are becoming 
a much governed  nation, governed by all  manner of  councils 
and  boards  and  officers, central  and  local,  high  and  low, 
exercising  the powers  which  have been  committed  to them 
by  modern  statutes. 
It may, I think, be instructive in this context to say a few 
words  as to the active duties which  our  law  lays  upon  the 
generality  of  Englishmen,  instructive  because  I  think  that 
their extent is often neglected  by  students of jurisprudence. 
By active duties I mean duties which  consist  in  the doing of 
something, and not in the leaving of  something undone.  Now 
the great  mass  of  our  ordinary criminal  law is  made up of 
prohibitions, of the imposition of negative duties; its language 
is 'Thou shalt do no  murder,' 'Thou shalt not  steal,' and so 
forth.  It does not say '  Thou shalt succour thy neighbour  in 
distress'-I  commit no crime by not pulling my neighbour out 
of the water,  though  thereby  I  could  save  his  life  without 
wetting  my  feet  So  again  our  law  as  to  civil  injuries, 
'  Torts ' as we call them, consists of  prohibitions-I  am not to 
assault  or  slander  or  defraud  my  neighbour, trespass on his 
land or damage his goods.  Generally it takes some contract 
or some special relationship or some office to create an active 
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bound actively to do something, he  is  bound  because he has 
agreed to be bound.  In some other cases he is bound because 
of  a  standing  relationship  between  him  and  the person  for 
whose benefit he must act, such a relationship, for instance, as 
that of  father and child.  So again there are duties arising out 
of the holding of  a ~ublic  office.  But there are cases in  which 
active duties are cast by law upon a person irrespective of any 
contract, of any special relationship, or of any public ofice. 
First  there  is  a  comprehensive  duty  or  class  of  duties 
consisting in the payment of  taxes and rates.  Think for one 
moment how great a group of  duties we  have here.  If  your 
imagination  fails you, flatter yourselves  that you  are young 
and happy.  The generality of  Englishmen  have to pay  first 
the taxes which  parliament  directly  imposes, and  then  the 
rates  which  it  empowers  local  boards  and so forth  to raise. 
During the nineteenth century  the system of  local taxation 
has rapidly grown ; one can be taxed by many different bodies, 
for many different purposes, for the relief  of the poor (that is 
an old matter), the maintenance of a police force, the improve- 
ment  of  sanitary  conditions,  for  public  education,  for  the 
erection of town halls, public baths, public  libraries, and very 
many  other purposes.  But  it  is  not  on duties that can  be 
discharged  by  the payment  of  money  that  I  would  at this 
moment dwell.  There are other active duties : some ancient, 
some modern, some  imposed  by  the common  law, some  by 
statute. 
From  military  duties  we  are  practically  free.  We have 
already traced the history of  this matter.  There is no  power 
to  force  men  to  serve  as  soldiers  except  under  the  ballot 
clauses of  the Militia Act which are suspended  year by  year, 
There is a prerogative  power  of  ~ressing  sea-faring men  for 
the royal navy, but this has not been exercised for a long time 
past.  The Englishman is still by statute bound to serve as a 
parish constable or find  a substitute if he  is  between twenty- 
five and fifty-five years of age, and is rated to the poor rate at 
£4  or more, and does not  belong to certain special exempted 
classes : the power of forcing men to serve as parish constables 
might  be  put  in  force  if  the  justices  at  Quarter Sessions 
thought  fit, but  as a matter of  fact owing to the creation  of 
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the professional  police  forces  it  is  found  unnecessary.  But 
one may be forced to serve as a special  constable  if occasion 
requires for a  particular  occasion, and the (Home) Secretary 
can  order that even the exempted classes may  be sworn  in. 
These matters are regulated by a statute of  I 83  I. 
Then  again  the  common  law  requires  everyone to  give 
active  aid  to  a  parish  constable  in  the  apprehension  of 
offenders:  within  recent years  a man  has been  indicted and 
convicted  for not aiding the police  when they  called  for his 
assistance (R. v.  Sherloch, I.  C.C.R., 20)~. We may probably 
lay down a more general rule and say that it is the legal duty 
of  every subject to do all that in  him  lies to suppress a  riot, 
and  that  one  might  be  indicted  for  neglecting  this  duty. 
Again in general one is not under any legal duty to reveal  a 
crime that has come to one's  knowledge-so  long as there is 
no aiding and abetting, no harbouring of the criminal, so long 
as one simply does nothing one is guilty of  no offence.  But 
it is laid down in the books that high treason is an exception: 
if  I know that high  treason  has been  committed  and do not 
within  a reasonable time give information  thereof, I  commit 
the crime  known  as misprision  of  treason  and  may  be im- 
prisoned  for  life. 
Then look at jury  service: of old  this was  incumbent  on 
the freeholders.  Under  modern  acts it  is  cast  upon  those 
who occupy houses of a certain value or have interests in land 
of  a  certain  value;  speaking generally  the person  liable  to 
jury  service must  be a householder  rated  at £20  or  have an 
interest in land worth £10 or £20  according to the nature of 
the interest ; but all burgesses are bound to serve on the jury 
at the Quarter Sessions for the borough. 
Then again one of  the public duties that our law  enforces 
is the duty of  giving evidence.  A  person  can  be compelled 
to testify in criminal proceedings and in civil actions and also 
in  many  proceedings  of  many  kinds  which are inquisitorial 
rather than judicial.  For instance one may be summoned  as 
a  witness  not  only  before  the  ordinary  law  courts,  before 
ecclesiastical  courts,  courts  martial,  but  also  before  either 
Sherlock was fined five pounds by the Quarter Sessioils at Lewes z July 1865. 
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House or a committee of either House of Parliament ; or again 
to take examples of  what  is  becoming  common,  before  the 
persons appointed by the Board  of  Trade to investigate the  , 
causes of a railway accident, or by the Home Office to investi- 
gate the causes of  an explosion.  If  one thus summoned will 
not  attend, he can  generally be  punished  for  a contempt in 
a  very  summary  way.  In  civil  actions a  witness  need  not 
appear unless  a  reasonable  sum  is  tendered  to him  for  his 
expenses,  but  no  such  tender  is  necessary  in  a  criminal 
proceeding. 
Then again  it  is  a very general, if  somewhat antiquated, 
doctrine of  the common law that a person  is bound  to serve 
the crown in all manner of  offices.  We see this chiefly applied 
in the cases of sheriffs : a person who has sufficient land in the 
county to qualify him  for  the office (a very  vaguely defined 
amount) is bound to serve if he be appointed and can be fined 
if  he refuses.  This is, I think, but  an  instance of  a general 
principle  which  exists,  though  it  is  seldom  put  in  force. 
Could  a man  be  punished  for refusing to become Chancellor 
of  the  Exchequer  or  Secretary of  State?  It  is  absurd  to 
consider  such  a  case, but  I  imagine  that he  could.  But  in 
particular cases statute has stepped in to enforce this doctrine: 
a qualified person elected to serve as an officer of  a municipal 
corporation can be fined for not  accepting the office, thus one 
elected to the office of mayor may be fined £100. 
But now  glance for one moment at the active duties which 
modern statutes have cast  upon  Englishmen  in  general.  An 
Englishman has a child born to him ; within 42 days (says an 
act of  1874: 37 and 38 Vic., c. 88) he must register its birth at 
the proper  office,  if  he  does  not  he  can  be  fined.  Within 
three  months, says an act of  1867 (30 and  31 Vic., c. 84), he 
must  have  that child  vaccina~ed,  otherwise  he  can  be  fined. 
Then, says an act of  I 876 (39 and 40 Vic., c.'  79), '  it shall be 
the duty of the parent  of  every  child to cause such child  to 
receive  elementary instruction  in  reading, writing and  arith- 
metic, and if  such  parent  fail  to perform  such duty he  shall 
be  liable  to  such  orders  and  penalties  as are provided  by 
this  act.' 
I take these instances of active duties not to be discharged 
Negative  Duties  of  Citizens 
by the payment of  money, because it  seems a stronger thing 
to command a man to do something than to prohibit him from 
doing  something.  I  want  to warn  you  against taking too 
narrow a view of  the field  of  modern  English law, and in  so 
doing  I  may  be  of  some  service  to you  in  your  study  of 
general jurisprudence.  Do not imagine that English  law is 
exhausted  by  those  departments of  it  that  you  can  study 
here-the  law of crimes, the law of  property, torts, and con- 
tracts, and that part of constitutional law which  is concerned 
with king and parliament.  No, there are vast departments of 
law lying outside these boundaries; some of  them  belong to 
constitutional law, others perhaps may be called administrative 
law; for the most part they are statutory and of recent creation, 
the work of the last fifty years: but  their  importance is  very 
great.  For turn from  active duties to negative duties, duties 
which  consist  in  forbearance  only  and see how  we  are sur- 
rounded  by  prohibitions : the list  of  offences for  which  one 
may  be  punished  summarily  by  justices  of  the  peace  is 
enormous.  Then  if  one takes  up  any business  or employ- 
ment, if  one begins  to  build  a  house  or  thinks  to  open  a 
lodging-house, or  keep  a  trading-ship  or  be  a  baker  or  a 
chimney-sweep, straightway  one  comes  in  contact  with  a 
mass of  statutory rules, and if one keeps all the rules expressly  . 
laid down by statute still one is not safe, one may come across 
the rules, orders and regulations which some Secretary of  State 
or central board has been empowered to make or the bye-laws 
of a municipal borough or of  a local sanitary authority.  And 
then  you  may  have  to consider  whether  you  are bound  by 
those rules or that bye-law : for remember  that the Secretary 
of  State or the municipal corporation  has no unlimited  power 
of legislation ;  it is but a delegated  power, and  if  the rule  or 
bye-law is not authorized by the power you may break it with 
impunity, and the judges  will  say that it is invalid.  If  you 
take up a modern volume of  the reports of the Queen's Bench 
division, you will find that about half  the cases reported  have 
to  do with  rules  of  administrative law;  I  mean  with  such 
matters as local rating, the powers of local boards, the granting 
of licenses for various trades and professions, the Public Health 
Acts, the Education Acts and so forth.  Now these matters you Constitutional History 
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cannot study here ; they are not elementary, they are regulated 
by volumes upon volumes ofstatutes.  Only do not neglect their 
existence in your general conception  of  what  English law is. 
If you do, you will frame a false and antiquated notion of  our 
constitution.  That constitution  does  not  now-a-days  consist 
merely  of  king  and  parliament, privy  council, courts  of  law 
and some purely  executive officers,  such as sheriffs, obeying 
their  commands.  We have  changed  all that since  the  first 
Reform  Act.  The  governmental  powers,  the  subordinate 
legislative powers of the great officers, the Secretaries of  State, 
the  Treasury, the  Board  of  Trade, the  Local  Government 
Board,  and  again  of  the  Justices  in  Quarter  Sessions, the 
Municipal  Corporations, the Guardians of  the  Poor,  School 
Boards, Boards of Health and so forth ; these have become of 
the greatest importance, and to leave them out of  the picture 
is to make the picture a partial one-sided obsolete sketch. 
J.  The  C/zzlrch. 
We  ought  to devote a little time to  the history and the 
present  position of the church, looking of  course at its legal 
side.  We speak  of the church  as being  established  by law. 
This phrase  has  a  correct  meaning,  still  it  may  suggest  a 
wrong view  of history, it  may suggest that at some time or 
another the state chose out one among a number of competing 
faiths, established  it  and endowed  it.  Of  course this is  not 
true: the church has a continuous history from  a time when 
there were no competing faiths, when  the idea  of choosing  a 
religion would have seemed a profane absurdity.  The medieval 
theory of  the relation  between  church and state seems  this, 
that they are independent organisms consisting nevertheless 
of  the same units.  Every man, we  may say, is  a member  of 
both-except  indeed  the  Jews, whose  position  in  England 
before  they  were  banished  by  Edward  I,  was  altogether 
anomalous ; they were not  members  of  the. church, but  then 
they were  hardly  in  any sense  members  of the state-they 
lived  under  special  laws of  their own protected  by the kings, 
to whom they were financially useful, against the very general 
hatred of the people ; they are an exception which  illustrates 
the rule.  But though consisting of the same units, church and 
state were not one ; each had its laws, its legislature, its courts 
of  justice, its proper sphere of  action.  Their relation to each 
other constituted a standing denial of that theory of sovereignty 
which  has  become  orthodox  in  our  own  times.  And  it 
is  well  for  students of  jurisprudence  to observe that such  a 
denial  does  not  mean  anarchy.  From  time  to  time  there 
were  disputes  between  the  two  powers;  it  is  sufficient  to 
recall the quarrel between Henry I1 and Archbishop Thomas; 
and  through  several  centuries  there  is  a  constant  border 
warfare going on between the temporal  and the ecclesiastical 
courts as to the exact  limits of  their  several  domains-but 
normally  the  relation  between  the  two  powers  is  that  of 
peace. 
I spoke of  the two  organisms  as consisting of  the  same 
units;  this,  however,  is  not  quite  true,  and  only  perhaps 
because  it was  not quite true was a prolonged continuance of 
the situation possible.  The English church was but a branch 
or  member  of  the church  catholic  and  Roman.  King  and 
parliament might  be supreme over  the English state, but  the 
provincial  convocations  were  not  supreme  over  the  English 
church; they  acknowledged  the  authority  of  the Pope  and 
general councils of the church.  To a large extent the English 
church claimed  and enjoyed what we may describe as Home 
Rule,  and about  certain  matters  a quarrel with  the See  of 
Rome was maintained  from century to century ; in particular 
the Pope was constantly striving to interfere with ecclesiastical 
appointments in  a way which  English churchmen as well  as 
English statesmen warmly resented.  For full a hundred and 
fifty years before Henry VIII broke with the Pope the English 
parliament  had  been  legislating at intervals  against what  it 
regarded as the usurpations of the See of  Rome-interferences 
with rights of  patronage, and all this without  a suspicion of 
heresy or schism. 
Let  us  look  briefly  at  the  relation  between  the  two 
organisms  as it was at the end  of  the Middle  Ages.  In the 
first place we notice that the rulers of the church have a place 
in  the supreme body of  the state.  The bishops  and abbots 
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in that body  is, however, somewhat ambiguous ; if  they are 
prelates  of  the church  they  are also  tenants  in  chief  of  the 
crown, and many abbots have shaken off  the duty of going to 
parliament  by the plea  that  they  are  not  tenants  in  chief. 
Then  again  the inferior clergy are summoned  to parliament 
by  the praemunientes  clause;  they  do not  attend, but  they 
tax  themselves  in  the  two  principal  convocations,  usually 
making a grant proportioned to that which the commons have 
made  in  parliament.  In  these  convocations  they  enjoy  a 
certain power of  legislating as to spiritual matters, of  making 
canons, and these canons can be  enforced against the laity as 
well as the clergy in the ecclesiastical courts. 
These  ecclesiastical  courts have  a  manifold  jurisdiction. 
In the first place there is the discipline of  the clergy, and this is 
a wide field-for  not only is the purely ecclesiastical discipline 
within  their cognizance, but  we  have to remember  that they 
are the only courts which can  punish  an  ordained  clerk  for 
felonies, murder, robbery and  so forth-to  treason, it  is said, 
the benefit of  clergy does not extend.  Then again they have 
large  fields  of  jurisdiction  which  do  not  seem  to  us  very 
spiritual-all  testamentary  causes  including  the distribution 
of the goods and chattels of  intestates are within their sphere, 
and  again  all  matrimonial  causes.  Not  content  with  this 
they  have  long  sought  to  obtain  a  general  jurisdiction  in 
matters of  contract;  in this  they  have  failed, the temporal 
courts have  warned  them  off  that  field, but  in  consequence 
have been  obliged  to enlarge their own notions of  the law of 
contract.  Besides all this these courts exercise a very  wide 
jurisdiction  over  what  we  may  call  immorality-forms  of 
social misdoing to which the lay courts pay no heed, such as 
fornication and incest.  In the medieval law of  the lay courts 
we find no such headings as slander and libel ; these matters 
are dealt with as sins by the tribunals of the church. 
The means  which  these  courts  have  of  enforcing  their 
decrees  are in  theory  spiritual.  Over the clergy they  have 
large powers, being able, for example, to degrade a clerk from 
his  orders.  Over the laity they exercise authority by means 
of penance and excommunication.  In  the last resort, however, 
the secular arm gives them its aid.  If the exco~nmunicated 
person  remained  contumacious for forty days, this was  signi- 
fied  to the king's court, which then issued a writ commanding 
the sheriff to imprison  him  until he should satisfy the claims 
of the church.  Excommunication itself had very serious legal 
consequences, for the excommunicated  person  was  unable to 
bring  any  action  even  in  the  temporal  courts :  it  was  a 
sufficient answer  to him  to say 'You  are excommunicated.' 
In this  respect  his  condition  was  no  better  than  that of  an 
outlaw. 
The existence of  these  ecclesiastical  courts  involved  the 
existence  of  a  considerable  class  of  ecclesiastical  lawyers, 
canon lawyers, familiar with the jurisprudence of  those courts 
-a  jurisprudence  which  was  distinct  from  that of  the lay 
tribunals.  It  included  the  body  of  canon  law  published 
in  the  Decretzrm  of  Gratian  and  its  successive supplements, 
the more  recent  canons of  general  councils  and  the canons 
published  by  the  English  archbishops  in  their  provincial 
convocations.  Canon law was taught in the universities ; the 
common law was not ; its students acquired  their learning in 
London, in  the Inns of  Court, societies  of  common  lawyers 
which  had  gradually grown  up  and  provided  more  or  less 
efficiently for  legal  education1. 
As to heresy, for  a long  time we  had  practically no  law, 
for  we  had  no  heretics.  Probably it was  considered  that a 
heretic,  if  one occurred, would  be  properly  burned ; in  1222 
we hear of a deacon being burned-he  had turned Jew for the 
love of a Jewess!  But  practical  law  against  heresy we had 
none and needed none until the rise of  Lollardy at the end of 
the fourteenth century.  In  1382  we  have  our  first  statute 
against  heresy-heretics  are to be kept in  prison  until  they 
satisfy the claims of the church.  An act of 1401  went further 
-a  heretic who refused to abjure was  to be  publicly burned. 
In 1414  a further act was passed ; it made heresy an indictable 
offence-but  the accused person  is to be tried in the bishop's 
court.  It was under this statute that most of the executions 
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries took place. 
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We have also to think of the church as being endowed: 
but this phrase again  must not  lead  us  astray-there  never 
was any body of  men  called  the church which held property. 
First and last the church has never been a corporation, holding 
or  capable  of  holding  property.  'Church  property,'  if  we 
allow  ourselves  that  phrase,  consisted  and consists  of  the 
various properties of a large number of different persons:  e.g. 
the Bishop of  Ely as such had  land, the Abbey of S. Albans 
as such had  land, the parson  of  Trumpington as such had 
land-a  very large part indeed of the land in this country was 
held by religious houses, though from Edward 1's day onward 
the statutes of  mortmain  had  prevented the increase of  that 
quantity; but any land  belonging to these religious  houses 
belonged  to them and to them only.  And  as with  land so 
with  tithe-in  a  remote  age  the  general  Christian  duty of 
devoting a tenth of  one's property to the service of  God had 
become defined as a burden on land ; this piece of  land owed 
tithe to the parson of the parish church, or its tithe had been 
appropriated to some monastery, but there was  no body, no 
corporation, entitled to the aggregate of the tithes of England. 
As regards ecclesiastical patronage we have to remember 
that at an early time this had come to be regarded as property. 
The right  to appoint  the parson  of  a  church, or  rather to 
present him to the bishop  for  appointment, the advowson of 
the church  (advocuiio ecclesiae) was  freely  bought  and sold ; 
often  it belonged  to the lord  of  the mandr, but it might  be 
held separately from the manor.  Over this form of  property, 
for such we must call it, the royal courts claimed jurisdiction, 
and already in the twelfth century they had  made good their 
point.  Thus the line  between  the spiritual  and the ecclesi- 
astical  jurisdictions  was  not  drawn  just  where  we  might 
expect to find  it.  The provision  of  a parson  for  the parish 
we might regard as a religious trust.  On the other hand we 
might think that testamentary  causes had  little about them 
that  was  spiritual;  but  in  the  Middle  Ages  all  litigation 
regarding wills  was  matter  for  the  courts  Christian,  while 
over the right  to present to ecclesiastical benefices the king's 
courts exercised an exclusive jurisdiction. 
The  great series of events which we know as the Protestant 
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Reformation altered profoundly the relation between  church 
and  state; still  it would  be  easy  for  us  to exaggerate  the 
extent of the definite legal changes.  The old legal organiza- 
tion  of  the church  with  its bishops, its convocations and its 
courts, was for the most part preserved, though it was brought 
under subjection to king and parliament.  We have only time 
to deal very briefly with subsequent history.  I  will  make an 
attempt to sum it up under several headings. 
In the first place  we have the subjection of the church to 
the  state.  In  1534  Henry  VIII,  having  wrung  from  the 
clergy a reluctant  promise that they would  never  make any 
new  canons without  the royal assent, this rule was confirmed 
by  statute  (25 Hen. VIII, c.  19).  In the next year  it  was 
declared  by statute that the king our sovereign lord, his heirs 
and successors, kings  of  this realm, shall be  taken, accepted, 
and  reputed  the only supreme head  in  earth of  the Church 
of England (26  Hen. VIII, c.  I).  These.acts, I think we may 
say, mark the moment at which the church was brought under 
the  state.  At the  same time  the  Church  of  England  was 
severed from the Church of Rome.  It had already been made 
unlawful to pay to the Pope the annates and first-fruits which 
he had  been  accustomed  to receive, appeals to Rome from 
the ecclesiastical courts were  forbidden, the  English chapters 
were  to  elect  as  bishops the persons  recommended  by the 
king; if they would  not  do so, the king was  to have  power 
to  make  the  appointment  by  letters  patent.  The  smaller 
monasteries  were  dissolved  in  1536, the greater in  1539: the 
effect that these  measures had upon  the constitution of  the 
House of  Lords we  have  already  observed1.  The result  of 
these  measures  at a  time when  the doctrines of  the church 
were  being called  in  question was  that  in  1539 parliament 
found  itself  legislating  about  religious  doctrine-legislating 
this time in a conservative sense.  The Act of the Six Articles 
made it highly penal  to deny certain articles of  the faith, in 
particular  the  real  presence.  Henry  did  not  intend  that 
his  political  measures  should  lend  to  any  renunciation  of 
catholic dogma or catholic ritual.  But under Edward VI the 
reforming party got the  upper  hand.  In 1545 we  have  the 
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first Act of  Uniformity-a  certain  book  of  common  prayer 
has been  drawn up and is  to be used  in all churches.  Any 
parson who does not use the book  or uses  any other form  of 
liturgy is to be punished in a lay court-on  a third conviction 
he  is  even  to be  imprisoned  for  life.  All  other  books  of 
prayer are to be destroyed ; all  images in churches are to be 
destroyed;  bishops  are  to be  appointed  simply  by  letters 
patent.  Religion  has now  become  an affair of  statute.  But 
the  power  which  makes  statutes can  unmake  them,  as the 
reformers learned  under  Mary.  The legislation  of  the  two 
last reigns  was  swept away, and the reformers \Yere  heretics 
who could be proceeded against under the Lancastrian statutes. 
That  legislation  was  restored  under  Elizabeth,  except  that 
she did not assume, nor have her successors assumed, the title 
'Head of the Church,' and except also that bishops were to be 
made under the act of Henry VIII which preserved  the form 
of  capitular  election, not  under  that  of  Edward  VI which 
abolished  it.  The reign begins with Acts of  Supremacy and 
Uniformity.  The former is called  an ' Act to restore to the 
Crown the ancient jurisdiction  over the Estate, Ecclesiastical 
and Spiritual,' and among other things it founded the Court of 
High Commission and imposed on all ecclesiastics an oath ac- 
knowledging the queen's supremacy and renouncing all foreign 
authority.  The  Act of Uniformity imposed a book of  common 
prayer-to  use  any other  liturgy  was  made  highly  penal. 
In substance this act (1559) has fixed the law from that time 
to the present day.  The  present prayer book, however, is one 
ordained by a statute of 1662-by  the Act of Uniformity passed 
after the Restoration-a  revised  edition  of  the earlier prayer 
book.  You  should  therefore understand  that a clergyman of 
the Church of  England in reading the service is performing a 
statutory duty; it would  be penal  for  him to read  any other 
service.  In 1871 it was thought desirable to alter the lectionary 
of  the service;  the new lectionary was introduced by statute, 
34 and 35 Vic., c. 37 ; it is a schedule to an act of  parliament. 
It is  under  a  special  proviso  of  the  act  of  1662 that  the 
University sermon  can  be  preached  without  any reading  of 
the book  of  common prayer.  I say this in order to illustrate 
the fact that the church services are statutory.  There is no 
body  which  has  any power  to alter  them  except king  and 
parliament. 
This leads us to speak of the convocations.  In Henry VIII's 
day parliament began to pass statutes confirming the grants 
of  the  clergy-the  clerical  subsidies' ; but  the  convocations 
continued  to grant their taxes until  the Civil War and began 
the practice again after the Restoration.  In 1662 the practice 
was  quietly  abandoned,  and  parliament  began  to tax  the 
clergy directly.  During the reign of  William  111 a  quarrel 
broke out between the upper and lower houses of  the convo- 
cation  of  Canterbury.  The two houses took  different  views 
of ecclesiastical policy, but the exact point of dispute was the 
question whether the archbishop could  prorogue  the houses. 
The quarrel  went  on until  1717  when  the two houses  were 
at issue  over  the Bangorian  controversy.  They were  never 
again  summoned  for  business  until  1861-though  between 
1717 and 1741  formal meetings were held.  Thus for a whole 
century and more the Church of England (if any such body can 
be said to exist) had no representative  assembly, no power of 
making rules for  itself.  The convocations cannot now  meet 
without the royal summons ;  they can make no canons without 
the royal assent.  And further, since the days of James I it has 
been the doctrine of the law courts that canons even when they 
have received  the royal  assent are not binding on  the laity. 
Thusthe legal powers of the convocations are extremelylimited; 
they may discuss and deliberate, but they can do very little. 
In reviewing  the present position  of  the church  it would 
be  necessary to chronicle that the bishops, or  rather some of 
the bishops,  sit in the House of  Lords, that no clergyman can 
sit  in  the House of  Cornmons, but  that there  is  nothing to 
prevent  him  from  voting  in  a  parliamentary  electibn.  As 
regards  the  disqualification  from  being  elected,  we have  to 
remember  that the clergy are still summoned  to parliament 
under tl~epvae~nzc?tie~zteses  clause.  In 1801 Horne Tooke, a clerk 
in  holy  orders,  having  been  elected,  search  was  rnade  for 
precedents ; they were considered  obscure and  inconclusive ; 
the  House  refused  to declare that  Tooke was  incapable  of 
sitting  but  passed  an act (41  Geo.  111,  c. 63) disqualifyi~ig 
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clergymen for the future.  At the same time  it disqualified 
the  clergy  of  the  Scottish  Church.  In  1829 when  Roman 
Catholic laymen were admitted by the Catholic Emancipation 
Act  (10 Geo.  IV, c.  7), the  Roman  Catholic  clergy  were 
expressly excluded.  These  disqualifications  are  somewhat 
anomalous, for  there is  nothing to prevent  the minister of  a 
congregation  of  Protestant  nonconformists  from  sitting.  In 
1870  (33  and  34  Vic.,  c.  91) persons  in  the orders of  the 
established  church  were  enabled  to solemnly renounce their 
orders and so free themselves from disability. 
We turn to another portion of our subject.  From the time 
of  the Reformation onwards a long attempt is made to force 
people to accept the doctrines and worship of  the church  as 
defined by statute.  The gradual abandonment of this attempt 
constitutes the history of toleration.  Starting in  Elizabeth's 
day we find one set of statutes directed against the Catholics, 
and  another  against  the  Puritans.  Ill  1562  the  oath  of 
supremacy, which  declared  the queen to be the only supreme 
governor of this realm, as well in  all spiritual or ecclesiastical 
causes as temporal, was required of members of  the House of 
Commons: it might be tendered to all persons who had taken 
a  degree  in  the  University,  to  all  schoolmasters,  to  all 
barristers, and to various other classes; to refuse it once was to 
incur the penalty ofpmem~rnire,  to refuse it a second time was 
high treason.  In 1  571 new treasons were invented :  thus to call 
the queen a heretic was treasonable, to publish any papal bull 
was treasonable,  to reconcile  any of  the queen's  subjects to 
the See of Rome was treasonable.  In 1580 to celebrate mass 
was made a crime, and to hear mass.  Everyone was to attend 
the church service upon pain of forfeiting £20  per month.  In 
1585  the  Jesuits  and  seminary  priests  were  expelled:  for 
them to remain  here was  high treason.  As to the Puritans, 
the rigorous  action of  the Court of  High Commission  served 
to expel them from ecclesiastical  benefices, and in  I 593 there 
is  direct  legislation  against  them;  persons  who  frequent 
irregular conventicles are to be imprisoned until they conform. 
Under  James  there  was  fresh  legislation  against  popish 
recusants, that is  to say against  all  persons  who  refused  to 
take an oath declaring that James was lawfully king, and that 
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the Pope had  no power to depose him.  Such a  person was 
deprived  of  most  of  his  civil  rights,  and  was  almost in  the 
position of an outlaw.  The legislation  against Catholics was 
infinitely  more  severe  than  the legislation  against Puritans. 
Still the latter had many grievances in that they were excluded 
from ecclesiastical benefices by the Act of  Uniformity, which 
was  rigorously  enforced.  Then,  as  we  know,  for  a  time 
Puritanism gained the upper hand, and again at  the Restoration 
it fell.  The time then  comes for laws against the Protestant 
nonconformists.  All  the while,  however,  the  terrible  code 
against  the  Catholics  remains  unrepealed,  though  under 
Charles I1 and James I1 breaches of it are connived at by the 
king, and sanctioned by virtue of the dispensing power.  The 
great acts of  Charles 11's reign which we have to notice are 
five  in  number.  The  Corporation  Act,  1661,  obliged  all 
holders  of  office  in  municipal  corporations  to  receive  the 
sacrament according to the rites of  the Church of  England. 
The Conventicle Act of  1664 made it penal for any person to 
attend a conventicle, that is, any meeting for religious worship 
at which  five  persons  were  present  besides  the  household. 
Three months  imprisonment was the punishment for the first 
offence.  The Five Mile Act of  1665 made it unlawful for any 
nonconformist minister to come within five miles of a corporate 
town  upon  pain  of  a  A40 fine, and no nonconformist  might 
teach in any public or private school.  The Test Act of 1673 
imposed the sacramental test on all persons holdrng any office 
of  trust.  The  Parliamentary  Test  Act  of  1678,  directed 
against  Roman  Catholics,  imposed  the  declaration  against 
transubstantiation upon members of both Houses, and thus for 
the first time excluded Roman Catholic peers from the House 
of Lords. 
Meanwhile  the old  law as to the burning of  heretics had 
passed  away.  Its  history  is  particularly  complicated  and 
confused, owing to the rapid  fluctuations of  religious opinion 
during the age of the Reformation.  On Elizabeth's  accession 
the old  statutes of  Henry IV and  Henry V  were  repealed ; 
some  Anabaptists  were  burnt  in  her  reign,  and  an Arian 
was burnt in  1612 under James I; but it is doubtful whether 
these proceedings were lawful, and in particular Coke gave his opinion  against  the execution  of  161z1.  The question  was 
whether the common  law-the  old statutes being repealed- 
had  any  procedure  against  heresy.  This  case  of  1612 is 
believed  to be  the last  case  of  anyone being  executed as a 
heretic.  In  1677,  under  Charles  11,  an  act  was  passed 
(29 Car. 11, c.  9) which  abolishes  whatever  power there may 
have been of burning heretics.  We must carefully distinguish 
the trial of a man  for heresy, from  his  trial  under any of  the 
statutes directed  against  Papists ; the Catholics who  for  one 
reason and another suffered death under Elizabeth and James, 
were tried by the ordinary legal tribunals for offences created 
by statute. 
Immediately after the Revolution the Penal  Code against 
Protestant  dissenters  was  very  much  mitigated  by  the 
Toleration Act of  1688 (I Will. and Mary, c.  18).  There was 
a slight reaction  in  favour of  persecution  under Anne, which 
produced  the  act  against  occasional  conformity  of  1711 
(10 Anne, c. 6)' and the Schism  Act of  1713 (13 Anne, c. 7), 
but  the  latter  was  repealed  five  years  afterwards  in  1718 
(5 Geo. I, c. 4).  In 1728,  just  after the accession of George 11, 
a practice was begun of passing every year an act indemnifying 
those holders  of  offices  who  had  failed to take the requisite 
oath or to receive the sacrament-a  curious English practice. 
It amounts to saying 'We will  not repeal the law, but  it  is 
understood  that nobody  need  keep it, for  every year  an act 
will be passed indemnifying those who have not kept it.' 
I can best illustrate this part of  the subject by referring to 
Rlackstone's Commenta~ies,vol.  IV, p. 53.  Blackstone, writing in 
the middle of the eighteenth century, still treats nonconformity 
as being in a general way an offence-he  calls it the crime of 
nonconformity-and  then  describes  how  of  late  exceptions 
have been made to a general rule.  For instance it is still, as a 
general rule, a statutory offence under  acts of  Elizabeth and 
James not to go to church ; he  who absents himself forfeits 
one shilling for every Sunday, and £20  if  he absents himself 
for  a  month, but  an exception  has been  made in  favour  of 
dissenters by the Toleration Act; they may absent themselves 
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provided  (I) they  be  neither  Papists  nor  U~~itarians,  (2) 
they have  taken  the oaths of allegiance and supremacy and 
subscribed the declaration against transubstantiation, (3) they 
repair  to some  registered  place  of  worship.  So again  dis- 
senting preachers are exempted from the acts which prohibit 
them  from  teaching  if they have  subscribed  the Thirty-nine 
Articles except three and part of  a fourth, that is, except those 
which  relate  to the  government  of  the  church  and  infant 
baptism ; they are also exempted by a still newer act of 1779, 
if instead of  subscribing the Articles they will  profess  them- 
selves Christians and Protestants.  Toleration of  any profession 
of  faith, other than  that of  the established church, is still the 
exception,  not  the  rule.  However,  by  this  time  the  more 
orthodox sects of  Protestant  nonconformists  enjoyed liberty 
of  worship  and  teaching.  The  annual  Indemnity  Acts 
enabled  them  to hold  office, and  there  had  never,  I  think, 
been  anything which excluded  them  from  voting  in  parlia- 
mentary elections, or sitting in either House of  Parliament. 
With the Catholics it was still far otherwise.  Catholicism 
had been treated  not as a mere religious error, but as a grave 
political danger, and considering the risings of  1715  and 1745, 
we  are perhaps  not justified  in  condemning  that  treatment. 
How  enormously  severe the law  was, will  appear  from  the 
following passage from Blackstone' : ' Papists may be divided 
into three classes--persons  professing popery, popish recusants 
convict, and popish priests.  I.  Persons professing the popish 
religion, besides the former penalties for not frequenting their 
parish  church,  are  disabled  from  taking  lands  either  by 
descent  or  purchase  after  eighteen  years  of  age, until  they 
renounce  their  errors ; they  must, at the age of  twenty-one, 
register their estates before acquired, and all future conveyances 
and wills relating  to them ; they are incapable of  presenting 
to any advowson [or granting to any other person any  avoidance 
of the same], they may not keep or teach any school, under pain 
of  perpetual  imprisonment; and if  they willingly say or hear 
mass they forfeit the one zoo, the other loo marks, and each 
shall suffer a year's  imprisonment.  Thus much  for  persons, 
'  Coke, Reports,  ~11,  93.  See on  the  whole  question,  Stephen, Hastory  of 
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who, from the misfortune of family prejudices or otherwise, have 
conceived an unhappy attachment to the Rotnish Church from 
their infancy, and publicly profess  its errors.  But if any evil 
industry is used to rivet these errors upon them, if any person 
oion, or  sends another abroad to be educated in the popish  reli,' 
to reside  in  any religious  house abroad  for  that purpose, or 
contributes to their maintenance when there, both the sender, 
the sent and  the contributor  are disabled  to sue in  law  or 
equity, to be executor or administrator to any person, to take 
any legacy or deed of gift, and to bear any  office in the realm, 
and shall forfeit  all their goods and chattels and likewise  all 
their  real  estate  for  life.  And where  these  errors are also 
aggravated  by  apostasy or  perversion,  where  a  person  is 
reconciled  to the  See of  Rome,  or  procures  others  to be 
reconciled, the offence amounts to high  treason.  2.  Popish 
recusants,  convicted  in  a  court  of  law  of  not  attending the 
service of the Church of England, are subject to the following 
disabilities, penalties  and  forfeitures,  over  and  above  those 
before  mentioned.  They are considered  as persons  excom- 
municated;  they  can  hold  no office  or  employment; they 
must  not  keep  arms in their  houses,  but the  same  may be 
seized  by the justices  of  the  peace ; they  must  not  come 
within ten miles of London on  pain  of £100,  they can bring 
no action at law or suit in  equity ; they are not permitted  to 
travel  above  five  miles  from  home  unless  by licence, upon 
pain of forfeiting  all their goods ; and they may not come to 
court under pain of £100 ....  A married woman, when recusant, 
shall forfeit  two-thirds of  her dower or jointure,  may not be 
executrix  or administratrix  to her  husband,  nor  have  any 
part of  his goods, and during the coverture may be kept in 
prison, unless her husband  redeems  her at the rate of  £10  a 
month or the third  part  of  all  his  lands.  And  lastly, as a 
feme-covert, a recusant may be imprisoned ; so all others must 
within  three  months  after  conviction,  either  submit  and 
renounce their errors, or if  required  so to do by four justices, 
must abjure and renounce the realm, and if they do not depart 
or if they return without the king's licence, they shall be guilty 
of  felony, and suffer death as felons without benefit of clergy. 
...  But (3) the remaining species or degree, viz. popish priests, 
are in  a  still  more  dangerous  condition, for  by  I I  and  12 
VCTill. 111, c. 4,  popish bishops  or priests celebrating mass or 
exercising any part of  their  functions  in  England, except in 
the houses of ambassadors, are liable to perpetual  imprison- 
ment.  And  by 27 Eliz., c.  2, any popish  priest  born  in  the 
dominions  of the crown  of  England, who  shall  come hither 
from  beyond  sea  (unless  driven  by  stress  of  weather  and 
tarrying  only  a  reasonable  time),  or  shall  be  in  England 
three days without conforming and taking the oaths, is guilty 
of  high treason ; and all persons harbouring him are guilty of 
felony without the benefit of clergy.' 
Such were the laws against Catholics in  the middle of the 
eighteenth century, the result of a series of statutes extending 
from  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  to that  of  George  11.  It is 
customary for writers to become eloquent over the acts against 
Protestant  nonconformists-the  Corporation  Act, Five  Mile 
Act, Conventicle Act-  they were trifles when  compared with 
the rigorous  laws against the Catholics.  In Blackstone's day 
they were seldom enforced, still they existed. 
From both Houses of  Parliament Catholics were excluded 
by the declaration against transubstantiation. 
The greater  part  of  this  rigorous  code was  repealed  in 
1791 (3  I  Geo. 111, c. 32), or rather all Catholics were exempted 
from it upon taking an oath, which it was possible for them to 
take, renouncing the Pope's civil power and the doctrines that 
faith need  not be kept with heretics, and that princes excom- 
municated  by the Pope  might be deposed or murdered.  A 
Catholic  who  would  take  this  oath  was  freed  from  civil 
disabilities, might worship in his own way in a registered place 
(which,  however,  might  not  have a  steeple nor  a  bell),  and 
could not be prosecuted for not attending church.  He  might 
hold most offices in consequence of the annual indemnity acts. 
He  was still, however, unable to sit in either House of  Parlia- 
ment, because  the declaration  against transubstantiation was 
required  of  all  members.  In  strictness of  law  he could not 
vote  in  a  parliamentary  election,  because  all  electors  on 
presenting  themselves  to vote  might be required  to take an 
oath  declaring  that  the  Pope  had  no  spiritual  jurisdiction 
within this realm ; an oath which, though  not so stringent as Constif  utionad  History 
the  declaration  against  transubstantiation,  a  conscientious 
Catholic could  hardly  take.  As a  matter  of  fact, however, 
I suspect that Catholics  did vote, for the oath seems to have 
seldom been tendered; owing to the lengthy process of swear- 
ing the electors, an  act of  1794 said  that this form was only 
to be gone through if a candidate required it, and then  at his 
own expense.  Catholic emancipation  came in  the year  1829 
(10 Geo.  IV, c.  7).  Catholics  might  vote  in  parliamentary 
elections, sit in  either House and hold any lay office (except 
those of  Regent, Chancellor and Lord-Lieutenant of  Ireland) 
on taking an oath  of  allegiance in  which there  was  nothing 
offensive to their religious principles.  The subsequent history 
of  parliamentary oaths we have already traced.  However, as 
I have explained, the act of  1791 did  not repeal the old laws 
against Catholics, it merely exempted from their  terms those 
who would take a certain oath.  It was not until  1846 (g and 
10 Vic., c. 59) that those laws were swept off the statute book. 
Meanwhile  full  relief  had  been  given  to  the  Protestant 
nonconformists.  The provisions of  ;he  Test and Corporatior1 
Acts, which  were  obnoxious to them, were  repealed  in  1828 
(9 Geo. IV, c. 17), though the work was not quite accomplished 
until  1868 (31 and 32  Vic., c. 72):  betiireen those two dates a 
declaration  was  required  of  office-holders to the effect  that 
they would not use their offices to injure or weaken the Church 
of England. 
The  legislation  by  which  disabilities  have  been  first  - 
imposed  and  then  removed  is  very  complicated, but  at the 
Dresent  moment  we  may, I think,  say that religious  liberty  I 
and religious equality is complete.  These, however, are vague 
phrases, and we ought to render them  more precise.  I mean 
by them : 
(I)  That the profession of  any religion or of  no  religion 
is no offence.  This, however, is  subject to what I shall here- 
after have to say as to blasphemy, and as to the procedure of 
the ecclesiastical courts against heresy. 
(2)  That  every  form  of  public  worship  is  permitted. 
There are provisions as to the registration of  places of worship; 
but  these,  however,  hardly  derogate  from  our  proposition. 
There are  also  some  statutory  clauses  still  in  force against 
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Jesuits  and  other  religious  orders  of  the  Church  of  Rome, 
requiring  that  they  should  obtain  license  to  reside  in  the 
United  Kingdom : whether  they  are  practically  applied  I 
cannot say; they are laid  down in  the Emancipation Act of 
1829, and are severer than most  people imagine: it is a mis- 
demeanour for a Jesuit  to come into this realm  without  the 
license of  a Secretary of State. 
(3)  The profession of  any form  of religious belief  is not 
a condition for the existence or exercise of  civil rights.  On 
the whole, I think we may say that this certainly is so, though 
it is only of quite late years that a person having no  religious 
belief has been able to give testimony before a court of justice. 
Until  1869 a person  who  would  not  take  an  oath could  not 
give  evidence  unless  he  was  a  Quaker-Quakers  had  been 
relieved  much  earlier.  In  that  year  he  was  enabled  to 
substitute  a declaration  for  an oath, on  satisfying the judge 
that an oath would  have no binding effect on his conscience. 
We  may  note  also  a  disability  in  respect  of  advowsons. 
Roman  Catholics cannot  present to livings in the established 
church.  This, however, is hardly an exception, though it is 
curious, for it seems that an atheist may present. 
(4)  The profession  of  any form of  religious  belief  is not 
a  condition  for the  existence or exercise  of  political  rights. 
This is generally true-but  there  are  some exceptions  and 
one very notable exception.  The king forfeits the crown by 
becoming  or marrying a  Papist, also the king is directed  to 
join  in  communion  with  t5e  established  church.  It seems 
however  that  the  king  would  not  commit  a  forfeiture  by 
becoming  a  Baptist. 
Again  it  would  appear that there  are two  offices  which 
cannot be  held  by  Roman  Catholics, those  namely  of  Lord 
Chancellor of  England, and  Lord-Lieutenant  of  Ireland.  A 
statute of  I 867 (30 and 31 Vic., c. 75) provides that the Lord 
Chancellor of Ireland may be Catholic. 
It remains to qualify our proposition as to the lawfulness 
of publishing opinions about religion : 
(a)  Blasphemy  is a common  law  misdemeanour.  Until 
lately there was good ground for contending that any publica- 
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Christianity;  this  had  been  so  laid  down  in  several  cases. 
But  it  seems  now  that we  must  qualify  it  by  adding  that 
publications intended in  good  faith to propagate opinions on 
religious  subjects,  which  the  person  who  publishes  them 
regards as true, are not blasphemous, if  they are expressed in 
decent terms. 
(6)  Under  Stat. 9 and  10  Will. 111, c.  32  (1698) it  is  a 
misdemeanour for  anyone who has been  a Christian  to deny 
a  the Christian  by writing, printing, teaching or advised speakin, 
religion to be true or the Old and New Testaments to be  of 
divine  authority.  The offender  upon  a  first  conviction  is 
disabled from holding any office or employment, ecclesiastical, 
civil  or  military.  On  a  second  conviction  he  must  be  im- 
prisoned for three years.  This act had long lain dormant  on 
the statute book,  when  an  attempt, which  failed, was  made 
to put it in force against Bradlaugh1. 
(c)  Mere heresy or schism is in all probability to this day 
an ecclesiastical offence, i.e. an offence to be punished  in  the 
ecclesiastical courts, and for it a man miglit be imprisoned for 
six months.  I am not aware, however, that a layman has been 
prosecuted  for  heresy  for  the last  century  and  more.  But 
this  leads  us  to another  part  of  our  subject: the history  of 
the ecclesiastical  courts. 
The act  of  the  Long  Parliament  which  abolished  the 
Court of  High Commission used such very general words that, 
if  it did not abolish the old ecclesiastical courts, it  practically 
deprived  them of  their  power.  At the Restoration, however, 
by  statute passed in  1661 (13 Car. 11, c. 12) it was 'explained' 
that this was not the desired result : the Court of  High Com- 
mission was not to be re-established, but  the old ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction  of the old ecclesiastical courts was to be exercised 
as of old.  A few years afterwards (1677, 29 Car. 11, c. 9) the 
act was  passed  which  farbad  the burning  of  heretics, but  it 
was expressly added that nothing contained in that act should 
ues in cases  take away the jurisdiction  of  the ecclesiastical jud, 
of atheism, blasphemy, heresy or schism, or any other damnable 
doctrines  and  opinions, but  that they may  punish  the same 
Reg.  v.  Bradlaugh  and others, 1883.  Cox,  Cri7ninal Law  Cuses, vol. XV, 
p. z18ff. 
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by  excommunication,  deprivation,  degradation  and  other 
ecclesiastical  censures. 
There were then ecclesiastical courts-an  elaborate struc- 
ture of  them, with appeal  lying from the lower to the higher; 
an archdeacon's  court for each archdeaconry, a bishop's  court 
for  each  diocese, an  archbishop's  court  for  either  province: 
the final  appeal  being  under  an  act  of  Henry VIII (1534, 
25 Hen. VIII, c. 19) to the king who was to appoint judges, 
'judges delegate,' to hear the cause.  This structure of  courts 
with  little modification  still exists.  The greatest  change  is 
that in  1832 (2 and 3 Will. IV, c. 92) the jurisdiction  of  these 
judges  delegate was transferred  to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council, which was formed in the next year.  Under 
an act of  I 876 the ultimate appeal is to the Judicial Committee, 
certain bishops sitting as assessors of  the judges according to 
a rota of seniority settled in 1876. 
But  though  these  ecclesiastical  courts  still  exist  their 
power  has  very  much  declined.  Let  us  take  up  the  main 
heads  of  the  old  ecclesiastical jurisdiction  one  by  one. 
(i)  In the first place they were, as so often said, the courts 
for  matrimonial  and  testamentary  causes :  and  this brought 
them a great deal of  work.  Every will  of  personal  property 
had to be proved in the bishop's  or archbishop's  court.  This 
large jurisdiction  they retained until  1857, when  it  was  taken 
from them and vested in  two new courts : a Court for Divorce 
and Matrimonial Causes, and a Court of  Probate, courts which 
in  1875 were merged in  the High Court of Justice. 
(ii)  They had, and theoretically still have, a considerzble 
penal jurisdiction  over laity as well as clergy., in  what we may 
call cases of irreligion and immorality: a power to correct the 
sinner #YO  salute  auimae by  means  of  penance  and  excom- 
munication.  Throughout  the  Middle  Ages  this  power  was 
largely  used,  and  it  has  never  been  expressly  taken  away. 
However it has long been considered an established  principle 
that the ecclesiastical courts were not to try men for temporal 
offences, i.e.  offences  punishable  in  the king's  courts.  Now 
many  of  the  graver  offences, with  which  the  ecclesiastical 
courts once dealt, have by statute been  made crimes punish- 
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have lost jurisdiction.  Bigamy is a case in  point; until  1603 
it was only an offence against ecclesiastical law : in  that year 
it was  made a  felony.  Until  1855 the ecclesiastical  courts 
punished defamatory words : in that year their jurisdiction  in 
this matter was abolished by a statute (18 and rg Vic., c. 41) 
which  speaks of  it as grievous  and oppressive, so I  suppose 
that it was exercised.  But they probably still have  power  in 
cases of adultery and of fornication.  To  these must be added 
heresy  and  schism.  This jurisdiction  is  expressly saved  by 
the act which abolished the writ  de hneretico cornburendo.  It 
is not exercised ; but seemingly it exists.  As to the weapons 
which these courts have at command-over  the laity these are 
penance, and  in  the last  resort  excommunication.  Excom- 
munication, as already  said, involved  a  number of  civil  dis- 
abilities, and if the excommunicated person would not submit, 
the king's  writ  issued  de excom~nunicato  ca$ietzdo,  and he was 
imprisoned until he satisfied the church.  In 1813  (53 Geo. 111, 
c. I 27) the law was altered ;  excommunication was no longer to 
have  any  disabling  effect,  but  the  court  pronouncing  the 
sentence of  excommunication was to have power to imprison 
the excommunicate for any term  not exceeding six months. 
It would  seem  then  that the heretic,  schismatic, fornicator, 
adulterer  or  other  offender  (the  catalogue  of  offences  we 
cannot lay  down  with  any certainty) may be tried  by the 
ecclesiastical  court, excommunicated  and imprisoned  for  six 
months. 
(iii)  These courts have had a power, never very extensive, 
in some matters relating to the endowments of  the churches, 
in  particular  tithes  and  church  rates.  They could  compel, 
for instance, the payment of  tithes, if  the right  to the tithes 
was not disputed, but their sphere was a limited one: from an 
early time, as we have already said, the king's courts regarded 
ecclesiastical  endowments  and  ecclesiastical  patronage  as 
belonging to their own province.  And practically the sphere 
of the courts Christian has become very limited indeed, a series 
of  modern  acts having  provided  summary  remedies  for  the 
recovery  of  tithes,  and  of  the rent-charge  into which  tithes 
have been commuted: while as to church rates, the compulsory 
church rates were abolished  in  1867 (31 and  32 Vic., c.  109). 
There are a good many small miscellaneous matters relating to 
the fabrics of  the churches which are subject to these courts, 
but as a matter of  fact the greater number of these courts do 
no business whatever from year's end to year's end. 
(iv)  However it must not be  forgotten that their power 
over the clergy is large and real.  They can suspend a clerk 
in orders from ministration, and they may deprive him  of  his 
benefice if  he has one.  The legal  position  of  a  clerk  in  the 
orders of the Church of England differs radically from that of 
the priest or the minister of  any other religion.  The one, we 
may say, has in the strict sense of the term a legal status, the 
other  has not.  The duties of the clerk  in  holy  orders  are 
directly imposed upon him by law; if, for instance, he is bound 
not to perform publicly any service save those authorized by 
the book of  common  prayer, this is no matter  of  contract  or 
of  trust, it is  a  matter of  status, and  there are special courts 
which  can  enforce  those  duties.  Otherwise  is  it  with  the 
Catholic priest or the Wesleyan minister, the law  imposes no 
duty upon him as such.  If  he has contracted to preach those 
doctrines  or perform  those  ceremonies  and  none  other, an 
action may lie against him  for  breaking his  contract.  If  the 
trustees or owners of  a chapel have engaged him to teach one 
set of  dogmas, he will not be  allowed  to use  that chapel  for 
the propagation of another set of inconsistent dogmas.  Before 
now  the Court  of  Chancery  has had  to decide that a  non- 
conformist minister had no right  to use a chapel, because he 
was  engaged  to preach  the doctrine  of  universal  depravity 
and was not preaching it.  So  an English temporal court might 
have to decide whether a Koman priest was  preaching ortho- 
doxy or  heterodoxy, i.e. whether he was doing what he was 
paid for, or putting a particular building to its right use.  But 
all this is matter of contract or of trust, matter of private law, 
and  the  court  would  receive  evidence  as to what  are  the 
orthodox doctrines of the Roman Church or of  the Particular 
Baptists.  Otherwise with the clerk in English orders-contract 
or no contract, trust  or no trust, he has both  negative and 
positive duties: he must  not preach  heterodox  doctrines, he 
must not use ceremonies not authorized  by  the prayer  book ; 
if  he has a  church he must perform  the church services, he Constitut  ional History 
must  bury,  he  must  marry,  and  the  courts do not  require 
evidence  as to the doctrines  that he is to teach, or the cere- 
monies that he is to perform : the standard of orthodox dogma 
and orthodox ritual is directly fixed by law. 
Once more I call  your attention  to the fact that there is 
no body having  power  to  alter that standard, other than  the 
statute-making body, king and parliament.  This gives to the 
Church of  England a very unique position.  Indeed I do not 
think  that  we  can  for  legal  purposes  define  the  Church  of 
England as consisting of  a body of  persons, or as represented 
by  a  body  of  persons.  It is  no  corporation,  it  is  no  self- 
governing body of  persons, consequently it has no rights  and 
no duties.  As already explained it has no property : there is 
no land, for instance, which belongs to the Church of England- 
there is glebe of this parish church, and of  that parish church. 
Further the benefit of  the organization is not confined to any 
definite body of  persons : the parishioller has a legal  right  of 
attending the services in  his parish church, until comparatively 
recent times it was his  legal  duty to attend them, even from 
the  Holy  Colnlnunion  he  can  only  be  excluded  for  one 
among several definite causes, known to the law ; the clergy- 
man  who  refused  to  receive him  would  have  to  prove  the 
existence of  one of  those causes.  We may speak if  we  will 
of the church as a legal organization, but  we must  not  think 
of it as of a legal person or as a definite body of  persons. 
K.  The Dejnition  of  Corzstitutional Law. 
We will end our cause by raising a question which perhaps 
in your opinion ought to have been raised and discussed  long 
ago, namely, How are we to define constitutional law ?  I have 
thought it best to postpone the discussion  until  this our  last 
moment, because  it  seems  to me  that we  cannot  profitably 
define a departmellt  of law  until  we  already  know  a good 
deal of  its  contents.  I hope  that  I  do not  undervalue  that 
study of  general jurisprudence which holds the first place in 
the programme of  the law tripos ; still you  will  by  this time 
have learnt enough to know that a classification of  legal rules 
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which  suits  the law  of  one  country  and  one  age  will  not 
necessarily suit the law of  another country or of  another age. 
One may  perhaps  force the rules  into  the  scheme  that  we 
have  prepared  for  them,  but  the  scheme  is  not  natural  or 
convenient.  Only those  who  know  a good  deal  of  English 
law  are really  entitled  to have  any opinion  as to the limits 
of  that  part  of  the  law  which  it  is  convenient  to  call 
constitutional. 
Now my first remark must be that this question  is  on  the 
whole a question of  convenience.  It is  not to be  solved by 
ariy appeal to authority.  The phrase, constitutional law, is of 
course a very common phrase, but it is not a technical  phrase 
of  English law.  I am not aware that it has ever been used in 
the statute book  or  that  any judge  has  ever set himself  to 
define  it.  If  we  had  a  code  which  called  itself  a code  of 
constitutional  law,  then  the definition  might  be  a matter of 
authority, it would be thrust upon  us  by the legislature;  but 
we  have nothing of  the sort, and are therefore free to consider 
what definition would  be  convenient  and conformable to the 
ordinary usage of  the term. 
Now  there is  one use  of  the  word  constitutional  which 
we  must  notice  in  order  that  we  may  put  it  on  one  side. 
Occasionally  it  is  contrasted  with  legal :  we  are  told  for 
example that a minister's conduct was legal but  not constitu- 
tional.  We have seen  that our  rules  of law  touching public 
affairs  are  very  intimately  connected  with  rules  touching 
public  affairs which  are  not  rules  of  law,  rules  which  are 
sometimes called rules of  constitutional morality, or constitu- 
tional practice, the custonis of  the constitution, the conventions 
of the constitution, or again constitutional understandings.  It 
is to a breach of  rules of  this latter class, rules which are not 
rules of  law, that we refer when we say that a man's  cor~duct 
though legal was not  constitutional.  He has  broken  no rule 
of  law, but he has  broken  some rule of  constitutional usage, 
some  convention  of  the constitution:  no  court  of  law  will 
punish  hirn  or take any notice  of his  misdoing, still he has 
broken a rule which is generally kept and which in the opinion 
ofpeople in general ought not to be broken.  But this usage of 
the word can hardly help us when  our object  is  to determine Constitutional History  Austin's  View 
what part of the law is to be called constitutional ; it merely 
tells us  that according to common opinion  certain rules  are 
constitutional which are not rules of  law. 
Now I will place before you  two accredited  definitions  or 
descriptions of constitutional law ; the one comes from Austin, 
the other from  Professor Holland.  Austin's opinion will  be 
found  in  a  note at the  end of  the  Ozrtfine of  the  Course  of 
Leciztf*esl.  Having defined 'public law' as the law of political 
conditions, he subdivides 'public law' into 'constitutional law' 
and 'administrative law' ; and he writes thus : ' In a country 
governed  by  a  monarch,  constitutional  law  is  extremely 
simple : for  it  merely determines the person  who  shall  bear 
the sovereignty.  In a country governed  by a  number, con- 
stitutional law is more complex : for it determines the persons 
or the classes of persons who shall bear the sovereign powers ; 
and  it  determines  moreover  the mode wherein  such persons 
shall share those powers.  In a country governed by a monarch, 
constitutional  law  is  positive  morality merely:  in  a  country 
governed  by  a  number,  it  may consist  of  positive  morality, 
or of  a  compound  of  positive  morality  and  positive  law. 
'Administrative  law  determines  the  ends  and  modes  to 
and in  which the sovereign powers  shall be exercised : shall 
be exercised  directly  by  the  monarch  or  sovereign number, 
or  shall  be  exercised  directly  by  the  subordinate  political 
superiors to whom portions of  those powers  are delegated or 
committed in trust. 
'The  two  departments  therefore  of  constitutional  and 
administrative  law  do not  quadrate  exactly  with  the  two 
departments  of  law  which  regard  respectively  the stands  of 
the sovereign  and the various status of  subordinate  political 
superiors.  Though the  rights  and  d~tties  of  the latter  are 
comprised  by administrative law, and are not comprised  by 
constitutional law,  administrative law  colnprises  the powers 
of  the sovereign  in  so far  as they are exercised  directly by 
the monarch or sovereign  number. 
&In  so far  as the powers  of  the sovereign  are delegated 
to political  subordioates, administrative  law  is  positive  law, 
whether  the  country  be  governed  by  a  monarch  or by  a 
sovereign  number.  In so  far  as the sovereign  powers  are 
exercised  by the sovereign directly, administrative law  in  a 
country governed by a  monarch  is  positive morality merely : 
in a country governed by a number it may consist of  positive 
morality, or of  a compound of  positive morality and positive 
law.' 
Let  us  try to make this  clearer by examples.  The one 
object of  constitutional law, according to Austin, is  to define 
the sovereign.  In a monarchical state it is  extremely simple 
and  is  not  in  the strict sense law.  Thus on a  subsequent 
page  Austin  says that from  the days of  Richelieu  to those 
of  the great Revolution the king of  France was  sovereign in 
France'.  'But  in  the  same country, and  during the same 
period, a traditional maxim cherished by the courts of justice 
and rooted  in  the affections of  the bulk of  the people deter- 
mined  the succession  to the throne : it determined  that the 
throne, on the demise of an actual occupant, should invariably 
be taken  by the person  who then might happen  to be  heir 
to it agreeably to the canon of  inheritance which  was named 
the  Salic  law.'  This  then,  in  his  opinion, was  the  whole 
substance of  the constitutional law  of  France: the heir male 
of  S.  Louis  is  to be  sovereign,  and  in  the  strictest  sense 
this  was  no  rule  of  law,  it  was  only  a  rule  of  positive 
morality.  Austin's view, as you  probably  know, is  that in a 
monarchical state the succession to the throne cannot be fixed 
by law, positive law : when the king dies law dies with him ; 
sovereignty is not a matter of  law, it is a matter of  fact : the 
people by accepting, tacitly accepting, Louis XV  on the death 
of Louis XIV  obey no law; they raise up a new sovereign; the 
rule which  they observed  in accepting the great-grandson of 
the late king was no rule of law ; they would  have broken no 
law, had  they instead  accepted  a  bastard  or a  foreigner  or 
anyone else.  In such a case constitutional law  then  consists 
of  some simple  rule,  probably  some canon  of  descent,  and 
even  that is  not in  strictness law. 
As to administrative law in a monarchical state; it defines 
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the powers of the sovereign  and the powers  of  the political 
subordinates.  In so far  as it  deals  with  the  powers  of  the 
sovereign, it  is  not  in  strictness  law: no  law  can  limit  the 
powers of the sovereign.  If  it be generally expected by the 
French nation  that Louis XIV will  only exercise his  powers 
in these or those ways this expectation can constitute no rule 
of  law, it can at best give rise to positive morality.  But as to 
political subordinates-ministers,  judges, intendants-the  rules 
which, for the time being, define who  they shall be and what 
powers they shall have, will be true rules of law-positive  law- 
though rules which the sovereign monarch might at any time 
abolish.  This then is the sphere of administrative law. 
But turn from France of  the eighteenth century to England 
of  our own  day.  Constitutional  law determines the persons 
or the classes of persons who shall bear the sovereign powers ; 
it  determines,  moreover,  the  mode  wherein  those  persons 
shall share those powers.  Now Austin himself had, as I dare- 
say you know, a curious doctrine about the sovereignty of this 
realm; instead of  holding that the sovereign body consisted of 
the king, the lords and the representatives  of  the commons 
assembled  in  parliament,  he  held  that  it  consisted  of  the 
king, the lords  and the electors: he treats the members  of 
the  House  of  Commons as mere  delegates  of  the electors. 
This seems to me a singularly profitless speculation.  Suppose 
that the present parliament were to make a statute contrary 
to the strongest wishes and well-founded expectations of those 
who  elected  it ; doubtless  that  statute would  be  law;  the 
courts  would  treat it as law  and would  not  for one  instant 
permit a suggestion that parliament had exceeded its powers 
by betraying (if  you  will)  the trust that was  imposed  in  it. 
I  am obliged to notice  this  point  in passing, but  it is of  no 
very great importance to us at the present moment; for which- 
ever view we take, whether Austin's which places sovereignty 
in  king, lords and electors, or the commoner and saner view 
which places it in king and parliament, the mass of  rules that 
will be covered by his definition of  constitutional  law will  be 
much  the same.  It is to determine the persons  who  shall, 
bear the sovereign powers and the mode wherein those persons 
shall share those powers.  It must determine then, in  the first 
place, who is to be king.  The act which settled the succession 
to the throne on the heirs of the body of the electress Sophia, 
being Protestants, is clearly a part of constitutional law.  The 
rule that a king will forfeit his crown by  marrying a Papist is 
clearly a rule of  constitutional  law.  Whatever law we  have 
as to regencies will  be constitutional law.  Then all the law 
as to the composition of  the House of Lords will be constitu- 
tional  law.  Again  all  the  law  as  to  the  qualifications  of 
voters for members of  the House of Commons must  in  any 
case be constitutional  law.  Accepting the ordinary  doctrine 
that our sovereign  body consists of king and parliament, all 
the law as to the qualifications  of members of the House of 
Commons will be constitutional; but Austin, I think, can hardly 
include it within his definition, for according to him  it is not 
the representatives but the represented who  form part  of  the 
sovereign body, and the rules  as to how  many delegates  the 
electors may choose, and  what  must  be  the qualification  of 
those  delegates, would  seem  to be  no  part  of the law  that 
defines the composition of the sovereign body.  But any way 
you  will  see that Austin's  definition  of  constitutional  law is 
very  narrow:  it  only  includes  those  rules  which  determine 
the compositioll of  the sovereign  body.  All rules  as to the 
appointment  and powers  of  officers  who  are  subordinate to 
the sovereign are excluded : they are relegated to the depart- 
ment of  administrative law.  Thus Austin's constitutional law 
would,  I  take it, say nothing  of the  Privy  Council, of  the 
Treasury,  of  the  Secretaries  of  State,  of  the judges,  still 
less  of  justices  of  the peace,  poor  law  guardians,  boards  of 
health, policemen : all these are topics  not  of  constitutional 
but of administrative law.  Even the procedure of the sovereign 
body itself  is a topic not of  constitutional but  of administra- 
tive law. 
For my own part, I regard this definition as far too narrow, 
by which I mean that it excludes a very great deal of what is 
ordinarily  called  constitutional  law,  and  most  certainly  any 
student set to study constitutional law would  be  ill-advised if 
he  were  to  trust that his  examiners  would  not  go  beyond 
Austin's  definition.  To take  one  instance;  the  question 
whether  the  king has power  to tax without  the consent  of Consti  tu  f ional Hisf  ory  View 
parliament would  be  very  generally  treated  as a grave  and 
typical  question  of  constitutional  law, but  it  does  not  fall 
within  Austin's  definition ; it  might  be  admitted  that  the 
sovereign power was possessed by king and parliament, or by 
king, lords and electors in certain shares, and yet the question 
would  be  possible  whether  law  gave  the  king  a  power  of 
imposing  customs  duties. 
Let us  turn to Professor  Holland.  Having divided  law 
into public and private, he subdivides public law into six de- 
partments, the first  of  which he calls constitutional and the 
second administrative.  Of constitutional law he writes thus1 : 
'  The primary function of constitutional  law is to ascertain 
the political centre of gravity of any given state.  It  announces 
in  what  portion  of  the whole  is  to  be  found  the 'internal 
sovereignty,'  'suprema fotestas,' 'Staatsgewalt,'  or as Aristotle 
called it, 72,  ~C;~LOV  r;jq ~6.X~oq.  In other words it defines the 
form of government.'  '  The definition of  the sovereign power 
in a state necessarily  leads to the consideration  of  its  com- 
ponent  parts.. ..It prescribes  the order  of  succession  to the 
throne, or, in  a  Republic, the mode  of  electing a  President. 
It enumerates  the  prerogatives  of  the  king  or  other  chief 
magistrate.  It regulates  the composition  of  the Council  of 
State, and  of  the  Upper  and  Lower  Houses  of  Assembly, 
when  the  assembly is  thus  divided;  the mode  in  which  a 
seat is acquired  in  the Upper  House, whether by succession, 
by nomination, or  by tenure of  office,  the mode  of  electing 
members of  the House of  Representatives; the powers  and 
privileges of  the assembly as a whole, and of  the individuals 
who compose it and the machinery of  law-making.  It deals 
also  with  the  ministers,  their  responsibility  and  their  re- 
spective spheres of action; the government  offices and their 
organization ; the armed forces of  the State, their control and 
the mode  in  which  they are recruited;  the relation,  if  any, 
between  Church and  State ; the judges and their immunities; 
the relations between the mother country and its colonies and 
dependencies.  It describes the portions of the earth's surface 
over which the sovereignty of  the state extends, and defines 
the persons  who  are subject  to its authority.  It comprises, 
therefore, rules  for the ascertainment of  nationality,  and for 
regulating the acquisition of  a new nationality by naturaliza- 
tion.  It declares the rights of  the state over its subjects  in 
respect of their liability to military conscription, to service as 
jurymen  and otherwise ....  The contents  of the constitutional 
branch of law may be illustrated by reference to a draft piece 
of legislation, which enters far more  into detail than is usual 
in such undertakings.  The draft Political Code of  the State 
of New York  purports to be divided into four parts, whereof 
"The first declares what  persons compose the people  of  the 
State, and the political rights and duties of  all persons subject 
to  its  jurisdiction;  the  second  defines  the  territory  of  the 
State and its civil  divisions ; the third relates to the general 
government  of  the State, the functions of  its  public  officers, 
its public  ways, its general police and civil polity ; the fourth 
relates to the local government of  counties, cities, towns and 
villages." ' 
Now this can hardly be called a definition of  constitutional 
law, rather  it  is  a  string of  particulars.  I  have  no  doubt, 
however, that Professor Holland has general usage on his side 
in giving the term a far wider meaning than that which Austin 
put upon it.  But he has to meet this difficulty,  that he includes 
so  much  under  constitutional  law  that  he  seems  to  leave 
little  to  come  under  his  head  of  administrative  law.  His 
general idea, however, is given  in  these words: 'The various 
organs of the sovereign power are described by constitutional 
law as at rest; but  it is also necessary  that they should  be 
considered as in motion, and that the manner of their activity 
should  be  prescribed  in  detail.  The branch of law that does 
this  is  called  administrative law, ' Vemaftungsrecht"  in  the 
widest  sense of  the word1.'  I think that we  catch his idea if 
we  say that,  while  constitutional  law  deals  with  structure, 
administrative  law  deals  with  function.  If  this  idea  were 
pursued,  then  constitutional  law  would  tell  us  how  a  king 
comes to be  king, and  how  he can  cease to be  king, how a 
man  comes to be  a peer of  the realm, when, where and how 
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men  are elected  to the House of  Commons, how  parliament 
is summoned, prorogued, dissolved, how  men  become  privy 
councillors, secretaries of  state, judges, justices  of  the peace, 
aldermen, poor law guardians-for  constitutional law deals not 
only with  the structure of  the sovereign  body, but  also with 
the structure  of  inferior  bodies  possessing  legal  powers  of 
central or  local government.  But if  we  ask  what  can these 
bodies  and  these  officers  do, what  are their  functions,  then, 
according to the general idea, we  should be sent to adminis- 
trative law; thus, if  we  ask what  are the royal  prerogatives, 
what  are the  privileges  of  the  House  of  Commons,  what 
powers has a secretary of state, a justice of  the peace, a town 
councillor.  But if, with  this idea before  us, we attempted  to 
state the law of England, or, I should imagine, the law of any 
other country, we  should probably find  ourselves involved in 
many  difficulties.  For  instance,  it  is  certainly  the duty of 
constitutional law to state how, when, and by whom, parliament 
can be summoned and prorogued.  Attempting to do this, we 
immediately  find  ourselves  describing  one  of  the  king's 
prerogatives.  It is certainly the duty of constitutional law to 
define the composition of the House of Lords, but immediately 
we have to state another of the king's prerogatives-the  power 
of making peers.  So  again, if we have to describe the structure 
of the ministry, we must  deal with the functions of  the king 
in appointing and  dismissing  ministers; while  if we  descend 
to inferior organs, such as municipal corporations and boards 
of  guardians, we shall have to speak freely of the functions of 
the local government  board  and the secretaries of  state.  In 
short, it is impossible to describe the structure of  some organs 
without describing the functions of others, for it is among the 
most important functions of some organs, especially the higher, 
to determine the structure of  other organs.  Thus, taking the 
view  that  constitutional  law  deals with  structure, not  with 
function, we  still  cannot  get through  our  constitutional  law 
without describing very many functions of the highest organs ; 
we  have,  for  instance, to  describe  many  of  the  royal  pre- 
rogatives, the functions of the king.  The question then arises 
whether it is convenient  to break  up so important a topic as 
the royal prerogatives, in order to deal with  some parts of  it 
under the heading of constitutional law, and to relegate other 
parts to various sub-heads of administrative law. 
Professor  Holland  is alive to the inconvenience  of  such a 
course of procedure.  He  expressly includes an enumeration of 
the king's  prerogatives under  constitutional  law, also  he  in- 
cludes under the same head the whole topic of  parliamentary 
privileges, and I venture to think that he is right  in  so doing. 
A book  on  constitutional  law, which  did not deal with royal 
prerogatives  and privileges of  parliament, would, I  think, be 
generally  considered  as worse  than  imperfect.  This  brings 
him to abandon, for the sake of  convenience, the general idea 
with  which  he  started, namely, that constitutional law deals 
with  structure, and  administrative  law  with  function.  His 
ultimate  opinion  seems  to be  that  constitutional  law  deals 
with  structure  and  with  the  broader  rules  which  regulate 
function, while the details of  function  are left to administra- 
tive law. 
So far as I am aware, this is in  accordance with  common 
usage, though we certainly use the term constitutional law now 
in a wider and now in  a narrower sense, and we shall look in 
vain for any such term as administrative law in  our orthodox 
English  text-books.  Rut  I  may illustrate  the difficulty  of 
drawing convenient lines.  It would be generally allowed that 
the law as to parliamentary elections is a most important part 
of  constitutional law: that, for instance, the extension of  the 
county franchise,  from  the  40  shilling  freeholders  to many 
other classes, constituted a great change in  our constitutional 
law.  Then again  it would  be allowed  that the introduction 
of  the ballot was another great change-that  members of  the 
House of  Commons are elected by secret voting is, I take it, 
distinctly a rule of  constitutional law.  But then our law has 
minute provisions as to how the registers of voters are to be 
made up and revised, and again it has minute provisions as to 
the conduct  of  the election, the custody of  the voting papers 
and so forth ; in  order to secure secrecy it descends to very 
small details.  Now shall we call all these small rules, rules of 
constitutional  law?  Would  our  code  of  constitutional  law 
describe  all  the  duties  of  revising  barristers  and  returning 
officers ?  That, I think, is a question of  convenience, a ques- Restr Zts  not StrztggZes  Constitu  t  ioutnl History 
tion which the maker of a complete code of English law would 
have  to  consider  very  carefully,  but  still  a  question  of 
convenience, a question to be solved by the art of  draftsman- 
ship.  One of the points that he would have to consider would 
be the desirability of avoiding repetitions.  Very possibly he 
would  find  it convenient to bring under the head of constitu- 
tional  law  the  broad  rules  which  settle the qualification  of 
electors, and leave the details as to the making and revision 
of the registers to come under some chapter of  administrative 
law.  Very possibly he would find it convenient to state, as a 
rule  of constitutional  law, that elections are to be made by 
secret voting, and to place  the description of  the process  of 
election,  the  rules  which  regulate  the conduct  of  returning 
officers, under some chapter of administrative law. 
In  this  country  such  questions  would  be  questions  of 
convenience, because  our  constitutional  law  has  no  special 
sanctity.  It would  not be  so everywhere.  Some countries 
have  constitutions which  cannot be  altered  by the ordinary 
legislature.  In  such  countries  it  is,  of  course,  a  fact  of 
immense importance that a particular rule is, or is not, a rule 
of  the  constitutioll ; if  it  is  not, it  can  be  repealed  by the 
legislative  assembly, if  it is, then to repeal it may require an 
appeal to the people, or there may be no recognized mode of 
repealing it at all.  But here in England that part of  the law 
which  we  call  constitutional  has  no special  sanctity.  The 
hours, during which  an election  may be  held, are fixed  by 
statute, the  succession  to  the  throne  is  fixed by  statute; 
neither  the  one  nor  the other could  be  altered  except  by 
statute, but  the  same statute  might  alter  both, the one as 
easily as the other.  So, I repeat it once more, the demarcation 
of  the province  of  constitutional  law is  with  us  a  matter of 
convenience.  I do not think that we  have any theory about 
it  which  can  claim  to  be  called  orthodox.  I  think  that 
Austin's  definition  is  decidedly  too  narrow.  I  think  that 
Professor  Holland's  description  is  fairly conformable to our 
ordinary usage, but that the line between  the constitutional 
and the administrative departments  is  one which  it  is  very 
hard  to draw. 
And  as  with  constitutional  law  so  with  constitutional 
history.  This title was,  I  believe, a  new  one when  Hallam 
chose it for his great work, and it was liable to misconstruction. 
By this time it is well rooted in our language, but there seems 
to be no great room for difference of opinion as to its meaning. 
But I think that we  can see a  steady tendency, very manifest 
in the great work of Stubbs, to widen the scope of the term in 
one direction, to narrow  it in  another.  On the one hand we 
no longer  conceive that the historian  of  our constitution has 
done his duty when he has told us of  kings and parliaments ; 
at least, as regards early times, we expect him to speak of the 
courts of law, of  the sheriffs, of  local government, of hundred 
courts and county courts.  On the other hand  we expect him 
to give us a history of  results, rather than a history of efforts 
and projects.  If we look at May's hook we find it to be  to a 
large  extent a  history  of  efforts  and  projects:  it  is  full  of 
proposals  to alter the law, of  the strife between  Whigs and 
Tories--the  struggle  over  the  Reform  Bill  for  example. 
Some people seem to think that a bill loses all its importance 
at the very  moment  when  it becomes law, that it ceases to 
be  a  subject  for  constitutional history, or indeed  for  history 
of  any kind, when  the  last  division  has  been  taken.  But 
that surely is a  perverse view, and I hope that it is becoming 
an old-fashioned  view:  political struggles are important, but 
chiefly  because  they alter  the  law.  Constitutional  history 
should,  to  my mind,  be  a  history,  not  of  parties,  but  of 
institutions, not of  struggles, but of results ; the struggles are 
evanescent, the results  are permanent.  That is, I  think, the 
view  taken  by the latest and greatest of  the historians of  our 
constitution, and  I  hope  the day may come when  someone 
will take up the tale where  Stubbs has dropped it, and bring 
the  history  of  our  constitution down  to modern  days, as a 
history of  institutions, a  history of  one great department  of 
law, and  of  its  actual  working. 
It will perhaps occur to you that I am making an apology, 
for I have spoken a great deal about modern statutes, and not 
a word of Whigs and Tories, Liberals and Conservatives.  Well, 
I know that a great many apologies might be required of me, 
but not, I  think, for  this.  I  have  been  trying to turn your 
thoughts  away  from  what  I  think  to be  an  obsolete  and Colzstitu  f  ional History 
inadequate  idea  of  the province  of  constitutional  history,  I 
have been asking you to set your faces towards the rising sun. 
And the sun will rise, not a doubt of it. 
The  practical  application  of  these  remarks  should  be 
obvious.  The student who  is  set  to read  English  constitu- 
tional  law  will, if  he  be  prudent,  take  a  wide  view  of  his 
subject.  Even  if  his  sole  object  be to obtain  marks  in  an 
examination, he  will  do well  to recognize the fact  that the 
limits of  constitutional law are not strictly defined, and that 
his  examiners may  not  be  disposed  to make them  narrow. 
And when  he is asked to study constitutional history as well 
as constitutional law, the expedience of  wide reading will  be 
the more apparent.  Regarding the matter historically we may 
say that there is hardly any department of  law which does not, 
at one time or another, become of  constitutional  importance. 
Go back for a moment to the Middle Ages.  If we are to learn 
anything  about  the  constitution  it  is  necessary  first  and 
foremost  that  we  should  learn  a good  deal  about the land 
law.  We can  make no  progress  whatever  in  the history of 
parliament  without  speaking  of  tenure,  indeed  our  whole 
constitutional law seems at times to be but an appendix to the 
law of  real property.  It would be disastrous therefore, as well 
as stupid advice, were I to tell you that you could  read  con- 
stitutional history without studying land law-you  cannot do 
this, no one can do it.  And then again, turn to the seventeenth 
century and the great struggle between king and parliament ; 
this truly is a constitutional  struggle in  the strictest sense of 
the word, it  is  a struggle for  sovereigrlty, but  how  can  you 
study  it  without  knowing  something  of  criminal  law  and 
criminal  procedure?  At more than  one moment  the whole 
history of  England  seems to depend  on what it is possible to 
describe as a detail of criminal procedure-the  question whether 
He is committed to prison pele  speciale ma~zdatufn  domilzi regis,' 
is or is not a good return to a writ of  habeas corpus.  How can 
we  form  any opinion  about  that question  unless we  know 
something about the ordinary course of  criminal  procedure ? 
A  modern  code-maker  would  very  possibly  not  put  the 
provisions  of  the Habeas  Corpus Act  into that  part of  the 
code which dealt with constitutional law-he  would keep it for 
U~ity  of  the  Low 
the part which dealt with criminal procedure-still  we can see 
that the history of  the writ  is very truly part of the history of 
our  constitution;  if  the  king  had  been  able  to commit  to 
prison  without  giving any reason, he would  have had  at his 
command  a  potent  engine  for  controlling  parliament,  and 
might have succeeded in  his effort to make himself an absolute 
monarch. 
I  have  some  little  fear  lest  the  study  of  what  we  call 
general  jurisprudence  may lead  you  to take a  false view of 
law.  Writers on general jurisprudence  are largely concerned 
with the classification of  legal rules.  This is a very important 
task,  and  to  their  efforts  we  owe  a  great  deal-it  is  most 
desirable that law should be clearly stated according to some 
rational and logical scheme.  But do not get into the way of 
thinking  of  law  as  consisting of  a  number  of  independent 
compartments, one of  which is labelled constitutional, another 
administrative, another criminal, another property, so that you 
can learn the contents of  one compartment, and know nothing 
as to what is in the others.  No, law is a body, a living  body, 
every member of  which  is connected with  and depends upon 
every  other member.  There is  no  science which  deals with 
the foot, or  the hand, or  the heart.  Science deals with the 
body as a whole, and with  every part of  it  as related  to the 
whole.  Who,  at  this  moment,  can  vote  in  parliamentary 
elections?  Begin answering that question, and you  begin  to 
talk  about  freeholders,  copyholders,  leaseholders;  but  you 
cannot  talk  about  them  with  much  intelligence  unless  you 
understand some real property law.  Life I know is short, and 
law  is  long,  very  long,  and we  cannot  study everything at 
once; still, no good  comes of  refusing  to see  the truth, and 
the truth is that all parts of  our law are very closely related 
to each other, so closely that we can set no logical limit to our 
labours. APPENDIX 
By the Parliament  Act of  191  I (I and z Geo. V, c.  13) it 
is  provided 
I.  That  if  a  Money  Bill  (subsequently  defined  as 'a 
Public Bill which in the opinion of  the Speaker of  the House 
of  Commons contains only provisions dealing with all or the 
following subjects '-a  list follows) is sent up to the House of 
Lords at least one month before the end of  the session and 
is  not  passed  by  the  House of  Lords  without  amendment 
within  one  month  after  it is  sent  up, the Bill  shall, unless 
the House of Commons direct the contrary, be presented to 
the King  and  become  an  Act  of  Parliament  on the Royal 
Assent  being  signified  notwithstanding  that  the  House  of 
Lords have not  consented  to the Bill. 
2.  That if  any Public Bill  (other than a Money Bill or 
a  Bill  containing  any  provision  to  extend  the  maximum 
duration  of  Parliament  beyond  five  years)  is passed  by the 
House of  Commons in  three successive sessions (whether of 
the same Parliament or not) and having been  sent up to the 
House of  Lords at least  one month  before  the end  of  the 
session is  rejected  by  the  House  of  Lords in  each of  those 
sessions, the Bill  shall on  its rejection  a  third  time  by  the 
House  of  Lords, unless  the House  of  Commons  direct  the 
contrary, be  presented  to the  King and  become an  Act of 
Parliament  on  the  Royal  Assent  being  signified  thereto, 
provided  that two years  have  elapsed  between  the date of 
the second reading in the first of  these sessions in the House 
of  Commons  and the date at which it passes the House of 
Commons in  the third  of  these sessions. 
3.  That a  Bill  shall be deemed  to be rejected  by the 
House of  Lords if  it  is  not  passed  by the House  of  Lords 
either without  amendment or with such amendments only as 
may  be  agreed  to by  both  Houses. 
4.  That the House of  Commons may in  the passage of 
such  a  Bill  through  the  House  in  the  second  and  third 
sessions suggest amendments  without  inserting them  in  the 
Bill.  If these amendments  are  agreed  to by  the  House of 
Lords, they  shall  be  treated  as amendments  made  by the 
House of Lords and agreed to by the House of Commons. 
5.  That the duration  of  Parliament  should  be  reduced 
from seven  to five  years. 
The general effect of these provisions is (I) to deprive the 
House  of  Lords  altogether  of  its  power  of  amending  or 
rejecting  Money Bills, (2)  to restrict the House of  Lords to 
a suspensive veto in  respect of Bills (other than Money Bills 
or Bills  to prolong  the duration  of  Parliament), as may be 
passed by the House of Commons in three successi.re sessions 
during the first two years of  Parliament,  (3)  to enable  the 
country  to  pronounce  more  rapidly  upon  the action  of  a 
ministry  so  passing  bills  into  statutes  in  defiance  of  the 
opposition  of  the Second  Chamber. INDEX. 
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Edward IV,  174,  178,  181,  194,  199, 
?2r.  266 
.  . 
Frankalmoign,  25,  I57 
Freehold,  35-8 
Fyrd,  162 
Gaol Delivery,  140 
George  1, 395,  397 
George 11,  395,  397 
George  111,  395,  397,  409,  494 
George  IV,  408-9 
Gesith, 56,  146 
Glanvill,  7,  13,  18,  22,97,  103,  111, 
115,  124,  156 
Gloucester,  Statute of,  132, 205 
Grand Assize,  I I?,  I24 
Grand  Jury,  21  1-12,  474-5,  and  See  - - - , -  - - 
Edward  VI, 239,  249  Jury 
Elections (Parliamentary), 173-4;  Dis-  Grand  Sergeanty,  30 
puted,  247-8,  291,  370-1  Great Officers of  State,  390-1,  428-30 
Electoral districts,  362-3  Guardians of  the Poor,  4y7-8 
Eliot,  Sir John,  231,  242,  3149  321 
Elizabeth,  238-9,  242,  249,  2569  261, 
263,  267,  325,  512 
Enlistment,  452-3 
Equity,  221-6,  466-71 
Escheats,  29-30,  1  I I 
Estates of  the Realm,  74-90,  181-2 
Ethelbert,  I, 2 
Ethelred  the Unready,  98,  127 
Evidence, 469-70,  503 
Exchequer,  13,  63,  68,  133,  1.35, 
209-10 
Excise,  434-7 
Excommunication,  524 
Executive  and  Leg~slative,  415-8,  430 
Ex~ulsion  from  House  of  Conlmons, 
372 
Eyre, Articles  of  the,  127,  137-8 
Eyre, Governor,  492 
Felony,  I 10-1,  229-30,  478 
Fenwick, Sir J.,  319,  386 
Ferrer's  case,  244 
Feudal  Courts,  105-6,  151 
Feudal  Revenues,  433-4 
Feudalism,  23-4,  38-9,  57,  141-64 
Finch,  C.  J.,  299,  300 
Finch, H., Lord Nottlngham, 312, 466 
Fines on  alienation,  29 
Fitzharris case,  317 
Fitzwalter Barony,  82 
Five  Mile  Act, 515 
Flambard,  R.,  160 
Floyd's  case,  244,  245 
Folkland,  57,  93,  146-7,  150, 431 
Forests,  13 
Habeas Corpus Act, 314-5,  477;  w~I., 
271-5:  313-41  324,  3789  538 
Hale,  Sir  M.,  19,  260,  419 
Hall's  case,  244 
Harold,  Election of,  59,  60 
Haxey's  case,  241 
Henry I, 8, 9,  10, 53, 60, 63,  97,  1371 
I 59-60 
Henry 11, IO-I~,~I,  66-7,  109, 111-13, 
124,  137,  162-3,  333 
Henry  111,  14-18,  70-1,  91,  95,  97, 
102-4,  133,  134,  2001 482 
Henry  IV,  182,  184,  191-2,  217 
Henry V, 173, 178, 192,  201,  21 7,  278 
Henry VI,  173-4,  178,  193-4,  200-1, 
216 
Henry VII,  178,  181,  183,  195,  200, 
202,  219-20,  333 
Henry VIII, 227, 239,  z48, 251-3,2.i6, 
258,  263,  264-5,  286-7,  3309  334, 
3479  511 
Heresy,  509,  515-6,  522 
Heriot,  148,  159-60 
High Steward, see  Lord High 
Highway  Boards,  499 
Hlothar,  z 
Hobbes, T.,  297-8 
Holland, T.  H.,  528,  532-5 
Steward 
~om~e,  26 
Home Secretary,  410-1 
Horne Tooke,  513 
Hubert  de Burgh,  133,  200 
Hundred,  44,  493,  500 
Hundred Court,  44-6,  105-6,  132 
Hundred  Rolls,  88 
Impeachment,  215,  z45,  31 7-8,  322, 
3273  477,  480 
Inlpositions,  258-9,  306-8 
Impressment,  280, 453,  461-2 
Indemnity,  Acts of,  386-7 
India,  41 I 
Indictable Otlences,  230-1 
Indictment,  109-10,  128-31,  213, 474- 
57 480 
Ine,  z 
Infant  and  Incapable Kings,  344-6 
Inquest of  Sheriffs,  41 
Inquest  (Frankish), 7,  9,  121-2 
Inquest  (Norman), I 22-4 
Ireland,  Parliament  of,  333-5 ; repre- 
sentation  of,  290;  Union  of,  335-6, 
349-5 I 
Irish  Peers,  350-1 
Itinerant  Justices,  43,  63,  69,  127-8, 
137-41,  210 
James 1, 238, 239, 243, 250,253, 261-2, 
268-71,  279,  331 
James 11, 283-5,  287, 291,  304-6,  312, 
328-9 
Jews,  365-7,  506 
John, 68,  939  97,  103,  I341  333 
Judges  summoned  to Parliament,  84 ; 
independence  of,  3 12-3,  478-9 
Judicature  Act  of  1875, 471 
Juries,  independence  of,  3 15-6 
jury,  7,  13,  71,  112, 115-31,  211-13, 
2199  23'3-1,  468,  47% 474-5,  503 
Justice,  Administration of, 105-41,  162- 
3,  204-26,  311-20,  462-84 ; High 
Court  of,  464,  471-2 
Justices of the Peace, 206-9,  z 18, 231-3, 
2359  486-9,  493-9 
Justiciar,  63,  91,  133 
Keeper of  the Privy Seal,  203 
Kentish  Laws,  I,  2,  6 ; Custom  of 
Borough,  English,  37 
Kingship, origin of,  55-60;  hereditary 
character  of,  97-8 ; conception  of, 
98-100;  legal  theory  of,  100-105 ; 
powers  of,  195-9;  constitution  of, 
281-8;  after  1689,  343-6;  depend- 
ence on ministers,  3923; new  sta- 
tutory powers  of,  399 ;  classification 
of powers,  422-30 
King's  Bench,  69,  133-5,  209-10 
King's  Court, 61-4,  105-41 
King's  Peace:  108-10,  197 
King's  seals,  202-3 
Knights of  the  Shire, 71-5,  81,  85-8, 
172-3,  291-2 
Knight's  service,  25-30,  157-8 
Lambard, W.,  232,  236,  493 
Lancastrian  view  of  the  Constitution, 
198-9 
Landrecht,  Land-system,  I 56  23-39,  see  Feudalism 
Laud.  Archbishop,  286,  319 
Law Officers,  481; sphere of,  505-6 
Leges  E~fwar,dr  Confessoris, 8,  10,  108 
Leges Henrici Prinzi, 8, ro,  70-1,  107- 
8,  I 10, 169 
Leges  Willelp~zi  himi, 8, ro 
Legislation,  source  of,  96 ; develop- 
ment  of,  18430; for  dependenc~es, 
337-8;  change in character of, 383-7; 
indistinct  sphere  of,  196 
Lehnrecht,  I 56 
Lex  Salica,  I,  7,  8 
Life  Peers,  79,  167-8,  348 
Local  Government,  39-54,  204-11, 
232-36,  492-506 ;  Local  Govern- 
ment  Act.  loo-GOO  ,  a,,  "  - 
Local  Government  Board,  384,  412, 
4989  500 
Locke,  John,  290,  291 
London,  5.3,  117,  175, 291,  486-7 
Long Parliament,  282,  293-5,  311-2 
Lord  Hlgh Admiral,  393 
Lord  High  Steward,  Court  of,  170,  . . 
214,  3;8-9 
Lord  High  Treasurer,  135,  220,  392 
Lord  Lieutenant,  234-5,  455-6,  459 
Lord  President  of  the Council.  202  , ". 
Lords, House of, 78-9,  I 36,  I 69, z 13-5, 
238-9,  z45-6,  248,  288-9,  310-1, 
3'6-79  3359  347-51,  473 
Lords of  Appeal, 350-1,  473 
Magisterial  Examination, 477 
Magna Carta, 64, 66, 69, 93, 129, 133, 
138, 160, 169, 172, 183, 313, 333 
Man,  Isle of,  337 
Manor,  47-8,  57 
Manor Court,  48-52,  133 
Markham,  228 
Marlborough, Statute  of,  17,  27,  73 
Marriage  Law,  I I 
Marriage,  Right  of,  28 
Marriage  (Royal)  Act,  344 
Marshall,  The,  266 
Marshall, William,  70,  zoo 
Martial Law,  266-8,  279,  324-5,  328,  .  -  .. - 
490-2 
Mary,  239,  249,  267 
Melville's  case,  477 
Merchant  Guild,  53 
Metropolitan  Police,  487 
Middlesex,  Sheriffs  of,  375,  378 
Militia,  162,  234-5,  276-9,  325-6, Index  546  Idex 
Ministerial  Responsibility,  20.3, 393-4,  Petition of  Right, The, 293,  307, 313, 
396,  484 ; system,  i68-9 i  offices, 
403 
Ministry,  380 
Minorities,  200-2 
Misdemeanours,  230-1,  478,  488 
Mompesson,  Sir G.,  246 
Monasteries,  5  I I 
Money-Bills,  origination  of,  182,  247, 
310-1 
Monopolies,  260-1 
Montfort,  see  Simon 
Afu~zdb~yce,  108 
Municipal  Reform,  359-60,  495-7 ; 
Corporations,  Act  of  1882,  413-4 
MZLT~YU?~,  46 
Mutiny  Acts,  328-9,  447-8 
National  Debt,  438-42 
Nationality,  34 I 
Naturalization,  384,  426-8 
Navy,  460-2 
Nisi P~ius,  I 39-4  I 
NoZle  proseyui,  303,  48 I 
Norman  Conquest,  6-10,  151-61 
Norman  Law,  7 
Northampton,  Assize  of,  13,  128-9 
Nowell's  case,  247 
Oath-helpers,  I 15-8,  205 
Oaths,  I r 5-6 ; Parliamentary,  364-6 ; 
Privy  Councillors,  400 
Offa,  2 
Ordeal,  18,  I 15, I 19-20,  129-30 
Orders in  Council,  394-5,  405-7,  463, 
496 
Ordinances,  187-8 
Outlawry,  475 
Oxford, Provisions of,  73 
Oyer and  Terminer,  140-1 
Palatine  Earldoms,  qr ;  Counties,  90, 
163,  289?  465 
Pardon,  R~ght  of,  476,  479-80 
Parliament,  16,  20,  21,  64-96,  163, 
166-90,  238-55,  288-97,  337-40, 
347-87 
Parry's  case,  244 
par$  government,  395-7 
Pateshnll,  RI.,  21 
Patey's  case,  324 
Patronage  (royal),  428-30;  (ecclesias- 
tical),  510 
Peacham's  case,  270 
Peerage,  167-72,  288-9,  348-51,  377, 
a:h-7 
p;;agi  Bills,  348 
Peers,  Trial by,  169-71,  214,  318-9 
Petition  of  Right,  482-5 
3279  49' 
Petition,  Right  of,  323 
Petty Jury,  "2-3,  and see  Jury 
Petty  OKences,  231-2 
petty Sergeanty,  30 
Petty  Sessions,  474 
Pipe  Roll,  10 
Placemen,  292,  368 
Placita  Coro?ze, see  Pleas of the Crown 
Pleas  of  the Crown,  107-1 r 
Police  System,  485-92,  502-3 
Poor  Laws,  233, 384,  4x2, 415, 497-9 
Posse  Cornitatus, srr  M~litia 
Possessory  Assizes,  r 24-5,  I 389 
Postmaster-General,  4 I 3 
Poynings'  Law,  333-5 
Pyecipe,  Writ,  100,  I 12-3 
Py~nrzrrzientes  Clause,  78,  166, 240-1 
Pye~rzunire,  Statute of,  218 
Preliminary  Examination,  232-3 
Prerogative,  195-7,  298-301,  342-3, 
418-21,  422-30 
Prime  Minister,  396,  404- 5 
Primer  Seisin,  27-8 
PrimogeniP~re,  37-8,  157 
Privilege, Parliamentary,  240-5,  320-4, 
37430 
Privy  Council,  91,  136,  187-8,  199- 
zoo,  216-19,  221-6,  255-75,  320, 
334? 337,388-909  34-57  400,405-7 ; 
Jud~c~al  Comm~ttee  of, 340,  462-3 
Probate and  Divorce,  I I, 464,  471-2, 
523 
Procedure,  Chancery,  469-7 I 
Procedure,  Legal,  I I 5-31 
Procedure,  Parliamentary,  248 
Proclamations,  256-8,  302 
Proclamations,  Act  of,  253 
Proctors,  73,  77,  166 
Prohibitions,  268-9 
Prosecutions,  48  1-2 
Protestation of  1621,  243 
Provisions of  Oxford,  73 
Provisions,  Papal,  172,  507 
Provisors,  Statute of,  186,  218 
Proxies,  248 
Public  Health Act,  498 
Purveyance,  183,  327 
Quakers,  365,  521 
Qualification (parliament), 291-2,  369- 
70;  (commission of  the peace),  zoy 
Quarter Sessions, 206-9,  231-3,  474-5, 
486-7 
Quia  E?~r$to?-es,  24,  25,  51,  73,  86 
Raleigh,  W.,  zr 
Real and  Personal Property,  37 
Recorders,  497 
Reeve,  47 
Reform,  Parliamentary, 290,  291,  348, 
354-63 
Reformation,  Effects  of,  238,  511-3 
Regency  question,  345-6 
Registration  system,  370 
Reliefs,  27,  159-61 
Religious  disabilities,  364-7,  514-21 
Reporting  (Parliamentary), 376 
Representation, 47,  64-8,  71-2,  ~6~-6, 
362-3 
Resumption,  Acts of,  431-2 
Revenue, royal and national, 92-6,  251, 
43-43. 
Revolution  of  1688,  284-6,  388 
Rex  v.  Broadfoot,  461-2 
Richard  11,  103,  167,  187-8,  191-2, 
~97-8,  241 
Richard  111,  181 
Riot  Act,  489-90 
Rolls,  Master  of,  393,  467 
Roman  Law,  5,  6,  11,  14,  21, 
332 
Royal  Family,  346 
Sac  nnd Soc,  9 
Saladin Tithe,  13, 67 
Salisbury, oath of,  161 
Sanitary  Law, 498 
Scotland, representation of, 290;  union 
with, 331-2,  349, 351 
Scottish  Law,  332 ; peers,  349 
Scutage,  13,  64,  158,  179 
Seals,  202-3,  393-4 
Secretaries of  State,  392,  402-4,  409- 
11,  428,  4543  486-7 
Seisin,  112,  124-5 
Septennial Act,  296,  374 
Shaftesbury's  case,  324 
Sheriff, 40-1,  89,  134,  205,  207,  233- 
43  48.59  504 
Sherlock's  case,  503 
Ship-money case,  298-300,  308 
Shire,  see  County 
Shire Court,  see  County Court 
Shirley's  case,  244 
Shirley  v.  Fag-, 317 
Simon de Montfort,  72-3,  85 
Six Articles,  Act of,  51  I 
Skin~ler  v.  East  India  Co., 3 16 
Slavery,  Abolition of,  339 
Smalley's  case,  244 
Smith, Sir T.,  255,  298 
Socage,  31-2,  35,  150 
Sokemanni,  48 
Soldiers,  legal  position  of,  451,  490, 
and see  Army 
Somerset, Protector,  253-4,  256 
Sovereignty, Theory of,  101-3,  254-5, 
297-301,  482 
Speclal Reserve,  459-60 
Spelman,  Sir H.,  142-3 
Star Chamber,  218-21,  261-~, 274-5, 
3119  3149  316 
Statute, form of,  184-6,  381 ;  evidence 
for, 382; contrasted  with Ordinance, 
186-8;  government by,  382-7,  405-9 
Statute Law,  189-90,  253-4 
Stephen, 9,  10,  11,  12, 60 
Steward's Court, see  Lord High Stew- 
ard 
- 
Stipendiaries,  474 
Stockdale  v.  Hansard,  375-6 
Storie's  case,  244 
Stratford's case,  I 71 
Strode's  case,  242,  321 
Succession  to  Crown,  59-60,  97-100, 
190-5,  252-3,  281-6,  343-6 
Suit of  Court,  48 
Supremacy, Act of,  265, 51%  ; oath of,  . - 
364,  514 
Suspending Power,  3054 
Tacking,  310-1,  399 
Tallage,  94,  96,  179 
Taxation, 64, 66-8,  71-2,  92-6,  174-6, 
179-84,  247,  306-1  1,  430-7,  502 
Temple's  scheme,  389 
Tenths and  Fifteenths,  174,  176 
Tenure,  idea  of,  153 ;  importance  of, 
538-9 
Tenure in  chief,  61,  64,  66,  163 
Termor.  26 
~erritohai  Army,  459-60 
Test Act,  515 
Testament, see  Wills 
Test  and  Corporation  Act, repeal  of, 
366,  520 
Thegns, 56-7,  146-7 
Thegn-service,  147-8 
Tltot~zas  v.  Keg.,  483 
Thorue's  case.  zar 
~01e;ation  ~dt,  gr6 
Tonnage  and  Poundage,  178,  182-3, 
251,  2933  3079  435 
Torture,  131,  221 
Tourn,  see  Turn 
Township,  47,  51-2 
Treason,  59, 148, 226-9,319,  478, 503, 
514 
Treasurer,  see  Lord  High Treasurer 
Treasury,  135, 407-9 
Treaties,  425-6 
Triennial  Acts, 293,  295-6,  373-4 
Trusts,  223-4 
Tudor Monarchy,  237-8 
Turn, the  Sheriff's,  46,  485 Uniformity, Acts  of,  512, 515 
Unions,  see  Poor  Laws 
Uses,  223-4 
Vacarius,  I  r,  I  2 
Vaccination,  504 
Veto,  Royal,  189,  423 
YiZlata, see  Townsh~p 
Villeinage,  33-5,  204 
Wages, attempt to  fix  rate  of,  207-8 
Wages  (Justices), 494 
Wages,  Parliamentary,  I  76, 37  I 
Wales,  representation of,  239, 330 
Wapentake,  44-5 
War and Peace,  423-4 
Wardship,  28 
Warren  Hastings'  case,  318, 477 
Wason v.  Walter,  376 
Ways  and  Means,  Committee  of, 
447 
Wensleydale case,  79, 168, 348 
Wentworth,  Peter,  242 
Westminster,  Parliament  at,  175 ; 
Provisions  of,  17  ; Courts  at,  69 ; 
Statutes  of,  20,  27,  73-4,  139-40, 
272-39  3'5 
Wihtrzed,  2, 6 
Wilkes, John,  372, 410 
Willlam  I,  7, 9, 60-1,  154-8, 161 
William  11,  60,  159-60, 162 
William  111,  283-7,  296-7,  334, 388, 
3953 4231  4s2 
Wllls,  Law  of,  30, 37-8 
Winchester,  Statute of,  162,  276, 279 
Witan,  56, 58-9 
Witnesses,  I  18-9 
Women,  rights of,  82, 364 
Woodstock, Assize  of,  13 
Wool,  Customs on,  180-1 
Wrtt-making  power,  104-5,  1  14, 222 
Wr~t  of Error,. 476 
Wr~t  of  Inquis~tion,  123 
Wr~t  of  Right,  I  I  1-2 
Writ  of  Subpana, 468-9 
Writs of  Summons,  76, 176-7 
Writs of  Trespass,  I  14 
Year-Books,  22, 210 
York and Lgncaster,  192-4 